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“Ben makes Paul even more complicated than he already is.” A colleague minister made this remark in 
her speech at my leave-taking from the Protestantse Gemeente Heeze c.a. Ten years later, I will defend 
the present thesis and hope to present detextification as an approach that will clarify our understanding 
of the letters of Paul. However, experiences with co-readers throughout the years has made it clear to 
me that it takes time before the argument starts making sense. So, I feel urged in this preface to 
forewarn you: as highly trained reader, please, do not underestimate how much your way of thinking is 
based on the media of and fused with the mindset behind text. 
     
The biblical text as text is a given. That is the starting point of this book. For that reason, the 
argumentation centres on detextifying “text” and “reader”/“to read”/“reading.” Nonetheless, several 
incentives to other forms of detextification are provided as well. Related to the functioning of text, 
suggestions are provided for detextifying “meaning,” “interpretation,” “hermeneutics,” and “media.” 
Apparently more severed from text, detextification also sheds light on notions such as “tradition” or 
“theology” and schemes such as “text-context” and “subject-object.” As a next project, I would be 
interested in labouring a detextification of Scripture. More personally, in my work as prison chaplain, I 
have detextified my own practice of preaching. More than just working without text as physical 
artefact in preparing and performing church services, it has radically changed my view of the Bible 
and the Gospel of Jesus Christ in relation to the inmates, who often have a low level of literacy. (For 
more information, see the lemma “detextification” on Wikipedia.) 
 
This book is indebted to so many people. I hold invaluable memories of the time as a visiting scholar 
at the Duke Divinity School, in Durham, NC. Prof. Dr Richard Hays supervised me there in a cordial 
and inspiring way. These conversations led to the first testcase as presented in Chapter 4. In a later 
stage, Prof. Dr Samuel Byrskog was willing to read through the manuscript several times. In 
particular, he has helped me in coming to terms with the roots of the term text itself. Throughout the 
years at the Vrije Universiteit, Prof. Dr Martin de Boer has put his mark on my approach to Paul and 
his letters due to his perception of the apostle, his Letter to the Galatians, and, in particular, 
apocalyptic. I want to mention Prof. Dr Jan Willem van Henten here, because he was right when he 
taught me that there is a difference between “gelijk hebben” and “gelijk krijgen.” As friends, who 
were interested and willing to read parts of the developing manuscript, I think of, among others, the 
late Dr Janneke Raaijmakers, Dr Jan Bor, and Dr Daniel Timmerman. My head of the Protestant 
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prison chaplaincy allowed me to take time off to finish this project and also challenged me to provide  
training for colleagues in detextifying church services in prison. My brother-in-law, Theo van den 
Heuvel, was willing to apply his professional qualities to create the Infographic and to help me design 
the cover (Studio Uitzien). Helen Pears did a great job in editing and at the same time teaching me 
how to improve my writing on an academic level (The Better Writing Service). I also want to thank 
the members of the reading committee, who were willing to read my manuscript and also helped me 
with their comments to further clarify aspects in the line of my argumentation. In this respect, I want 
to especially thank my promotors, Prof. Dr Arie Zwiep and Prof. Dr Bert Jan Lietaert Peerbolte. With 
professional guidance, sincere interest, and patience, Arie Zwiep has led me through many rewritings 
of my manuscript. In this way, the argumentation became clearer not only to him but also to myself. 
Bert Jan Lietaert Peerbolte has convinced me to insert the special Cautions to the reader #1–4 in the 
Introduction. 
   
I am grateful for the financial support I received from Prins Bernhard Cultuur Fonds, Stichting 
Uitpakken, Stichting Zonneweelde, and Vicariefonds Ridderlijke Duitsche Orde Balije van Utrecht.  
 
My parents and parents-in-law were supportive. It is incredible to have people around me who believe 
in me. Great to know that Stefan Dijkhuizen and Giel Schormans will support me in the moment of 
defence as paranymphen. Most important in this process and in my life, I want to thank my wife 
Helene. She has been of great support and guidance in finding a way through all the barriers 
accompanying this project. Thank you for your belief in me, letting me grow, and enabling me to 
come this far. Also, my lovely children: Sarah, Noa, Tijs, and Jonas, you are the joys of my life! SDG.  
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Biblical scholars read and write texts.1 They study the Bible. This normally leads to publications in 
books and journals. These texts again evoke reactions in writing. Beginning and end then are 
dominated by “text.” In the words of Werner Kelber: “The methods that we deploy in biblical studies 
have instilled in us the idea of autonomous textual entities, which grew out of texts, linked up directly 
with other texts, and in turn generated new texts.”2 For centuries, this practice of going back and forth 
between texts has been common in academia. In this way, we relate to the world around us – it 
becomes abstracted “world” which is represented in text.3 This dynamic prompts Paul Ricoeur to 
claim that “[t]his relation of text to text, within the effacement of the world about which we speak, 
engenders the quasi-world of texts or literature.”4 Metaphorically speaking, the biblical scholar exists 
in an ever-expanding universe of texts.  
 
 
A. Text and an emerging communis opinio in biblical scholarship 
 
In biblical scholarship there is, however, another perspective on the Christian Old and New 
Testaments to be found as well: these ancient documents functioned in a cultural context in which 
 
1 The writer of the present text comes from a Protestant background. As a characteristic feature of this 
tradition, one is urged to read and study the Bible for oneself, individually. In the Catholic tradition one 
encounters, as a rule, the Scriptures at the moment of hearing/reading them aloud in the liturgy. Traditionally 
speaking, individual engagement with the Bible is less familiar there. The same pertains to Orthodox 
communities. Characteristically, passages from Scripture are taken up here in the liturgy without being 
explicated as such. These differences came to me in a conversation with Prof. Dr Jens Schröter, Prof. Dr Arie 
Zwiep, and Prof. Dr Bart Koet at a symposium in Utrecht in 2017.     
2 Werner H. Kelber, “Jesus and Tradition: Words in Time, Words in Space,” Semeia 65 (1994), 141. See 
also, Rafael Rodríguez, “Reading and Hearing in Ancient Contexts,” JSNT 32 (2009), 151: “The various 
disciplines comprising biblical studies have at their heart literary agenda, a fact consonant with the etymology of 
Bible.” 
3 In the present study, by “us” I refer to you as reader and myself as writer of the current text. As reader, I 
presuppose that you live in the twenty-first century, have a basic knowledge of the discipline and history of 
biblical studies, and  are trained or able to read on an academic level of literacy.       
4 See Paul Ricoeur, “What is a text? Explanation and Understanding,” in Hermeneutics and the Human 
Science: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation, ed., trans. And introduced by John B. Thompson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1981), 149 
(emphasis original). Also published in his From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II. Studies in 
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, trans. by Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson (London: 
Athlone, 1991); trans. of “Qu’est-ce qu’un texte? Expliquer et comprendre,” in Hermeneutik und Dialektik, vol. 
2, ed. Rüdiger Bubner et.al. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1970), 181–200. I thank Prof. Dr Arie Zwiep for drawing 
my attention to this article. 
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speech and sound dominated communication.5 In the history of research, we find indications that a 
communis opinio is emerging in New Testament scholarship on the important role of the spoken word 
in the Roman era (Chapter 2).6 Originally, lectors and emissaries mediated the New Testament gospels 
and letters to live audiences. So, the intended addressees did not read themselves, but they were 
exposed to someone embodying the message to them.  
The present study seeks to carefully examine this approach to engaging with biblical material. In order 
to bring a clearer focus for this, the so-called authentic letters of Paul, and in particular, the letter to the 
Galatians will be considered specifically.7 This restriction will lead to a clearer focus. The rather high 
degree of specificity in the case of the Galatian converts, their rhetorical situation (for example, other 
teachers), and the tense relationship with the apostle will help shed light on the originally intended 
communicative process or media functioning of this letter there-and-then.8       
 
5 As a classic publication with regard to the Old Testament, see Susan Niditch, Oral World and Written 
Word: Ancient Israelite Literature, LAI (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1996). For the New Testament, see 
Werner H. Kelber, The Oral and the Written Gospel: The Hermeneutics of Speaking and Writing in the Synoptic 
Tradition, Mark, Paul, and Q (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983; repr., with a new introduction by the author, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).  
6 For the emergence of a communis opinio in New Testament scholarship, we can refer inter alia to the 
polemical and critical essay by Larry W. Hurtado, “Oral Fixation and New Testament Studies? ‘Orality,’ 
‘Performance’ and Reading Texts in Early Christianity,” NTS 60 (2014): 321–40. Given Werner Kelber’s study, 
Hurtado explicitly affirms that the appreciation of the spoken word in the Roman era “may be taken now as 
widely accepted and not under dispute here” (323).  He explicates this point of view in detail (Chapter 2).    
7 Regarding the related genre, the present study prefers the designation “letter” over “epistle.” This 
distinction was introduced by Adolf Deissmann; see his Bibelstudien: Beiträge, aus den Papyri und Inschriften, 
zur Geschichte der Sprache, des Schrifttums und der Religion des hellenistischen Judentums und des 
Urchristentums (Marburg: Elwert, 1895), 1–59. Based on his explanation, we prefer the designation “letter,” 
despite the confusing homonym, because it is framed in line with “mündliche Zwiesprache” and expresses the 
actuality and oral-aural aspect of this communicative event. “Epistle” refers to a piece of composed literature 
meant to be disseminated to a wider and more abstracted public of trained readers.  
8 It is important to make a distinction between the rather simple compositional process behind Paul’s letters 
and the rather complicated and layered ones underlying the gospels. Regarding the letters of Paul, we are dealing 
with the apostle as the composer (assisted by his co-workers), the emissary, one artefact (autograph), and the 
community that Paul wanted to reach in the event of delivery. Not to mention that the nature of the 
communication is direct speech, since the emissary represented Paul in person. In this historical trajectory, there 
are only a few identifiable links in the chain; the speech of the apostle is directly relatable to the specific 
rhetorical situations of these communities. Regarding the Gospel of Mark, Matthew, Luke, and John, the 
communicative trajectory is rather different and more diffuse. For their emergence, one has to start with the 
performances and reperformances of the ipsissima verba of Jesus himself. Subsequently, one has to consider 
how his friends and followers spread these logia and simultaneously how their experiences with Jesus turned 
into stories about him. The study of memory makes clear that one has to consider in this respect the role of 
appropriation and reappropriation of the past to the circumstances of the ever-changing present (see Alan Kirk, 
“Social and Cultural Memory,” Semeia 52 [2005], 7). In that light, the stage in the Jesus movement comes to 
mind that is determined by a growing need to write down. Information about the circumstances of and the 
participants in these processes that led to the available gospels is sparse (Who are Mark, Matthew, Luke, and 
John and did they actually write these gospels themselves or were they even involved in this process?); their 
becoming and original functioning is open to many reconstructions. In this light, the question of composition of 
the gospels is different from the one of the letters of Paul. Therefore, the argumentation of the present study is in 
a more general way applicable to the genre of the gospels. For the role of memory, scribality, and textuality in 
the making of the gospels, see Samuel Byrskog, Story as History – History as Story: The Gospel Tradition in the 
Context of Ancient Oral History, WUNT 123 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000); Werner H. Kelber, “The Case of 
the Gospels: Memory’s Desire and the Limits of Historical Criticism,” OT 17 (2002): 55–86; James D.G. Dunn, 
“Altering the Default Setting: Re-envisaging the Early Transmission of the Jesus Tradition,” NTS 49 (2003): 
139–175; Alan Kirk and Tom Thatcher, “Jesus Tradition as Social Memory,” Semeia 52 (2005): 25–42; Barry 
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1. Confusion of roles: Reader and/or historian? 
In the above, two different situations are discernible: as physical artefacts, we as present-day readers 
are dealing with the gospels and letters as text. We see the characters of the Greek or English alphabet 
in specific combinations with spaces between them; these letters appear to us in black, ordered in 
straight lines, and by margins against the background of a white page or screen – that is, the so-called 
“text area” (to which you also relate right now). In this way, the available biblical text forces us to the 
familiar activity of reading. In principle, this engagement with text is repeatable and elicits intellectual 
labour: “What does the text say?”9 or “What does it mean?”10 Vis-à-vis text, we are determined to find 
some sort of meaning for ourselves and for the communities we serve – such as academia, biblical or 
Pauline scholarship, Christian churches or society at large.11  
 
Schwartz, “Christian Origins: Historical Truth and Social Memory,” Semeia 52 (2005): 43–56; Richard A. 
Horsley, “Prominent Patterns in the Social Memory of Jesus and Friends,” Semeia 52 (2005): 57–78; Holly 
Hearon, “The Story of ‘the Woman Who Anointed Jesus’ as Social Memory: A Methodological Proposal for the 
Study of Tradition as Memory,” Semeia 52 (2005): 99–118; Werner H. Kelber, “The Works of Memory: 
Christian Origins as MnemoHistory – A Response,” Semeia 52 (2005): 221–248; Barry Schwartz, “Jesus in 
First-Century Memory – A Response,” Semeia 52 (2005): 249–262; James D.G. Dunn, Remembered: 
Christianity in the Making, Volume 1 (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans, 2009); Rafael 
Rodríquez, “Reading and Hearing in Ancient Contexts,” JSNT 32 (2009): 151–178; Werner H. Kelber, “The 
Generative Force of Memory: Early Christian Traditions as Processes of Remembering,” BTB 36 (2016): 15–22. 
9 In an earlier stage of this research project, I was invited to present my work at the Amsterdam New 
Testament Colloquium. Éminence grice, the late Prof. Dr  Tjitze Baarda attended this meeting. He ended his 
response to my presentation with the statement that as a biblical scholar he was taught to ask the question: “What 
does the text say?” 
10 In the opening chapter “What Is Exegesis? An Analysis of Various Definitions”, in Handbook to Exegesis 
of the New Testament, ed. Stanley E. Porter, 3rd ed. (Boston and Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2002), 
Stanley Porter and Kent Clarke describe the existing ambiguity between words as “exegesis,” “interpretation,” 
and “hermeneutics” to arrive at the following clarification: “Broadly speaking, all three terms fall under the 
discipline of 'heuristics' (…) that is, the study and development of methods or principles that aid one in 
discovering the sense and meaning of a text” (4/5; emphasis mine). Subsequently, they state: “[T]he word 
interpretation is often used interchangeably with the words hermeneutics and exegesis” (5). At the end, they 
draw the following conclusion  “The fact is that there are various aspects of a text's meaning and different types 
of exegesis can address these various aspects.” Thus, in this given and crucial question, the main focus and 
activity in biblical scholarship seem somehow condensed: the reader is exposed to the text looking for meaning, 
that is, what it meant and/or what it means.  
11 This stance sheds light on how the objective of the present study relates to theories and approaches on 
“intertextuality.” Julia Kristeva introduced this term (“Le mot, le dialogue et le roman,” in Σημειωτικὴ: 
Reserches pour une sémanalyse [Seuil: Paris, 1969], 85). Inspired by Michail Bachtin and Jacques Derrida, she 
wanted to break open the dominant structuralistic view in literary criticism on “text.” Instead of defining text as a 
set of linguistic structures in need of decoding, she advocates “the ‘literary word’ as an intersection of textual 
surfaces instead of a point (fixed meaning), as a dialogue among several writings: that of the writer, the 
addressee (or the character), and the contemporary or earlier cultural context” (“Word, Dialogue, and Novel,” in 
Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, ed. Leon S. Roudiez [New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1980], 65). Although widening the scope of writing as far as the historical and social 
dimensions of the writer and reader involved, her theory emerges from literature functioning as text and/or 
writing. Next to this rather broad and open definition, more limited approaches were also developed. In this 
respect, the intertextual approach by Richard B. Hays in Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1989, rev. and repr., 1993) and The Conversion of the Imagination: Paul as 
Interpreter of Israel’s Scripture (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2002) is highly relevant. In Echoes, 
regarding the broad matrix of intertextuality as used by Kristeva, Hays “propose[s] instead to discuss the 
phenomenon of intertextuality in Paul’s letters in a more limited sense, focusing on his actual citations of and 
allusions to specific texts” (15). For discussion and an example on Hab 2.4/Gal 3.11, see footnotes 479 and 548. 
For the present study, the following observation is important: in an open as well as a limited intertextual 
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This relation to the letters in the present can be distinguished – especially when centring upon the 
Letter to the Galatians – from an unrepeatable, envisioned, and trenchant moment of oral delivery in 
the past. We can imagine someone standing amid the gathered assembly and addressing them. Not 
only aspects such as the raising of the voice, pausing at certain moments, and the role of gesticulation 
should be thought of, but also what went before (conversion, baptism, the appearance of other 
teachers, and their call to circumcision), the sphere of the gathering (anxiety, agitation, or anger?), 
factions and interests (Jewish and Gentile members, different social classes), power relations ([Jewish] 
teachers, leaders in the local congregations) and the authority of the sender (Paul) bestowed on the 
emissary. However, this past historical moment has vanished. Critical reconstruction and imagination 
are needed to come to an adequate description – as a rule, in text – of that historical context.  
Self-evidently, a physical artefact was constitutive of this past event. The letter as thing (autograph) 
has been transmitted (apographs) and studied throughout the ages (manuscripts). In this process of 
transmission, the appearance of these documents has transformed into the printed or digital versions to 
which we are now accustomed. Thus, the transmitted documents constituting the corpus Paulinum 
here-and-now-to-us witness to these somehow lost and highly specific moments there-and-then-to-
them. Paradoxically, however, as witnesses, these letters – that is, the physically transmitted and 
transformed artefact[s] here-and-now – did not yet function as “text” to the original addressees in the 
way they do to us. Put differently, there are two perspectives on the letters as written 
documents/“texts.” First, and most familiar to us because of the relation to the available version as 
text, one is placed in the role of reader to ask, What does it mean? In this typical question, the 
fundamental, though implicit and intricate relation between “text,” “reading,” and “meaning” becomes 
visible to us. Second, the original addressees were exposed to someone who performed the 
documented wordings to them on behalf of Paul. More precisely, in the process of composition, the 
apostle must have envisioned and anticipated how his addressees would hear or react to the utterings 
of the one who read the letter aloud in his name. So, in line with this second perspective, we become 
reconstructive historians in a sense and ask, What is happening, more specifically, What is happening 
there-and-then in the envisioned oral delivery between performer and his audience?  
The purpose of the following investigation is to clarify the relation between our roles as historians and 
as readers: representation of the oral performance there-and-then is the role of the reconstructive 




approach, the biblical text functioning as text here-and-now-to-us forms the starting point. Therefore, the 
presented approach of detextification can also be relevant and applied to intertextual approaches of the biblical 
documents.  
12 As we indicated in the preceding footnote, with “text,” “writing,” and “literature” as bases, it is plausible to 
state that participants in theories in intertextuality will tend towards the role of reader.   
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Caution to the reader #1: To give priority to the historian 
Pursuing this purpose necessarily involves much complexity. To present a clearer path, the exploration 
of the approach of detextification lies at the centre of this study. As it may seem counter-intuitive to 
speak of detextifying with regard to the study of “text,” four “cautions” are noted in the Introduction 
with the intention of setting out some context for this approach from the outset.   
As historians, we are in a fundamental way confronted with the hermeneutical gap between there-and-
then and here-and-now.13 In the present study, this gap is concretized by these two communicative 
situations of oral performance there-and-then and text here-and-now. However, this distinction 
becomes somewhat blurred: the operational way (textual) in which we argue for a distinctive media 
culture there-and-then (oral performance) turns the historian necessarily into a reader. Put simply, 
“history” is dealt with on the level of text (this actual text in front of you). Thus in the very nature of 
this thesis itself we find tension. We are engaged in one of the two media functionings involved 
(reading text in actu), while we want to do justice – in and through that same process – to that other 
communicative process (historicizing oral performance). In this imbalanced endeavour, one could ask 
whether we, instead of bridging a gap, resemble Baron Munchausen who tried to pull himself out of 
the mire by his own hair.  
In doing justice to this analysis, the present research project takes on a philosophical dimension. How 
to proceed in this respect? When we speak of history (or to historicize) in this research project, we do 
not necessarily and solely relate to the “past” (there-and-then) in distinction from the “present” (here-
and-now). Another dichotomy will structure the present argumentation. The terms past and present 
refer to a perspective on “reality” that is dominated by the human body or our senses: in this way, we 
relate primarily in real time/in actu, or uncritically, to the world around us. Put differently, the 
dimensions of time and place are constitutive of the realm of history.14 Importantly, this applies to 
those “there-and-then” (Paul, the Galatians, and other teachers) as well as to ourselves “here-and-now” 
(biblical scholar, present-day reader, and in academia). So, instead of being applied pejoratively, the 
adjective uncritical is used in a descriptive way. A key characteristic of Western philosophical 
tradition, especially vis-à-vis text, is that the reader is enabled to create a distance between themselves 
(their participation/being present) and the object of study (their observation/representation of). This 
typical relation to the world around enables critical thought. The movement is from being uncritically 
present in to critical representation of the world. For that reason, we explicitly distinguish, in the 
present study, the realm of history (presence/uncritical) and the realm of extra-historical thought 
 
13 In “What is Exegesis?", Porter and Clarke phrase the consequences regarding the exegetical task as 
follows: “Exegesis that seeks to answer what the text means at present is usually based upon the synchronic 
condition of the text, that is, what it is. On the other hand, exegesis that concerns itself with what the text meant 
relies more heavily upon the diachronic condition of the text, that is, how it came to be what it is” (11–12; 
emphasis original). 
14 In Chapter 3, Section A.1. Textualizing text hic et nunc pro nobis, we will argue that another dimension is 
involved next to those of time and place, namely, the knowing subject in actu. 
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(representation/critical). The reader, text, and the typical way of relating to the world aligns with the 
latter realm, the historian focuses on the former realm. We will give priority to the historian and, 
therefore, the realm of extra-historical thought will be subject to the realm of history. That is to say, 
the way we are used to formulate and argue will be critically and systematically examined against the 
background of the realm of history. (This will be worked out in the subsequent Cautions to the reader.) 
For now, we will conclude this caution with four remarks. First, this distinction or dichotomy is itself 
highly critical in nature: to formulate the “realm of history” is not possible without and somehow takes  
place in the “realm of extra-historical thought.” Thus, the intellectual endeavour of detextification 
should not be seen as a disqualification of or as being in opposition to text. It is important to state 
clearly that we need text to detextify. Second, this systematic approach of the “realm of history” and to 
giving this realm and its laws priority – in distinction from the “realm of extra-historical thought” – 
will constitute a critical structure in the argumentation as a whole. Third, because of this 
presuppositional level, the present study can be valued as a contribution to the philosophy of biblical 
studies in a sense. Fourth, the traditional hermeneutical gap is transformed from the separation 
between here-and-now and there-and-then to the distinction between the realm of history and 
freischwebendes Denken. In the second and fourth Chapters, several examples will illuminate the 
working of this structure. In this way, like Baron Munchausen, we will get hold of our own hair to 
begin pulling ourselves up. 
 
2. The communication model: Sender, message, and addressee 
These communicative processes of participating in oral performance and reading text overlap to some 
extent. When we take the standard communication model (singular) which is constituted by the 
elements of sender (singular), message (singular), and addressee (singular) as a starting-point, we do 
not immediately find substantial differences.15 Such a model, however, presents as highly abstract and 
reductive – as witnessed in the typical formulation in the singular – where attention to the dimension 
of the media is virtually absent. These three elements represent “worlds” in themselves. Regarding the 
Letter to the Galatians, we answer the questions of sender, message, and addressees without much 
difficulty; the answers are as concise as the elements themselves: Paul, the letter or text, and his 
Galatian converts.  
In line with the purpose of the present study though, the answer to the last question (addressee) needs 
to be refined. From the perspective of technology, one could argue that when we read the letter as text, 
we ourselves have become in a sense the addressees. The communicative dynamic implied in text is 
 
15 This model is based on the so-called Organon model developed by Karl Bühler in his Sprachtheorie: Die 
Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache (Jena: Fischer, 1934). He influenced Roman Jakobson to formulate his six 
communication functions, see the latter’s “Closing Statements: Linguistics and Poetics,” in Style in Language, 
ed. Thomas A. Sebeok (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960), 350–377. 
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that the one who actually reads (in the present) is the one who comes to understanding (represent in 
the present). Against the background of the realm of history in which the biblical scholar participates 
in real time, it becomes clear that when the letter is functioning as text, the reader becomes the 
addressee. Inevitably, I emphasize here the media functioning of text. The role of what Hans-Georg 
Gadamer terms our Vorverständnis (prior understanding), or, in the words of Umberto Eco, our 
encyclopaedia of knowledge, is not to be denied. This should explain, for example, why a biblical 
scholar will say that not they themselves but the Galatians are the addressees – for they know that 
already on the basis of basic knowledge. And, as the practice of current biblical scholarship 
demonstrates, it is clear that different readings are certainly possible; they can even be in line with the 
originally intended communicative process (as we will see later on in the discussion of Chapter 4). 
The following point is important, however: It is the actual reader of the text who arrives, in the 
process of reading, at some sort of understanding; how the originally intended addressees in the event 
of delivery would have come to understand – and whether there are possible differences in their way of 
structuring thought – is a different matter. For the present study, this is an important distinction or 
plurality to explore further. 
 
3. Umberto Eco: “What one calls ‘message’ is usually a text” 
We must also pay attention to the second element, that is, the message. In his study The Role of the 
Reader, Umberto Eco comments on the above mentioned basic communicative model that it “does not 
describe the actual functioning of communicative discourse.”16 He concretizes the model and 
distinguishes the following layers: various codes and subcodes regarding sender and addressee, variety 
in socio-cultural circumstances – which can differ between the former and latter – and the rate of 
initiative displayed by the addressee in making presuppositions and abductions. He also makes an 
important distinction between “text as expression” (text as object) and “interpreted text as content” 
(the moment that the reading subject is relating to it to explicate an understanding). On this basis, Eco 
presents his famous distinction between “closed” and “open texts.” Based on clichés, the former pull 
the reader along a predetermined path, “carefully displaying their effects so as to arouse pity or fear, 
excitement or depression at the due place and at the right moment.”17 These closed texts are ‘open’ to 
“any possible ‘aberrant’ decoding.”18 On the contrary, the open texts cannot be used as the reader 
wants, “but only as the text wants you to use it.”19 Here the real-time process of interpretation is a 
structural element of the generative process of the text. The layers in his theory of semiotics lead him 
to state that “[i]t is just by playing upon the prerequisites of such a general process that a text can 
 
16 Umberto Eco, The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts, AdvSem (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1979), 5.  
17 Eco, Role of the Reader, 8. 
18 In Chapter 3, we will see that, according to Eco, the discourse in the letters of Paul resembles “closed text.”  
19 Eco, Role of the Reader, 9. 
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succeed in being more or less open or closed.” In a more general way then, Eco comments: 
“Moreover, what one calls ‘message’ is usually a text” (emphasis original).20 The adverb “usually” 
seems to imply that “message” and “text” are normally equated. First, his remark suggests that a 
message can be sent by more than one media. Second and important for the purport of this 
Introduction, in real time we usually and uncritically tend to funnel “message” – in our argumentations 
– into a single and implied media, that of “text.” So, in the standard communicative model of sender, 
message, and addressee, Eco puts the finger on the suppressed role of media and he identifies this 
mechanism of implicit equation as a blind spot. This subliminal inclination requires systematic 
explication – which is the concern of the present study. 
 
4. Media muddle: The implicit equation of “letter” and “text” 
Above, we discussed the issue of the subordination of the reader to the historian (Caution to the reader 
#1). The semiotics of Eco turns our attention to text as media – to which we relate primarily as reader. 
With regard to this, Thomas Boomershine’s article “Peter’s Denial as Polemic or Confession: The 
Implications of Media Criticism for Biblical Hermeneutics” is a key work with which to engage.21 As 
an important leader in the Biblical Storytellers Network, he criticizes the usage of “literature” as 
reference to the New Testament as anachronistic. In this article, he argues that in using this term, an 
anomalous media, which emerged only later, is brought into the New Testament documents in an 
uncritical way. He calls this “media eisegesis.”22 In this respect, one of the central arguments of this 
thesis is that regarding the corpus Paulinum, there tends to be an implicit equation of “letter” and 
“text.” So, like Eco, Boomershine asks attention for the fact that distinctive media are mingled. Instead 
of a communis opinio – wrought in debate – we could speak of the functioning of “literature” and 
“text” in biblical scholarship as a questionable though given communis practica through mere 
repetition. In this way, the biblical scholar gets in a media muddle: In a formal way, the scholar can 
acknowledge or even advocate that the letters were meant to be embodied by the lector in the oral 
performance there-and-then, recall the emerging communis opinio, and the related question What is 
happening? Operationally however, by relating themselves in their real-time praxis to the letter as text-
to-be-read (communis practica), the scholar overrules here-and-now the performance as the intended 
media in actu. The problem of the media muddle is that conclusions and insights on the formal level 
(representation) are made ineffective by, or do not reach into, the operational situation or praxis of the 
biblical scholar (presence). In still reading the letter as text in real time, the governing question will 
 
20 Ibid., 5. When we ask how Eco defines “text,” his preface provides an answer: Notwithstanding one essay 
dealing with “various sorts of texts,” all the others deal with “verbal text” (vii). This limitation is underscored by 
his consistent use of terms such as “text,” “reader,” and “author” in his book. 
21 Thomas E. Boomershine, “Peter’s Denial as Polemic or Confession: The Implications of Media Criticism 
for Biblical Hermeneutics,” Semeia 39 (1987): 48–50.  
22 Ibid., 48. 
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remain: What does it mean? As Chapter 2 will show, we even have to draw this conclusion regarding 
advocates of actual performances here-and-now of the New Testament documents.  
 
 
B. Hypothesis (1): Two different media functionings at issue 
 
This equation of message and text (Eco) must be problematized, in light of the communis opinio on the 
originally intended functioning of Paul’s letters. When we do not make any fundamental distinction 
between the two, the functioning of “text” takes over in real time – to us – regarding the message of 
the letters. Now we can make a firm step to the hypothesis of the present study: Regarding the letters 
of Paul, it is of the utmost importance to identify distinctive media; that is to say, we have to look for 
differences in the functioning of (the letters as) text to a present-day reader and the letter as oral 
performance/public reading to the originally intended addressees. (In section E. of this Introduction, 
another dimension inherent in this hypothesis is set out.) 
 
Caution to the reader #2: The level of text and textualization 
In the present study, we refer to the way in which we are used in academia to come to an 
understanding of the world around us as the level of text. On and by means of this level, we are able to 
represent. What we represent is what we term “reality,” “history,” that which was/is “present” or the 
“concrete lifeworld.” The latter, however, exists per se beyond the level of text. In this way, we are 
like a dog chasing its own tail. The conundrum is as follows: on and via the level of text, we 
understand that which is beyond that same level. We can recognize here the contours of the earlier 
presented dichotomy between the realm of history and the realm of extra-historical thought. Giving 
priority to the perspective of the historian, we have to critically and continuously push our 
formulations at the level of text (extra-historical thought) beyond that level (into the realm of the 
history involved) – although this intellectual endeavour takes place by means of that same level. The 
aim is to break through uncritical constraints inherent in the level of text or the realm of extra-
historical thought. In particular, we will engage critically with and challenge the use of terms related to 
the crucial matrix of “text,” and in dealing with “text” the terms “to read”/“reading”/“reader” and “to 
mean”/“meaning.” In addition, “oral performance,” “media,” “interpretation,” “hermeneutics,” 
“composition” (Chapter 3), “syllogism,” “theology,” and so on (Chapter 4), but also the text-context 
and subject-object schemes (Chapter 3), will similarly be pushed beyond that level.23 They will be 
 
23 For a comparable though different endeavour in Homeric studies, see Barry P. Powell, “Text, Orality, 
Literacy, Tradition, Dictation, Education, and Other Paradigms of Explication in Greek Literary Studies,” OT 15 
(2000): 96–125. In this article, Powell wants to come to a redefinition of these terms by zooming in on relevant 
historical praxes, whether as described in ancient sources as retrieved by experiments, such as performed by 
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placed against the background of the realm of history there-and-then and also the realm of history 
here-and-now. Without explication or explanation, we will see that these terms are used as a given – 
that is, on the level of text. Therefore, they will be framed by the actual reader in actu of that text 
beyond that level – that is uncritically in line with his own mindset and concrete lifeworld (see the 
exploration of “reading” in distinction from “public reading” below). Once we are aware of this 
tension between on and beyond the level of text, we will find a way out of the media muddle. In 
Chapters 2 and 4, we critically engage in this way studies on the distinctive media culture regarding 
the New Testament.  
In the present study, we refer to the procedure to push concepts and notions beyond the level of text as 
textualization. This form of historicization or description will lead to a broadening of the level of text. 
In distinction to reasoning which is isolated in the realm of extra-historical thought, one can textualize 
history (see below). The framing of this intellectual movement is intentionally based on a verb, more 
precisely, a participle: to textualize/textualizing/textualization. It implies that a process is taking place 
or that an activity is in progress. In line with the distinction between the realm of extra-historical 
thought and the realm of history, this particular formulation of “textualizing” gives priority to the 
latter. In textualizing history, we do not only explicate and explain what we mean by certain familiar 
notions and words, but we also have to structure our reasoning as far as possible in line with the 
dynamics or laws of the realm of history (becoming). So, by reframing the overly familiar noun 
(“text”) as an activity in progress (“to textualize”), the fixedness which comes with being should be 
loosened. Textualization is, therefore, a process which takes place through the level of text (means), 
yet on that level, we can continually move deeper into the realm of history (end). We do so by asking 
and describing what is happening or how it functions. It will never be finished, fixed, completed, or 
perfect (being). So, although, to follow the metaphor of Baron Munchausen, we may never fully get 
out of the mire, we can pull ourselves by our own hair always higher.  
 
 
C. “Oral performance”: Preliminary considerations 
 
To textualize differences between the functionings of the letter, we must start by first explicating the 
parameters of “oral performance” in the realm of history. Regarding the originally intended media 
functioning of the letters, we can take the example of Gal 3.1. Here Paul cries out: “You foolish 
Galatians! Who has bewitched you?”24 For us, as present-day readers, this is an odd experience. When 
we process the text by reading and encounter an exclamation like this, all of a sudden, our relationship 
 
Milman Parry and Albert Lord (see Chapter 1). On the one hand, he acts as a historian and pushes these terms as 
far as possible beyond the level of text, while on the other hand, he leaves the term “text” as such unchanged on 
the level of text.  
24 All quotations will be from the NRSV unless otherwise stated. 
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to the letter changes. From thinking we turn to experiencing – as if we hear the apostle cry out 
himself! Several senses become activated and we ask: What is going on? What has happened to make 
Paul cry out like this? Similarly, we can experience Gal 4.20: “I wish I were present with you now and 
could change my tone, for I am perplexed about you.” Here we sense a mixture of indignation and 
concern over his spiritual children. A different understanding is the result. In these passages of the 
letter, Paul comes very near to us. For a moment, the text becomes living or direct speech. At the same 
time, we realize that this exclamation is not meant for us as twenty-first-century readers. Needless to 
say, it was directed to the historical Galatians as persons of flesh and blood. Its intended effect was 
related to their specific situation (realm of history).  
 
1. Parlance: “Public reading” and “reading” 
As a consequence, “public reading” and/or “oral performance” cannot and will not be treated as 
opposites in the present study.25 The goal of both activities is the same: to influence how the intended 
hearers grasp and act in their concrete situation. Hence, on the level of text, we will critically 
distinguish, in the present study, “reading” and “public reading” there-and-then-to-them. The use of 
notions such as “reading”, “to read,” and “reader” involves an abstracting tendency. We sense the 
consequence when we formulate, regarding the “original addressees,” that they – or the “emissary” – 
would “read” the letter. Any form of explication or explanation is lacking in such a formulation as to 
the kind of reading we are dealing with. As a consequence, we will fill in – technically speaking – the 
kind of “reading” with which we are familiar ourselves in real time: namely that a particular individual 
is silently relating to a written physical record.26 Since biblical scholars do this all the time in their 
own real-time realm of history, it is a subliminal or uncritical process. As a result, “reading” in the 
first-century Mediterranean world comes to imply – once more, technically speaking – the same 
practice as in the twenty-first-century Western academic world.27 Thus the frame of reference implied 
in the singular concept of “reading” is also bound to singularity. It will be everywhere, every time, and 
for everyone somehow the same.28 This structuring of thought veils other possible practices of reading. 
In this way, the simple and singular mentioning of “reading” at the level of text presses us all the more 
into the real-time and uncritical role of “reader” looking for the meaning. Typically, the reader then 
 
25 In Chapter 2, we will see that Hurtado drives a wedge between them in his essay “Oral Fixation and New 
Testament Studies?”   
26 In the words of sociologist and psychoanalyst Jeffrey Prager, “[I]t becomes nearly impossible to parse out 
memories of the past from the categories of experience available in the present”; see his Presenting the Past: 
Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Misremembering (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 5. 
27 Note that this does not imply one and the same actual understanding, but technically speaking the approach 
is the same; the structuring of thought is comparable (Chapter 3). 
28 Beyond the level of text, there are of course several possible outcomes from our readings of one and the 
same text. However, we argue here in the main text consistently on and regarding the level of text. The 
perspective on these different readings or outcomes centres on the questions, How are these propositions 
structured? What terms are used? What is explicated and what remains, as a result, implicit on that level? 
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takes over from the historian. So, in this functioning of text to us, we lack critical differentiation 
between the realm of history there-and-then (“oral performance/public reading”) and here-and-now 
(“reading”).  
In public reading, the adjective binds the one who is reading first and foremost to other human beings.  
The problem here is when we limit our scope – on the level of the text – to the lector as “reader” and 
the letter as “text,” we overlook the end of this communicative process, that is, the intended hearers; 
the lector is reading to them. The activity of public reading is a means to an end: the lector vocalizes 
these soundbites so that the audience can come to some sort of understanding and that they will be 
influenced in that way.  
A distinctive structure in the presumed communicative process comes to the fore. The small extension 
of “public” enables us to structure our thoughts into the concrete situation of that act. The historian can 
stand up to ask, What is happening to the public there-and-then? As a result, the level of text more 
adequately resembles what is beyond that level. 
 
2. Public reading and the crucial role of the body 
We can deepen the difference between “reading” and “public reading” on the level of text, when we 
concentrate on the human body. In “reading text,” our concrete lifeworld becomes concentrated in the 
visual exposure to the text area. Put simply, we should not look around – that is, beyond the 
boundaries of the text area – when we want to read effectively. Moreover, the (bodily) presence of the 
writer plays no role. We could describe this as the movement from “eye to text area.” In this way, we 
see how text area and the level of text resemble each other (this is discussed in Chapter 3).  
In regard to public reading, Robert Funk’s “The Apostolic Parousia: Form and Significance” is highly 
relevant.29 He states that Paul sent an emissary to represent himself amid his gathered addressees. This 
emissary communicated bodily Paul’s message (verbal), intentions, and agenda (meta-verbal) as if 
they were relating to the apostle himself – in all sensorial aspects – at that moment. In this case, the 
human body is a crucial constituent of the intended communicative process involved. So, we can 
comprehend public reading as “body to body.” Per se, it takes place beyond the level of text. 
The differences between the given formulation of “reading” and the explication of “public reading” 
thus drives a wedge between rather highly abstracted reasoning (reading) on the one hand, and 
concretizing a specific realm of history with the human body (emissary, gathered addressees, and other 
 
29 Robert W. Funk, “The Apostolic Parousia: Form and Significance,” in Christian History and 
Interpretation: Studies Presented to John Knox, ed. William R. Farmer, Charles F.D. Moule, and Richard R. 
Niebuhr (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 249–268. In her article “New 
Testament Envoys in the Context of Greco-Roman Diplomatic and Epistolary Conventions: The Example of 
Timothy and Titus,” JBL 111 (1992): 641–692, Margaret Mitchell nuances the generalizing argument of Funk. 
Regarding the first Letter to Timothy and Titus, she argues that Paul preferred communication through the letter 
to his presence there. She argues, “it is quite possible that we have a Pauline corpus in the first place because of 
the relative ineffectiveness of Paul’s personal presence and his own creative recognition of that limitation” (642).  
 21 
teachers) within it as the focal point on the other hand (historicizing). In the latter, our imagination 
comes alive. When the emissary uses the registers of direct speech and sensorially based 
communication, we can differentiate between such an embodied experience – even in our lives now – 
and the intellectual or disembodying effect of reading prosaic and academic “text.”  
This stance also sheds light on “scribality” and “textuality” – both relate to the emergence and role of 
the written piece in the presupposed realm of history. Since Paul’s concern is directed to his hearers 
(not his emissary who would be exposed to the documented wording), the implied structure might be 
summarized as the apostle trying to regain influence over his former converts in the envisioned event 
of delivery (Letter to the Galatians). On the one hand, the emissary or public reader related to the 
written words by a form of reading and this to some degree touches on our practice and the presence of 
text(s). On the other hand, there is no necessity to deal with the technical relationship between the 
emissary and the physical artefact, because that issue is valued as subservient to the earlier described 
goal of delivery. This is not to deny that the process of composition has led via dictation or 
documentation to the emergence of the physical artefact, which formed the basis of the performance 
and reperformances (Col 3.16) and is transmitted up to the present day as text, but the emphasis and 
focus of the exploration is upon the fact that the original addressees experience the words being 
embodied. This is the direction of travel intended when we speak of “oral performance” or “public 
reading.”30 
 
3. The importance of the study of oral tradition 
The incentive behind the present study is found in the work of Milman Parry (1902–1935).31 As a 
young American scholar in classical studies, he devoted his career to the study of the Homeric epics. 
His interest was directed towards the technique of composition behind these lengthy stories. He began 
studying Homer as literature. Later on, he was able to experience performances of similar extended 
stories in real time in the former Yugoslavia. He interviewed several bards who were used to 
performing their epics over and over without the aid of written versions. This research took place in a 
socio-cultural context practically void of the influence of text-as-known-to-us, let alone academic 
training. Throughout the history of this discipline, other scholars such as Albert Lord and John Miles 
Foley addressed other aspects of this process (see Chapter 1). In several scholarly disciplines, a debate 
emerged not only on orality but also on literacy, scribality, and textuality. 
To a certain extent, we can recognize here the contours of the same two media functionings in 
contemporary biblical scholarship. Parry’s colleagues related to Homer solely through text – study 
 
30 As set out in footnote 8, it is important to mark once more the distinction between the intended addressees 
of Paul’s letters and the gospels.  
31 See Adam Parry, ed., The Making of Homeric Verse: The Collected Papers of Milman Parry (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1971). For a short biography and overview, see the introduction by Adam Parry, ix–
lxii.  
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based on printed versions without any mention of the possible impact of this specific media on their 
understanding. Parry was able to observe comparable epics performed in real time. These 
communicative events between non-literate though highly skilled bards, and similarly non-literate live 
audiences who were used to participating in this kind of occasion were sui generis. He started to relate 
to the Homeric epics as a historian, asking the question What is happening between the performer and 
his audience? Above, we suggested that oral performance is all about presence. Parry moved from the 
level of representation, that is, Homer functioning as text to him, into the situation of being present 
himself and observing bards and their audiences in actu (see Chapter 1). For the present study, this 
movement from representation to presence is the crucial transition that we seek to fruitfully employ 
for our understanding of the corpus Paulinum in its original functioning. 
 
4. Ancient literacy in the first-century Mediterranean world  
There are differences between preliterate Homeric and early twentieth-century non-literate Slavic 
bards on the one hand, and Paul, his co-workers, emissaries, converts, opponents, and letters as 
physical artefacts on the other. It is well-known that the Judaism of Paul’s day was especially a culture 
of studying and arguing with Scripture.32 Paul participates in this praxis; one can point to the seven 
quotations from the Jewish scriptures as found in the short range of Gal 3.1–20 – “for it is written.” At 
the same time, it is telling that the kind of studying in Judaism as recorded in the Mishna and Talmud 
is categorized as “oral Torah,” in contrast to the documents studied as “written Torah.”33 So, there is 
substantial evidence of writing, as well as indications of differing types and higher degrees of literacy 
with respect to Paul himself,34 his socio-cultural (Jewish) context, his letters and, therefore, the realm 
of history in which we locate his original addressees. This train of thought might prompt the following 
argument on the level of text: since there is abundant evidence of “literacy,” the role of “orality” can 
only be peripheral to the “literature” or “texts” of the New Testament.35   
 
32 In “Reading, Writing, and Memorizing Together: Reading Culture in Ancient Judaism and the Dead Sea 
Scrolls in a Mediterranean Context,” DSD 24 (2017): 447–470, Mladen Popović describes certain groups in the 
Dead Sea Scrolls textual community as consisting of “intellectual” or “scholarly readers” (447). In his article 
though, the question how these scholarly or intellectual readers came to structure their thoughts vis-à-vis these 
scrolls – possibly in distinction from the contemporary academic (“scholarly?”) reader – remains open. A 
profound textualization could provide answers.  
33 The distinction between “oral” and “written Torah” is seen as originating from the Second Temple period. 
However, it is only attested in rabbinic literature. In his article “The Origins of Oral Torah: A New Pauline 
Perspective” JSJ 51 (2020): 43–66, Yael Fisch argues, in view of Rom 3.19–31 and 10.5–13, that Paul already 
presents  a twofold torah.   
34 Consider especially Chris Keith, “‘In My Own Hand’: Grapho-Literacy and the Apostle Paul,” Biblica 89 
(2008): 39–58. In this article, Keith explicates spectrums and kinds of literacies. In this historicization of “literate 
competencies,” he states that Paul was – in his words – “grapho-literate”: The apostle was not only able to read, 
but also – which added to his status – to write himself. Regarding Gal 6.11, “See with what big letters I write to 
you in my own hand,” he, therefore argues that these words have rhetorical force, since Paul, on the one hand, 
demonstrates that he can write, but, on the other, is in a position that he can use an amanuensis.      
35 In an exemplary way, we will encounter this reasoning in the essay by Larry Hurtado, “Oral Fixation and 
New Testament Studies?” (See Chapter 2 of this thesis).  
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Hence, in the present study, “ancient literacy” is approached in the following way: while types, levels, 
rates, and activities in “literacy” in the realm of history there-and-then are acknowledged, 
subsequently, “literacy” needs to be extended beyond the level of text. This then, serves to guard 
against the implicit equation of our deeply ingrained way of structuring thought vis-à-vis the letters as 
text and text in general – that is, our kind of “literacy” in the twenty-first-century academia – with the 
construal of knowledge by the original addressees in the intended oral performances.  
 
5. Contemporary orality and a predominantly oral mindset there-and-then 
Regarding the mindset in biblical scholarship, we intentionally continue to explicate the operational 
and real-time context, that is, “vis-à-vis text.” When we, as highly trained readers, move away from 
the text area and are exposed bodily to situations of performance ourselves, we also deal with a 
different experience. A captivating sermon in church or lecture at the university, a political speech in 
times of election,36 a TED Talk on YouTube, or an appealing call at a rally of some sort are perhaps 
cases in point. Regarding the present research project, these experiences are identified as distinct 
(body-to-body) from reading prosaic or academic text in silence and solitude (eye-to-text-area). We 
consume and do not produce these moments of performance as a rule. Traditional academic training is 
not directed towards this practice. When we keep these activities in mind though, we can relate 
ourselves better to the presupposed original functioning of the biblical documents. As we will see, we 
also structure our thoughts in a different way in such moments (Chapters 1 and 3). In this way, neither 
an “oral mindset” on their side nor a “literate” one on ours is absolutized. This acknowledgement 
prevents us from some sort of Great Divide thesis.37 In this scheme, “literacy” and related “literate” 
 
36 In his article “Reading and Hearing,” Rafael Rodríguez uses this same example to argue the opposite. 
Responding to another biblical scholar who introduces Walter Ong’s oral psychodynamic “agonistic tone” as 
typical of oral thought and on the basis of a spectrum between primal orality up to high literacy, Rodríguez 
argues: “If we assume that twenty-first-century American political discourse properly resides nearer the literate 
pole of [the] spectrum bridging primary oral and literate cultures, what explains the agonistic tone of American 
politics?” (153). Note that, in the present study, this specific example should illustrate our own (uncritical?) 
proximity to some sort of an oral-aurally determined mindset.   
37 In his essay, “Creating a New ‘Great Divide’: The Exoticization of Ancient Culture in Some Recent 
Applications of Orality Studies to the Bible,” JBL 136 (2017): 749–764, Paul S. Evans notices that certain 
criticisms of the Great Divide thesis set up an artificial great divide of their own. Instead of a chasm between 
orality and literacy, he advocates an understanding of the relation between them as a continuum (750). In his 
third and fourth issue, he tackles the assumption that ancient scribes would have had an “oral mindset.” In this 
mindset, the ancient scribe would be “more comfortable with variation and less concerned with exact detail than 
is the case with a literate mindset” (758). Based on research by Lord and Ong, he rejects the suggestion of 
Raymond Person of “non-literate scribes” (759). He argues that “caution must be taken in attributing a non-
literate mindset to a highly literate individual such as, for example, the author(s) of Chronicles” (760). From the 
perspective of scribality, he explores the extent to which ancient scribes can have an “oral mindset.” Did they 
variate in the wording of repeated poems or narratives or did they tend to exact repetition? Based on 
ethnographic research, he comments, “If non-literate people … did in fact care about correct repetition – even 
verbatim repetition – we should be cautious in ascribing to literate scribes a mindset that was not concerned with 
verbatim repetition” (763). He concludes, “While the theory of a great divide between oral and literate cultures 
has rightly been questioned, we must be cautious not to put in its place a new great divide that exoticizes ancient 
cultures and exaggerates differences between ancient and modern literate cultures” (764). He adds, “As 
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societies are positioned over against “non-” or “preliterate” ones. Fixed dichotomies like these can 
preclude openness – on and because of the level of text – to kinds of continua between oralities and 
literacies (plural) in specific realms of history.38  
Nevertheless, since the intention is to compare the earlier hypothesized two media in which Paul’s 
letters function[-ed], contrasts may help us to identify differences. We ourselves are familiar with and 
operationally caught up in one of them (text). The physical artefact, however, also plays a constitutive 
role in the oral performance there-and-then. Contrariwise, oral performance does not play such a role 
in our own processing of the letters as text. Heuristically speaking, we need a nuanced form of 
contrast.39 Therefore, in the present study, the distinctive cultural background of Paul’s original 




fieldwork has shown, literacy does have a powerful effect on non-literates; therefore caution needs to be 
exercised before an oral mindset is ascribed to a literate scribe” (764). First, the present study underscores 
Evans’s intent to advocate a continuum and not a chasm between orality and literacy. Second, his formulations 
such as “oral” and “literate mindset,” “literacy” and “non-literates” can be deepened through this same 
continuum.  The present study proposes framing the first-century Mediterranean world as a predominantly oral 
culture with varying types and high degrees of literacy and a similarly predominantly oral mindset – especially in 
terms of exposure to oral performances. In a similar way, readers in the socio-cultural context of academia here-
and-now – also involving various sorts and degrees of orality and aurality – are understood as having a 
predominantly literate mindset, especially vis-à-vis text.    
38 In this respect, we can turn, once more, to Rafael Rodríguez. In his article “Reading and Hearing,” he 
critiques an evolutionary paradigm regarding “orality” and “literacy”: “the language of ‘from oral to written 
tradition’ is … inappropriate because the earliest communities understood themselves, from the very earliest 
surviving evidence, with respect to (written) Hebrew biblical traditions” (170). 
39 In his article “Reading and Hearing,” Rafael Rodríguez takes a critical stance: “Nevertheless, we find 
compelling reasons to demur at the concept of an ‘oral mentality,’ and especially at the hopelessly vague ‘oral 
culture,’ both of which continue to be influential within NT research” (157). In another section, he adds, “we 
have to avoid idealizing so-called ‘oral cultures’ (primary, residual or otherwise)” (160). He wants to move 
beyond the opposition between “literacy” and “orality”; not only because they exclude each other, but also 
because of the inherent “universalizing” or “essentializing” tendency in defining them in this scheme (158): “We 
cannot reduce writing to frozen speech; it does not merely displace or replace orality, and it is not simply ‘in 
service of’ orality. Though writing can be any of these things, we are trying to avoid just these reductionist 
tendencies” (161). It is important to notice that Rodríguez studies the gospels and the communities in which they 
(“texts” [sic]) functioned. Note, in line with the earlier remarks in footnote 8, that the central role of the gospels 
as “texts” provides a different structure than, for example, the Galatian communities who are envisioned to be 
exposed to the unrepeatable and trenchant moments of body-to-body communication (oral deliverances of the 
letter by the emissary).  
40 Chapter 2 discusses comparable stances in the following publications: Werner Kelber, The Oral and the 
Written Gospel; Paul J. Achtemeier, “OMNE VERBUM SONAT: The New Testament and the Oral Environment 
of Late Western Antiquity,” JBL 109/1 (1990): 3–27; Pieter J.J. Botha, “Letter Writing and Oral Communication 
in Antiquity: Suggested Implications for the Interpretation of Paul’s Letter to the Galatians,” Scriptura 42 
(1992): 17–34; William A. Johnson, “Toward a Sociology of Reading in Classical Antiquity,” AJP 121/4 (2000): 
593–627; Joanna D. Dewey, “Textuality in an Oral Culture: A Survey of Pauline Traditions,” Semeia 65 (1994): 
139–168; Arthur J. Dewey, “A Re-Hearing of Romans 10.1–15,” Semeia 65 (1994): 109–127; Casey W. Davis, 
Oral Biblical Criticism: The Influence of the Principles of Orality on the Literary Structure of Paul’s Epistle to 
the Philippians, JSNTSup 172 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999); David M. Rhoads, “Performance 
Criticism: An Emerging Discipline (Part I and II),” BTB 36 (2006): 118–133, 164–84; Bernhard Oestreich, 
Performanzkritik der Paulusbriefe, WUNT 296 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012); Larry Hurtado, “Oral Fixation 
and New Testament Studies?”  
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6. Recapitulation: Oral performance 
A communicative act is framed as “oral performance” in the present study when someone addresses 
another/others by words which are either composed and documented to be read aloud or vocalized in 
the specific situation of those listening. The aim of this body-to-body communication is to affect these 
addressees in real time, so that they will change (or affirm) their grasp of and stance in their concrete 
situation. Thus, the goal of “oral performance” is inextricably bound to being present (live) in that 
specific realm of history. Relevant to us, as readers vis-à-vis text, “oral performance” in essence takes 
place beyond the level of text or representation. Therefore, regarding the letters of Paul, this study 
emphasizes that the originally intended participants have a predominantly oral mindset.   
 
 
D. “Text”: Preliminary considerations 
 
We turn to the other media constitutive of the present study, that is “text.” The aim is similarly, in 
explicating the parameters in the realm of history, we push the concept beyond the designation of the 
level of text.  
It could be argued that the contemporary function of text is largely due to the educational culture of 
the West. This culture is driven by the capacity to read and write. The first evidences of writing 
systems in Western history go back as far as 1800 BCE (Cretan, linear A, linear B). Throughout the 
ages, the development of literacy has been both qualitative and quantitative.41 In The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the right to education is structurally interpreted as “literacy” 
(article 26). From a young age, one becomes acquainted with this ancient technology.42 Levels and 
kinds of literacy are related to lower and higher degrees of education based on the capacity to read and 
write; it is more appropriate, then, to speak of literacies (plural). The academic community worldwide 
represents and sustains a culture of high literacy. Here text leads to more texts that describe, interpret, 
react, inquire, counter, comment, summarize, categorize, prescribe and so forth. The present study will 
be no exception and is only possible due to this tradition – namely, we need text to detextify. The 
actual reader of this specific text is seen as a product of this socio-cultural context. The pervasiveness 
of this tradition and training defines us as readers par excellence. Therefore, in search of differences, 
in this study we frame the socio-cultural context of biblical scholarship – especially vis-à-vis text – as 
predominantly literate.  
 
41 Jack Goody, The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986); Steven R. Fischer, A History of Writing (London: Reaktion Books, 2001); Barry B. Powell, 
Writing: Theory and History of the Technology of Civilization (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009). 
42 As formulated in The Hamburg Declaration on Adult Learning and the Agenda for the Future of the 
UNESCO (1997): “Literacy, broadly conceived as the basic knowledge and skills needed by all in a rapidly 
changing world, is a fundamental right” (resolution 11). See also, The Persepolis Declaration (UNESCO, 1975), 
24: “Literacy is not an end in itself. It is a fundamental human right.”  
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1. Corpus Paulinum: Some text from the start 
As already mentioned, in everyday life in biblical scholarship and beyond, one also speaks of the New 
Testament as “text.” Let us now narrow the focus to the corpus Paulinum. Earlier we presupposed a 
trail throughout history: from the autograph, via apographs to the products of the printing press and the 
possibilities of the current digital revolution. This trail is in some way materialized in the artfacts with 
which we deal ourselves here-and-now, in the editions available to us. We can identify radical 
differences in matter and also between available editions; differences, for example, between scriptio 
continua then and word dividers now, iron-gall and carbon ink then and chemical ink and pixels now, 
or parchment and papyrus then and paper and screens now. The point to make here is that, despite all 
these differences, we often frame these letters as physical artefacts or things. This specific perspective 
on the documented word makes the letter a part of the so-called world of objects (being). Our thoughts 
become structured in line with the letter as a product. The result is that the letter as process – or how it 
functions in reality, in which particular realm of history it belongs (becoming) – is not reflected upon. 
The implicit equation in our parlance of “text” and “New Testament” or “Paul’s letters” somehow 
strengthens this imbalance of objectification (being). The framing of the Bible as “text” on that level is 
ubiquitous. In line with this, we can conclude that we – as actual readers – are used to thinking that 
there has been (some) “text” from the very start.  
 
2. Illustrations: The “text” of the “New Testament” 
Many publications affirm this analysis. In literature in general and in commentaries, monographs, and 
articles within biblical studies, we can see that – on the level of text – the Bible is interwoven with the 
monograph or essay involved. Quotation marks, indentation, and referencing indicate the differing 
origins of the biblical text. Besides this familiar codification, there is no indication on that level of any 
fundamental difference – in nature and/or functioning – between the biblical text as “text” and the text 
that includes it. In the ever-expanding universe of text, we travel back and forth between biblical text 
and other texts.  
In this light, we can scrutinize the discipline of biblical hermeneutics. In the introduction to the 
Lexikon der Bibelhermeneutik, editor Oda Wischmeyer explains,  
 
Die textbezogene Hermeneutik der Bibel stellt ein neues hermeneutisches Paradigma dar, in dem die 
kanonische Fassung der Bibel nicht primär binnentheologisch als ‘Evangelium’ und ‘Heilige Schrift’ 
verstanden wird und damit den nicht-theologischen textbezogenen Disziplinen hermeneutisch und 
methodisch weitgehend entzogen ist (…) Zum Verstehen dieser Texte bzw. dieses Textes werde alle 
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gegenwärtige texterklärenden wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen mit ihren Theorien, Methoden, Konzeptionen 
und Begriffen herangezogen. (emphasis original)43   
 
Wischmeyer’s proposal here for a text-oriented approach of the Bible seeks to overcome an 
exclusively theological one. We see an enormous broadening of the horizon against which one wants 
to come to an understanding of these ancient documents.44 At the same time, the presupposition and 
parlance is that the Bible exists of and as “text(s)” (singular and plural).  
In a similar vein, we can turn to the commentaries on Galatians that are used in the discussion of 
Chapter 4. In his introduction, commentator Hans Dieter Betz opines on the “textual history” of this 
letter: “The text of Galatians must be discussed in conjunction with the tradition of the entire corpus 
Paulinum.”45 The way he expresses this thus gives the impression that the old manuscripts provide us 
with the “text” of the “letter.” In the editorial preface to the World Biblical Commentary volume on 
Galatians by Richard Longenecker,46 we read that “our commentators were asked to prepare their own 
rendering of the original biblical text.” In a note on the translation in his commentary, Martinus de 
Boer writes, “The aim of the commentary requires a translation that seeks to be as faithful as possible 
to the Greek text that Paul wrote and the Galatians actually heard.”47 In his commentary on Galatians, 
Louis Martyn speaks consistently of “letter” and “document” – not “text”: “If the letter were literally 
presented to us today in dramatic form, we would see an actor seated and reading aloud from an 
epistolary scroll he holds in his hands.”48 Thus, Martyn suggests that the letter qualifies as “oral 
communication” and an “oral” and “highly situational sermon.”49 Nonetheless, he uses the term  
“text” consistently when it comes to Paul’s quotations from the LXX; these documents equal “text.”50 
So these commentaries illustrate the widespread idea that there is “text” from the start. 
 
3. Textual criticism: Ausgangstext and “text”  
Now we turn to textual criticism in New Testament scholarship.51 This discipline provides us with, to 
use the typical parlance, the “text” of the “Greek New Testament.” In its study of the Greek witnesses 
 
43 Oda Wischmeyer, ed., Lexikon der Bibelhermeneutik: Begriffe, Methoden, Theorien, Konzepte (Berlin: de 
Gruyter, 2009–2013), xiv–xv.  
44 Oda Wischmeyer, “Texte, Text und Rezeption: Das Paradigma der Text-Rezeptions-Hermeneutik des 
Neuen Testaments,” in Die Bibel als Text: Beiträge zu einer textbezogenen Bibelhermeneutik, NET 14, ed. Oda 
Wischmeyer and Stefan Scholz (Tübingen-Basel: Francke, 2008), 155–192.  
45 Hans Dieter Betz, Galatians: A Commentary on Paul’s Letter to the Churches in Galatia, Hermeneia 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), 13. 
46 Richard N. Longenecker, Galatians, WBC (Dallas: Word, 1990), ix. 
47 Martinus C. de Boer, Galatians: A Commentary, NTL (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 2. 
48 J. Louis Martyn, Galatians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 33A (New York: 
Doubleday, 1997), 13. 
49 Martyn, Galatians, 22, 23. 
50 See, for example, Martyn, Galatians, 299–300. 
51 Prof. Dr Bert Jan Lietaert Peerbolte urged me to include a section on detextification and the Ausgangstext 
in the present study. In this way, I came to the insights as presented in the next section, Section D.4. Text: The 
necessary media to transmit a dead language. 
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(papyri, majuscules, and minuscules), lectionaries, quotations from patristic literature, and early Latin, 
Syriac, Coptic, and other versions, this field of scholarship is dedicated to understand the creation and 
historical transmission of the documents which constitute the New Testament.52 It is the concern of 
textual critics to establish a base text by the many snippets, parts, and complete old manuscript texts 
available to us. In the introduction of the twenty-eighth edition of the Nestle-Aland Novum 
Testamentum Graece, we read concerning the use of the Editio Critica Maior53 for the Catholic Letters 
that “[i]t marks a new state of scientific research into the text of the Greek New Testament and offers a 
new constitution of the text created on this basis.”54 So the Novum Testamentum Graece  – with which 
the fifth edition of The Greek New Testament shares “an identical text”55 – represents the most recent 
results of textual criticism. To do justice to the notion of “text” as used here (“a new constitution of the 
text”), exploration of the so-called Ausgangstext is necessary.56 Textual critical research of the last 
century has led to establishing an initial text that is continuously improved.57 This eclectic text is 
hypothesized as the initial version of which the available manuscript traditions originate. Important to 
note is that the stages in the process of transmission between the autograph and this Ausgangstext are 
not accessible to textual criticism.  
This sketch allows us to draw some conclusions. First, in the present study, there is no intent to claim 
alternatives or offer improvements on the level of the documented wording as proposed by textual 
criticism. So, the edited documented Greek wording of the New Testament as presented in Editio 
Critica Maior, Novum Testamentum Graece, and The Greek New Testament is valued as the best 
representation of the verbal constitution of the autograph. Second, although we acknowledge the 
inaccessibility of the stages prior to the Ausgangstext on the level of the documented wording, we 
focus on textualizing the moment in which the autographs of Paul were orally delivered and on asking 
how the apostle would have envisioned the way his intended addressees would structure their thoughts 
in this process. One could even ponder whether the available old manuscripts and lectionaries that now 
operationally function in textual criticism as “manuscript texts” (plural) to establish the “initial text” 
(singular), would not once have functioned in a comparable (oral-aural) process. Third, we note that 
the biblical scholar relates in his everyday praxis (realm of history) to the editions of textual critical 
research as “text,” that is, the initial text as the “Greek text of the New Testament” (emphasis mine), 
 
52 See the introductions to Barbara Aland, Kurt Aland et al., eds., Novum Testamentum Graece, 28th rev. ed. 
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2012), and Barbara Aland, Kurt Aland et al., eds., The Greek New 
Testament, 5th ed. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2014). 
53 Barbara Aland et al., eds., Novum Testamentum Graecum, Editio Critica Maior: IV/I Die Katholische 
Briefe, 2 vols., 2nd rev. ed. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2013). 
54 Aland et. al, Novum Testamentum, 28th ed., xv.  
55 Aland et. al, Greek New Testament, ix. 
56 Gerd Mink, “Eine umfassende Genealogie der neutestamentlichen Überlieferung,” NTS 39 (1993): 481–
499. 
57 Kurt Aland and Barbara Aland, The Text of the New Testament: An Introduction to the Critical Editions 
and to the Theory and Practice of Modern Textual Criticism, 2nd rev. ed., trans. by Errol F. Rhodes (Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1995). 
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that is, eye-to-text-area communication. Not without reason, this discipline is named “textual 
criticism.” It is this specific, singular, and restrained media perspective that makes that this different 
original functioning of autographs and apographs falls outside the scope of textual criticism.  
 
4. Text: The necessary media to transmit a dead language  
It would be odd to speak of the “Greek letters” or the “Greek gospel.” Intuitively, we feel that the 
language of the documents (koinè Greek) is not relevant to categorizing the different genres, but 
determines the text underlying them. All the New Testament documents are composed in the lingua 
franca of the first-century Mediterranean world. For centuries, however, this language has been 
regarded as being dead. That is to say, nobody speaks this language anymore as their native tongue or 
in a natural or everyday manner. It has become disembodied regarding living and regenerating 
communities. So, for us, “koinè Greek” and “living speech” go not together. Once more, the 
distinctive media, the focus of the present study, come to the fore: since this language is not spoken 
anymore, the sole media by which koinè Greek has been transmitted – and thereby survives – is that of 
writing and/or text. Per se, dead language is conserved in text; it needs text so that one can relate to it, 
namely by reading (not to mention the painstaking academic training and the lasting necessity of 
printed or digitalized grammars, concordances, and dictionaries to do so).58 One cannot underestimate 
the impact of this dynamic on the community of biblical scholarship. Once caught up in this tunnel, 
one can only project some “Greek text” from the start. What else could we imagine from that 
perspective?  
 
5. Etymology of text: Between textum and text-as-known-to-us 
In the attempt to establish the historical parameters of “text,” it is beneficial to explore the 
etymological roots of “text.” Derived from the Latin verb texere and related to the participle textum, 
the term carries connotations such as “to weave” and “that which is woven.”59 As readers, we might be 
inclined to fill that idea with the supposition that this exposure to text is primarily visual, text appears 
as a tapestry. The text area is woven of words, interpunction, lines, and margins. Should we take this 
solely and singularly visual view, however, we would be misled. The historical origin is dominated by 
a different sensorially based experience. 
 
58 Dead languages can be attempted to be brought to life again. See, for example, Frederic J. Long and T. 
Michael W. Halcomb, Speak Koinè Greek: A Conversational Phrasebook, AGROS 1 (Wilmore: GlossaHouse, 
2014). Malcom Halcomb has also started the Koinè Conversational Institute. On another scale, and already 
highly developed, we can think of how biblical Hebrew has been brought to life again throughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. Nowadays, this modern Hebrew forms the official language of the state of Israel.  
59 Charlton T. Lewis, and Charles Short, A Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1879, repr. 
1980), 1865. 
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For example, we find the verb texere in Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria Book 9 4.13.60 The art of 
oratory prompts him to comment here on Cicero. He argues that oratory involves the structural art of 
weaving (texere) together rhythm and melody as well as eloquence. He identifies how the inherent 
powers of the spoken word should be woven together. The technical role of writing is subservient to 
this end. So we get an indication that textum and texere originally point to the procedure of composing 
powerful oratory. We see this affirmed in the world of ancient Greece where writing was also seen as a 
form of weaving. In The Craft of Zeus: Myths of Weaving and Fabric, John Scheid and Jesper Svenbro 
point out that the metaphor of weaving resembles the functioning of writing there-and-then.61 They 
distinguish woof and warp: the documented words (warp) ask for one to vocalise them in a specific 
moment to an explicit other (woof). So the combination of warp and woof constitutes the intended 
“weaving.” In the present study, we attempt to relate the “letter” in the media of “text” and “oral 
performance” to each other. The inclination here might be to frame warp as “text” or the physical 
artefact and woof as the real-time “oral performance” experienced by original addressees. As a result, 
“text” as warp was only complete through the woof. When exposed to the oral performance (woof), 
though, the intended audience was, technically speaking, not in contact with the warp itself (exposed 
to the text area). In the actual experience of the hearer(s), the woof dominated and structured the warp. 
It is clear though important to observe that this weaving of warp and woof has ceased to be the 
standard practice today. In biblical scholarship, the woof is lost and the warp is what has remained – 
transmitted through history and transformed into “text.”62 The etymology of “text” indicates the 
aforementioned lack of clarity: throughout the long history of the biblical documents the functioning 
of “text” moves from textum to text-as-known-to-us, and sometimes (arbitrarily/confusingly or 
justifiably) back. 
 
6. Paul Ricoeur: The emancipation of text 
We now turn the focus upon how the notion of “text” is used in the present study. In his essay “What 
is a text? Explanation and understanding,”63 Paul Ricoeur provides the following train of thought: he 
 
60 Quintilian, The Orator’s Education, vol. IV: Books 9–10, LBL 127, ed. and trans. by Donald A. Russel 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
61 John Scheid and Jesper Svenbro, The Craft of Zeus: Myths of Weaving and Fabric (Cambridge, Mass., and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1996; repr. 2001), 111–156; trans. of Le métier de Zeus: Mythe de tissage et 
du tissu dans le monde gréco-romain (Paris: Editions la Découverte, 1994). 
62 I was introduced to this etymology and historical perspective in a personal conversation with Prof. Dr  
Samuel Byrskog. See also Samuel Byrskog, “History and Story in Acts – A Middle Way? The ‘We’ Passages, 
Historical Intertexture, and Oral History,” in Contextualizing Acts: Lukan Narrative and Greco-Roman 
Discourse, SBLSS 20, ed. Todd Penner and Caroline Vander Stichele (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature 
2003), 257–283.  
63 Paul Ricoeur, “What is a text? Explanation and understanding,” in Hermeneutics and the Human Science: 
Essays on Language, Action, and Interpretation, ed., trans. and introduced by John B. Thompson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1981), 145–64. 
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says “that a text is any discourse fixed by writing.”64 This fixedness of speech in writing has 
“provoked a radical change in our relation to the very statements of discourse.”65 Thus he situates 
“discourse” between speech and writing. Although a discourse could be orally expressed, it “is written 
precisely because it is not said.” Speech discourse has to be differentiated from text discourse. So 
“fixation by writing takes the very place of speech.” This changed relation to discourse “suggests that 
a text is really a text only when it is not restricted to transcribing an anterior speech, when instead it 
inscribes directly in written letters what the discourse means.” In conclusion, real text has to be 
different from (an anterior) speech. 
Then Ricoeur compares dialogue – “an exchange of questions and answers” – with the writing-reading 
relation. Contrary to dialogue, “the writer does not respond to the reader” and “the book divides the act 
of writing and reading into two sides, between which there is no communication.” Text provides 
monologue. Thus, we will suggest in the present study that text-as-known-to-us has to speak for itself.  
The comparison to dialogue “confirms our hypothesis that writing is a realisation which takes the 
place of it [the act of dialogue] and, as it were, intercepts it.” This interception is related to the reversal 
“that what comes to writing is discourse as intention-to-say and that writing is a direct inscription of 
this intention, even if … writing began with the graphic transcription of the signs of speech.” The 
related discourse in text becomes abstracted from the circumstantial milieu. At the end of this section, 
we read that “[t]his emancipation of writing … is the birth of text.”66 So Ricoeur provides a historical 
understanding of how text-as-we-know-it developed and how it functions now. His train of thought 
commences with the situation in which writing is subservient to, defined by, and not more than the 
inscription of living speech in reciprocity to the actual circumstantial milieu of that specific speech. 
We can recognize here not only what has been said before on textum and the ancient Greek metaphor 
of warp and woof, but also the body-to-body communication which was originally related to the letters 
of Paul. His explanation culminates in the description of “text” as an idiosyncratic and independently 
functioning media. For reasons of clarity, in the present study, this specific media is framed as 
autonomous text, that is, autonomously functioning text. The historical analysis by Ricoeur prompts 
the conclusion that (autonomous) text emerges from the documentation of the spoken word, but cannot 
implicitly or self-evidently be equated with it or the documentation thereof (textum). In this light, 
explication or differentiation is imperative when we encounter or use the notion of “text” on the level 
of text.  
In distinction from text-as-known-to-us, we will approach the corpus Paulinum in line with Ricoeur’s 
“inscription of living speech.” In search of forms of contrast, we will take into account the two 
distinctive contexts mentioned, namely, the circumstantial milieu of living speech and the quasi-world 
of texts (Chapter 3). 
 
64 Ricoeur, “What is a text?”, 145. 
65 Ibid., 146. 
66 Ibid., 147. 
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Ricoeur draws a crucial conclusion from the emancipation of text. As we will see, this differentiation 
between “text” and “living speech” penetrates the mental dimension – which is of particular interest to 
this study:  
 
The eclipse of the circumstantial world by the quasi-world of texts can be so complete that, in a civilisation 
of writing, the world itself is no longer what can be shown in speaking but is reduced to a kind of ‘aura’ 
which written works unfold. Thus we speak of the Greek world or the Byzantine world. This world can be 
called ‘imaginary’, in the sense that it is represented by writing in lieu of the world presented by speech; by 
this imaginary world is itself a creation of literature (emphasis original).67 
 
Living speech presents, whereas text represents the world. We can now add to the earlier argument 
that text has to speak for itself, that this monologue is structured on another level as well, namely, the 
level of representation. We can also refer to this dynamic as abstraction, formalization, or critical 
knowledge. As we saw in the introduction to section D. “Text”: Preliminary considerations, this way 
of structuring thought is framed as the predominantly literate state of mind. Because of text, we can 
make the intellectual movement from the uncritical participation in a concrete situation (presence) to 
the formal and externalized knowledge of that same realm of history (representation). Due to this 
possibility, we do not need to be present ourselves per se in a particular realm of history to represent it. 
In this typical way, we relate to past events; this pertains, for example, to the earlier mentioned 
“Greek” and “Byzantine world” but also, as we will see in Chapter 3, to the originally intended 
delivery of the Letter to the Galatians.68  
In line with Ricoeur, we observe that the emancipation of writing into text has created a new and 
fundamentally different relation to the world around us. Representation has brought a structuring of 
thought of its own. For this reason, we define “text” to be autonomous: Autonomous text functions 
independently from the circumstantial milieu (presence), while it can represent – according to its own 
rules – reality in total (representation/representing presence). Ricoeur’s historical overview of “text,” 
therefore, underscores the intent to take two distinct mindsets into account, that is, a predominantly 
oral mindset and a predominantly literate one.69   
 
67 Ibid., 149. 
68 Although we are not present ourselves, we will basically always fall back on and fill in uncritically this 
distant past “world” from our presently experienced world, unless we come explicitly and critically to another 
textualization. As was noted, for example, in the discussion on the parlance of “reading” and “public reading” 
regarding the original functioning of the New Testament (see above). 
69 In this respect, we allow ourselves a detour to Jacques Derrida and “the question of the text” as addressed 
by him in his Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak with preface by the translator; rev. ed. 
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). We do this in an extended footnote because the 
argumentation in the present study is not directed by his answer. As explained in his preface, this question is 
related to the “historical status” and/or “proper time and place” of “text” (lxxxix, emphasis original). In the first 
chapter, he concentrates on “writing.” He distinguishes between a “secondary” and “primary” form of writing. 
The former is “writing in the narrow sense,” that is, the common perception of writing as the “simple 
‘supplement to the spoken word’” (7). He explains this approach to “writing” on the basis of a scheme of 
Aristotle (De Interpr. 1.16a): knowledge starts with “mental experiences” which are symbolized in the “spoken 
word” which are symbolized and exteriorized in the “written word” (11). In this hierarchical structure, the 
written word is exterior and secondary to the phonè (voice) and, in particular, the Logos. Based on a dichotomy 
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With regard to the present study, there are two important implications in terms of doing justice to the 
different communicative processes behind the common “text” parlance in biblical scholarship. First, 
when we refer to “text” in the present study, we mean the independent media of autonomous text as 
we are used to in academia, not textum or the inscription of living speech. In Chapter 3, the 
textualization of “text here-and-now to us” will grant more depth to this framing. Second, the opacity 
in the phraseology makes clear that a radical path should be pursued to create more clarity on the 
status of “text” in biblical scholarship (concept and/or physical artefact and the implicit equation with 
letter). The present study is concerned to contribute to this debate. In a heuristic manner or “on the 
level of text,” we posit, as a consequence, that the realm of history there-and-then is void of “text.” 
This is not so much a claim on the factual or objective level, but, in this way, we force ourselves to 
critically reconsider our vocabulary and explore alternative formulations of the intended 
communicative act. In this respect, we will use terms on the original functioning such as “to 
compose/composition,” “oral performance,” “aural event,” “oral delivery,” or “embodiment by the 
emissary.” Regarding the object, we will speak of “documented wording,” “textum,” “inscription of 
living speech,” “scroll,” “token,” or “ancient document.” 
 
between “the non-worldly and wordly, the inside and outside, ideality and non-ideality, … transcendental and 
empirical etc.” (8) – which can be extended to the “signified” (thought-sense) and “signifier” (concept) – the 
Logos, as well as the phonè, belong to the first part of these oppositions. In different formulations, we can 
glimpse the Logos as follows: it is “full speech, that was fully present (present to itself, to its signified, to the 
other very condition of the theme of presence in general)” (8). This “logocentrism” – being closely related or 
even synonymous to “phonocentrism” – means that “[t]he privilege of the phonè does not depend upon a choice 
that could have been avoided (…) The system of ‘hearing (understanding)-oneself-speak’ through the phonic 
substance – which presents itself as the non-exterior, nonmundane, therefore nonempirical or noncontingent 
signifier – has necessarily dominated the history of the world during an entire epoch” (7/8). “All the 
metaphysical determinations of truth … are ... inseparable from the instance of the logos ... understood … in the 
sense of God’s infinite understanding” (10, 11). He argues that the Logos is related to the metaphor of the 
“book” – for example, the “book of Nature and God’s writing” (15) or “God’s book (natural or law, indeed 
natural law)” (16). In this light, another quotation is helpful: “The idea of the book is the idea of a totality … of 
the signifier; this totality of the signifier cannot be a totality, unless a totality constituted by the signified pre-
exists it, supervises its inscriptions and its signs, and is independent of it in its ideality” (18). For that reason and 
in line with his deconstructive agenda, he declares the “death of the book” – similar to “a death of … full 
speech” (8). In this way, we touch on his definition of “text”: “[T]he destruction of the book … denudes the 
surface of text” (18). Destructing the totality of the Logos makes to shift the relation between the “signified” and 
“signifier” or the nature of the “sign.” Here he introduces the thought of the signifier as “trace” (18). Beyond the 
instituting question of philosophy “What is … ?” (19), we move towards “the liberation of the signifier from its 
dependence or derivation with respect to the logos and the related concept of truth or the primary signified, in 
whatever sense that is understood” (19). Referring to Friedrich Nietzsche, he argues that at the moment that 
“writing” or the “text” does not any longer have “to transcribe or discover … the … presence of the logos” (19), 
we do not have to “restore … some originary truth” (19). The fundamental and repetitive distinction between 
“non-worldly and worldly,” “transcendental and empirical,” and “signified and signifier” does not have to be 
bridged anymore (9). Beyond this system of oppositions, he poses the grammè as the element which precedes the 
origin of meaning in general (9). Instead of a “secondary,” he speaks of a “primary writing.” This activity entails 
a deconstruction of the traditional and deeply ingrained perception of text. In the words of the translator, Spivak, 
one can formulate that this perception “is inadequate yet necessary to say” (xiii; see also 13) and “the ‘text’ is a 
preface to the next” (xii). This primary writing entails a continuously repeating though constantly deepening of 
what is expressed. From the perspective of the approach of detextification, two questions come to the fore. First, 
is this effect, in the end, restricted to the realm of text[s] or does it penetrate the participatory realm of history as 
such? The second question is related to the distinction between mindsets as applied in the present study: Does 
deconstruction and the “death of the book” affect and change the way in which we structure thought?   
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Caution to the reader #3: The Galatians as knowing subjects in actu – not the reader 
Now we bring together a number of lines of thinking mentioned in the previous Cautions to the reader. 
In accordance with the earlier sketched historical parameters of oral performance, not only a 
distinctive media is at stake (oral performance) but also a different subject in actu is at stake (Galatian 
converts). Next to “time” and “place,” we get hold of another constituent of the realm of history, that 
is, the “knowing subject in actu.” So not only the way in which present-day readers participate 
(reading text) is different than in oral delivery, but – put radically – in the originally intended realm of 
history they have no place. Paul related to his Galatian converts as the knowing subjects in actu. This 
presupposition has the following crucial implication: as long as we, as present-day readers, remain in 
an uncritical or operational way the knowing subject vis-à-vis the biblical text as “text,” we exclude 
the originally intended addressees from the process of coming to understand. So, instead of labouring 
to come to some understanding ourselves – What does it mean? – or debating differences in given 
meanings (what), we have to come to understand the way in which these original hearers would have 
understood, that is, differences in how thoughts are organized. Thus, when we explicate the Galatian 
converts as the knowing subjects in actu, on their own terms in the realm of history there-and-then, in 
distinction to ourselves vis-à-vis the biblical text in our realm here-and-now, we get sight of the 
mental dimension in the realm of history. That is to say, we are forced to do justice to their specific 
way of structuring thought in distinction from as well as by means of our (highly literate and 
dominant) way of doing so – we need text to detextify. Once more, we see in this way that the 
historian has to be given priority over the reader by asking what is happening, or how does it function.  
 
Caution to the reader #4: Detextification and textification  
In the preceding Caution to the reader, we touched on the most important insight of the present study: 
detextification means that the dimension of the knowing subjects in actu (plural) – that lies per se 
beyond the level of text – has to be included on the level of text. The problem is that the manner in 
which the original addressees of Paul’s letters structured their thoughts is not intrinsically in line with 
the level of text or the realm of extra-historical thought. Now the dichotomy noted earlier will prove to 
be crucial (Caution to the reader #1): the letter functioning as oral performance there-and-then-to-them 
will be distinguished from the functioning as autonomous text here-and-now-to-us. In light of this, the 
study explicitly and systematically textualizes from the perspective of the different knowing subjects 
in these distinctive realms of history. These additions of the distinctive knowing subjects in actu have 
an important consequence: it breaks open the tight relation between the reader and their text – that is, 
the mechanism that at the moment that the biblical scholar turns in real time to the text area in the 
edition (Bible) before them, that they, by reading, will construe meaning themselves. Put differently, 
including and distinguishing the subjects in actu (plural) will problematize our search for the meaning 
of the text and will break open some inherent limitations of the level of text or the realm of extra-
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historical thought. This becomes apparent when we critically examine the question that governs 
reading: What does it mean? The knowing subject in actu implicitly determines the following 
dimensions of the realm of history in which that subject participates; that is to say, we have to add to 
the question, What does it mean, “to me/us,” “here-and-now,” “vis-à-vis text,” and in a 
“predominantly literate mindset”? When we detextify the letters of Paul, we will ask, How does it 
function, to whom, in what state of mind, and from whose perspective? (Chapter 3).  
Since the given object (text as noun) causes the reader to be the knowing subject in actu, the term de-
text-i-fication enables to overcome this intellectual dynamic. Through this approach we can unmake 
(de and facere) the process that the reader vis-à-vis the given object (text as noun) takes over as 
knowing subject in actu in the process of reading and focus on and textualize the original addressees 
in their specific processes of understanding in the oral delivery.  
We will refer to the opposite dynamic as textification. This movement implies that the distinctive 
functioning of the New Testament documents in the realm of history there-and-then is explicitly 
acknowledged (oral performance/public reading). However, in one and the same argumentation, the 
nature or essence of these documents is also defined as text in an absolute way: as we will see in 
Chapter 2, in several studies one refers to “the text” (emphasis original) of the Bible. In this way, we 
move alongside the realm of history (process) especially on the one of extra-historical thought 
(product); the originally intended and represented functioning cannot infringe on this status and the 
present availability of the New Testament. As a consequence, the biblical scholar – in the actual 
process of reading the biblical text – will always remain the single and uncritical knowing subject in 
actu. Textification is, therefore, the process in which the biblical text is declared to be text in an 
absolute manner, that is, on and beyond the level of text; the use of the nomen and related physically 
available artefact (“text”) is placed beyond critical questioning.  
 
7. Recapitulation: Text 
In the present study, the notion “text” is only used to frame a distinct and independently functioning 
media. That is to say, on the level of this actual text, “text” consistently means “autonomously 
functioning text.” This media can and has to speak for itself. This monologue is different from 
everyday speaking in that it re-presents the “world,” “reality,” or the “realm of history” according to 
its own rules. In this representation, it facilitates the realm of extra-historical thought.70 The realm of 
 
70 This perspective has to be differentiated from “text” as used by Rafael Rodrìquez, In his article “Reading 
and Hearing,” referring to Brian Street and “textuality,” he wants to do justice to the fact “that Jesus traditions 
could enter written media without becoming ‘frozen’ or being severed from cultural milieu that incorporated but 
transcended written texts” (163). According to him, in these communities, “texts … emerge as a reference 
system for behaviour and orientation, they become central points round which group identities develop and 
cohere” (163); “the emphasis on oral performative dynamics and the decentring of written texts that I am 
proposing requires us to rethink the role written texts played in the production of other written texts in the 
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history is characterized by flux and becoming, text resembles fixedness and being. This abstracted 
relation to the “world” is possible due to the eye-to-text-area communication. In academia, we not 
only have a predominantly literate mindset, but we also have internalized this media beyond critical 
awareness, that is, we live in an ever-expanding universe of text. 
 
 
E. Hypothesis (2): Media and mindsets – to understand how they understood  
 
It is now time to turn to some preliminary considerations about the Letter to the Galatians. 
Notwithstanding the somewhat odd and exceptional passages of Gal 3.1 and 4.20 (see above), we 
normally deal with familiar kinds of reading experiences. We mean those passages that constitute the 
essential and theological core of Galatians. In these cases, reading often is taken as an intellectual 
labour. Take, for example, Gal 2.19–20 – a passage we will investigate in Chapter 4: 
 
For through the law I died to the law, so that I might live to God. I have been crucified with Christ; and it is 
no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me. And the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the 
Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me.  
 
Another example is 3.10–12, which will also be discussed later: 
  
All who rely on observing the law are under a curse, for it is written: “Cursed is everyone who does not 
continue to do everything written in the Book of the Law.” Clearly no one is justified before God by the law, 
because, “The righteous will live by faith.” The law is not based on faith; on the contrary, “The man who 
does these things will live by them.”  
 
Contrary to Gal 3.1, when we asked What is happening?, in this instance we are captivated ourselves 
by these complex reasonings. Vis-à-vis these passages, we are determined to understand the text: What 
does Paul mean? How does he reason? How does he use these Scripture proofs? What are his 
presuppositions? What is his theology? What do others write about this passage? The role of the reader 
seems to usurp that of the historian. 
When we ponder over the different nature of this reading experience, compared to Gal 3.1, we realize 
that we do not hear him personally cry out to his Galatian converts anymore. These words are not self-
evidently identifiable for us as direct speech. Neither the role of the emissary, nor the question of what 
had happened to cause Paul to reason in this (perhaps complicated) way comes naturally to mind. We 
are caught up in the zone (level) of text. In the role of historian, however, the central question is, What 
is happening to the Galatian converts in the moment of delivery of this passage – as envisioned by 
Paul in the process of composition? Therefore, as an antidote to the implicit equation of “message” 
(Eco) or “letter” and “text” – through which our reading of it could eclipse the original functioning in 
 
ancient world” (170). In line with this agenda, the contribution of the present study is to offer alternatives for the 
given use of concepts such as “text” on the level of our own texts.     
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which the Galatian converts would have participated – we propose to explicitly differentiate between 
not only media but also mindset. This is the second step to come to the hypothesis of the present study 
(see earlier, Section B.).  
 
 
F. Detextification: How to get before the letter functioning as text to us? 
 
On this basis, we can formulate the leading question of the present study: How can a biblical scholar 
here-and-now relate to the text of the letters of Paul in such a way that one can understand how the 
apostle envisioned his original addressees to understand the documented words in the event of 
delivery? In this way, we bring together in one question the two hypothesized media functionings, the 
related distinctive mindsets or knowing subjects in actu, and the roles of and hierarchy between reader 
and historian.  
We can divide this overarching question into smaller units and turn to the Letter to the Galatians. 
Three governing questions come to the fore. The first two are related and concern the mode of 
communication. First, the question is asked, What does oral performance do to the participating 
hearer? How will the hearer structure their thoughts in this body-to-body communication? In our 
answering, we will concentrate on the Galatian converts. Second, we ask, What does eye-to-text-area 
communication, that is, processing autonomous text, do to the academically trained reader (including 
the letter as text)? How will they structure their thoughts? The present study is, however, constituted in 
real time by one of these media, that is, text. Since the predominantly oral culture of the first-century 
Mediterranean world has been studied extensively, we will pay attention in particular to the 
ramifications of the functioning of text here-and-now-to-us for our understanding of the functioning of 
oral performance there-and-then-to-them. Thus, we need to ask a third question that is more 
fundamental in nature and adds to the idea of the present study as philosophy of biblical studies: How 
does the real-time media and mindset in biblical scholarship (second question) influence how we 
answer the first question? Answers to this question should penetrate the technology of autonomous 
text. In this way, the approach of detextification will become clear (Chapter 3). So, the reader of the 
current text should be warned once more: the approach of detextification can impinge on how we are 
used to structuring our thoughts. The aim is to find guidelines to identify and overcome possible 
effects of the media muddle and to correct and/or deepen in certain aspects our representation of the 
original functioning of the Letter to the Galatians. The answers to this more fundamental question will 
help us to develop an approach in line with the leading question of the present study (see above).  
To address these subquestions, we review in the first Chapter a selection of publications in the field of 
oral studies. Starting with the founding fathers of the modern study of oral tradition, Milman Parry and 
Albert Lord, we will turn to John Miles Foley, who was able to deepen their grasp of the oral 
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traditions under scrutiny. In his Theory of Metonymical or Traditional Referentiality, Foley has 
described how structural elements – recorded in ancient documents – relate to the collective memory 
of the intended participants. Subsequently, we will pay attention to Eric Havelock and Walter Ong, 
who participated in a revolutionary exploration of, broadly speaking, orality as well as literacy.71 They 
enable us to explore mental transformations in Western culture based on the technology of writing, 
that is, the typical way in which knowledge is construed (mindsets).  
In the second Chapter, we provide a history of the research of biblical studies that relate the corpus 
Paulinum to the predominantly oral culture of the first-century Mediterranean world. Here the 
introduced implicit equation between “letter” and “text” becomes relevant. The following 
subquestions will govern the discussion of this Chapter: How do these studies relate the different 
media functionings or communicative processes involved to each other? What kind of critical attention 
is paid to the terminology – the use of “text” and related concepts on the level of text (see Caution to 
the reader #2: The level of text and textualization)? What can we learn in this respect from these 
studies? 
In the third Chapter, we present the approach of detextification. The Chapter contends that we can 
overcome an implicit equation of “letter” and “text” in real time by two intellectual movements. In 
both, we relate the totality of history to the particular artefact of the physically available letter. On the 
one hand, we argue that the realm of history (totality) is the background against which the intended 
exposure of the original audience to the oral delivery had to take place (there-and-then-to-them). On 
the other, our actual reading of the letter as text here-and-now also takes place in the realm of history 
as well. First, text hic et nunc pro nobis is textualized. Second, we provide a textualization of oral 
performance illic et tunc pro eis. In the terminology of our study, this intellectual endeavour is referred 
to as textualizing history. The Chapter goes on to argue that another intellectual movement is similarly 
needed. Next to the emerging communis opinio on the original oral delivery of the biblical documents, 
it was noted above that the presupposition and parlance in biblical scholarship is that there has been 
“text” from the start. This product is at the same time a given; it is physically available to us here-and-
now. Thus, we have to deal with the crucial moment in which we ourselves turn in real time from the 
formal level of critical representation to the operational realm in which we are uncritically present. 
This transition is emphasised because the functioning of the rather unfamiliar textum has to penetrate 
the overly familiar one of text-as-known-to-us (that is actually operative right now!). We call this 
movement historicizing text. These two complementary movements will pave the way to the 
 
71 Despite valid critique on the autonomy as ascribed to literacy by Havelock and Ong and the allegation of 
the so-called Great Divide theory, we seek to demonstrate that several of their insights can help us to understand 
ourselves as present-day readers in the specific socio-cultural context of academia or high literacy (Chapter 1).   
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detextification of Paul’s letters: through textualizing history and historicizing text, we can detextify 
our understanding of Paul’s letters.72  
In the fourth Chapter, we approach two specific passages from Paul’s Letter to the Galatians, Gal 
3.10–12 and 2.18–21. In comparison with existing perceptions of some contemporary scholars, the 
detextification of both passages will hone in upon differences in the structuring of thought by the 
intended addressees. In the first example, we will provide an enthymematical perspective on the 
reasoning in Gal 3.10–12. As a result, one simple and historically self-evident syllogistic structure will 
be identified as governing the whole reasoning in chapters 2 and 3 of the letter. In this logos, we 
encounter one of the means of power on the part of Paul’s opponents, which the apostle attempts to 
counter. In a similar vein, we will concretize our grasp of Gal 2.18–21. The rhetorical strategy is 
inextricably related to the sensorially based memories of the Galatian converts. When we detextify our 
grasp of this passage, in particular we see – as affirmation but also deepening of the commentaries by 
Louis Martyn and Martinus de Boer – that the power struggle between Paul and his opponents is 
determined by the body. By recalling and reframing the baptismal experiences of his hearers, the 
apostle wants to counter the call to circumcision of these teachers. The concern of these examples is to 



















72 This is stated with the reserve that we will never bridge the gap between abstract and concrete, extra- and 
inner-historical and formal and operational. However, we can scrutinize degrees of abstraction in our structuring 
of thought. Although never fully, we can pull ourselves – like the Baron – more and more out of the mire. 




1. The study of oral tradition: Getting before Homer as text 
 
This Chapter explores not only the rather unknown world of preliteracy, the predominantly oral 
mindset, and the practice of oral performance, but also the interfaces with literacy and textuality, by 
engaging with the work of Milman Parry, Albert Bates Lord, and John Miles Foley as the founding 
fathers of this field.73 The Chapter also examines Eric Havelock and Walter Ong as influential scholars 
in orality studies, acknowledging that in the contemporary debate, however, their contributions are 
partially regarded as outdated.74 One reason is that their approach tends to be governed by an 
ideological presupposition. The critique is that they ascribe an autonomous status to “literacy” 
(singular): although operating within the realm of history, it is not affected or transformed by it.75 In 
his Literacy in Theory and Practice, Brian Street states that Havelock and Ong argue that literacy does 
something to people, but they forget that people also do things to literacy.76 Here a change of 
perspective is involved. Instead of a monolithic and freischwebende “literacy,” Street frames these 
human activities as literacy practices (plural).77 In the field of ancient literacy, the alternative title of a 
volume on the subject is illustrative: Ancient Literacies: The Culture of Reading in Greece and 
Rome.78 The plural of “literacies” should correct the title of William Harris’s seminal monograph 
 
73 The main forum in orality studies is the journal Oral Tradition (http://oraltradition.org). 
74 In the field of ancient literacy, see William A. Johnson, “Toward a Sociology of Reading in Classical 
Antiquity,” AJP 121/4 (2000): 593–627. Given the debate on ancient reading hitherto – whether reading was 
aloud or in silence – he comments that how the question is formulated is decisive. He warns against an 
oversimplified approach. In his own words: “... it will not do to focus narrowly, as in the recent debate, on a 
single mode of inquiry such as cognitive analysis. Similarly, the analysis ... of scholars like Goody, Havelock, 
Ong, and their followers – who find in writing and in its reflex, reading, a ‘technology’ with (various) 
determinative consequences for the society – will, from this point of view, be seen as too simplistic, even 
reductionist, and too inattentive to the particulars of the specific cultures under study.” (604/5) 
75 Another point of critique is related to the alleged Great Divide. For advocates of this standpoint, the 
presence, influence, and development of literacy entails a pejorative stance towards the preceding time and/or 
influence of primal orality. In Chapter 2 of the present study, this viewpoint and critique will become clearer in 
the discussion of the seminal book by Werner H. Kelber, The Oral and the Written Gospel: The Hermeneutics of 
Speaking and Writing in the Synoptic Tradition, Mark, Paul, and Q (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983; repr., with a 
new introduction by the author, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997). 
76 Brian V. Street, Literacy in Theory and Practice, CSOLC 9 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984; repr. 1993, 1995), 13. In his explanation of the problem of this approach, two alleged functions of oral 
language have to be distinguished. One function is directed towards “imparting meaning,” that is, “statements ... 
assigning a set of truth conditions.” The second function is the one of “regulating and maintaining social or 
interpersonal relations between people.” The pivotal and, as a result, debated effect of writing is that the latter 
enabled the separation of these two functions. The second one remained unchanged, whereas the first function 
could develop into “autonomous text” (20). 
77 Street, Literacy, 1–2. The value of this perspective is that it is not dogmatic or – in terms of the present 
study – extra-historical in nature. “Literacy practices” have to be located in the realm of history and 
differentiated according to kinds of practices and several cultural contexts in which they take place. 
78 William A. Johnson and Holt N. Parker, eds., Ancient Literacies: The Culture of Reading in Greece and 
Rome (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009). This title is derived from the first contribution by Rosalind 
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Ancient Literacy.79 In comparison to Havelock and Ong, scholars from the 1980s onward have a 
historical and/or sociological perspective and draw conclusions in a more tentative way as to what 
people do to literacy.  
Nonetheless, there is still another valid perspective. In the Introduction, the long history of Western 
literacy is outlined, culminating in academia as our socio-cultural context. Especially in the 
Humanities, text is the dominant media. We postulated a predominantly literate mindset. Since the 
predominantly oral mindset of Paul and his original addressees in the moment of delivery has to be 
taken into account as well, these contexts are decisively different. Regarding the contemporary study 
of ancient literacies, we must, therefore, ask: What role does the “literacy” of these scholars, that is, 
the tradition of institutionalized research, autonomous text as dominant media, and the related socio-
cultural mindset, play in their grasp of these distinct “ancient literacies” (see the third governing 
question in the Introduction)? As argued before, we use this contrast as a heuristic lever. So, the aim of 
the present study is not so much to isolate and study a historical practice (oral delivery of Paul’s 
letters), but to explore the different ways in which the different subjects in actu arrive at understanding 
(original participants there-and-then and ourselves as present-day readers in academia). In view of this 
contrast, we will scrutinize these seminal studies by Havelock and Ong.  
 
 
A. Milman Parry: Homeric epics – Breaking the spell of text 
 
Despite his early death and limited number of publications, Milman Parry (1902–1935) has changed 
Homeric studies. More so, he initiated with his research a new academic discipline, the study of oral 
tradition. At the age of twenty-three, Parry left America for France to study at the Sorbonne in Paris. 
There he studied under the supervision of the linguist Antoine Meillet. Not hindered by any 
convention in classical studies, this professor provided him with a rather unconventional perspective 
on Homer’s epics: Meillet was convinced that the Iliad and Odyssey were not the product of a single 
literate genius,80 but the residue of refined oral traditional techniques of several generations of singers. 
The Master of Arts thesis which Parry wrote in Paris, already adumbrated the outlines of his 
 
Thomas, “Writing, Reading, Public and Private ‘Literacies’: Functional Literacy and Democratic Literacy in 
Greece,” 13–45. 
79 William V. Harris, Ancient Literacy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); see also 
Johnson’s Introduction to Ancient Literacies, 3–13. Note that the plural is not extended to the key concepts of the 
subtitle, “culture,” and “reading.” As argued in the Introduction, we encounter here the extra-historical tendency 
to the one, unchangeable, and absolute (being). We could ask, therefore, whether it is not more logical to speak 
of “cultures” and “ways of reading” (plural). 
80 The search for this kind of genius is characteristic of cultures deeply formed by literacy. 
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revolutionary approach to Homer.81 Though the lasting impact of his research came as a result of 
fieldwork among bards in present-day Serbia and Croatia. His approach to Homer became decisively 
framed by a rigid historical or operational matrix. He was able to frame his understanding, not in the 
standard manner vis-à-vis text, but by getting before these epics functioning as “text” to him: he was 
present at and participated in live performances of comparable stories. Thus, Homer as text for highly 
trained readers, such as Parry’s colleagues in academia, became distinguished from Homer as live oral 
performance. In short, he forged a way out of the media muddle in the study of Homer.  
It is important to note at this point that, in terms of the methodology of this study, it is not possible to 
engage in fieldwork in the same way; we cannot personally witness processes comparable to the 
apostle in actu – in the sense of composing letters and instructing emissaries who will deliver them in 
real time, or gain personal experience of the influence of the predominantly oral mindset on this 
process. 
Parry lived in the days in which historical criticism was on the rise. Contrary to the given traditional 
opinions, modern humankind felt obliged to comprehend reality by a radical application of reason. 
This movement – which gained influence in Homeric studies and in the approach to the Christian 
Bible – represented the modern era in optima forma. Regarding the Iliad and Odyssey, the Homeric 
question had come to the fore anew in a different way: Who was Homer? Were the epics written by 
one or several authors? By whom, when, and where were the poems composed? Under what 
circumstances were they composed? This historico-critical approach changed the debate. The 
conviction was that there existed different layers in the text of the Homeric epics. These layers – found 
in the text itself – represented different stages of composition throughout history. In addition to 
historical (higher) criticism, textual (lower) criticism became important; this discipline aimed at 
reconstructing the most original form of the text of the Homeric epics. In the early decades of the 
1900s, it was assumed that the Homeric epics were memorized verbatim; they must have been recited 
word by word every time in the same fixed manner before the process of writing down. So, the highly 
literate academy approached Homer under its own conditions of media and mindset.  
In comparison to his contemporaries in classical studies, Parry pursued his own path. It is in the last 
three years of his short life that he conducted fieldwork. On two trips in 1933 and 1934–35, he 
researched bardic culture in actu. Together with his assistant Albert Lord, he studied the complex 
communicative dynamics of traditional poetry as encountered in oral live performances. In the words 
of Milman Parry himself, “Its method was to observe singers working in a thriving tradition of 
 
81 Milman Parry, “The Traditional Epithet in Homer,” in The Making of Homeric Verse: The Collected 
Papers of Milman Parry, ed. Adam Parry (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 1–190; trans. of L’Épithet 
traditionnelle dans Homère: Essai sur un problème de style homêrique (Paris, 1928).  
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unlettered song and see how the form of their songs hangs upon their having to learn and practice their 
art without reading and writing.”82   
In his fieldwork, Parry was able to study and describe the practice of bards in line with the question 
What is happening to them? (see the Introduction). The most fundamental insight was that, instead of 
verbatim rehearsals, these singers could (re)perform their epics time and again without the aid of 
writing. Dependent on the specific situation of the audience, in every performance, they created these 
same stories anew. Every time the same stories, but never verbatim the same. A distinctive perspective 
on the epics was the result. As phrased by John Miles Foley, “From unmatched philological scrutiny 
through innovative fieldwork that was as careful and thorough as it was creative, he fashioned the 
foundation for what has since become an entire new discipline in its own right.” 83 His work has 
generated a still growing and broadening stream of research and publications.  
To break this new ground, Parry paid focused attention to the details of the Homeric epics down to 
their ornamental and minute elements. Due to literate biases, these components were not regarded then 
as being constitutive for the epics as such. In his Master of Arts thesis, his first step was to describe the 
formula. This formulaic structure – also referred to as the noun epithet – is a recurring fixed 
expression:  
 
The epic poets fashioned and preserved in the course of generations a complex technique of formulae, a 
technique designed in its smallest details for the twofold purpose of expressing ideas appropriate to epic in a 
suitable manner, and of attenuating the difficulties of versification.  
 
The epics were sung in hexameter, a line of verse consisting of six metrical dactyls (one stressed 
syllable followed by two unstressed ones). These formulae occupied fixed places in the hexameter 
line. Their place was determined by audible pauses in the performance of the line (caesura).84 These 
fixed elements were stitched together in various though recurring ways. The rhythm of the wording 
governed the choice and structuring of the formulae. In this way, the performer was able to capture the 
attention of his hearers. Here we gain an interesting perspective. Meter has to do with the activated 
senses (bodies) of a live audience. The rhythm takes hold of the body and via the body the heart is 
reached. In a similar vein, Parry studied in his subsequent doctoral thesis in Paris the ornamental 
adjective or epithet.85 As with the formula, the ornamental adjective served meter as well. However, 
more was at issue, since he discovered a mechanism of pars pro toto. By mentioning a single epithet, 
 
82 A quote taken from a manuscript for a book titled The Singer of Tales, which Parry started to write after his 
return from the former Yugoslavia and was unable to finish because of his untimely death. See the second 
edition of Albert B. Lord’s The Singer of Tales, ed. Stephen Mitchell and Gregory Nagy (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press: 2000), 3.  
83 John M. Foley, ed., Comparative Research on Oral Traditions: A Memorial for Milman Parry (Columbus: 
Slavica Publishers, 1987), 19. 
84 See Parry, “The Traditional Epithet in Homer,” 9 
85 A well-known example is the recurring fixed expression, “the swift-footed Achilleus” (ποδάρκης δῖος 
Ἀχιλλεύς). See “Homeric Formulae and Homeric Metre,” in The Making of Homeric Verse, 191–239; trans. of 
Les Formules et la mêtrique d’Homère (Paris, 1928).   
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the poet could evoke a matrix of associations in the minds of his audience.86 Thus, the activated senses 
govern the communicative process in the realm of history there-and-then-to-them, whereas in the 
textual transmission of these stories this dimension is lost. So Parry disclosed a function of words that 
is not exclusively determined by abstracted or free-standing “meaning” – as seems to be the case in 
text here-and-now-for-us.87  
Although the specific role of meter cannot be transposed to Paul’s letters, we can take a step in 
grasping the impact of oral performance on originally intended audiences.88 The performer is called to 
capture and influence the hearts of his hearers. He does so via their bodily presence at and sensorial 
experience of the performance. Therefore, regarding the first governing question, we will stress the 
importance or dominance of context over text or – in line with the Introduction – the role of the body 
in distinction from a freischwebende cognitio. As a result, we are warned about an approach to these 
documents which is exclusively determined by “meaning” with which the present-day reader is 
acquainted.  
We conclude that the major contribution of Milman Parry is the distinction between the overly 
familiar realm of literacy and the unknown one of orality.89 In view of the Homeric epics, he left the 
quasi-world of texts (Ricoeur) and entered the forgotten world of preliteracy. Approaching Homer as 
oral performance or bard in actu, he broke the spell of text. That is, he got before Homer mediated by 
text and could thereby grasp these epics in a historically more adequate way by understanding the 
functioning of them as real-time oral performances. We emphasize, in the present study, that for 
understanding participation in oral performance the “body” is a focal point. In the terminology of the 
present study, Parry is the one who detextified the Homeric epics.   
 
 
B. Albert Bates Lord: Preliterate bards and their rather unknown world 
 
Albert Bates Lord was a student of Milman Parry and accompanied him on his field trips to the former 
Yugoslavia. By his continuing research, Lord moulded their observations in the field into the Oral-
Formulaic Theory or the Parry-Lord Thesis. As he states himself in the foreword to his The Singer of 
 
86 Adam Parry, The Making of Homeric Verse, xxix–xxx (with extensive quotes from Milman Parry) and 
Milman Parry, “The Homeric Gloss: A Study in Word-sense,” TAPhA 59 (1928): 233–247; repr. in The Making 
of Homeric Verse, 240–50. This outlook necessitates postulating an original audience in distinction from 
ourselves. In their anticipated participation, we touch on the notions of collective memory and imagination (see 
the Introduction). We will see that John Miles Foley takes this aspect further. 
87 Adam Parry, The Making of Homeric Verse, xx.  
88 In this respect, we can refer to the study by Dan Nässelqvist, Public Reading in Early Christianity: 
Lectors, Manuscripts, and Sound in the Oral Delivery of John 1–4, NovTSup 163 (Leiden: Brill, 2016). In this 
monograph, he describes and exemplifies a method of sound analysis regarding the Gospel of John.    
89 See Adam Parry, The Making of Homeric Verse, xxxiv: “What has made him best known, and has most 
aroused interest in his writing, is his sense that all poetry is divided into two great and distinct realms, the literary 
and the oral, that each of these realms has its own laws of operation and its own values, so that each is almost a 
way of looking at the world.” 
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Tales, “a theory of composition must be based not on another theory but on the facts of the practice of 
the poetry.”90 He made Parry’s concern his own – to know how oral poets continuously compose and 
recompose their songs. Here we recognize the emphasis on the operational dimension of the process.  
Their fieldwork in the former Yugoslavia and later by Lord also in Albania was originally intended to 
serve the needs of Homeric scholarship. This becomes clear in the structure of The Singer of Tales, 
which in 1949 Lord defended as his doctoral thesis.91 In the first part, he develops a fully-formed 
version of the Oral-Formulaic Theory. In the second part, the observations on the Balkan bards are 
applied to the Iliad and Odyssey. The last chapter is entitled “Some Notes on Medieval Epic.” Despite 
the brevity of these notes, the Parry-Lord legacy has extended far beyond the disciplines of classical 
and Slavic studies and even comparative literature.92  
Contrary to the assumption that bards would have memorized a poem verbatim to recall it in the 
moment of public performance, Parry and Lord demonstrated that through development over 
generations and painstaking training of the individual singers, “[a]n oral poem is not composed for but 
in performance.”93 Here the modern reader has to embark upon a journey into the unknown: 
 
Since, as we shall see, he has not memorized his song, we must conclude either that he is a phenomenal 
virtuoso or that he has a special technique of composition outside our field of experience (emphasis mine).94  
 
Our proper understanding of these procedures is hindered by our lack of a suitable vocabulary for defining 
the steps of the process. The singers themselves cannot help us in this regard because they do not think in 
terms of form as we think of it; their descriptions are too vague, at least for academic preciseness.  
 
Lord elaborates extensively on the differences between the primary oral singer and the predominantly 
literate reader. In particular, he deconstructs the basic unit in which modern man thinks – that is, “the 
word”: 
 
Man without writing thinks in terms of sound groups and not in words, and the two do not necessarily 
coincide. When asked what a word is, he will reply that he does not know, or he will give a sound group 
which may vary in length from what we call a word to an entire line of poetry, or even an entire song.95 
 
Illustrated by the word-on-the-level-of-text over against continuously changing sound groups, it 
becomes clear how great the differences are. Put in a simple and abstract dichotomy, it is the ear 
versus the eye. “Word” dominates our field of visual experience in academia. In academic discourse, 
words-as-records help us to critically distance ourselves from the flux and complexity of reality: words 
 
90 Albert B. Lord, The Singer of Tales, HSCL 24, ed. Stephen Mitchel and Gregory Nagy (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press: [1960] 2000), xxxvi. 
91 Albert B. Lord, The Singer of Tales (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960). 
92 The Singer of Tales has become a standard work in several disciplines. See the introduction to the second 
edition. 
93 Lord, Singer, 13. 
94 Ibid., 17. 
95 Ibid., 25. 
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fixate aspects of reality and become visible as externalization on physical surfaces (text area). In this 
socio-cultural context, the role of speech (sound) is subservient to the technology of reading and 
writing.  
At the same time, we should note that when we as twenty-first-century persons speak, no interruption 
or pause between words can be distinguished – contrary to writing or typing. The natural way of 
conversation is a stream of sounds governed by breathing, and interrupted for emphasis or by others 
with whom we speak. In this respect, we can also think of pre-school children when they are learning 
to speak. As parents, we teach them objects “word” by “word.” For them, however, at that stage they 
are mediated as sound only. Clearly, our training in literacy, dependent on the level, governs our 
processing of words-as-sound (talking). The important point is that the concrete lifeworld of the 
present-day reader resembles to a certain extent the one of the preliterate bard; there is no absolute 
dichotomy for us between “orality” and “literacy” or the “predominantly oral” and “predominantly 
literate state of mind.”96 So the formal framing of “word,” or word as implicitly equated with 
appearance on the level of text, in the predominantly literate state of mind is severed from the real-
time practice of talking – including ourselves. In the participatory realm of history, the basic unit is not 
fixed and does not function as w-o-r-d.97 We conclude that, historically speaking, “the word” is not the 
basic unit – not even to us. In the realm of extra-historical thought, however, this is the case. More so, 
it forms the foundation and structure of our predominantly literate mindset.  
In this way, we find an answer to the third governing question: as present-day readers, we have to be 
aware that the basic unit of the word – which we discern on the level of text and which constitutes our 
default mode of understanding in the realm of history – does not coincide with that of (predominantly) 
oral humanity, nor with that of ourselves when we are caught up in talking or listening. This is the 
fallacy of the earlier mentioned assumption that all oral performance was verbatim. We cannot take for 
granted that they structured their thoughts through “words,” in the manner that we do in this present 
study for example.  
Notwithstanding the enormity of this critical step of Lord – exploring preliterate bards in actu – what 
was not fully addressed was the decisive role of the audience and how this might be incorporated into 






96 For that reason, we prefer to qualify the world of preliteracy as “rather unknown” instead of “lost” (Adam 
Parry).  
97 The letters are separated here to emphasize the nature of the word “word” as existing at the level of text. At 
the moment that you read this word (“word”) in the line above, you experience or are exposed yourself to this 
specific media.  
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C. John Miles Foley: Preliteracy – Going into the methodological deep 
 
For the deepening of the study of oral tradition, John Miles Foley (1947–2012) has been decisive.98 As 
a scholar in comparative oral tradition, he was at home in different academic disciplines such as 
ancient Greek (Homer), medieval and Old English literature, and Serbian epic.99 Foley founded the 
academic journal Oral Tradition and the Centre for Studies in Oral Tradition at the University of 
Missouri. In the last phase of his career, he broadened his scope to studying the role of the Internet. He 
became convinced that the communicative dynamics in the Internet show parallels with those of 
primary oral communication. He brought the study of these communicative technologies together in 
the Centre for eResearch100 and, in particular, The Pathways Project.101  
 
1. What does it mean? over against How does it mean? 
Although Milman Parry and Albert Lord broke new ground with respect to oral tradition, Foley leads 
us into the methodological deep of this world void of text-as-known-to-us. Due to his efforts, the Oral-
Formulaic Theory transformed into the much broader Oral Theory. Like Parry and Lord, he 
commenced his scholarly career by fieldwork in the former Yugoslavia. In line with their focus, his 
first area of interest was matters of composition. This resulted in The Theory of Oral Composition: 
History and Methodology.102 Herein, he describes the history of the Oral-Formulaic Theory and its 
application to a myriad of ethnolinguistic areas (Hispanic, Old French, Medieval German, Irish, 
African, Arabic, Indian amongst others). Because of the diversity in ethnolinguistic research, the status 
of the formula as described by Parry required broadening. In his book Immanent Art: From Structure 
to Meaning in Traditional Oral Epic,103 Foley did just this. The result was his Theory of Traditional or 
Metonymical Referentiality. For the present study, this theory will prove to be crucial.  
In understanding oral traditional works, Foley’s step forward is his rephrasing of the fundamental 
question “What does it mean?” As argued in the Introduction, we readers in the highly literate socio-
 
98 John Miles Foley (1947-2012) was Curators’s Professor of classical studies and English and occupied the 
W. H. Byler Endowed Chair in the Humanities at the University of Missouri until his retirement in 2011. 
99 R. Scott Garner, “Annotated Bibliography of Works by John Miles Foley,” OT 26.2 (2011): 677. 
100 Centre for eResearch, http://www.e-researchcentre.org/main/index.  
101 John M. Foley, Oral Tradition and the Internet: Pathways of the Mind (Champaign: University of Illinois, 
2012). Centre for eResearch, http://www.pathwaysproject.org: “The major purpose of the Pathways Project is to 
illustrate and explain the fundamental similarities and correspondences between humankind’s oldest and newest 
thought-technologies: oral tradition and the Internet.” 
102 John M. Foley, The Theory of Oral Composition: History and Methodology (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1988). See also his, “Introduction: The Oral Theory in Context,” in Oral Traditional 
Literature: A Festschrift for Albert Bates Lord, ed. John M. Foley (Columbus: Slavica Publishers, 1981), 27–
122; John M. Foley, Oral Formulaic Theory and Research: An Introduction and Annotated Bibliography (New 
York: Garland, 1985; repr. 1989). 
103 John M. Foley, Immanent Art: From Structure to Meaning in Traditional Oral Epic (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1991). 
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cultural context of academia are trained to relate through this question to a transmitted epic or the 
Bible as text. An underlying, though silently assumed framing of understanding is, however, at issue 
here: 
 
Instead of asking “what” is meant by a work of art and its constituent parts, we should begin by asking “how” 
that work or part conveys whatever meaning can be or is communicated. Indeed, we are so imbued with the 
“literate and literary way of meaning,” with our set of proscriptive rules for negotiating aesthetic content, that 
we customarily start the inquiry with “what,” assuming silently and even unconsciously that we already know 
the “how.”104  
 
In short, he asks the question “How does it mean?” before and instead of “What does it mean?” We 
can relate this line of reasoning to the earlier described media muddle in biblical scholarship. When we 
ask “what?” while processing by reading a passage in Paul’s letters, the media dimension (“how”) is 
already implied. In the given versions within biblical scholarship, the letter means as “text” – recalling 
the statement of Umberto Eco that “what one calls ‘message’ is usually a text” (Introduction).105 Thus 
Foley also puts his finger on the media dimension in the praxis (realm of history) of scholarship.106  
 
2. Structural elements: Broadening the ‘formula’ 
In developing this theory of verbal art, Foley broadens the formulae to structural elements. These 
structural elements constitute an “oral” or “orally-derived work” and function as metonymy. 
Metonymy refers to the communicative dynamic of pars pro toto. This is reminiscent of Parry and his 
study on the epithet. In the moment that the performer uses a sound group – being vocalized in real 
time and with which his implied audience is apparently familiar – this explicit part (pars) is substituted 
for the implicit traditional whole (totum) for which it stands for both orator and audience. We can add 
that this process is governed by their imagination. 
Regarding the dynamic of the structural element in this kind of oral communication, Foley opines,  
 
Traditional elements reach out of the immediate instance in which they appear to the fecund totality of the 
entire tradition, defined synchronically and diachronically, and they bear meanings as wide and deep as the 
tradition they encode.107 
 
This is clearly a subliminal or participatory process – something that happens by just doing. It puts 
into words the fundamental relation of an audience to its specific collective memory.108 
 
104 Foley, Immanent Art, 5. 
105 In Chapter 3, Section A. Textualizing history, we will also involve the matrix of “meaning”/“to mean” in 
our effort to textualize history, because the question of how is also applicable in this respect. 
106 Note that Foley’s “literate way of meaning” is, in the present study, similar to thinking within the 
predominantly literate state of mind. 
107 Foley, Immanent Art, 7. 
108 This term has an academic history. Generally, Maurice Halbwachs has been recognized as the father of 
memory research. In the beginnings of the twentieth century, he claimed that individual memories can only be 
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Notwithstanding Foley’s focus on traditional oral works, this applies also to ourselves here-and-now. 
For example, when someone utters “9/11” (pars), this date will evoke the related matrix (totum), for 
example, from the dreadful images of one of the Twin Towers burning and an aeroplane crashing into 
the other up to themes as the war on terror and Muslim fundamentalism. Contrarily, we could also 
argue that speeches, lectures, or sermons can be experienced as tiresome when an appeal to our 
concrete lifeworld is missing. Crucial for the present research project is that, regarding the originally 
intended operational matrix of ancient documents, the intended audience in actu and their memory 
cannot be equated with the situation in which we process them as autonomous text in the context of 
the quasi-world of texts. The role of the collective memory of the original addressees urges us to 
estrangement. Explicit historical reconstruction of the metonymical way in which the original 
addressees would have understood those specific structural elements is necessary. 
In comparison to formulae, these structural elements are an important broadening of the Parry-Lord 
thesis. Since the focus in our study is on the Letter to the Galatians, the question of the collective 
memory of these converts of Paul comes to the fore.109 In line with the first governing question, we 
can ask, How did they frame the structural elements (documented wording of the letter) by the implied 
whole (their collective memory)? In Chapter 4, the examples discussed there are structured by 
metonymical referentiality. In the first example, the syllogistic reasoning of Gal 3.10–12 will be 
identified as enthymematic in nature. Instead of complete formal syllogisms on the level of text, we 
will look for structural elements in the documented wording, that is, premises or conclusions (partes). 
 
understood in the context of a group. These shared memories (collective memory) unify the group and create 
some sort of collective identity. He developed his theory on mémoire collective in his Les cadres sociaux de la 
mémoire (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952), and La topographie légendaire des évangiles en terre 
sainte: Etude de mémoire collective (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1941); for an English translation, 
see On Collective Memory, ed., trans. and introduced by Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992). Debate and research are still ongoing. Over time, different perspectives and additions have been 
proposed. For example, in his book Religion and Cultural Memory, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2006), originally published as Religion und kulturelles Gedächtnis (München: C.H. 
Beck, 2000), Jan Assmann introduces the term “cultural memory.” Social or collective memory comprises 
knowledge of a certain group in a specific time span (canon). Cultural memory, which he defines with literate 
societies in view, however, comprises also a material archive that might be discovered and studied in later times. 
In view of his professorship in Egyptology, this perspective may not be surprising. Another perspective is 
suggested by James D. G. Dunn. In Jesus Remembered: Christianity in the Making, Volume 1 (Grand Rapids and 
Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2003), he speaks of “communal memory.” In his research into the gospel and the 
historical Jesus, he pays attention to questions on memory and oral tradition. He speaks of communal memory in 
view of the situation that Jesus himself is not present anymore to the communities involved, but the narratives on 
him must have persisted and have been recorded. Dunn deals with the question of reliability of these 
biographical stories in the light of memory. In this perspective, communal memory is structured by and limited 
to specifically shared traditions on Jesus’s ministry. In this respect, we can refer to a concise and insightful 
treatment of these different kinds of memories regarding the Markan community in Arie W. Zwiep, Jairus’s 
Daughter and the Haemorrhaging Woman: Tradition and Interpretation of an Early Christian Miracle Story, 
WUNT 421 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2019), 193–94. In the present study, we prefer the more general term 
collective memory, since the focus is on the rather recent experiences of the Galatian converts in view of their 
conversion to Paul’s gospel, their communal life afterwards in his absence, and, finally, the presence and 
performances of these other teachers who call them to live out of the law.  
109 In the present study, the concept of “collective memory” is preferred above the notion of “tradition.” The 
latter can be fleshed out in all kinds of aspects on the level of text. As a result, it remains rather abstract, whereas 
“collective memory” urges taking the specific bearers of it into account. 
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In this way, we will provide a single and historically adequate syllogistic reasoning (totum). Hand in 
hand with synonymous and antonymous terms and themes we will discern up to twenty-one parts of 
this totum. We will then argue that Paul presupposes this syllogistic reasoning as constitutive of the 
collective memory of his Galatian audience. In the second example, we will contextualize Gal 2.19–20 
as a rhetorical strategy of Paul. In this passage, we will identify structural elements such as “co-
crucifixion” and the specific sequence of “to die”/“to live.” On the basis of metonymic referentiality, 
we will argue that these specific terms recall and evoke their experience of baptism, as an event having 
taken place in their concrete lifeworld and being constitutive of their collective memory. So, with his 
Theory of Metonymical Referentiality, Foley will enable us to detextify this letter. 
 
 
D. Eric Havelock: Birth pangs of a new state of mind 
 
Over time, the insights of Milman Parry and Albert Lord started to be picked up by other scholars. In 
classical studies, one such notable scholar is Eric Havelock, who examined how such insights on 
orality might inform and re-shape understanding on Greek philosophy. In this section, we engage in 
particular with his monograph Preface to Plato, in order to inform the discussion around the 
relationship between media and mindset.110  
 
1. Homeric and Platonic states of mind 
At the beginning of his academic career, Havelock engaged with the earliest forms of Greek 
philosophy, the Pre-Socratics. The earliest history of Greek philosophy had been studied hitherto 
within the given intellectual framework of Western philosophy. Havelock was convinced that the 
highly developed literacy of his contemporaries influenced their understanding of these Pre-Socratics. 
In his early publication The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics,111 he therefore stressed the 
distinctiveness of the vocabulary and syntax of these documents:  
 
[E]pigraphy pointed to the conclusion that the Greek culture was maintained on a wholly oral basis until 
about 700 B.C. and if this were true, the first so-called philosophers were living and speaking in a period 
which was still adjusting to the conditions of a possible future literacy, conditions which I concluded would 
be slow of realisation, for they depend on the mastery not of the art of writing by a few, but of fluent reading 
by the many.112 
 
110 Eric A. Havelock, Preface to Plato (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). 
111 Eric A. Havelock, The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957). On 
the Pre-Socratics, see also in his Preface, the section “The Supreme Music is Philosophy,” 280: “Are they [Plato, 
Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus] not equally committed to the assertion that a different state 
of mind must be created in Greece, one which they seek to link with knowledge or science, and that the problem 
of energising this mind is one of energising a new language?” 
112 Havelock, Liberal Temper, ix. 
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Although these transmitted documents have been transformed into “text,” his intuitive insight was that 
distinctive organizations of litterae indicated a different way of structuring thought. So, in this way, 
we touch on the mental dimension of phenomena categorized as “literacy” and “orality” (mindset). As 
a rule, this mental dimension is reckoned to be somewhat vague or even invisible.  
Havelock discerned a continuum between primary orality and high(er) literacy. He wanted to do 
justice to the historical dynamic of development. He differentiated between a preliterate time and later 
periods in which growing masses were able to process by forms of reading. The vocabulary and syntax 
of the transmitted documents of these Pre-Socratics reflect a transitory stage, in which they attempted 
to come to a different way of thinking. In the words of some of his commentators, “Havelock’s claim 
is that a major task of the Pre-Socratics was to depart from the mythos of the Homeric mode of orally 
structured thought to a more literal, prosaic logos. To accomplish this end – Havelock argues – the 
Pre-Socratics created an abstract vocabulary.”113  
Tracing the origins of abstract thinking, Havelock became interested in the work of Parry which 
resulted in the book Preface to Plato. Here he fleshes out the vocabulary and syntax of the transmitted 
Homeric epics.114 “Homer, so far from being ‘special,’ embodies the ruling state of mind.”115 The 
transition that took place in Greece was from an oral (Homeric) to a more literate state of mind.116 He 
designates the latter as the “Platonic state of mind.” In this monograph, he sketches this transition and 
argues that Plato is both the product of and the advocate for this process of change.  
 
2. Episteme versus mimesis, Truth versus experience 
 Havelock’s book deals with Plato’s Republic, in particular with the philosopher’s attack on the poet 
and his poetry.117 Given the prominent role ascribed to poetry, he is one of the first to conclude that the 
Republic is not about politics but about education.118 The perspective of education in this treatise 
explains the crucial role of the poet – who should not be equated with his “literate” equivalent. The 
poet embodies the whole educational system of Plato’s time. More so, “Plato’s target seems to be 
precisely the poetic experience as such.”119 Instead of concentrating on the “poet” and his “works of 
verbal art,” Plato locates the danger in the interaction between the poet and his audience, that is, the 
experience which the performer brings to the hearer: 
 
113 Stacia Dunn Neeley, D. Bryan Magee, Richard L. Enos, review of E. Havelock, Preface to Plato, RhetR 
(1998), 201. 
114 See Havelock, Preface, part one “the Image-Thinkers,” in particular, 61–86, 87–96, and 115–133. 
115 Ibid., 135. 
116 Ibid., vii: “Between Homer and Plato, the method of storage began to alter, as the information became 
alphabetized, and correspondingly the eye supplanted the ear as the chief organ employed for this purpose.” 
117 Ibid., 4–5. 
118 Robert G. Hoerber, review of E. Havelock, Preface to Plato, CP 59 (1964), 70–1: “first complimenting 
Prof. Havelock on his keen observation that the theme of the Republic is educational instead of political.”   
119 Havelock, Preface, 6. 
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Thus the poet, he [Plato] says, contrives to colour his statement by the use of words and phrases and to 
embellish it by exploiting the resources of meter, rhythm and harmony. These are like cosmetics applied as 
an outward appearance which conceal the poverty of statement behind them.  
 
This poetic experience is a threat. Plato wanted to separate “truth” from experience.120 Enhanced by 
the Homeric state of mind, this aesthetic experience is a kind of psychic poison. Poetry “confuses a 
man’s values and renders him characterless and it robs him of any insight into the truth.”121 The 
Homeric state of mind leads to a cynical and hypocritical attitude: 
 
What Greece has hitherto enjoyed ... is a tradition of a half-morality ... according to which the younger 
generation is continually indoctrinated in the view that what is vital is not so much morality as social prestige 
and material reward which may flow from a moral reputation whether or not this is deserved. Or else (and 
this is not inconsistent) the young are insensibly warned that virtue is the ideal, of course, but it is difficult 
and often unprofitable. Do not the gods so often reward the unrighteous? And immoral conduct in any case 
can be expiated quite easily by religious rites. The over-all result is that the Greek adolescent is continually 
conditioned to an attitude which at bottom is cynical.122 
 
Plato opposes the influences of poetry by the founding of his Academy. There the philosopher-kings 
are educated and formed. Over against mimesis – as dramatic impersonation of the poet hypnotizing 
the audience by meter, rhythm, and wording – Plato places episteme as universal knowledge. The 
former is based on human beings as sensoria and determined by the relation to the poet, the latter 
becomes severed from the body as well as hierarchical relationships. 
The intellectual distraction involved with poetry necessitated Plato’s renowned Theory of Forms. Over 
against the sensual experience of poetry, he put the form as “the abstracted object per se which is the 
only possible object of thought.”123 As opposed to the concrete, Plato advocates the abstract. The 
knower becomes separated from the known. The Theory of Forms resembles the method of 
abstraction. The operational or real-time praxis is minimized or even rejected in favour of the formal 
or theory. The experience of the spoken word by skilled poets, rhetoricians, and performers is 
superseded by a search for unshakable and absolute Truth. This truth is not dependent on or mediated 
by meter, rhythm, and harmony. This knowledge seems to have an existence of its own, severed from 
time and place, bodies, senses and relationships it has become free-floating and extra-historical in 
nature. 
 
120 At another point in the same book, Havelock comments more extensively, ibid., 159: “Plato was correctly 
concerned with the emotional pathology of the poetic performance, and it explains also why he chose the term 
mimesis to describe several aspects of the poetic experience which we today feel should be distinguished ... But 
the minstrel recited effectively only as he re-enacted the doings and sayings of heroes and made them his own, a 
process which can be described in reverse as making himself ‘resemble’ them in endless succession. He sank his 
personality in his performance. His audience, in turn, would remember only as they entered effectively and 
sympathetically into what he was saying and this, in turn, meant that they became his servants and submitted to 
his spell ... The pattern of behaviour in artist and audience was therefore in some important respects identical.”  
121 Ibid., 6. 
122 Ibid., 12. 
123 Ibid., 254. 
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In this context, Havelock also refers to the famous Allegory of the Cave as contained in book VII of 
the Republic. In this allegory, Plato explains the ignorance in which humankind lives. All their lives 
long, a group of people are chained to a wall in a cave. In this condition, they are not able to see each 
other, but they can hear and converse with each other. On the wall in the cave they see shadows 
projected. These shadows are formed by things passing in front of a fire behind them. These prisoners 
give names to these projections of unclear shadows. Plato’s suggestion is that those who are ignorant 
view reality in this way. This procedure is comparable to the poetic experience. Human beings must 
liberate themselves from the chains to find a way out of the cave. In the first instance, when they get 
rid of the chains, the light of the sun will be overwhelmingly disturbing. Acquainted with reality 
outside of the cave though, they will become philosophers who know the truth. When they want to 
return to the cave to liberate and tell their fellow prisoners about the truth, however, they will 
encounter disbelief and even hostility. The ignorant are not able to grasp pure reality. This parable 
“shall suggest to us the ascent of man through education from the life of the senses towards the life of 
the reasoned intelligence.”124 Plato juxtaposes the immediate sensorial stance in the participatory 
realm of history or human beings as sensoria – chained in the cave (becoming) – with the abstracted 
representation of that reality – liberated outside in the sunlight (being). From within the realm of 
history, he wants humankind to be able to observe what is really true without being sensorially, bodily, 
or historically determined or – more importantly – without being misled. Thus the realm of history is 
the cave, and Truth (extra-historical thought) emerges as the origin of a new realm.125 This separation 
of the known from the knower inaugurates not only a new realm but is based on a new state of mind. 
In conclusion, according to Havelock, Plato has forced a way out of the realm of history. The realm of 
Plato’s Forms – unleashing unequivocal mental powers – has caused Western humanity to be an 
inhabitant of two worlds.  
Regarding the governing questions of the present Chapter, we can now begin to formulate some 
answers. In Havelock’s treatise, we touch on a rough, though clear distinction between two states of 
mind. According to Plato, in Havelock’s representation, the Homeric is inferior to the Platonic 
mindset, because it “deals with becoming rather than being, and with the many rather than the one and 
with the visible rather with the invisible and thinkable.”126 The key words in Plato’s new language on 
thought are, therefore, “‘itself per se’, which is ‘one’, and which is ‘unseen’.”127 This terminology is a 
shift from “the image-world of the epic to the abstract world of scientific description and from the 
vocabulary and syntax of narrativised events in time towards the syntax and vocabulary of equations 
 
124 Ibid., 205. 
125 This extra-historical status or existence in se can and will be disputed in the present study. We do this 
because specific or socio-culturally contextualized groups of human beings are the bearers and advocates of this 
kind of knowledge and they are as such subject to the laws and values of the realm of history in general. In the 
end, this alleged independent realm has to be located somehow in the former. We will point to autonomous text 
as the most important and prominent bearer of this kind of thought.  
126 Havelock, Preface, 189. 
127 Ibid., 256. 
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and laws and formulas and topics which are outside time.”128 Imagination and narrative become 
juxtaposed with abstraction, the scientific description of laws and formulas. It is not hard to recognize 
in the latter the contours of prosaic text and contemporary academia. 
 
3. The Platonic state of mind and text  
In Havelock’s discussion, we can relate the different mindsets to the activity of writing and text. He 
compares the strengths of dialectic with those of the written word. In this respect, he defines dialectic 
as a way of critically questioning the one who is speaking so that the speaker can clarify, deepen, and 
develop their thoughts. Dialectic is a means to an end, namely, to grasp reality by elaborate reflection. 
Contrary to the hypnotic trance of performances, the recorded word offers the possibility of taking a 
critical stance. Since this new technology of communication muted the emotional identification with 
the poet, rational autonomy could be gained: 
Refreshment of memory through written signs enabled a reader to dispense with most of that emotional 
identification … This could release psychic energy, for a review and rearrangement of what had now been 
written down and of what could be seen as an object and not just heard and felt.129  
 
Writing fills out what is “just heard and felt” so that the “object” can be perceived. Paul Ricoeur 
echoes this idea when he states that there is no communication between writer and reader. It is all 
about reader and text. To the reader, the author is an abstraction and vice versa. As we argued in the 
Introduction, the text has to speak for itself and live a communicative life of its own. In line with 
Plato’s pursuit for episteme beyond the realm of history, text would then diminish bodily experience 
so that truth remains.130 We touch here on the second governing question – What does processing text 
do to us in terms of the structuring of our thoughts? Texts ask for objectifying or abstracting thought, 
and diminish emotions or dampen sensorial stimuli.  
While Havelock’s clear-cut distinction between the Platonic and Homeric mindsets enables us not 
only to grasp the contours of this rather unknown state of mind (Homeric), but also to become aware 
of our deeply ingrained mindset due to historical developments and mental transformations in Western 
history or literacy (Platonic), it can be critically observed that that the dichotomy is rather absolute in 
Havelock’s reconstruction. In no way do we find a positive or even neutral evaluation of preliteracy or 
oral culture. In contrast, the present study would argue that the phenomena of preliteracy/non-literacy 
as well as literacy should and must be valued on their own merits.  
In addition, Havelock does not deal with the question of how a present-day reader with their specific 
mindset should relate to transmitted documents which originate from communicative contexts 
 
128 Ibid., 259. 
129 Ibid., 208. 
130 In this way, we observe that the ancient subject-object problem comes to the fore. This problem of thought 
becomes related to the phenomenon of text. In section E below, this relation is addressed by Walter Ong. 
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determined by the Homeric or – in case of the Letter to the Galatians – a predominantly oral mindset. 
So, next to juxtaposing these mindsets as Havelock does, we have to ask how we can relate them to 
each other. To find answers we will now turn to the work of Walter Ong.  
 
 
E. Walter Ong: Coming to grips with different mindsets 
 
A strong and influential advocate for the study of orality and literacy has been Walter Jackson Ong 
(1912–2003). Appointed professor of English and Psychiatry at Saint Louis University, he was also an 
ordained Jesuit Priest. In a major way, he contributed to the establishment of orality and literacy 
studies and their interface. He published a considerable number of articles and monographs across 
various disciplines.  
In what follows, we will concentrate on two monographs, The Presence of the Word: Some 
Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious History131 and Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of 
the Word.132 Both books read like anthologies of the main aspects of his work and are thus a useful 
avenue for exploring the significant pillars of Ong’s thought.  
 
1. Oral residue: “Text” in need of historicization 
We can summarize the contribution of Ong regarding orality and literacy in a rather simple axiom. As 
he writes in the introduction to Orality and Literacy, 
 
The subject of this book is the differences between orality and literacy. Or, rather, since readers of this or any 
book by definition are acquainted with literate culture from the inside, the subject is, first, thought and its 
verbal expression in oral culture, which is strange and at times bizarre to us, and, second, literate thought and 
expression in terms of their emergence from and relation to orality.133 
 
 
Central to his scholarly efforts has been the exploration of this interrelatedness of “thought,” on the 
one hand, and “verbal expression” on the other. Not without reason, does he draw on Eric Havelock 
the most. Although the relation between verbal expression and thought patterns may seem simple and 
clear at first sight, he issues a warning in which one can hear an echo of Albert Lord: 
 
 
131 Walter J. Ong, The Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious History (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1967; repr. Binghamton: Global Publications, 2000). 
132 Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London: Methuen, 1982; repr. New 
York: Routledge, 2002). 
133 Ibid., 1. 
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We – readers of books such as this – are so literate that it is very difficult for us to conceive of an oral 
universe of communication or thought except as a variant of a literate universe. This book will attempt to 
overcome our biases in some degree and to open new ways to understanding.134   
 
At the beginning of Orality and Literacy, Ong describes the interface of oralities and literacies in three 
categories. He introduces primary and secondary orality, on the one hand, and oral residue on the 
other. Primary orality refers to cultures that are not influenced in any way by the technology of writing 
and reading – for example, the fieldwork of Parry and Lord on preliterate bards. As examples of 
secondary orality, he describes the transformed role of the spoken word in the course of his own life, 
that is, the development of technology such as radio, telephone, television, and also the beginnings of 
computer technology. Although the world of primary orality seems to be far away from the present-
day reader, Ong insists on the continued presence of this mindset: “Still, to varying degrees many 
cultures and subcultures, even in a high-technology ambience, preserve much of the mindset of 
primary orality.”135 We can recall earlier observations that when we are exposed to some sort of 
performance ourselves in real time (see Introduction). So, third, oral residue refers to reminiscences of 
speaking in all kinds of writing, such as repetitions, abundance of epithets, long sentences, and so 
forth. Oral residue connects the mechanisms in real-time speaking to the constitution of “text.”  
We turn to one of Ong’s areas of influential research, Tudor prose. In this transmitted prose, oral 
residue as documented in writing reflects a transitory stage in the history and development of “text.” 
Originating in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this prose can be designated as an interface of 
the still aurally oriented mind and the further developing media of writing.136 Texts contain parts, 
phrases, and fragments that, although practically appealing to the eye of the reader on the level of text, 
were composed for the ear. Based on the emerging communis opinio on the original communicative 
context of the biblical documents, we could argue that the whole corpus Paulinum is also to be 
understood as oral residue: all parts, phrases, terms, and themes were originally intended to function in 
this distinctive predominantly oral register.  
When the identification of oral residue is valid, an uncritical and self-evident approach to ancient texts 
as “text” (without any explication on the level of text) becomes problematic. It entails the impetus to 
systematically “historicize text.” For the present study, the consequence is that the letters of Paul 




134 Ibid., 2. 
135 Ibid., 11. Remarks like these seem to weaken the accusation of Ong as advocate of a Great Divide thesis. 
136 See Walter J. Ong, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology: Studies in the Interaction of Expression and 
Culture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), 47: “The new typographic media offered previously unheard-of 
opportunities to the impulse of the orally oriented performer to have as much as possible on hand so that he 
would be prepared to extemporize in absolutely any eventuality.” 
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2. Ancient rhetoric as speech art 
Ong illustrates this necessity of historicizing text in yet another way. The discipline of rhetoric sheds 
an important light on the history of Western literacy. In Orality and Literacy, he writes that rhetoric is 
“the most comprehensive academic subject in all western culture for two thousand years.”137 In the 
Roman Empire, education for the privileged cumulated in the teaching offered by a rhetor. This 
training was directed towards influencing the public by means of the spoken word.138 So education 
was fundamentally rhetorical.  
In its Greek setting, ἡ ῥητορική (sc. τέχνη) meant “speech art.”  There is an interesting twist here in 
historical retrospect. The oral practice of rhetoric has been accompanied over the centuries by a 
reflective science on it. Testimonies to this science have been documented in writing. It is because of 
these transmitted documents (texts) that modern humanity knows about it. In the beginning though, 
writing as “the inscription of living speech” (Ricoeur) did not impair but enhanced rhetoric as speech 
art. “[R]hetoric, basically meant public speaking or oratory, which for centuries even in literate and 
typographic cultures remained unreflexively pretty much the paradigm of all discourse, including that 
of writing.”139 By the sixteenth century, the balance shifted to a context of writing. In this 
development, the transmitted documents started to be used as “text” to compose “text”: 
 
With their attention directed to texts, scholars often went to assume, often without reflection, that oral 
verbalization was essentially the same as the written verbalization they normally dealt with, and that oral art 
forms were to all intents and purposes simply texts, except for the fact that they were not written down.140 
 
The role of rhetoric itself transformed then from the oral to the typographic and predominantly literate 
mindset: 
 
From classical antiquity the verbal skills learned in rhetoric were put to use not only in oratory but also in 
writing. By the sixteenth century, rhetoric textbooks were commonly omitting from the traditional five parts 
of rhetoric (invention, arrangement, style, memory and delivery) the fourth part, memory, which was not 
applicable to writing. They were also minimizing the last part, delivery ... the ‘art’ simply followed the drift 
of consciousness away from an oral to a writing economy. The drift was completed before it was noticed that 
anything was happening.141 
 
 
137 Ong, Orality, 9. 
138 See Anthony Corbeill, “Rhetorical Education and Social Reproduction in the Republic and Early Empire,” 
in A Companion to Roman Rhetoric, ed. William J. Dominik and Jon C. R. Hall (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010), 69–
97. 
139 Ong, Orality, 9. 
140 Ibid., 10. An illustration of this critique, but in the reverse direction, can be found in the naming of the 
academic heritage of Milman Parry and Albert Lord: The Milman Parry Collection of Oral Literature 
(https://library.harvard.edu/collections/milman-parry-collection-oral-literature). On the one hand, the world of 
“oral” verbal art is referred to. On the other, the collection is framed as “literature.” Although the contradictio in 
terminis is acknowledged today, the naming of this archive demonstrates how the scholarly community has been 
captive to the inherent predominantly literate mindset and how thought determines verbal expression. 
141 Ibid., 114. 
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Ong states that – in line with rhetoric – the spoken word remained dominant over the written word up 
to the eighteenth century.142 This exploration on the transformative history of rhetoric sheds light on 
the third governing question, that is, how our deeply ingrained processing of text influences our 
understanding of the rather unknown functioning of oral performance. A question which becomes 
more pressing when we contrast this original situation to the majorly textual practice of doing 
theology in the history of Western Christianity.   
 
3. “Meaning” and the text area 
For that reason, we will turn now to some considerations of Ong on the notion of “meaning.” In The 
Presence of the Word, he states, “In literate cultures, the illusion is widespread that if one has the exact 
words someone has uttered, one has by that very fact his exact meaning.”143 “Meaning” is framed and 
experienced as unmediated; a direct relationship between the “words” and their meaning is 
presupposed.144 In a similar vein, he addresses the commonplace of literal meaning: 
  
As philosophers and lexicographers well know, it is virtually impossible to assign to literal meaning a 
significance any more definite than the first or most obvious meaning of a passage as apprehended by one 
familiar with the language and context.  
  
 
142 Ibid., 113. 
143 Ong, Presence, 32. From another angle, we can turn here once more to the essay by Paul Ricoeur, “What 
is a text? Explanation and Understanding,” in Hermeneutics and the Human Science: Essays on Language, 
Action and Interpretation, ed., trans. and introduced by John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press; Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1981). After stating that “writing is fixed speech” 
and also that “the psychological and sociological priority of speech over writing is not in question,” he argues for 
a kind of reversal. Regarding “writing,” he comments that speech always precedes this activity. Hence, regarding 
“text,” he formulates “that a text is really a text only when it is not restricted to transcribing an anterior speech, 
when instead it inscribes directly in written letters what the discourse means” (146). In the next paragraph, he 
elaborates on “this idea of a direct relation between the meaning of the statement and writing.” In comparison to 
the self-evident referentiality of living speech in its “circumstantial milieu,” “the interlocutors are not only 
presented to one another, but also to the situation, the surroundings and the circumstantial milieu of discourse” 
(148) – he argues that, regarding text, “the movement of reference towards the act of showing is intercepted.” 
For this reason, he introduces the posture of interpretation. “The suspense which defers the reference merely 
leaves the text, as it were, ‘in the air’, outside or without a world.” (149) Based on this reasoning, he posits his 
“quasi-world of texts” or “literature.” The meaning in text(s) has to be construed in relation to text(s). Since 
Ricoeur rejects “the ideology of absolute text,” he remains convinced – despite his apparently direct relation 
between inscription and meaning – that text has reference that has to be fulfilled in the activity of reading as 
interpretation (148).    
144 Werner Kelber argues, in this respect, that “our humanistic legacy has shown a preference for unmediated 
notions of meaning, sense, idea, proclamation, and even information, it is ill-disposed to concede any cultural 
force to the increasingly material means of mediation.” See “Modality of Communication, Cognition, and 
Physiology of Perception: Orality, Rhetoric, and Scribality,” Semeia 65 (1994), 195. 
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Literal meaning implies a clearness and self-evidence that cannot be superseded. Literally seeing the 
litterae equals grasping the meaning; the formulation pushes the claim beyond critical awareness.145 
The visual experience of print culture deepens our grasp of this commonplace: 
The sense of order and control which the alphabet thus imposes is overwhelming. Arrangement in space 
seemingly provides maximal symbols of order and control, probably because the concepts of order and 
control are themselves kinesthetically and visually grounded, formed chiefly out of sensory experience 
involved with space. When the alphabet commits the verbal and conceptual worlds, themselves already 
ordered superbly in their own right, to the quiescent and obedient order of space, it imputes to language and 
to thought an additional consistency of which preliterate persons have no inkling.146 
  
We get here a clue of how the invisible whole of our thought in a predominantly literate state of mind 
becomes visible – that is, “the alphabet commits the verbal and conceptual worlds, themselves already 
ordered superbly in their own right.” The argument is that the visual experience of the “alphabet” or 
the “word” in print-or-pixels is reciprocal to how our thought is structured. In the present study, we 
relate this visibility to “the level of text.” According to Ong, this disposition leads inevitably to 
degradation of other forms of verbal expression and knowledge. 
An alphabetic culture, which puts a premium on visualist qualities such as sharp outline and clear-cut 
sequences, is likely to regard the literal meaning, in the sense of plain or definite meaning, as something 
altogether desirable, and to regard other remote, perhaps more profoundly symbolic meanings with 
disfavour.147  
 
The complexity and flux of the historical lifeworld, which we sensorially experience, is juxtaposed 
with the clarity, uniformity, and fixedness of the world of abstracted thought, which we control by our 
cognitive capacities. It is important to note that Ong equates a specific structure in visual experience 
with “meaning.” In the latter, we recognize a resemblance to Plato’s ideal world or Theory of Forms 
(see the discussion of Eric Havelock in Section D.).148  
 
 
145 In his words: “This term frequently implies that meaning which is literal, or according to the letter, is 
necessarily trim and easily manageable.” 
146 Ong, Presence, 46. 
147 Ibid., 47. 
148 Given the field of the present study, a caveat needs to be given here. Biblical scholarship stems from the 
oldest of academic disciplines, theology. Although still current and familiar, this categorization tends to present 
more oneness and harmony than is the case. The designation “theology” (singular) is in itself already in need of 
critical and historical differentiation. Throughout the ages and regions of the world, several theologies have 
emerged and persisted. Moreover, nowadays, in the West, one has to take into account as well (diversity in) 
Jewish, Christian, and Islamic theologies amongst others. Already this brief differentiation illustrates an inherent 
tendency in this academic discipline – towards a single and harmonious world of abstracted thought. In this way, 
another example is found of Ong’s warning against predominantly literate biases. 
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4. Oral context: Simplicity and accessibility 
To deepen this line of thinking, we turn to Ong’s discussion of the “psychodynamics of orality” in 
Orality and Literacy.149 Here the oral mindset is contrasted with the literate one. Oral communication 
is framed by the event of live performances. What is crucial here is that this setting is structured by the 
approval or disapproval of the actual audiences: they need to be captured, touched in their hearts, and 
more so come under the influence of the performer. The audience should be able to follow the 
narration easily; the words of the orator should directly and concretely be attuned to the rhetorical 
situation or collective memory of his audience. 
A related psychodynamic is homeostasis, that is, the dynamic in oral societies that only those 
memories and words are conserved that have immediate and self-evident relevance for that 
situation.150 Already in an early stage of the debate, valid critique was made as to the absolute 
character of Ong’s presentation of this psychodynamic. Some features of homeostasis, however, can 
help us to understand how human beings understand in primary, predominantly oral cultures and even 
ourselves when we are exposed, for example, to a captivating political speech or a sweeping sermon in 
a church. Print cultures have invented dictionaries with the various meanings attached to certain words 
and the history of its use. In oral cultures, the framing of words is directly linked to the collective 
memory of the actual audience. The room for semantic discrepancies is much smaller than in the 
writing-reading relation. The concrete human lifeworld of performer and audience controls to a high 
degree the single and univocal understanding. So, in the structuring of the spoken word, simplicity and 
accessibility is imperative.  
 
5. Memorizing over against analyzing 
In a literate mindset, the relation of an author to the reader of his text is severed and abstracted. The 
immediacy and self-evidence of the participatory realm of history is transferred to the parameters of 
the abstracted communicative process inherent in text: 
   
Written discourse develops more elaborate and fixed grammars than oral discourse does because to provide 
meaning it is more dependent simply upon linguistic structure, since it lacks the normal full existential 
contexts which surround oral discourse and help determine meaning in oral discourse somewhat 
independently of grammar.151 
 
In their development, written words have grown more and more complex. Due to the separation from 
the “normal full existential contexts,” one can argue that through autonomous text a new context 
 
149 This discussion is related to the following psychodynamics as coined by Ong: i. Additive rather than 
subordinative, ii. Aggregative rather than analytic, iii. Redundant or ‘copious,’ and iv. Conservative or 
traditionalist, ibid., 37–42. 
150 In his book, Orality and Literacy, Ong phrases this psychodynamic, number viii., as Homeostatic, 46–9. 
151 Ibid., 38. 
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emerged. This idiosyncratic context, based on “more elaborate and fixed grammar” and “linguistic 
structure,” severs the ties of time and place. These shared (though to a high degree abstracted) 
structures are needed to mediate the implied meaning of text. Thus, recalling Ong’s axiom of the 
interrelatedness of verbal expression and thought structures, we witness once more in this emerging 
context of autonomous text the implied mental transformation towards high literacy.   
In this respect, Ong also highlights another consequence. Once the written word is stored in the media 
of autonomous text and at the disposal of a society, the energy needed to uphold the collective 
memory can be used for other purposes. In this respect, the mechanism of looking up (e.g. in a 
dictionary, encyclopaedia, or on the internet) is typical: 
 
Fully literate persons can only with great difficulty imagine what a primary oral culture is like, that is, a 
culture with no knowledge whatsoever of writing or even of the possibility of writing. Try to imagine a 
culture where no one has ever ‘looked up’ anything. In a primary oral culture, the expression ‘to look up 
something’ is an empty phrase: it would have no conceivable meaning. Without writing, words as such have 
no visual presence, even when the objects they represent are visual. They are sounds. You might ‘call’ them 
back – ‘recall’ them. But there is nowhere to ‘look’ for them. They have no focus and no trace (a visual 
metaphor, showing dependency on writing), not even a trajectory. They are occurrences, events.152  
 
An important distinction between predominantly literate and oral cultures becomes clear: “Oral 
expression thus carries a load of epithets and other formulary baggage which high literacy rejects as 
cumbersome and tiresomely redundant because of its aggregative weight.”153 Since memory is of no 
concern anymore, a universe of text-to-look-up comes into existence.  
 
Thought requires some sort of continuity. Writing establishes in the text a ‘line’ of continuity outside the 
mind. If distraction confuses or obliterates from the mind the context out of which emerges the material I am 
now reading, the context can be retrieved by glancing back over the text selectively ... In oral discourse, the 
situation is different. There is nothing to backloop into outside the mind, for the oral utterance has vanished 
as soon it is uttered ... Redundancy, repetition of the just-said, keeps both speaker and hearer surely on the 
track.154  
 
In line with this contrast, Ong concludes that linearity is not natural to thought and speech; they are 
artificial creations structured by the technology of writing.155 Since thought structures and 
representations are externalized, stored, and available, one can go over them critically to dissect, 
reject, adjust, elaborate, and deepen them. One of the most prominent and valuable purposes of literate 
cultures is – instead of memorizing – analyzing. 
Ong warns, however, that we should not assume that oral cultures lack originality: 
 
 
152 Ibid., 31. 
153 Ibid., 38. 
154 Ibid., 39–40. 
155 Ibid., 40. 
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Narrative originality lodges not in making up new stories but in managing a particular interaction with this 
audience at this time – at every telling the story has to be introduced uniquely into a unique situation, for in 
oral cultures an audience must be brought to respond, often vigorously.156  
 
Anticipating the next Chapters, regarding the originally intended effect of Paul’s letters, we 
presuppose that the apostle is involved in aggregative communication as well. As a consequence, we 
will propose that the terms, themes, reasonings, metaphors – which are recorded in the letter and have 
been copied, transmitted, and, finally, transformed into autonomous text to us – should have been, as a 
rule, familiar and known to his intended hearers. This means that, in his envisioned oral performance, 
new themes and ways of reasoning would have been an exception. Put differently, new themes and 
reasonings must have been introduced explicitly. As a result, we should not ask “what” does the 
apostle say (to us?), but, in line with the previous quotation, the crucial question is, How does he 
introduce the already and mainly familiar themes and reasonings in the actual situation of his intended 
addressees? From this perspective, we can identify in the first example of Chapter 4 several terms and 
themes of Paul’s opponents: “law,” “rectification,” “sin,” “Gentiles,” and “faith.” In the second 
example of Gal 2.19–20, the passage will be related to “baptism,” as Gal 3.27 makes clear that his 
hearers must have been familiar with this ritual in the moment of delivery. The question, therefore, 
concerns how Paul attempts to structure their thoughts in this part of the oral delivery of the letter on 
this subject.  
 
6. The golden rule of Walter Ong 
This is one of the main critiques of Ong concerning the predominantly literate state of mind: 
  
Deeply typographic folk forget to think of words as primarily oral, as events, and hence as necessarily 
powered: for them, words tend rather to be assimilated to things, ‘out there’ on a flat surface.157 
 
In its development throughout time, text has become isolated more and more from the diffuse and 
complex historical lifeworld of which the actual reader is inextricably part. Text can be grasped as 
“object.” Once we are exposed to it, we enter the “world of objects” (see also Introduction, Section 
D.1. Corpus Paulinum: Some text from the start). This line of reasoning evokes the fundamental 
question as to the nature of this “object”: Does t-e-x-t/“text” refer to a physical artefact at hand or is it 
a mental concept on the level of text? In this question, one recognizes the tension between concrete 
versus abstract, inner- versus extra-historical, becoming versus being, formal versus operational, and 
(inter)subjective versus objective.  
To answer the question, we turn once more to Ong. In Orality and Literacy, he comments on the 
tension between concrete and abstract thought with the help of the example of “tree”: 
 
156 Ibid., 41, 42. 
157 Ibid., 32, 33. 
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All conceptual thinking is to a degree abstract. So ‘concrete’ a term as ‘tree’ does not refer simply to a 
singular ‘concrete’ tree but is an abstraction, drawn out of, away from, individual, sensible actuality; it refers 
to a concept which is neither this tree nor that tree but can apply to any tree. Each individual object that we 
style a tree is truly ‘concrete’, simply itself, not ‘abstract’ at all, but the term we apply to the individual object 
is in itself abstract. Nevertheless, if all conceptual thinking is thus to some degree abstract, some uses of 
concepts are more abstract than others. Oral cultures tend to use concepts in situational, operational frames of 
reference that are minimally abstract in the sense that they remain close to the living human lifeworld.158  
 
For our purpose, this line of thinking is crucial. It contains two key perspectives. First, when we 
replace “tree” by “text,” the problem of concrete and abstract or physical artefact and concept becomes 
clearer. In concreto, we can posit that text exists in the realm of history there-and-then as handwritten 
scrolls, codices, constituted by surfaces made out of thinly sliced wood, papyrus or parchment, or in 
the one here-and-now as printed books, journals, and pixels on screens. In abstracto, all these different 
kinds of concrete appearances can be referred to as “text” – as we indicated in the Introduction.   
Since the masses were reached several centuries ago by the technology of reading, due to the 
commercialization of book print, t–e–x–t has become an overly familiar designator. As a consequence 
of large-scale and programmatic training in literacy in Western culture, text has been internalized 
beyond critical awareness (see Introduction). This process relates to the operational as well as formal 
dimension. We can argue that the operational and formal realm fuse in “text” in optima forma. “Text” 
functions on the level of text and is at the same time available as physical object (text) beyond or 
facilitating that specific level. This means that for us “text” is part and parcel of extra-historical 
thought. 
A second observation is based on the conclusion that “all conceptual thinking is to a degree abstract.” 
We turn here to Orality and Literacy as well. In his listing of oral psychodynamics,159 Ong comments 
that the method of abstraction separates man as the knower from the known. In this process of 
analysing reality (in abstracto), one is heavily dependent on the “elaborate analytic categories that 
depend on writing to structure knowledge at a distance from lived experience.”160 Since primary oral 
culture cannot enter this alienating state of mind, all their thought and speech will be embedded in 
their lifeworld or actual situation: “Oral cultures tend to use concepts in situational, operational frames 
of reference that are minimally abstract in the sense that they remain close to the living human 
lifeworld.”161 In conclusion, oral verbal expression – given the implied thought structures – limits the 
level of abstraction on the side of the participants. When we apply this heuristically to the original 
functioning of Paul’s letters, we as present-day readers should try to approach as closely as possible 
the sensorially experienced concrete lifeworld of the composer behind the ancient documents at hand. 
 
158 Ibid., 49. 
159 In this section, his line of reasoning is related to numbers v. Close to the human lifeworld, ibid., 42–43, 
and ix. Situational rather than abstract, 49–57. 
160 Ibid., 42. 
161 Ibid., 49. 
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Likewise, in the opposite manner, we should acknowledge that the complex, elaborate, and extra-
historical thinking on higher levels of abstraction that we can encounter in commentaries, articles, and 
monographs, needs to be made subject to critique. In some way – even dampened – our imagination 
should come to life and help us to scrutinize given prepositions and to textualize as adequately as 
possible the realm of history involved. In the first example in Chapter 4, this will become clear from 
the work of Moisés Mayordomo and Michael Bachmann on the syllogistic reasonings in Gal 3.10–12. 
Their proposals represent abstractions of a high level: they are complicated and fully dependent on the 
media of autonomous text. In this way, not only the second and third governing question come 
together, but Ong also provides a golden rule to counter the subliminal influences of our default 
mindset vis-à-vis text on the understanding of these ancient documents: we can scrutinize the degree 
of concretization in our abstractions and representations of oral performances in which Paul’s 
original addressees participated; we have to bend our thoughts162 as deeply as possible into the realm 




162 The phrase “to bend our thoughts into the realm of history” captures the sense of not just directing 
thinking towards, but entering into that realm intentionally. 
163 Ong enables us to apply this even to “history” as a whole. This conceptualization in order to grasp past 
events demands a degree of abstraction unknown to predominantly oral-aural humanity. In that regard, we turn 
to his Presence of the Word once more: “Perhaps one of the most striking and informative differences is that an 
oral-aural culture is necessarily a culture with a relationship to time different from ours. It has no records. It does 
have memory, but this is not by any means the same as records, for the written record is not a remembrance but 
an aid to recall. It does not belong to us as memory does. It is an external thing. In an oral-aural culture one can 
ask about something, but no one can look up anything. As a result, in an oral-aural culture there is no history in 
our modern sense of the term. The past is indeed present, as to a degree the past always is, but it is present in the 
speech and social institutions of people, not in the more abstract forms in which modern history deals” (23). In 
no instance, should our approach to history be, therefore, pejoratively discarded. One has to be aware, however, 
that this relation to past events as representation, such as “D-day,” “Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo,” the implied 
“performances of Homeric epics,” or the “letters of Paul,” is typical of the present-day reader. One searches to 
find entrance to objectified events. In this way, “history” is external. The past exists separately from the present. 
The difference is that the transmission of the letter to the Galatians links us to that past, but the transformation 
into text distances us in terms of media and mindset from this same past. In Chapter 3, we will present the 
approach of detextification to overcome this tension. We cognitively know about but do not participate in an 
immediate and sensorial way in that specific historical period or event under scrutiny. The better the 
reconstruction, the more specific the event becomes to the researcher. The deeper the historicization the more 
our imagination comes to life – for example, the enormous popularity of re-enactment of all kinds of historical 
periods. In oral cultures, the past is part and parcel of the present. Rather than existing as two differentiated 
realms – as we characterize them here – the past constitutes the present to them. Both are inextricably related and 
therefore one. We might think here of the Haggada at the Jewish Seder in which the exodus out of Egypt is 
consistently related to those celebrating at that moment (for example, Haggada, Maggied 5.c.). The same 
pertains to the Christian ritual of the Eucharist or the Lord’s Supper. A similar perspective arises out of studies in 
social memory. In remembrance, the past is always appropriated and reappropriated to the needs of the ever-
changing present (see, Alan Kirk, “Social and Cultural Memory,” Semeia 52 (2005): 1 –24). The familiar 
conceptualization of history is first and foremost a product of the abstraction typical of Western culture. This line 
of thinking affirms the earlier posed problem of the media muddle: the present-day reader is explicitly not part of 




In their study of traditional oral epic, Milman Parry and Albert Lord broke new ground in academia. 
They forged a way into the preliterate state of mind. In the exploration of this newly broken ground, 
what emerged very clearly and strongly from the material is an explicit warning from Lord, and 
echoed later by Ong, to present-day readers in a predominantly literate state of mind: we are 
subliminally inclined to understand the unknown in line with the known, that is, to funnel the 
dynamics of “orality” into the one of “literacy.” Parry’s fieldwork proved particularly illustrative of 
this with regard to the apparently self-evident presupposition that oral performances were verbatim 
reproductions based on learning by heart – resembling the fixedness and order of wording in text. His 
overturning of that assumption leads to what this study contends is the crucial transition: Parry moved 
beyond the level of text into the actual presence of performers and their audiences in actu – asking the 
question, What is happening when this performer sings his tales? This is significant for the direction of 
the discussion in this research where the aim is to describe the original functioning of Paul’s letters 
along the same lines. Moreover, in line with the agenda of the present study, the same, consistent 
historical perspective will be taken on the communicative process in which we ourselves are caught up 
right now: What is happening when we read autonomous text in silence and solitude?  
The individual studies discussed in the Chapter each contribute particular insights that inform the 
contours of the research. In addition to the formative question noted above, Parry highlighted the 
importance of paying attention to the body. Based on his research into the formula and epithet, he was 
able to conclude that “words” there-and-then were not related to the kind of “meaning” with which we 
are familiar. The use of words was dependent on meter (rhythm). Abstracted thought reaches for 
cognition, whereas meter takes over the body. Once the performer has “captured” the body, he can 
gain influence over the hearts of his audience. The body will be a focal point in our construction of the 
realm of history in which oral performance takes place. 
Notable in the work of Lord, is his repeated emphasis on the decisive role of sound groups for 
preliterate bards. Contrary to the fixedness and free-standing nature of “words” with which we are 
familiar – on the level of text – he explains that sound is evanescent, bound to a specific time and 
place, and immediately directed towards addressees who are bodily present. In this state of mind, each 
performance is constituted anew and, according to the preliterate bards themselves, the “word” (as 
fixed basic unit to us) could change between being a single term up to a whole line of verse. Even we 
ourselves, despite our highly developed literate mindset, do not pause in living speech between every 
single word. So, in the preliterate worldview, but also in our own concrete lifeworld, the fixed visual 
basic unit (“word”) is difficult to identify. From this, we can draw three conclusions. First, the present-
day reader – especially when processing text in silence and solitude – has constant recourse to the 
objective dimension of the w-o-r-d. This is not only apparent in the media of text but also in the 
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accompanying mindset. To quote Ricoeur again, “words cease to efface themselves in front of things; 
written words become words for themselves.”164 Second, this kind of knowledge was not present in 
primary oral humanity, nor was it required or at issue in the moment of exposure by an orator in actu. 
Third, we could see here in an ultimate way the affirmation that in the participatory realm of history 
there is only flux, change, and diversity (see, in the Introduction, Caution to the reader #1).  
In terms of offering a way of understanding the structuring of thought with relation to ancient 
documents, John Miles Foley is of utmost importance. Systematically, he differentiates on the level of 
thought patterns. In his Theory of Metonymical or Traditional Referentiality, he explicates the role of 
the structural element. He argues that in a metonymic way the partes are visible and recorded in these 
ancient documents – on the level of text, so to speak – and the implied whole or totum consists of 
tradition or collective memory. As a major step forwards, this thought structure refines the first 
governing question: as present-day readers of ancient documents, we can grasp the distinctive way in 
which participation in oral performance structures thought by relating the visible parts (documented 
wording) to the collective memory of the originally intended addressees. In the actual performance, it 
is they who participate in the construal of that event – not we who are reading these documents as 
“text” centuries later. The performer anticipates this matrix in which his words will be framed.   
From another angle, Foley also helps us to bend our thoughts into the realm of the history involved. 
Regarding ancient documents, we should not any longer ask the question What does it mean? on the 
level of text and to us, but How does it function for them? In the first question, we put our bodies and 
a/our specific kind of participation – processing by reading in silence and solitude – in the place of 
theirs. From this perspective, repercussions of the earlier mentioned media muddle become 
intelligible: vis-à-vis text, the present-day reader comes to some sort of understanding; we have to 
come to understand, however, how the original addressees were intended to understand while being 
exposed to the emissary in performance.  
This outlook coincides with the discussion of mindsets in Eric Havelock’s Preface to Plato. By 
comparing the Homeric with the Platonic state of mind, he creates an insightful distinction. According 
to Plato, performances are like psychic poison. Through meter, imagination, and mimesis the 
participants – who are engaged bodily – are brought under a spell, as it were. The rhetorician or poet is 
not so much interested in the truth but in gaining influence over his audience. Thus, Havelock’s 
discussion provides a firm basis for the relational or bodily parameters of the predominantly oral 
mindset (inner-historical). By contrast, the Platonic state of mind represents absolute truth, as 
expressed by the Theory of Forms. Contrary to the flux and complexity of the realm of history, Plato 
advocated that reality should be grasped as “‘itself per se,’ [that] which is ‘one,’ and [that] which is 
‘unseen’.”165 We witnessed here some sort of birth of the method of abstraction. This kind of 
knowledge tends to move away from the specificities of the participatory realm of history in which the 
 
164 Paul Ricoeur, “What is a text?”, 149. 
165 Havelock, Preface, 256. 
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subject in actu exists. In this structuring of thought, in which the contours of the predominantly literate 
state of mind were recognized, the second governing question on the effect of eye-to-text 
communication on the academically trained reader is answered.  
Notwithstanding the heuristic value of the dichotomy between “orality” and “literacy,” Walter Ong 
makes clear that the historical interface is more complicated than that. He demonstrates that “text” can 
be living speech in disguise. Although the Iliad and the Odyssey, Tudor Prose, and the corpus 
Paulinum appear to us as “text,” we must do justice to a possibly different original functioning than 
autonomous texts (oral residue). However, Ong points out, text is more usually perceived as a 
monolithic or extra-historical entity per se, involving the same processing everywhere, every time, and 
for everyone. So, he calls for a systematic approach to the historicization of “text” as such, or a 
differentiation of functionings. This is especially relevant in terms of the third governing question 
regarding how the prevailing mindset in scholarship affects our reading of ancient documents.  
Ong is equally important on the other side of the dichotomy with regard to literacy. He answers the 
question: What is happening when we read autonomous text in silence and solitude? In short, 
autonomous text is a form of abstraction in itself; the physical appearance of text (litterae, w-o-r-d-s, 
order, sequence, text area) represents the unchanging and invisible forms of “being” and (abstracted) 
thought to us. Thus he succeeds in contextualizing autonomous text. Ong provides a simple golden 
rule to counter the impairment of our state of mind vis-à-vis text. Namely, to acknowledge that there 
are different degrees of abstraction. We have to concretize our abstractions, representations, or 
propositions on the level of text as adequately as possible. It is imperative to bend our thoughts into 
the specific realm of history. Our imagination should be brought to life to guide and critically 
scrutinize our explorations. Since the question What does it mean? is restricted to text, the other 
question How does it mean? forces us to deepen our representation of actual communicative processes 
(oral performance/text) – to push it beyond the level of text. In the following Chapter concerning the 
history of Pauline research, we will not only discuss what is said about Paul and the oral 
performance/public reading of his letters there-and-then, but we will also enquire into the role of 











2. Pauline scholarship and oral performance, but what about “text”?  
 
In this history of research, publications are discussed that approach the corpus Paulinum from the 
perspective of orality studies, with the intention of addressing the first governing question. The 
hypothesis is that the mental transformations of the Western mind – because of developments in the 
technology of reading and writing – lay beyond the critical awareness of biblical scholarship. For that 
reason, these studies will be scrutinized on the present-day processing of the letters as “text” as well. 
The questions that lie at the heart of this scrutiny address issues of How do these studies relate the 
different media cultures of oral performance there-and-then-to-them and text here-and-now-to-us to 
each other? What can be learned from the explicit and implicit ways in which they are related to each 
other?  
This Chapter discusses a representative selection of publications. The criterion of selection is related 
to the field of Pauline scholarship, and in particular, those that deal with the Letter to the Galatians. In 
addition, some relevant studies that encompass the New Testament as a whole will be considered. The 
ordering is according to date of publication. Three sections can be distinguished. The first six scholars 
deal with Paul and oral dynamics in a more general way. The recent movement of Biblical 
Performance Criticism is then discussed. In the process of this movement gaining influence, Larry 
Hurtado published an article to correct some of its underlying premises, which prompted a response 
from Kelly Iverson and another from Hurtado himself. The perspectives of these various studies will 
lead to some important conclusions on the interaction of the two media cultures at issue. 
 
 
A. Werner Kelber: The Oral and the Written Gospel 
 
In 1983, Werner Kelber published his seminal study The Oral and the Written Gospel: The 
Hermeneutics of Speaking and Writing in the Synoptic Tradition, Mark, Paul, and Q.166 In the preface 
to the edition of 1997, he states, “I have written this book out of a concern for what seemed to me a 
disproportionately print-oriented hermeneutics in our study of the Bible.” He disqualifies the search 
for the original form as a governing bias, rejects the paradigm of linearity and criticizes the form-
 
166 Werner H. Kelber, The Oral and the Written Gospel: The Hermeneutics of Speaking and Writing in the 
Synoptic Tradition, Mark, Paul, and Q (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983; repr. with a new introduction by the 
author, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997). 
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critical presupposition that the written gospel is self-evidently in continuity with oral traditions.167 The 
subliminal inclination of New Testament studies is “to treat words primarily as records in need of 
interpretation, neglecting all too often a rather different hermeneutics, deeply rooted in biblical 
language that proclaims words as an act inviting participation.” He aims “to broaden biblical 
hermeneutics by developing a sympathetic understanding of both the oral and the written word, and by 
studying ways in which one acts upon the other.”168 
The main part of the book is devoted to the gospel of Mark.169 Since this treatment provides the 
blueprint of Kelber’s oral hermeneutics, we will first discuss the chapters on Mark’s oral legacy170  
and textuality.171 He claims that “the very genre of the written gospel may be linked with the intent to 
provide a radical alternative to a preceding tradition.”172 Thus, the explicitly written gospel indicates a 
radical incision to all previous oral stages. Based on Havelock’s treatise of Plato's Republic (Chapter 
1), Kelber explains Mark’s written gospel as an inherent critique on the system of oral transmission. 
Similar to the poets in Plato’s day, the disciples are the oral representatives of Jesus. This frame sheds 
light on a major theme in Mark’s Gospel: Jesus constantly has to confront the disciples over their lack 
of understanding as to who he is and what his mission is. “This leads us to suggest that the 
dysfunctional role of the disciples narrates the breakdown of the mimetic process and casts a vote of 
censure against the guarantors of tradition.” According to Mark, the reason for this defect is “that oral 
transmission did not work because it could not work.”173 To do justice to “the theological complexities 
that characterize the fullness of Jesus,” a fundamentally different mindset is needed. Only literacy can 
provide this. In a pejorative way, orality is juxtaposed with and judged as inferior to literacy. One can 
recognize here the critique coined as the Great Divide.174  
Once he has formulated this fundamental opposition between orality and textuality, Kelber elaborates 
the consequences. His line of thought is that Mark composed the gospel in “writing” and that the 
addressees participated by “reading.” He then adds the following parenthetical remark: “even if the 
 
167 Kelber, Oral and the Written, xv. 
168 Ibid., xvi. 
169 Ibid., 44–139. 
170 Ibid., 44–89. 
171 Ibid., 90–139. 
172 Ibid., xvii. 
173 Ibid., 97. 
174 In his new introduction to the reprint in 1997, Kelber defends himself against these charges, ibid., xxi/ii: 
“We must, thirdly, avoid any implications of what has come to be referred to as the Great Divide ... Repeatedly, 
my critics have pointed out that in late antiquity “oral operations (presentation and hearing) and literary 
operations (reading and writing) were ... inescapably interlocked” (J. Dewey, 1994: 45). I do not myself use the 
term the Great Divide nor was it part of our vocabulary in the late seventies and early eighties when the book 
was written. Indeed, the attentive reader will observe that my understanding of tradition and gospel is more 
nuanced than the label of the Great Divide gives it credit for ... I am, moreover, persuaded that the strong thesis 
of The Oral and the Written Gospel was, and to some extent still is, necessary to break theoretical ground and to 
challenge the chirographic-typographic hegemony that rules biblical scholarship and many of the human 
sciences.”  
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gospel was meant to be recited or read aloud.”175 First, “reading” itself, or how Kelber is using the 
term, is not explicated. Second, no explanation is found as to how this “reading” differs from his 
assertion that “the gospel was meant to be read aloud.” This remark remains a loose end. The 
conclusion seems to be that this radically new media relation to the gospel of Mark (reading) applies 
to all subsequent “readers” – including the contemporary, print- or screen-oriented biblical scholar.176 
Kelber then turns to Paul and starts with the following statement on the nature of the letter: 
 
A writer of letters has chosen a form that favours extension of one’s personal authority into written 
verbalization. As far as his authorial identity is concerned, Mark has retreated behind his text. Paul, by 
contrast, plays up his first person singular authority in the manner of oral speech. The letter form allows him 
to keep in as close touch with the recipients of his message as is possible for a writer, and to address them 
almost as if he were present in person.177  
 
Paul’s letters function as a second-best form of mediating personal authority – “as if he were present 
in person.” With a reference to Robert Funk, Kelber suggests that Paul even wrote reluctantly and 
regarded the “oral word more fully effective than letters.”178 This line of thought also proves to be a 
loose end, with no elaboration on the consequences of this alleged inferior quality of the letter form is 
found in evidence. 
Several remarks follow that illustrate Kelber’s oral hermeneutics. Gospel is the master metaphor of the 
apostle: “Paul links the word primarily not with content, but with the effect it has on hearers.”179 Since 
God is essentially invisible, Paul’s mission is directed towards interiorization: “The heart is the central 
organ of reception that facilitates communication with Spirit and gospel.”180 Internalization means 
participation: “the epistemological principle of orality [is] that to know actuality is to participate in 
it.”181 Therefore, knowing means participating and participating means knowing. With this 
epistemological principle “nothing less than a fundamental creed of the apostle’s oral hermeneutics” is 
 
175 Ibid., 115. 
176 See Paul J. Achtemeier, “OMNE VERBUM SONAT: The New Testament and the Oral Environment of 
Late Western Antiquity,” JBL 109/1 (1990), 5, note 7: “[This observation] would fall into the category of 
premature conclusions.” In a similar vein, Arthur J. Dewey, “A Re-Hearing of Romans 10:1-15,” Semeia 65 
(1994), 112, comments that “while Kelber made an important connection between writtenness and Law and 
noted that this connection does not refer to some legalistic character of the Law but to the sense of its written 
totality and complexity, he failed, in my opinion, to bring in the fundamental issue of the power conveyed 
through the written tradition (...) Again, the question is not simply one of orality versus writtenness but of how 
power was to be conveyed and augmented.” 
177 Kelber, Oral and the Written, 140. 
178 Robert W. Funk, “The Apostolic Parousia: Form and Significance,” in Christian History and 
Interpretation: Studies Presented to John Knox, ed. William R. Farmer, Charles F. D. Moule and Richard R. 
Niebuhr (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 259, note 1. Kelber, Oral and the 
Written, 141. 
179 Ibid., 145. 
180 Ibid., 146. 
181 Ibid., 150. 
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given.182 In this way, no separation is at stake between knower and known. Presence diminishes or 
excludes representation.  
This perspective on oral supremacy is expounded in his theory of oral synthesis. Paul’s message as 
spoken word “implicates speakers and hearers alike.”183 Oral synthesis is formed by the 
interrelatedness of message, speaker, and hearers: “Oral synthesis creates a tense world of personal 
loyalties and betrayals. Not only is the message inseparable from the speaker, but the speaker is as 
important to the recipients as his message.” The subject of mimesis comes to the fore. Contrary to the 
origins of Mark’s gospel, Kelber suggests that imitation is an integral part of Paul’s oral hermeneutics: 
“Because in oral hermeneutics words have no existence apart from persons, participation in the 
message is inseparable from imitation of the speaker.”184  
After this general overview, Kelber turns to 1 Thessalonians. At this point, Kelber seems to turn this 
view on its head to bring oral supremacy into question. The very way in which the apostle had 
originally conveyed the gospel to the Thessalonians, that is, the oral word/gospel, constituted the 
reason for the problematic enthusiasm. This negative effect of oral performance asked for correction 
by the counterpart, that is, the written word: “Distanced from the community by space and time, the 
apostle has to seize upon the written media that, despite the letter’s close affinity to speech, locates 
him vis-à-vis the oral gospel.”185  
To drive this point home, Kelber turns to 1 Corinthians. The problem at hand is recapitulated as 
follows: “His [Paul’s] polemic is distinctly directed against the oral powers of wisdom.” The apostle 
counters the power of wisdom with the power of the cross: “There is a subtle but inescapable linguistic 
logic that casts the cross in a position of judging the oral powers of Corinthian wisdom.”186 Kelber 
concludes, 
 
When faced with the extreme consequences of oral wisdom, Paul, preacher of the oral gospel, is here 
compelled to reconsider his hermeneutical priorities and to invoke the norm of Scripture. “Do not go beyond 
what is written” is a wholly exceptional statement in Pauline theology, and in making it the apostle has at this 
point sanctioned the written media as a basis of the new wisdom.  
 
Despite his original oral hermeneutics, the Paul of 1 Corinthians “is a subtle but consistent promoter of 
the values of literacy.”187 We can draw the following conclusions. The whole of his argumentation 
starts by stating that in essence the gospel is spoken; it needs to be heard so that participation and 
imitation can take place (oral synthesis). As readers of his book, our imagination comes to life. Kelber 
does not systematically relate, however, the “oral word” or “oral gospel,” as delivered by Paul himself, 
to the – apparently inferior – oral delivery of the letters by the emissary. A number of questions thus 
 
182 Ibid., 145. 
183 Ibid., 147. 
184 Ibid., 151. 
185 Ibid., 172. 
186 Ibid., 174. 
187 Ibid., 177. 
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arises: How is the effect of a sent emissary inferior to Paul travelling there and addressing the 
congregation himself? What role does the process of composition, the letter as physical artefact, and/or 
the event of delivery play in Paul achieving his goals? Concretization is also missing in his subsequent 
leap to the “letter” as “written medium” in the Thessalonian and Corinthian correspondence. Kelber 
does not explicate the operational process in the realm of history there-and-then, again leaving a 
number of points to be addressed. One might raise the questions: Does “reading the written medium” 
mean that the addressees read in silence and solitude – as the modern reader is used to do? What then 
was the role of the emissary? Was the letter present in that situation as one physical artefact 
(autograph) or did Paul send several apographs? Neither does Kelber enter into any discussion as to 
how all these moments of individual reading might have taken place or looked like in the life of the 
congregation, in what way the recipients might come to a communal understanding or discussion of 
the content, or of who would have been in charge of that process and on what grounds did this 
person/these persons have the authority to act in this way. Conversely, when we imagine that this 
“written medium” (single artefact) was negotiated to the addressees in some sort of a public reading, 
then the question that arises is, How could the addressees, as they are exposed to the emissary and his 
reading aloud, be able to grasp and experience this radically opposed functioning of “writing”? But we 
can go even further: If the goals, which Paul wanted to achieve with the “letter,” are dependent on the 
“written” form, what would be the consequence for the credibility of his prior gospel preaching 
mediated as “oral word”? Kelber’s reasoning on “written medium” and “reader” remains abstract and 
ambivalent.  
Here we might consider the intended audience of Mark’s gospel which Kelber designates as the 
“readers.” Since Kelber does not pay particular attention to this notion, the “reader” there-and-then can 
only be framed by the one he is familiar with, that is, he himself in actual practice. A huge gap in time 
is the result. A gradual development of the technology involved and possible mental transformative 
repercussions over time become blind spots. In the words of Casey Davis, “a scholar such as Werner 
Kelber, who argues that the New Testament writers were seeking to pull their readers into an abstract 
literate mentality and away from the concrete oral mindset, is condensing centuries of development 
into decades.”188 This critique pertains to the whole conceptual matrix of “reader,” “hearer,” “writer,” 
and, in particular, “letter,” and “text.” This monolithic and extra-historical usage structures thoughts 
away from the concreteness of the realm of history. In view of the third governing question, this is a 
clear example of the tendency characteristic of the predominantly literate state of mind.  
Therefore, we must ask whether the oral hermeneutics of Kelber is the inevitable result of this 
mindset. In this structuring of thought, “text” is free-floating. The phenomenon itself is left out of 
consideration; how the present-day reader relates to it is not reflected upon. In a similar vein, 
“hermeneutics” is neither located in a specific realm of history (there-and-then-by-them or here-and-
 
188 Casey W. Davis, Oral Biblical Criticism: The Influence of the Principles of Orality on the Literary 
Structure of Paul’s Epistle to the Philippians, JSNTSup 172 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 28.  
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now-by-us), nor are the specific subjects in actu (the original addressees or the contemporary reader of 
his book) sufficiently identified. From the start, his hermeneutics is determined and constrained by the 
communicative situation of the contemporary biblical scholar, that is more precise, his particular 
technical relation to the available versions here-and-now of the New Testament documents as “texts.” 
Nonetheless, despite this weakness, we will use his model of oral synthesis. Regarding the first 
governing question, the emphasis in his thesis on the participation of the intended addressees will be 
one of the focal points in defining body-to-body communication (Chapter 3).  
 
 
B. Paul Achtemeier: OMNE VERBUM SONAT 
 
In 1989, Paul Achtemeier, president of the Society of Biblical Literature for that year, delivered his 
presidential address, entitled “OMNE VERBUM SONAT: The New Testament and the Oral 
Environment of Late Western Antiquity.”189 In this lecture, he commences by hailing a salutary 
development in biblical research: “the recovery of the awareness that its documents were produced 
within the environment of late Western antiquity and that, therefore, knowledge of that [oral] 
environment will aid in their understanding.”190  
Achtemeier draws attention to the neglected aspect of the immediate cultural environment: “That 
aspect centers on the fact that we have in the culture of late Western antiquity a culture of high 
residual orality which nevertheless communicated significantly through literary creations.” In this 
opening statement, “high residual orality” is related to “literary creations.” The first phenomenon 
stems from Walter Ong (see Chapter 1), the second, however, is not explicated or defined. Since these 
“literary creations,” “writings,” “the written word,” or “manuscripts” are distinguished from oral 
performances, public readings, or emissaries, Achtemeier seems to frame them as things or objects 
(being).  
This tendency is also clear in the category of “residual orality,” which subjects the spoken word to the 
written word. We recognize this hierarchy also in Achtemeier’s focus on the “oral overlay”: these are 
“indications in written documents that would make their oral performance understandable even in the 
absence of any formal rhetorical training on the part of the writer or the listener.” In this way, he 
addresses the question proposed in the introduction to this Chapter as to how these studies relate the 
different media cultures involved to each other. From the start of his article, the influences of the oral 
culture there-and-then seem to be dominated by the physical artefacts. And since no distinction is 
made between the approach of “these literary creations” there-and-then and here-and-now, we seem to 
have them at our disposal as the New Testament “texts” in real time.  
 
189 Paul J. Achtemeier, “OMNE VERBUM SONAT: The New Testament and the Oral Environment of Late 
Western Antiquity,” JBL 109/1 (1990): 3–27. 
190 Achtemeier, “OMNE VERBUM,” 3.  
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What follows is an exploration of the outline of Achtemeier’s argumentation. His contribution is to 
address the oral overlay in the writings of the New Testament by reviewing how written documents 
were created and read. Here Achtemeier makes the significant remark, “Of primary importance to this 
discussion is the realization that ancient culture remained committed to the spoken word.”191 He refers 
to the preference of Seneca and Papias for oral accounts over written records, and points to “the sheer 
physical nature of the written page in classical antiquity” which “militated against its ease of reading 
and in that way also contributed to the culture’s reliance on the oral mode in communication.”192 
These aspects illustrate a cultural bias in favour of the spoken word. Nonetheless, writing was known 
in a variety of purposes and types, and paper was readily available: “the wide distribution of copies of 
the writings of the NT gives evidence of the extent to which literature could circulate even among the 
less prominent members of the Hellenistic culture.”193 Achtemeier also deals with the rules of 
dictation. He concludes that the documents that were produced and read “were predominantly, indeed 
exclusively” oral.194 
After this excursion into reading and writing in antiquity, Achtemeier launches his main point: “the 
oral environment was so pervasive that no writing occurred that was not vocalized.”195 Once more, this 
illustrates his emphasis on the oral inclination in late Western antiquity. For him, the research by 
Joseph Balogh had been decisive in shaping his view on this issue. In the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the question of whether antiquity was familiar with silent reading dominated the study of 
ancient literacy. In his article “Toward a Sociology of Reading in Classical Antiquity,”196 William 
Johnson observes that some decades before Achtemeier’s presidential address scholars had already 
disqualified the apparently revolutionary outcome of Balogh’s research.197 As a result, the communis 
opinio was that, next to the overly familiar practice of reading aloud in a predominantly oral culture, 
 
191 Ibid., 9. 
192 Ibid., 10. As an illustration, Achtemeier describes the physical appearance of the text: “The written page 
consisted entirely of lines each containing a similar number of letters, lines that ended and began irrespective of 
the words themselves. Documents were written without punctuation, without indications of sentence or 
paragraph structure, indeed without separation of the letters into individual words” (10). 
193 Ibid., 11. 
194 Ibid., 12. 
195 Ibid., 15. Many examples are mentioned by Achtemeier, ibid., such as Zechariah in the gospel of Luke, a 
tombstone epigraph assuming that the deceased is speaking what is read (15, 16), Herodotus reporting that 
Croesus “hears” the written oracles from Delphi. In line with these examples, he extends this practice of 
vocalization to public presentations of literature in general. As final step, he subsequently frames “early 
Christian gatherings” likewise (16). To drive his point home, he concludes, “Most interesting from our 
perspective, and perhaps least generally understood is the fact that even solitary readers, reading only to 
themselves, read aloud (...) Reading was, therefore, oral performance whenever it occurred and in whatever 
circumstances. Late antiquity knew nothing of the ‘silent, solitary reader’” (16–17).  
196 William A. Johnson, “Toward a Sociology of Reading in Classical Antiquity,” AJP 121/4 (2000), 595. 
197 As an unfortunate example of not being informed properly, Johnson explicitly refers to Achtemeier in note 
11, 597: “A startling example is the naive summary of the debate, which serves then as the basis for a study of 
New Testament texts, in Achtemeier 1990.” 
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there is evidence of the practice of reading in silence and solitude in antiquity as well.198 (See the  
Excursus on silent reading in antiquity below.) 
Returning to his quintessential thesis, Achtemeier turns once more to the sheer physical nature of the 
written page. The ancient reader had a difficult task:  
 
The visual format of the ancient manuscript – words run together, and in addition often abbreviated, no 
punctuation to indicate sentences or paragraphs – conveyed virtually no information about the organization 
and development of the content it intended to convey.199  
     
His argument seems to hone in on the absence of visual indications in the organization of the signs 
inscribed on the flat surface of the transmitted ancient documents. Implicitly, this absence is perceived 
as a problem, and is to scrutinizing this that we turn now.  
In his formulation, first, “the visual format” is bound to the “ancient manuscripts.” When we recall 
John Foley’s question (“How does it mean?”), it becomes clear that a specific media is given (text/text 
area) and an isolated sense is in operation (vision/eye). Therefore we must ask, the rather rhetorical 
question, whether this “visual format” or the absence of visual indications was problematic there-and-
then-to-them (emissaries, professional scribes, public readers) or is it problematic here-and-now-to-us 
(contemporary reader, biblical scholar)? No explanation or explication is given. For the present-day 
readers vis-à-vis these ancient manuscripts (with their scriptio continua, abbreviations, no punctuation, 
and so forth) as text, this specific and atypical “visual format” is usurped by that level of text itself. 
The emphasis in the present study on the participation of the originally intended audiences in the oral 
performances of the letter makes clear that the role of this visual perspective is not directly relevant for 
them. Thus, Achtemeier’s discussion lacks the question of to whom this visual format is important or 
apparently problematic.  
Second, the visual dimension of the intended communicative process is related to the problem of “the 
content it intended to convey.” Note that “it” refers to the physical object of the “manuscript.” It is not 
the audience in reciprocity to the emissary that comes to a certain understanding, but it is the 
manuscripts which can freely float throughout time and place (objects) that are considered to convey 
“content.” A priori the approach of the manuscripts there-and-then and the intended understanding is 
funnelled into our known and communal practice of reading them here-and-now in silence and 
solitude (text).  
Given the problematic situation of the visual format and the conveyance of content, Achtemeier offers 
two possibilities. First, he makes the following comment,  
 
 
198 Johnson, “Toward a Sociology of Reading,” 596. In his article “More Silent Reading in Antiquity: Non 
Omne Verbum Sonabat,” JBL 112/4 (1993): 689–694, biblical scholar Frank Gilliard provides several examples 
that undermine Achtemeier’s bold statement. 
199 Achtemeier, “OMNE VERBUM,” 16. 
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One way, of course, is to have someone deliver the writing who knows what it contains, and what the author 
intended with it, and have that person give such information. That in fact was frequently done with letters, 
itself an indication of the problem ancient writers faced in conveying their thoughts in understandable form. 
Yet such an expedient had limited utility at best, and in fact served virtually as a substitute for conveying 
information via the written word.200 
 
Achtemeier proposes the emissary not as a solution to the problem of the visual format but as “a 
substitute for conveying information via the written word.” He juxtaposes the process in which the 
emissary is crucial for activating the letter, with a distinctive communicative process based on 
“writing” or “the written word.” An either-or structuring of thought is the danger here. In this way, we 
notice once more the inner tension in his argumentation as a whole.  
We can make another observation on the presuppositional level. Achtemeier sees the role of the 
emissary as “an indication of the problem ancient writers faced in conveying their thoughts in 
understandable form.” In this remark, we recognize the poles that cause the inner tension in his 
argumentation. Apparently, ancient writers faced a “problem.” Now the question comes to the fore as 
to how does Achtemeier know (or, how can he demonstrate) that ancient writers faced (this as) a 
problem.201 Clearly, in biblical scholarship, or even as early as 2 Peter 3.15–16, one experiences 
difficulties in understanding documented words that are severed from their original realm of history 
and that have to speak, therefore, more or less for themselves. The crucial and presuppositional 
question is whether Paul, his emissaries, and/or originally intended audiences experienced this as a 
“problem” in the one, envisioned, unrepeatable, and trenchant moment of oral delivery. One can only 
experience the problem as stipulated above when a writer is aware of an alternative, namely, 
conveying one’s thoughts in understandable form via “the written word.” We should add once more 
that in Achtemeier’s reasoning these writings are seen as functioning independently from an emissary. 
In a Procrustean way, he seems to force textum into text. Put simply, either Paul is an inferior “ancient 
writer” or this was the normal and, therefore, non-problematic “visual format” at the time. The present 
study explores this latter line of thought.  
Alongside the solution of an emissary, Achtemeier continues by providing an “alternative to visual 
structuring of a manuscript to indicate organization of meaning.”  He states,  
 
In short, organization of written materials will depend on sound rather than sight for its effectiveness ... What 
we want to look for, are verbal clues that, by being heard (not seen!), would have aided the listener in 
 
200 Ibid., 17. 
201 In this respect, we can turn once more to the article by Paul S. Evans, “Creating a New ‘Great Divide’: 
The Exoticization of Ancient Culture in Some Recent Applications of Orality Studies to the Bible,” JBL 136 
(2017): 749–64. In his argumentation, he addresses issues relating to “the complexity of both orality and literacy 
in reconstructing the function of scribes and their texts in ancient Israelite circles” (753). As an Old Testament 
scholar with a particular interest in matters of scribality, he rejects the position that text could not be read at first 
sight: “The fact that we moderns might have difficulty in reading these ancient scrolls does not mean that ancient 
users did so” (753). 
 77 
understanding the organization of the kind of complex writings that are found in the NT, clues that helped the 
hearer determine when one unit of thought had ended and another begun.202  
 
So the focus seems to shift here from the reader being exposed to the visual format as such to the aural 
participation by the hearer in the moment of delivery. He presents three main structuring elements, that 
is, repetition,203 parallelism,204 and inclusio.205 These clues were earlier designated by him as “residual 
orality” and “oral overlay in written media.” On this basis, Achtemeier makes the following 
conclusion:  
 
Such, I would urge, are a few examples of the ways aural clues were built into the prose of the letters 
addressed to groups of Christians, clues that would aid the listener in following the course of some long and 
complex arguments contained in those letters, but which would also aid the reader in giving a coherent and 
meaningful presentation of the content.206  
 
In line with the focus of the present study, we must ask: How does Achtemeier know that these 
“arguments” would be experienced by the intended addressees as “long” and – more importantly – 
“complex”? What makes an “argument” complex to everyone, everywhere at every time? Or is this 
perhaps his own experience as a twentieth-century reader approaching the letter as “text”? 
Furthermore, it remains vague as to what the differences are between an instructed public reader 
(emissary) and an uninstructed one, and how we should imagine the latter against the background of 
the oral environment of the New Testament. We can further observe that these clues help to organize 
the verbiage, but do not interfere with the structure of the (complex?) argument. These identified 
structuring features (“clues”) solely function on the level of text. Once more, this perspective seems to 
be based on his own (uncritical) visual exposure to the available version (text).  
Let us evaluate now Achtemeier’s case for doing justice to the oral environment of late Western 
antiquity. Historically speaking, he rightly stresses the distinctiveness of the original context of the 
New Testament documents there-and-then-to-them. Also, his excursus on the role of the emissary is 
thoughtful and provides helpful material. Crucial is his uncritical turn from describing the specific 
process of delivering the letter by an instructed emissary there-and-then to the given product which 
seems to be also available here-and-now-to-us; on this basis, he formulates this problem of “visual 
format.” From the start of his article, however, we saw several indications that “text” (“manuscript,” 
“writing,” or “written word”) as thing/object dominates the “oral context.” These considerations may 
explain why the results of his call to do justice to this oral environment appear to be rather weak. He 
 
202 Achtemeier, “OMNE VERBUM,” 19–20. 
203 As an example of repetition, he elaborates on anaphora, that is, the repetition of a word or phrase at the 
beginning of successive clauses. For example, in 1 Corinthians, seven times reference is made by the phrase περὶ 
δὲ to topics dealt with in different settings (23). 
204 We can elaborate on one: In 1 Cor 1.27–28, the formula τοῦ κόσμου ἐξελέγατο ὁ θεὸς ἲνα is repeated 
three times. The third repetition, however, adds a second noun after τοῦ κόσμου and omits the ἵνα. In this way, 
the hearers are made aware that this unit has come to an end (24). 
205 For example, Rom 1.29–31; 12.9–13. 
206 Achtemeier, “OMNE VERBUM,” 25. 
 78 
does not problematize the nature of the complex argumentation or penetrate the different ways in 
which thought can be structured (mindsets). This is due to the free-standing status in his argumentation 
of “literary creations,” “writing,” “the written word” and/or “text” – but also “argument.” We deal 
with an a priori severing (abstraction) of the material[s] from a specific time and place (late Western 
antiquity) and functioning (emissary, oral performance, public reading). These oral clues do not affect 
our imagination; they do not bring to life the intended oral performance as an event. So, despite his 
good intentions, Achtemeier seems to leave us in the media muddle.  
 
 
Excursus: Silent reading in antiquity? 
 
Achtemeier’s omne verbum sonat urges us to ask whether there was a practice of silent reading in 
antiquity and, if so, what the nature of that type of reading was. Since the relation between silent 
reading there-and-then-by-them and here-and-now-by-us is pivotal, how well-known or unknown 
would this alleged ancient practice of silent reading be to academically trained readers?  
To take a stance in this matter, we will turn to William Johnson’s article on a sociology of reading in 
classical antiquity.207 He traces the roots of this debate to Eduard Norden’s Die antike Kunstprosa208 
and Josef Balogh’s “Voces Paginarum: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Lauten Lesens und 
Schreibens.”209 They have set the stage for the assumption that (almost) all reading in antiquity must 
have been aloud. Particularly the practice of scriptio continua even led to the suggestion that silent 
reading was neurophysiologically not even possible.210 This idea is still widespread. In 1968, Bernard 
Knox published an article on “Silent Reading in Antiquity.”211 Contrary to Balogh, he demonstrates 
that ancient letters and documentary texts could be read in silence.212 Along the same lines, Andrei 
Gravilov published an article in 1997 entitled “Reading Techniques in Classical Antiquity.”213 
Referring to the field of cognitive psychology, he demonstrates that neurophysiologically speaking 
Greeks and Romans must have been able to read silently.214 Despite cultural diversity, he suggests that 
we have to reckon with an underlying unity in silent reading in antiquity and modern times.215  
Who is right in this debate? This is the moment where Johnson takes over. The question whether 
reading was aloud or silent is dismissed by him. It implies a too simplistic approach to historical 
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reality: “We must proceed from a clear and deep perception that what we seek to analyze is an 
immensely complex, interlocking system.”216 Since there is clear evidence of silent reading and public 
reading and reading aloud, he reframes the question by asking what  “reading” is and “how the ancient 
reading culture (as I [WJ] will call it) does in fact differ from the reading-from-a-printed-book model 
familiar to us today.”217 Johnson takes a sociological turn on reading: “Critical is the observation that 
reading is not simply the cognitive process by the individual of the ‘technology’ of writing, but rather 
the negotiated construction of meaning within a particular socio-cultural context.”218 According to 
him, reading comprises the following facets: reading – the experience of the action; reading events – 
the contextualization of a particular “reading;” and reading culture – the cultural construct that 
underpins the behaviours of groups and individuals involved in this particular “reading event.” 
Johnson advances the following propositions: 
 
(1) The reading of different types of texts makes for different types of reading events ... (2) The reading of a 
given text in different contexts results in different reading events ... (3) ... the reader’s conception of ... to 
what reading community s/he thinks to belong, is an important ... part of the reading event ... (4) The reading 
community normally has not only a strictly social component ... but also a cultural component, in that the 
rules of engagement are in part directed by inherited traditions ... (5) Reading which is perceived to have a 
cultural dimension ... is intimately linked to the self-identity of the reader.219  
   
By contextualizing “reading” as specific “reading events” within a certain “reading culture,” he points 
the way towards a differentiated and socio-culturally grounded conceptualization of ancient reading 
practices (plural). In this way, Johnson attempts to do justice to the “immensely complex, interlocking 
system” or “highly complex socio-cultural system.”220 In other words, he applies the golden rule of 
Walter Ong that the level of concretization in abstraction is crucial. 
The second part of Johnson's article is dedicated to exemplifying this approach. Based on fragments 
from Lucian’s diatribe on The Ignorant Book Collector (Adv. Indoct.) and Pliny the Elder (Natural 
History), he focuses on reading events related to prose literary texts in the first and second century BC 
of the Roman era.221 In these particular socio-cultural instances, reading is situated in elitist circles in 
which the book rolls “were not ... conceptualized as static repositories of information (or of pleasure), 
but rather vehicles for performative reading in high social contexts.”222 This social context of reading 
must have functioned as a springboard to intellectual discussion by members of the group.223  
Notwithstanding the notion “that at times the ancients read silently and in solitude,” he emphasizes the 
force of tradition within the reading culture of using an out-loud reader. Referring to Raymond 
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Starr,224 Johnson suggests that the use of lectors has been adequately demonstrated and is so widely 
assumed that it is only rarely mentioned explicitly.225 In conclusion, he posits reading aloud to a 
(elitist) group as the dominant practice.226  
The treatment of the visual appearance of the book roll – clarity of letters, scriptio continua, the width 
of columns and intercolumn, the aesthetic dimension in the interplay of these features – already 
pointed in this direction. “The strict ... attention to continuous flow in the design of the ancient book 
interlocks with the idea that it was the reader’s job to bring the text alive, to insert the prosodic 
features and illocutionary force lacking in the writing system.”227 He draws the parallel to a present-
day reader relating to a play through text: 
 
Just as we, when we read a play, are conditioned to imagine the possibilities of the actor’s intervention, so 
ancient readers (and indeed ancient authors) were, I suppose, conditioned to regard the text not as a voiceless 
and straightforward representation of the author’s intent, but as a script to be represented in performance 
(whether actualized or not).228  
 
This echoes what was said about textum in the Introduction to this thesis. Ricoeur’s stipulation of 
writing as the inscription of living speech also comes to mind, since this takes place between actual 
human beings in a concrete situation in distinction from autonomous text.229 In conclusion, not only do 
we have to move away from a monolithic and extra-historical framing of “reading,” we can also infer 
from Johnson’s study that the practice of reading aloud was predominant. Therefore “reading” is to a 
certain extent known to the present-day reader – as “the experience of the action,” but he also has to 
take account of the unknown – as differing “reading events” and “reading cultures” in which the 
hearing of the word was central.  
In the documents of the New Testament, we can find many examples of “reading” as well. Obviously, 
we think of Jesus reading out loud in the synagogue in Nazareth230 or the Ethiopian eunuch reading 
 
224 Raymond Starr, “Lectores and Book Reading,” CJ 86 (1990–91): 337–343.  
225 Johnson, “Toward a Sociology,” 619, note 36. 
226 It is important to note here a difference with the communities that Paul addressed in his letters. See, Lee 
A. Johnson, “Paul’s Letters as Artifacts: The Value of the Written Text among Non-Literate People,” BTB 46 
(2016), 26: “The claims of the discussion of ancient letters arise out of literate cultures; both writers and 
recipients were literate, elite classes of people … In contrast, the make-up of the communities to whom Paul 
wrote were primarily poor, working classes ….” 
227 Ibid., 612–15. 
228 Ibid., 620.  
229 Paul Ricoeur, “What is a text?” Explanation and Understanding,” in Hermeneutics and the Human 
Science: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation, ed., trans. and introduced John B. Thompson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1981), 146. 
230 In his gospel, Luke depicts Jesus as reading in the synagogue (4.16–21): “When he came to Nazareth, 
where he had been brought up, he went to the synagogue on the sabbath day, as was his custom. He stood up to 
read (ἀνέστη ἀναγνῶναι), and the scroll (βιβλίον) of the prophet Isaiah was given to him. He unrolled the scroll 
and found the place where it was written (γεγραμμένον): ‘The Spirit of the Lord is upon me’ … And he rolled up 
the scroll, gave it back to the attendant, and sat down. The eyes of all in the synagogue were fixed on him. Then 
he began to say to them, ‘Today this scripture (ἡ γραφή) has been fulfilled in your hearing (ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶν ὑμῶν)’.” 
As part of the synagogue liturgy, the Jewish holy scriptures were read aloud to be applied to the concrete 
situation of the attendees and subsequently discussed. Elucidating is the combination of the active voice in “to 
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aloud to himself on his chariot.231 In line with Johnson, these two instances imply different reading 
events.  
In the letters and the corpus Paulinum in particular, several relevant passages can be found. In 1 
Thessalonians 5.27, it says, “I solemnly command you by the Lord that this letter (τὴν ἐπιστολὴν) be 
read (ἀναγνωσθῆναι) to all of them [brothers].” In the letter to the Colossians (4.16), a more extensive 
instruction is found: “And when this letter has been read among you (ἀναγνωσθῇ παρ᾽ ὑμῖν ἐπιστολή), 
have it read (ἀναγνωσθῇ) also in the church of the Laodiceans; and see that you read (ἀναγνῶτε) also 
the letter from Laodicea.” The composer of this letter urges recipients to exchange the letters involved. 
Both the passive and the active voice are employed. The former implies that someone else is reading 
and the addressees will participate by hearing the reading aloud. Since the active voice is used in one 
and the same command – “that you, in turn, read the letter from Laodicea” – it points at the same 
functioning of this letter.  
The second letter of Peter also contains an interesting remark (2 Peter 3.15–16): 
 
… and regard the patience of our Lord as salvation. So also our beloved brother Paul wrote (ἔγραψεν) to you 
according to the wisdom given him, speaking (λαλῶν [sic]) of this as he does in all his letters (πάσαις 
ἐπιστολαῖς). There are some things in them hard to understand, which the ignorant and unstable twist to their 
own destruction, as they do the other scriptures (λοιπὰς γραφάς).  
 
 
read” (ἀναγνῶναι) and the completion of this reading of that which is written (ἡ γραφή) “in your hearing” (ἐν 
τοῖς ὠσὶν ὑμῶν). Here the holy scriptures are read to be fulfilled in literal and figurative hearing. Together with 
the synagogue as the typical Jewish place of gathering this practice reaches far back in time. Every synagogue 
had a genizah, that is, a room or closet in which several rolls were kept for the gathering on the Sabbath. In line 
with this purpose, there is also a communis opinio on a practice of individual reading or studying of these rolls. 
In the Roman era, the Jews already exhibited a vast array of exegetical methods. In this tradition of studying the 
holy scriptures, we can observe the objectifying effect when spoken words are written down. As such the word 
as record becomes severed from the immediate and concrete contexts that enable and constitute the spoken word 
as evanescent sound (for example, Ricoeur’s circumstantial milieu). Contrary to the spoken word, the 
documented word is without natural and immediate (inner-historical) context. Whenever read or referred to, 
these documented soundbites ask for recontextualization. Illustrative in this respect is the well-known 
introductory formula “for it is written.” We encounter these in the letters of Paul as well as the gospels. In nuce, 
this standard phrase implies an explication and recontextualization of documented words that receive their value 
in relation to the actual situation in which they are activated and, therefore, in need of handling and application. 
In this way, one can recognize some of the typical communicative dynamics involved in the familiar media of 
autonomous text. The origin of these words, however, is out of reach. In their documented and transmitted status, 
they keep value within certain communities and are, as a result, in need of interpretation. We have to be aware 
that this practice in Jewish culture took place through vocalization. Although written down and affirming this 
particular status (cf., “for it is written,” or “Scripture says”), in the communicative event itself these words 
become vocalized. 
231 We find this scene in Acts, the story of Philip and the Ethiopian official (8.26–40): “Then an angel of the 
Lord said to Philip, ‘Get up and go towards the south to the road that goes down from Jerusalem to Gaza.’ (This 
is a wilderness road.) So he got up and went. Now there was an Ethiopian eunuch, a court official of the 
Candace, queen of the Ethiopians, in charge of her entire treasury. He had come to Jerusalem to worship and was 
returning home; seated in his chariot, he was reading (ἀνεγίνωσκεν) the prophet Isaiah. Then the Spirit said to 
Philip, ‘Go over to this chariot and join it.’ So Philip ran up to it and heard (ἤκουσεν) him reading 
(ἀναγινώσκοντος) the prophet Isaiah. He asked, ‘Do you understand (γινώσκεις) what you are reading 
(ἀναγινώσκεις)?’” (emphasis mine). As in his gospel, Luke uses here once more the active voice of 
ἀναγινώσκειν (to read). The eunuch is reading for himself. Contrary to our habit, however, he is doing so aloud.  
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The alleged authorships of Colossians (Paul) and 2 Peter (Peter) are disputed. On all accounts, 
however, we get a glimpse of how letters in the early Jesus movement and the Pauline communities 
could have functioned. After the intended and one-time-and-place deliveries of Paul’s letters, these 
passages seem to point to a practice of (re-)reading (aloud) and studying them as physical artefacts as a 
community. Originally, the instructed emissary embodied the letter. In subsequent stages, the emissary 
is absent and the letter as physical artefact must have become more important as a starting point of the 
public reading and studying in the community.232 There must have been exchange and a kind of 
distribution of the related physical artefacts. In this way, we witness in a sense the earliest beginnings 
of the textification of the letters.233 Nonetheless, since there are no clear indications of reading in 
silence and solitude as practised in contemporary academia, an explicit differentiation between these 




C. Pieter Botha: Letter Writing and Oral Communication in Antiquity 
 
In his article “Letter Writing and Oral Communication in Antiquity: Suggested Implications for the 
Interpretation of Paul’s Letter to the Galatians,”234 Pieter Botha aims at “locating Pauline letter writing 
within the context of ancient communication to make the constraints of an orally based culture 
relevant to the understanding of his letters.” Despite Adolf Deissmann’s distinction between “epistle” 
and “letter”235 – which led to the valid and fundamental recognition of the situational character of 
Paul’s letters – and the relevance of Greco-Roman rhetoric and epistolography, Botha claims that “the 
 
232 It seems that letters deemed pseudepigraphical, such as Colossians and 2 Peter, must have been brought 
into circulation as manuscripts that suggested they started their life cycle as sent from an/one author in a single 
originating oral performance – something that, however, never actually took place. Nonetheless, once being 
written, copied, and distributed (funnelled?) in these communities, they could have functioned well in this 
procedure of public rereading and studying.  
233 In his study Communal Reading in the Time of Jesus: A Window into Early Christian Reading Practices 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017), Brian J. Wright introduces the practice of “communal reading” as a control 
of literary tradition or a guarantor of the stability of documented wordings in key documents within the early 
Jesus movement. The fact that the practice of repetitious communal reading of specific documents took place in 
communities made these audiences sensitive to the specificity of words used in the public reading. 
Notwithstanding a focus on the gospels, he also deals with the Pauline corpus (153–183). The Foreword of this 
book is written by Larry Hurtado. For oral performance and/or public reading of the biblical documents and the 
approach of performance criticism, Wright refers to and agrees with the former’s article “Oral Fixation and New 
Testament Studies? ‘Orality,’ ‘Performance’ and Reading Texts in Early Christianity,” NTS Vol. 60/3 (2014): 
321–340 (see below). Since Hurtado does not engage this specific perspective on the documents, in the study we 
value Wright’s discussion of communal reading in line with the comment above on the beginnings of the 
textification of the letters of Paul in the history of the church. 
234 Pieter J.J. Botha, “Letter writing and oral communication in antiquity: Suggested implications for the 
interpretation of Paul’s Letter to the Galatians,” Scriptura 42 (1992): 17–34. 
235 Adolf G. Deissmann, Bibelstudien: Beiträge, aus den Papyri und Inschriften, zur Geschichte der Sprache, 
des Schrifttums and der Religion des hellenistischen Judentums und des Urchristentums (Marburg: N. G. Elwert, 
1885), 1–59; Licht vom Osten: Das Neue Testament und die neuentdeckten Texte der hellenistisch-römische 
Welt (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1923), 148–9 and 230–45.  
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context of ancient communication still remains peripheral to these [Pauline] studies.”236 He observes a 
tendency “to study historical facets in isolation.”237 So how does he approach the subject himself?  
Botha’s first step is to clear “our minds of tacit assumptions,” echoing the warnings of Albert Lord and 
Walter Ong (see Chapter 1), urging that “we must replace our misleading, modern literate view of 
ancient writing activities with a more responsible view that takes into account their historical, 
religious, intellectual, and psychological situation.”238 With respect to the first governing question 
regarding the effect of body-to-body communication, we see Botha identifying a clear and radical 
distinction between the two media cultures involved. He argues that the selection of modern 
scholarship in terms of witnesses from the past is governed by the availability of their writings. In this 
way, “we are misled by our prejudice towards the (infinitesimal) elite section of antiquity.” Thus the 
witnesses chosen are, because of their relatively high literacy there-and-then, not representative of the 
culture in general.239      
The second step is the discussion of ancient communication itself. Botha makes the preliminary 
remark that “by not critically defining our concepts we can easily fall into the trap of facile 
oversimplification.”240 This insight touches on the golden rule of Ong (Chapter 1). He suggests, also 
citing the words of Ramsay MacMullen, that the primary difference with modern literacy is that “we 
are dealing with a different culture, a world that must be dealt with in its own right … [where] ‘the 
explicit record at important points fits badly with what are, to ourselves, entirely natural 
expectations’.”241 The present-day reader must become aware of their subliminal inclinations and 
distrust them, and the self-evident or given way of the original addressees to participate in oral 
performance must be subject to critical examination. 
The next sections are more focused. In dealing with scribes and scribal culture, Botha states that, 
despite an oral world, people were familiar with writing. They used it, however, through the skills of 
others: “Writing was product and a commodity to be sold, not an intellectual process.” Once more we 
recognize Ricoeur’s distinction between “writing” – as the inscription of living speech – and text 
(Introduction). In light of this practice, Botha draws the important conclusion that the letters of Paul 
“are texts that originated as and were designed for oral presentations.”242 
 After discussing co-authorship and the role of an amanuensis, Botha turns to the delivery. Although 
the imperial government maintained a postal service, private letters had to be sent by private means. 
Wealthy people had their letter carriers (tabularii). The role of a tabularius was decisive in this 
 
236 Botha, “Letter writing,” 17. 
237 Ibid., 17–8. 
238 Ibid., 18. 
239 Thus he argues that we should also differentiate within the proposed predominantly oral state of mind in 
the first-century Mediterranean world; the elite could have been informed by practices and degrees of literacy 
not available to a majority of the population. 
240 Botha, “Letter writing,” 19. 
241 See, for his quote, Ramsay MacMullen, Christianizing the Roman Empire (AD 100–400) (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1984), 42. 
242 Botha, “Letter writing,” 21.  
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communicative process. The journey was full of dangers (shipwreck, robbery, illness). In winter, letter 
carrying was not even possible. There are also accounts of the forgery and disclosure of contents. To 
deal with all these problems, one selected emissaries based on their trustworthiness. They were not 
only instructed on the contents of the letter and given supplementary reports on matters that were not 
set down in writing, but “[t]he letter writer was careful to entrust the real message of the letter to the 
carrier, not merely the text of the letter itself.”243 The choice of the letter carrier was, therefore, more 
crucial than the “text” (note the use of the term by Botha) of the letter: “they receive authority to 
convey the letters to expand upon them, and to continue Paul’s work.”244 The intentions of Paul had to 
be fulfilled by the letter carrier in the event of its delivery. In this respect, Botha critically reflects on 
the common conceptualization: 
 
All commentators refer to the ‘readers’ of Paul’s letter, identifying the Galatian Christians, the recipients of 
the letter. How should this be pictured historically? Not as a little book passing from member to member! 
Even reference to “reading in the assembly” or “in worship” is not spelt out ... There is abundant evidence 
that reading in antiquity was related to performance. Reading in antiquity, especially when it was not private 
reading, was similar to recitals or to oral delivery. 
 
“Performance” is characterized by Botha as of the utmost importance in an oral environment, namely 
as “bodily incarnation of the word.”245  
We can start the evaluation of this article with the following observation: regarding media and 
mindset, Botha presents a well-thought through call for the need to pay attention to the modern, 
literate, and uncritical framing of ancient writing activities. The present-day reader brings their own 
“natural” expectations to the printed versions of the letter here-and-now that must be criticized. The 
communication at issue should not be conceptualized as a message “from one mind to another.” He 
stresses the necessity to explicate the historical nature of the delivery and the specific persons and 
mindset there-and-then.246  
For an adequate understanding by the present-day biblical scholar, another related observation is 
important: Botha downplays the role of the transmitted letter as “text.” Based on his reconstructions of 
orality, scribes/scribal culture, co-authorship, amanuenses, deliveries, and oral performances, he 
suggests that the really intended “message” was not necessarily contained by the wording of the 
 
243 Botha cites here William G. Doty, Letters in Primitive Christianity (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973), 
268. 
244 Botha, “Letter writing,” 24. See Doty, Letters, 37. 
245 Ibid., 25. Given Achtemeier’s oversimplification omne verbum sonat, Botha distinguishes between private 
and public reading. The latter has to be framed as oral delivery, that is, an orator performing in reciprocity with 
his specific audience. From this perspective, he criticizes how modern scholars think of rhetoric. The oral aspect 
of ancient rhetoric has been neglected. Summarizing the rhetorical principles of Hellenistic culture, he writes, 
“their rhetorical principles aimed specifically ... at oral performance, and, consequently, also at creating 
successful communication through bodily presence.” Referring to Quintilian, he elaborates on the detailed 
instructions in this respect. “The orator studies to deliver an effective performance: to stimulate the audience by 
the animation of his presentation, and to kindle the imagination, not through ambitious imagery, but by bringing 
the audience into actual touch with the things themselves” (26). 
246 Botha, “Letter writing,” 23.   
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document but entrusted to and embodied by the letter carrier in the moment of delivery. Put simply, 
we have to focus on and imagine the emissary in actu. This is an important insight: the actual 
performance of the letter must be made concrete and specific. Nonetheless, we also note that the real 
“message”/“the work of Paul,” on the one hand, and the “text” of the “letter,” on the other, become 
severed from each other. This leads to a crucial point in his argument: the documented wording in the 
letter could be different from what the emissary would say in the oral performance. As a consequence, 
the role of the documented wording (sound groups) in the letter becomes critical. Through this 
argumentation, Botha forces us to choose between two perspectives: Do we want to grasp the delivery 
of the letter as envisioned by Paul in the moment of composition (a priori/in spe), or as the implied 
historical event of delivery by the emissary (in actu/in re) – who could expand on, deviate from, or 
possibly even contradict the documented wording? In the present study, we focus on Paul and his co-
workers as composing in actu and on the intended goals for the anticipated event of delivery. This 
perspective can be taken independently from what might have happened in the assumed real delivery 
as such. The central question, therefore, is, What kind of understanding did Paul anticipate in the 
process of composition on the side of his hearers during the intended delivery? 
 
  
D. Louis Martyn: Events in Galatia 
 
In his “Events in Galatia: Modified Covenantal Nomism versus God’s Invasion of the Cosmos in the 
Singular Gospel: A Response to J. D. G. Dunn and B. R. Gaventa,”247 Louis Martyn responds to 
papers of other participants of the SBL seminar on Pauline Theology. The discussion focusses on the 
definition of the “theology” of Galatians. In his contribution, James Dunn defines it as “a responsive 
argument crafted in the light of previous developments.”248 Martyn comments that “while helpful, 
[this] does not reach all the way.” He is convinced that Paul initiated the letter as a communicative act 
 
in the confidence that God intended to cause a certain event to occur in the Galatian congregations when 
Paul’s messenger read the letter aloud to them (…) [T]he theology of Galatians is focused on that aural 
event, as it was intended and actively anticipated by Paul (emphasis original).249  
 
Contrary to Dunn’s “responsive argument,” theology is related here to a specific “event” and also to 
the oral-aural media which apparently constitutes it. So an important layer is explicated here in the 
communicative process. Not only do biblical scholars have to hear the letter with the ears of the 
 
247 J. Louis Martyn, “Events in Galatia. Modified Covenantal Nomism versus God’s Invasion of the Cosmos 
in the Singular Gospel: A Response to James D. G. Dunn and Beverly R. Gaventa” in Pauline Theology Vol I: 
Thessalonians, Philippians, Galatians, Philemon, ed. Jouette M. Bassler (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 
160–79. 
248 James D. G. Dunn, “The Theology of Galatians” in Pauline Theology, 125–46. 
249 Martyn, “Events in Galatia,” 161. 
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Galatians, but they also have to look over the shoulder of the composer to enter into his active 
anticipation of this aural event.  
As an inevitable next step, this textualization of the realm of history there-and-then-to-them urges 
Martyn to unfold this envisioned event. There is a focal point in his imaginative explorations: the 
presence of other teachers in the Galatian communities. Thus, he gives answers to questions in line 
with What is happening to them there-and-then?  
 
Paul knows that the Galatians will hear his letter with the Teachers’ words still ringing in their ears, indeed 
with the Teachers themselves sitting in their midst, doubtless more than ready to assist them in interpreting 
the missive. ... knowing their major motifs, even some of their favourite locutions and scripture texts, Paul 
can anticipate how the Galatians will hear his words when he borrows elements of the Teachers’ vocabulary 
and when he gives his own exegesis of their texts.250  
 
The role of these other teachers leads Martyn to distinguish three possible rhetorical strategies of Paul; 
and these offer possible ways of bending our thoughts into the realm of history there-and-then. First, 
the apostle could have accepted the questions and basic frame of reference of his opponents. He would 
argue then to defeat them on their own ground. Second, he could have taken a radically different 
starting point to arrive at a conclusion having neither a linguistic nor conceptual connection with the 
performances of these teachers. He chooses, however, a third option:  
 
[H]e could begin his argument at a different point ... make contact with the Teachers’ message ... to modulate 
the terms of that message onto a radically new level of discourse consonant with his different point of 
departure ... to arrive at a conclusion that ultimately silences the Teachers’ themes not by contradicting them, 
properly speaking, but rather by being composed, as it were, on a radically different musical scale.251   
 
Martyn argues that Paul in composing the letter is doing theology and anticipating a theological 
event.252 Contrary to Dunn’s “responsive argument,” which tends to be an outlined and cognitive 
object of thought (product), he speaks of an “invasion” and an argumentation in progress (process). He 
broadens and transforms the frame of “theology.”253 So the second governing sub-question in this 
Chapter comes to mind, namely, What can we learn from the ways in which the two media involved 
are related to each other? 
In the second part of the article, Martyn deals with several passages from the letter to the Galatians 
itself. He presents his understanding of Paul’s theology in casu through major portions of the letter 
(1.1–2.21, 3.6–4.7, 4.21–5.1, and 5.16–6.18). Since the apostle does not commence his anticipated 
performance with issues important for his opponents, “he makes them wait” on the subject of the 
 
250 Ibid., 161–2. 
251 Ibid., 162. 
252 Ibid., 161. 
253 In Chapter 3, I argue for the preference of the notion of “rhetoric” over the one of “theology.” Next to an 
inherent extra-historical tendency in the production and nature of theology – how thoughts are structured – I 
argue that “rhetoric” is more in line with the dynamics of the realm of history there-and-then-to-them. 
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“law.”254 Only one thing counts: in Christ’s death and resurrection, the new age has been inaugurated. 
In line with his article “Apocalyptic Antinomies in Paul’s Letter to the Galatians,”255 Martyn 
juxtaposes the law with the gospel.256 Regarding the inauguration of the new age, “Paul sees an 
antinomy between law observance and the faithful death of Christ.”257 As a comment on this 
reasoning, he adds, “The Galatians will have sensed his doing that; he will have anticipated their doing 
so; he will have intended them to do so.”258 Here we see an example of what he earlier demanded of 
his fellow Pauline scholars, namely the active anticipation of the aural event there-and-then-to-them in 
his own grasp of the letter here-and-now-by-us. He therefore rejects Dunn’s idea of Paul modifying a 
form of covenantal nomism: “What Dunn says, about covenantal nomism seems fundamentally 
appropriate to the position of the Teachers.”259 Over against human movement into the covenant, 
Martyn places God’s movement into the cosmos.  
Next, Martyn deals with the major themes of Paul’s opponents, for example, the “blessedness of 
Abraham’s children.” Over against the incorporation into Abraham, Paul points to the incorporation 
into Christ with “its necessary corollary the obliteration of the distinctions between Jews and Gentiles 
(3.26–28).” Paul is “unwilling (unable) to accept the Teachers’ frame of reference in the writing of his 
letter.”260 
Then he turns to the notions of “promise” and “covenant.” The event of the crucifixion has explicated 
an internal antinomy in the law. The cross symbolizes the collision between the law and God’s Christ. 
Paul does not reject, however, the promise that is closely related to the law. So, in his depiction of the 
origin of the law, God is absent: “In Paul’s picture – contrary to that of the Teachers – the covenant is 
tied exclusively to the Abrahamic promise, and it is emphatically divorced from the Law.”261 This 
radical divorce between law and promise is undergirded by the reference of the apostle, not to the 
seeds (plural) of Abraham (the Jews as a distinctive group as these teachers had done), but to his seed 
(singular) (Christ). Singularity as a line of thought now comes to the fore.262 “Thus the covenantal 
promise uttered by God to Abraham ... remained in a sort docetic state until the advent of the singular 
seed, Christ.”263 Before Christ, there was neither a covenant nor a linear history of a people of God: 
“For Christ was born not into the context of ‘Israel’s history’ but rather ‘under the dominance of the 
Law’ and thus ... into a context marked by a sort of covenantal docetism and by universal 
 
254 Martyn, “Events in Galatia,” 164. 
255 J. Louis Martyn, “Apocalyptic Antinomies in Paul’s Letter to the Galatians,” NTS 31 (1985): 410–24. 
256 Martyn, “Events in Galatia,” 167. 
257 Ibid., 165. 
258 Ibid., 166. 
259 Ibid., 164; see also 167. 
260 Ibid., 168.   
261 Ibid., 171. 
262 In this respect, he explicitly agrees with one of the major emphases in the third essay by Beverly Gaventa, 
“The Singularity of the Gospel: A Reading of Galatians,” in Pauline Theology, 147–59.  
263 Martyn, “Events in Galatia,” 172. 
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enslavement.”264 Based on the singularity of Christ, the end of Heilsgeschichte in the traditional 
understanding is marked. Gal. 4.21–5.1 undergirds this radical line of thought in terms of an invasion 
into the cosmos. Paul introduces here another covenant. Over against the Sinai/law covenant of Hagar 
which enslaves, he places the promise of Sarah which liberates. This sheds a subversive light on the 
effort of these teachers to bring Gentiles into the Sinai covenant.265 We observe here that Martyn goes 
back and forth between the theology (frames of reference) of the teachers, Paul’s rhetoric and the 
anticipated aural event that “explodes that frame of reference.”266  
When we relate this train of thought to the aspect of possible distinctive mindsets, Martyn offers 
several valuable insights. His main critique of Dunn’s approach, that is, the theology (singular) of 
Galatians as a responsive argument (singular), is that it runs the risk of uncritically equating the frames 
of reference of the teachers with those of Paul. Over against this one-dimensional approach, Martyn 
explicates a plurality of dimensions or perspectives concerning the realm of history. He highlights 
aspects such as the reading of the letter aloud by an emissary amid the gathered Galatians (event), the 
teaching of these other teachers still ringing in their ears at the moment of delivery (theology), and the 
possible presence and willingness (or not) of the opponents to help the Galatians understand Paul’s 
message (anticipation of participation).267  
The fulcrum of this SBL seminar was the question: What is the theology of Galatians? When Martyn 
systematically elaborates on the anticipated aural event and in particular in reaction to the presence 
and performances of these other teachers, his understanding is in line with the collective memory of 
the intended addressees of Paul. His conceptualization is structured more in line with the concrete 
lifeworld of the original addressees than the more abstract “responsive argument” proposed by Dunn. 
Martyn breaks here the spell of the implicit equation. In particular, the present study is indebted to the 
idea that Paul in the process of composition is anticipating the delivery of the letter as a decisive event 
there-and-then-to-them. Martyn does not locate his understanding of the letter in his encounter here-
and-now with the letter as autonomous text, but in the reconstruction of two conflicting theologies that 
 
264 Ibid., 174. 
265 Ibid., 176. 
266 Ibid., 171. Although the thrust is clearly in line with the study of oral tradition and results of the debate on 
orality and literacy – compare the central notion of “aural event” – one does not find any explicit reference in 
that direction. Martyn exhibits a rather intuitive understanding thereof. One could argue that this intuitive 
understanding is due to his thorough and extensive study of apocalypticism regarding Paul. This phenomenon 
implies an independent view of history as totality. Since this encompassing frame of reference is alien to modern 
humanity and in need of pondering and reconstruction (textualization), implicitly one has to move away from 
one’s own frame of reference (totality) which is overly familiar and internalized beyond critical awareness. In 
this way, one cannot escape also touching on the dimensions of communicative contexts (autonomous text in 
distinction from the one of the intended addressees participating in oral performance).  
267 One could object here that there is no proof that these other teachers would still be there at the moment of 
delivery. That is a valid objection. Conversely, there is also no proof of the opposite, that they were not there 
anymore at the moment of performance. In the process of historical reconstruction, one has to take decisions on 
the one hand, yet one also has to check such assumptions in the course and process of coming to understand on 
the other. For that reason, we will apply in one of the testcases in Chapter 4 the criteria for mirror-reading Paul’s 
letters as proposed by John M.G. Barclay in his article “Mirror-Reading a Polemical Letter: Galatians as a Test 
Case,” JSNT 31 (1987): 73–93. 
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have to be located in the realm of history there-and-then taking shape in the carefully prepared and 
intended “aural event.”  
Therefore, regarding the leading sub-questions central to this Chapter on the effect of body-to-body 
communication on the actual hearers and also on how the studies discussed relate the different media 
cultures there-and-then and here-and-now to each other, we can now see that the introduction of the 
perspective on the letter as aural event provides many possibilities to explore and textualize the realm 
of history and/or the functioning of the letter there-and-then-to-them. In this framing of the letter as 
“aural event,” Martyn disconnects the “gospel” or the “theology” of Paul from “text.” The biblical 
scholar cannot relate himself immediately to the former as text here-and-now, for example in the text 
of the letter or academic publications; contrarily, he has to imagine, beyond that level, how the apostle 
envisions the oral performance of his emissary to counter – in that “aural event” – the influence of 
these other teachers. In this way, our understanding of the letter becomes detextified.     
 
 
E. Joanna Dewey: Textuality in an Oral Culture: Pauline Traditions 
 
In what follows, two contributions to the SBL seminar in 1994 on the subject of “Textuality and 
Orality in the New Testament Literature” are discussed. In her contribution “Textuality in an Oral 
Culture: A Survey of Pauline Traditions,” Joanna Dewey commences with the present situation in the 
study of early Christianity.268 We hear an echo of the warnings uttered by Albert Lord and Walter Ong 
when she states that scholars have assumed on the whole “that the first-century media world 
functioned much as our modern print media world.”269 She then claims that “Christianity began as an 
oral phenomenon in a predominantly oral culture within which the dominant elite were literate and 
made extensive use of writing to maintain hegemony and control.”270  
From this sociological perspective on orality and textuality, Dewey surveys the Pauline traditions.271   
First, she starts with analysing the modern process of reading and writing.272 She then turns to Pieter 
Botha and the ancient media world, citing his words that “Graeco-Roman literacy – the little that 
existed – remained a kind of imitation talking.”273 She concludes that reading in silence and solitude 
did not yet exist. 
Regarding rates of literacy, she details how literacy was used for the arts, in trade, religion, to post 
laws inscribed in public places, and to rule the vast empire. In view of this, she notes that “it is 
 
268 Joanna D. Dewey, “Textuality in an Oral Culture: A Survey of Pauline Traditions,” Semeia 65 (1994): 
139–68.  
269 J. Dewey, “Textuality,” 37.  
270 Ibid., 38. 
271 Ibid., 39. 
272 Regarding her hypothesis, she comments, “But to define it that way is to define it from the perspective of 
the elite, those few who could read and write” (39).  
273 Taken from Botha, “Letter writing,” 206.   
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virtually impossible for modern academics to realize how unimportant writing and reading were for 
the conduct of daily life.” From a sociological perspective, she continues, 
 
On the other hand, writing was essential for the creation and maintenance of the Roman Empire (...) In a 
world in which most were non-literate, writing was both an instrument of power and a symbol of power. So 
although few could read or write, reading and writing were fundamental in structuring relations in the ancient 
world.274 
 
So, as a symbol and an instrument of power, reading and writing in general structured relations in the 
realm of history there-and-then.  
In the second part, Dewey turns her attention to the Pauline tradition. She asks the question of the 
degree and sort of literacy within the communities of Paul. According to Wayne Meeks,275 they 
contained “a cross-section of the social scale, excluding at the top the ruling elite, and at the bottom, 
the most destitute.”276 This demonstrates the exclusion of the only social group for whom fluent 
literacy was normal, namely, the elite. The people who carried Paul’s letters may have possessed some 
degree of literacy, “for that would assist them in using the letter as the basis for their recitation to the 
congregation.”277 In general, however, “the overall literacy of Pauline congregations would remain 
low.”278 
After these historical excavations, Dewey turns to her research question. Opposing the overestimated 
role of “literacy” and “textuality” in contemporary biblical scholarship, she examines the 
consequences of this sketch for our understanding of the formation of early Christianity. She turns to 
the role of Scripture in the Pauline congregations. Since reading and interpreting Scripture are 
nowhere mentioned in the Pauline material, she is convinced that this did not play a role in worship.279 
In the instances where Paul argues with Scripture, he did so solely because he was forced to by 
opponents. Subsequently, she contrasts the apostle with the practice of Oral Torah by the Pharisees: “it 
was quite precisely interpretation of a written (and probably memorized) text.” To the apostle, the text 
“does not appear to be the foundation for his understanding or the constant reference point.”280 Not 
 
274 J. Dewey, “Textuality,” 44. 
275 Wayne A. Meeks, The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul, 2nd ed. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1983; repr. 2003).   
276 J. Dewey, “Textuality,” 48.  
277 Ibid., 50. In view of William G. Doty, Letters in primitive Christianity (Philadelphia, Fortress, 1973), 45–
6, the picture becomes even more vivid: “I wonder if the Pauline letters may not be seen as the essential part of 
the messages Paul had to convey, pressed into brief compass as a basis for elaboration by the carriers. The 
subsequent reading of the letters in the primitive Christian communities would then have been the occasions for 
full exposition and expansion of the sketch of material in the letters.” (51) While not as radical and subversive as 
Botha’s interpretation (see section C above), the letter is described here as the sketch in need of exposition and 
even expansion by the instructed letter carrier.  
278 J. Dewey, “Textuality,” 50. In line with Meeks, she designates the typical member as the free artisan or 
small trader. They could run their small businesses without being literate (48). Dewey also notes that some 
members were clearly wealthy. Though it is not clear that they were literate, nor that they needed to be; they 
could have employed slaves or freed people. 
279 Ibid., 51. 
280 Ibid., 53. 
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text but Christ was central. She comes to the conclusion that “the only reading done during worship in 
Paul’s churches was the reading – or rather performance – of Paul’s letters.”281 Christians were not yet 
“people of the book … Authority was not yet vested in manuscripts.” So, in the realm of history there-
and-then, the produced artefacts (written documents) were of little importance.  
Regarding the sub-question of the present Chapter on how the studies discussed relate oral 
performances to “text” and the functioning of the letters there-and-then-to-them and here-and-now-to-
us, we note that the two media involved come to the fore. First, “orality” and “textuality” become 
absolute opposites. We can also observe, however, that these two explicated and juxtaposed media are 
concretized to a rather high degree, inasmuch as Dewey locates and describes them both in the realm 
of history there-and-then. Second, reflection on the situation of the present-day reader vis-à-vis the 
letter here-and-now (“text”) is missing. There seems to be a huge leap involved here: the artefacts 
there-and-then-to-them float freely into those here-and-now-to-us, an implicit equation based on being 
“text.”  
Dewey brings both media together in the following way: “The seeds of manuscript-based Christianity 
are found in Paul: they are not, however, dominant in Paul. Orality remained the dominant media for 
Christianity for some time to come.”282 An earlier statement affirms this division in periods within 
Christianity: “While texts were produced that later became very important within Christianity as texts, 
these texts began as aids to orality, and seemingly had little importance in themselves” (emphasis 
original).283 In short, although Paul had produced these documents, it was only later on that they 
became authoritative and autonomous texts.  
This line of reasoning leads to a dichotomy, as can be seen in Dewey’s statement that “[t]he oral 
memory of Paul seems to be more central to Christian debate and life than what he or his successors 
wrote.”284 She continues by arguing that Paul does not appear as a letter writer in the Acts of the 
Apostles or the Pastorals and that his successors did not quote or paraphrase him: “In all these writings 
we see not the textual Paul of the letters but the oral Paul of Christian memory.” In her argumentation, 
we observe, therefore, another juxtaposition, that is, an “oral Paul of memory” over against a “textual 
Paul of the letters.” Her argumentation seems to be contradictory here. In the opening of her article, 
she speaks about literacy as “imitation talking.” In this later section on Paul, text has become a media 
in itself, functioning separately from or even opposed to the spoken word (talking): textum – after 
being introduced as such – has hardened into autonomous text. Dewey proposes an explanation of this 
alleged discrepancy between a textual and oral Paul with the following distinction: “I want to suggest 
that a major reason the letters were ignored was that Christianity still relied on oral memory and oral 
 
281 Ibid., 52. 
282 Ibid., 54. 
283 Ibid., 51. 
284 Ibid., 54. 
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authority.”285 When we rethink this statement that “the letters were ignored,” then the rhetorical 
question comes to the fore why Paul would have composed and sent them in the first place. Something 
important seems to get lost here.  
The main thrust of her argument at this point seems to be that the Paul of the letters-framed-as-text 
first comes to the fore in the later history of Christianity when the literate Christian leaders turned 
away from oral memory and oral authority to manuscripts; then does “the Paul of the letters begin to 
creep into Christian discourse.”286  
In the third part, Dewey discusses several consequences of neglecting the distinction between the two 
stages. She explicitly introduces here the relation between “letter” and “text.” Here she says once more 
that first the letter equals the spoken word and later on the written one. In reconstructions of Christian 
history, “we have tended to conflate these two stages, assuming that reliance on the text was present 
from the moment of the text’s initial composition.”287 This is not the case. In the initial stage in early 
Christian history, “lack of literacy did not exclude one from leadership.”288 Later on, this oral 
leadership had to make place for the hierarchical, male, and educated form of leadership: “reliance on 
manuscript media drastically restricts access to leadership positions.”289 The literate elite gained 
control from then on. This is the point Dewey wants to make, that the still current perspective on Paul 
is uncritically determined by the literate elite. Already at an early stage, they took over control and up 
to the present day dominate the perception of this apostle. Therefore, her appeal is that the formative 
influence of orality on the beginnings of Christianity – which is neglected hitherto – leads to a 
fundamental revision of the history of early Christianity. 
In any evaluation of Dewey’s article, it is important to note that she brings to our attention the need to 
do justice to the distinctive predominantly oral context of early Christianity, in particular, regarding 
Paul and his letters. In doing so she brings helpful insight into the fact that “text” (in her terminology) 
functioned originally as “aid to orality” and not yet as an autonomous media. In and between both 
lines of thought, there is a tension: text-as-aid-to-orality stands over against text-as-having-
importance-in-itself. It is important to observe that because of this approach the relation between 
“text” and “context” starts to shift. Dewey directs her thoughts on “text” into two different “contexts” 
– the realm of history there-and-then and subsequently the later stage, in which it starts to function in 
 
285 Ibid., 55. In the following quotation from her article, we recognize the alleged problem of the “visual 
format” as identified by Achtemeier: “Since the rhetoric of the letters, unlike narrative, is not easily remembered, 
the letters never became as well known among Christians” (55). 
286 Ibid., 56. 
287 Ibid., 58. The importance of Scripture as text in Judaism prompts her to posit the following: “It is perhaps 
reasonable to suggest, then, that where the influence of synagogues and Jewish teachers (either by Jews or by 
Christian Jews) on Christianity was greater, ... the emphasis on reading and interpreting texts, would also be 
greater” (58). The later interaction with rabbinic Judaism might have pushed early Christian groups towards 
greater reliance on manuscripts as a distinct media (58). 
288 Ibid., 59. 
289 Ibid., 57. 
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itself. This is rather revolutionary: she changes, in this way, the hierarchy in the text-context scheme. 
This intimates the proposed intellectual movement of textualizing history (Chapter 3).290  
Similarly, however helpful the notion of text as an aid to orality is, there is need for this to be further 
concretized: How did “text” function in the realm of history there-and-then-to-them? What happened 
with this aid to orality, how was it physically or bodily mediated to the intended addressees? In her 
article, this context of text there-and-then-to-them remains abstract; deepening is much desired.  
However, there is also a problematic dichotomy and an implicit equation that tends to weaken her 
argument. In wanting to bring focus to the oral context, we can trace the following dichotomy: she 
juxtaposes the original “Paul of oral memory” with the subsequent “Paul of the letters.” The former 
prompts the question of his relation to and/or the function of his letters (artefacts). Since, however, this 
is not a theme for her, the explicit differentiation could lead to the impression that the Paul of oral 
memory – which should be considered as the true and original perspective on him – did not compose 
and sent letters. In the dichotomously structured phrase the “Paul of the letters,” the latter are in danger 
of becoming limited in their operational functioning to the one familiar media of autonomous “text.” 
So, this explicit differentiation frames the “letters” as “text” and seems to juxtapose them with the 
alleged historically valid depiction of an oral Paul, who, as a consequence, has nothing to do with the 
letters. 
Another implicit equation can be discerned. On the formal level or the level of text, “text” is implicitly 
equated in a confusing or even – in terms of functioning – contradictory way: it covers the range of 
textum to autonomous text (see Introduction to the present study). Despite Dewey’s considerations on 
the original functioning on the level of her own text, the “letter” is still and at the same time 
synonymous with “text.” Therefore, in her reasoning, “text” has a docetic nature. It represents 
“orality/aurality” and at the same time it functions to us within a framework of “literacy/textuality.” 
The problem is that the latter media and its attendant literate mindset dominate the actual operational 
matrix in which the biblical scholar processes these documents. For this reason, the present study 
proposes a textualization of the realm of history there-and-then-to-them which is void of the notion 






290 Dewey refers several times to the writings of Paul as “manuscript.” Given adequate conceptualization – or 
in the terminology of the present study textualizing history – this use seems to be more in line with the realm of 
history illic et tunc. To a certain degree, the letter as “manuscript” creates a distance between ourselves as 
present-day readers and the overly familiar phenomenon of “text.” “Manuscript” appeals more to our 
imagination than “text” (text area). In this way, the functioning can be described more easily. 
 94 
F. Arthur Dewey: A Re-Hearing of Romans 10.1–15 
 
As a second contribution to the SBL seminar referred to, we turn to Arthur Dewey’s “A Re-Hearing of 
Romans 10.1–15.”291 He starts with lauding the pioneering work of Werner Kelber on Paul in The 
Oral and the Written Gospel. Alongside respect for the ground-breaking detection of the oral 
dimension however, Dewey also criticizes his use of the oral/written distinction “to understand Paul’s 
acoustic field in absolute opposition to the regimentation of the ‘letter’.” Bringing both media 
together, Dewey interprets them as ways of reaching for power: “Paul was playing creatively to 
utopian desires of his audience and of the first-century in general;”292 both media are “different 
avenues of conveying power and breaking through the boundaries of space and time.”293  
Dewey then positions himself in relation to Kelber. Drawing upon the work of Ong, he expounds his 
own notion of acoustic space. In this definition, space as well as time are redefined as “a vast interior 
in the centre of which listeners find themselves together with their interlocutors.”294 In other words, 
central to the originally intended delivery of Romans is its effect upon the hearers. Subsequently, 
Dewey focuses (with Kelber) on the social effect of an oral performance. Spoken words create an 
audience, as it were. The rhetorical situation of this audience is often tense because of loyalties, 
interests, betrayals, and such like: “Thus the appearance of opposing parties (as happens quite often in 
Paul’s letters) would have a divisive effect since there is a competition for acoustic space.”295 The oral 
performance of the letter aims at regaining the loyalty of the audience. As a key concept in acoustic 
space, he utilizes the relational dynamic of participation: “the intent of Paul’s message is to create an 
ethos of participation.” So, by their participation, the apostle can regain influence over the audience.  
Dewey juxtaposes this acoustic space with the absolute dichotomy of Kelber, making the point that 
“[a]gain, the question is not simply one of orality versus writtenness but of how power was to be 
conveyed and augmented.”296 He suggests that Paul’s oral stance “could signal an alternative or even 
utopian stance.”  
In the next section, Dewey turns to the passage under scrutiny, Romans 10.1–15. Kelber called this 
passage the locus classicus of the oral hermeneutics of sound.297 In this part of Romans, Moses and 
Isaiah are introduced more than once and several passages from the Jewish holy scripture are referred 
to. Dewey takes the following perspective on the material: “Not only do we have the creation of an 
acoustic space, but we may discern ways in which Paul is trying to negotiate social relationships, 
 
291 Arthur J. Dewey, “A Re-Hearing of Romans 10.1–15,” Semeia 65 (1994): 109–27. 
292 A.J. Dewey, “Re-Hearing,” 110. 
293 Ibid., 111. 
294 Ibid., 110. 
295 Ibid., 111. 
296 Ibid., 112. 
297 Ibid., 113. 
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where the question of power comes into play.”298 This emphasis on relationships is based on Paul’s 
frequent use of δικαιοσύνη (righteousness). The right relationship – termed by Dewey as “patronage” 
– guarantees fundamental stability in an unstable and harsh societal context.  
In this passage, there is a tension between “Moses writes about the relationship from tradition” (Rom 
10.5) and “the relationship of trust says” (10.6; emphasis mine).299 He solves it by a personification of 
δικαιοσύνη. In this way, the proper relationship becomes imaginable in an ideal person. Δικαιοσύνη 
not only voices but also transforms the written tradition. This rhetorical use of the words of Deut 
30.12–14 by Paul in this passage “would not only be appealing to their own experience but would be 
demonstrating inductively that Dikaiosune [δικαιοσύνη] herself is speaking from the midst of their 
own situation, that is, from their experience of a trusting relationship with God.”300 In this (re-)hearing, 
the audience could discover that they are part of what is already going on and that this is the genuine 
relationship of δικαιοσύνη, that is, the patronage of the Lord. Regarding the citation of Isa 28.16 
(10.11), Dewey elaborates on the utopian vision taken up by Paul. The apostle supplements the 
original wording with “everyone.” Everyone can “petition the Universal Patron, who gives generously 
and freely upon the establishment of this relationship.” This utopian dream would reverberate in the 
experience of the Roman communities.  
To compare Paul’s use of Deut 30.11–14, Dewey surveys three passages from Philo (De Virt. 175–
182, Quod Prob. 62–73 and De spec. leg. 4.160–169). He concludes that Philo uses the same 
paraphrase of Deut 30 (the imagery of a patron/client relationship) to make it accessible to his 
audience consisting of prospective proselytes. The proselyte did not only develop their potentialities as 
a human being by becoming a true citizen, but they were also engaged in the construction of the finest 
commonwealth. In this respect, Philo sees the technique of writing as counterpart of progression 
towards this utopian society: 
 
As one enters fully into this tradition, writing out the words, a different self emerges, which is free from the 
constraints of a senate-bound present. The dialectic within, the internal argument, allows the space for a 
reasoning ego to appear.301  
 
Dewey then recapitulates both approaches to Deut 30. For Philo, the tradition comes to realisation 
when the individual utilizes the new chirographic technology and individuates to a self that is 
separated from the masses. Paul represents a counter-cultural position, because he wants to subvert the 
existing dynamics of patronage and kinship and establish a new community through the relationship to 
Christ as Universal Patron. 
 
298 Ibid., 114. 
299 “Moses writes concerning the righteousness that comes from the law, that “the person who does these 
things will live by them.” 6 But the righteousness that comes from faith says, “Do not say in your heart, ‘Who 
will ascend into heaven?’ (that is, to bring Christ down).” (Rom 10.5–6) 
300 A.J. Dewey, “Re-Hearing,” 117. 
301 Ibid., 124–5. 
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In conclusion, Dewey explores the oral dimension in one of Paul’s letters. For the present study, it is 
particularly crucial that he states the goal of the letter to be the creation of an ethos of participation. 
Surpassing and transforming Kelber’s orality-literacy dichotomy, he succeeds in presenting an apt 
description of how the intended audience could have heard the oral performance of Romans 10. The 
paradigm of patronage structures the rehearing. The relationship is bound to the realm of history there-
and-then-to-them; it is constitutive of the collective memory of the original audience. We note that by 
introducing this thought structure it is impossible for us, as present-day readers, to uncritically fill in 
an alternative structure from our own concrete lifeworld. In this way, Dewey directs our thoughts 
explicitly into this distinctive realm of history.  
On a critical note, it is not clear how Paul would have anticipated these intended hearers to participate 
in this central metaphor (δικαιοσύνη). The answer seems to be dependent on the specific framing of a 
single term. So Paul must have been convinced that the intended addressees were able to fill in the 
paradigm of universal patronage at the first hearing of this singular term, without introduction or any 
form of explication. Thus, we are dealing with minimal anticipation (one common term) and maximal 
participation (the entire paradigm as such). Nonetheless – as we observed earlier in Louis Martyn’s 
article – the historical dimension of the oral performance itself is integrated to an important extent in 
his understanding of this specific passage.302  
 
 
G. Casey Davis: Oral Biblical Criticism 
 
In 1999, Casey Wayne Davis defended his doctoral thesis Oral Biblical Criticism: The Influence of the 
Principles of Orality on the Literary Structure of Paul's Epistle to the Philippians.303 He wrote this 
study under the supervision of Paul Achtemeier. In this monograph, he seeks to present the rationale 
behind his method of Oral Biblical Criticism and applies it to the epistle of Paul to the Philippians. 
Davis states, “In particular, I seek to demonstrate the extent to which these principles [of orality] 
 
302 Regarding the application of Deut 30, another structuring of thought is recognizable. The frame which 
Dewey applies is the original context of Deut 30: “In its original context Deut 30.12–14 speaks of a remarkable 
transcending of limitations so that the covenant of God can be kept” (116). In the present study, we feel urged to 
scrutinize such terms/phraseology as the “original context” of Deut 30. Despite his careful consideration of 
acoustic space concerning the intended Roman audiences of Paul’s letter, at the same time on another level, he 
seems to relate to Deut 30 as text in a textual context (the ever-expanding universe of text) – as if Paul would 
relate to the “text” of Deut 30 in the same media and mindset as Dewey himself is used to doing. In this line of 
thinking, the realm of history in which these words from Deut 30 would have functioned for Paul or from Paul’s 
perspective on the intended hearers of the Letters to the Romans (anticipated participation) is not addressed. The 
communicative context of autonomous text, in which Dewey participates, seems to usurp here the other 
historical communicative context there-and-then-to-them. 
303 Casey W. Davis, Oral Biblical Criticism: The Influence of the Principles of Orality on the Literary 
Structure of Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, JSNTSup 172 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999). 
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affected the form, style, diction, scope, and interrelationships of the literary (or oral) units in this 
letter.”304  
Two preliminary observations are in order. First, the adjective between brackets, “oral,” seems to 
suggest that to Davis the letter is first and foremost a construal of “literary units.” Second, and despite 
this implicit hierarchy, he seems to treat the term “literary” as somehow synonymous with “oral.”305  
Third, we recognize the agenda to look for “principles of orality” in this kind of literature as advocated 
by Achtemeier in his presidential address (see, in this Chapter, Section B. Paul Achtemeier: OMNE 
VERBUM SONAT). We see this affirmed in the first chapter where he elaborates on the principles of 
orality in the method of Oral Biblical Criticism:   
 
While each of the above characteristics is useful in describing oral compositions, it is dangerous to use 
anyone or two of them as criteria for judging the influence of orality on a given work. Any characteristic of 
orality, including formulaic style, can be found to some degree in even the most modern literature.306     
 
The first governing question – How are the different media related to each other in the argumentations 
– comes to the fore here. When pinpointing the phrase “for judging the influence of orality on a given 
work,” we might ask, Who is judging here? Inevitably, the answer seems to be ourselves as present-
day readers of his text. Indiscriminately, we jump from the letter in the realm of history there-and-
then-to-them to the one here-and-now-for-us. So, in speaking of “the influence of orality” on “a given 
work,” the media muddle seems to be ingrained in this structuring of thought from the start.  
Davis commences with a sketch of the extent of literacy in the New Testament world.307 The 
quantitative influence of literacy in ancient times was limited; the qualitative influence of literacy 
would have been negligible as well.308 Since there was no real widespread growth of literacy, the 
mental transformation implied was not yet at issue. He argues that, as a rule, we are dealing with 
performance in line with oral composition.  
Then Davis turns to his methodology.309 Source and form criticism isolate sources and units to 
determine their history. Contrarily, Oral Biblical Criticism focuses on the final form of the text – 
which is emphasized in its canonical form (later more on this). Subsequently, an anthology of methods 
 
304 Davis, Oral Biblical Criticism, 11. 
305 It would also be possible, though less plausible, that Davis is referring solely to “literary units.” We follow 
the explication as given in the main text. 
306 Davis, Oral Biblical Criticism, 20. For chapter 1 on the principles of orality, see ibid., 11–63. 
307 Ibid., 23–26. He summarizes the situation as follows: “(1) Practical writing materials were expensive and 
hard to come by. (2) Availability of eyeglasses was extremely limited. (3) There were virtually no open school 
systems and the private schools could only be afforded by the rich. (4) The society was still primarily rural. (5) 
Finally, literacy was simply not necessary, even for cultural success. The society as a whole was still basically 
oral, and its traditional education provided the essentials for social life. Literary materials were also readily 
available to the illiterate through performances, speeches and recitations in the market place, the theatre and in 
various governmental and religious settings” (24).   
308 For a recent overview, see Brian J. Wright, “Ancient Literacy in New Testament Research: Incorporating 
a Few More Lines of Enquiry,” TRINJ 36NS (2015): 161–189. 
309 Davis, Oral Biblical Criticism, 29–61. 
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is presented. We will pay attention to his discussion of all these different methods on a meta-level. It 
will help us to evaluate his approach. He starts with the rhetorical critical approach by George 
Kennedy in his New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism.310 Kennedy argues that 
the modern critic should analyze the biblical text in six steps. He should start with determining 
rhetorical units: first, one should determine the smaller units and then the larger ones in which they are 
embedded. This step thus concentrates on the biblical text as such. The second step is to define the 
rhetorical situation.311 Exigency is pivotal in this respect, which Davis defines as “a situation in which 
a person is called upon to make some response which will affect that situation.”312 This step goes 
beyond the level of the biblical text itself and reaches into the context or realm of history there-and-
then; our imagination comes somehow alive. As steps three and four, the critic should establish the 
occasion that caused the speech (stasis) and the species of rhetoric involved (judicial, deliberative, or 
epideictic). The fifth and sixth steps are to examine the persuasive effects of the ordering of the 
elements that constitute the argument (assumptions, topics, enthymemes, devices of style). These steps 
are made in order to examine the efficaciousness of the entire unit “in meeting the exigencies and its 
implications for the author and audience.” In Davis’s description, Kennedy forces the present-day 
reader to reconstruct the realm of history there-and-then-to-them, that is, the historical horizon of the 
causative event as well as the effects on the audience.313  
In light of discourse analysis, Davis suggests that the modern critic should prefer synchronic to 
diachronic study. The critic should relate the basic meaning of words in texts not to the dictionary 
definition but to the particular context in which the word occurs. Based on Ferdinand de Saussure’s 
structuralism, the linguist can only study langue based on parole.314 So, once more, context is 
crucial.315  
With regard to this, Davis turns to the method of George Guthrie presented in his article “Cohesion, 
Shifts, and Stitches in Philippians.”316 The first step is to analyze the discourse grammatically.317 The 
second step then is based on Chomsky’s Transformational Grammar. It involves the dissection of a 
 
310 George A. Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina, 1984). 
311 In Davis’s words: “Critics should analyse the ‘categories’ of persons, events, objects and relationships 
involved, time and place (…) Note should also be taken of the overriding ‘rhetorical problem’ with which the 
speaker is often faced. It is usually evident at the beginning of the discourse” (44–5). 
312 Kennedy quotes Loyd F. Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation,” Philos Rhetor I (1968): 1–14. 
313 Davis, Oral Biblical Criticism, 45. 
314 Ibid., 49–52. 
315 The communicative value of a given text becomes prominent for Davis in terms of its cohesion in syntax; 
coherence of used concepts; intentionality of the speaker, that is, the author intends to communicate coherently 
and cohesively; acceptability of the audience, that is, the willingness of the addressees to participate in 
accomplishing the intentions of the author; informativity, that is, the reaction of the audience in being captivated 
or bored by it; situationality, that is, relevance of the text given the situation that produced it; and intertextuality, 
that is, the relation of the given text to other texts (54–5). 
316 George H. Guthrie, “Cohesion, Shifts and Stitches in Philippians,” in Discourse Analysis and Other 
Topics in Biblical Greek, ed. Stanley E. Porter and Donald A. Carson (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1995), 36–59.   
317 Davis, Oral Biblical Criticism, 56. 
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passage to its “kernels” which are the most significant units of the total discourse.318 Guthrie’s third 
step is to identify unit boundaries.319 The fourth step is to analyze the relationship between these 
units.320 The final step is to analyze the progression from unit to unit. In his evaluation of Guthrie, 
Davis objects that this method is directed and limited to the text as such: “The results of primarily sub-
conscious oral habits are seen primarily as intentional literary devices. The difference is subtle but can 
be significant.”321 There is apparently a difference between “oral habits” and “literary devices.” In 
contrast to Kennedy and discourse analysis, all steps of Guthrie remain on the level of (or limited to) 
the text. The rhetorical situation or historical context does not seem to be constitutive of this approach.  
After this caveat, Davis introduces the following imperative: “Interpreters must seek to determine the 
influences of orality and literacy on the author, the readers, and the general society in which a 
document was composed.” In this quote – despite the location of “author” and “readers” in the realm 
of history there-and-then (“the general society in which it was composed”) – once more the 
“document” seems to float freely from the original situation to the present-day one and back: we relate 
to it, without any further consideration. When we follow his argument further, Davis suddenly speaks 
of “principles” instead of “influences”: “those principles may then be used to more accurately interpret 
the structure and meaning of a document composed in that setting.”322 These “influences” are 
explicitly located in the realm of history there-and-then. Implicitly, however, these “principles” are 
related to the documents with which the biblical scholar works here-and-now. So, a sudden and 
implicit shift takes place from describing influences in the historical process as such (composition) to 
identifying these principles in the fixed and given product here-and-now (reading). In this substitution, 
we witness a turn from describing the process of production to the product as such, which seems to be 
free-floating and, therefore, equal to the one here-and-now-to-us (“text”).  
Finally, Davis turns to his own method. The rich anthology of insights and critical methods of chapter 
1 is now streamlined into a method consisting of three steps. The first step is to analyze the author’s 
rhetorical style (A).323 The subsequent step is to identify and analyze units (B).324 The final step is to 
 
318 Ibid., 56. 
319 Ibid., 57–9.  
320 Ibid., 59. 
321 Ibid., 60.  
322 Ibid., 61. 
323 In this step, the development of ethos and pathos is important. This is connected to heightened awareness 
of the speaker/audience relationship (A.1.). This comes to the fore in the use of dialogue and the diffusion of 
objections, the creation of adversaries, the presentation of examples, praise and blame, and stress on the 
relationship rather than philosophical position of right versus wrong (A.1.a.). Another element in this first step is 
the treatment of topics which apply to the present situation rather than to the theoretical (A.1.b.). In addition, 
various rhetorical figures of speech – such as antithesis, synonymy, vagueness and metaphor – should be paid 
due respect in this first step (A.2.). Also, an awareness of repetition in sound or of grammatical construction, 
words and topics is required (A.3.). Finally, this step includes attention to rare words chosen because of aural 
and rhetorical considerations, oral formulas and themes (A.4.–6.). Thus, it is on the basis of features in the text 
that he wants to define the “author’s rhetorical style.” Notwithstanding partial overlap, this does not cohere with 
reconstructing the realm of history there-and-then. 
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analyze the method of progression from unit to unit (C).325 In these three steps, a variety of oral 
characteristics are paid attention to. We can distinguish micro- (repetition in sound and rhetorical 
figures of speech [antithesis, vagueness and so forth]), meso- (literary or oral units) and macro-
characteristics (the progression from unit to unit).  
Davis posits that all these steps have to be made regarding the letters as “canonical text.” In the 
adjective “canonical,” the text becomes determined by the process in the early church, centuries later, 
in which a distinction was made between authoritative and non-authoritative documents. An uncritical 
leap in time shifts the perspective from the oral dimension to an affirmation of the text-ness of the 
letters or constitution of them as text. Put differently, a confessional category (canonical in 
combination with text) supersedes and governs a historical one (oral).  
In assessing/evaluating Davis’s methodology from a meta-perspective, the first comment would be 
that in order to establish Oral Biblical Criticism as a critical method, Davis deals with such an 
abundance of theories that it is sometimes difficult to comprehend how they matter or relate to each 
other. We observe, however, that, in the first chapter, he openly declares his indebtedness to the 
rhetorical-critical method of Kennedy, whose approach is directed towards a reconstruction of the 
rhetorical situation. In Kennedy’s method, a tension is apparent between the interpretation of a text on 
the one hand, and historical reconstruction on the other. When we take this into account, it is all the 
more surprising that in his step-by-step method Davis then goes on to actually employ, the rhetorical 
situation is completely lacking. In the end, all three steps are confined to present-day readers vis-à-vis 
text.  
When Davis applies his method to Philippians, one encounters a wide-ranging and meticulous analysis 
of this letter as text. In this gathering of data, the analysis of the realm of history there-and-then is 
absent, in particular, with regard to how the original addressees related to and participated in the 
delivery of the letter. The audience of the letter is not “concretized.” Apart from a minimum of explicit 
references, the addressees also remain anonymous and highly abstracted.326 This pertains to the 
rhetorical situation as well: it is virtually absent and does not gain depth.327 Regarding the category of 
Paul’s enemies, Davis comments in a footnote,  
 
324 For example, concentric and parallel structure (B.1.), introductory and concluding formulas (B.2.), 
changes in genre (B.3.), logical relationships (B.4.), grammatical inconsistencies (B.5.), sound, word, and topic 
grouping (B.6.), temporal and spatial frames (B.7.), and climaxes (B.8.). 
325 This step is structured by asking for logical relationships (C.1.); changes in location, time, characters, or 
referents (C.2.); transitional techniques (C.3.) and development of previously stated themes (C.4.). 
326 For examples of highly abstracted formulations, see Davis, Oral Biblical Criticism, 64: “Because of the 
high degree of interplay between a storyteller or teacher and the audience in an oral culture, ... ”; 96: “Such data 
is recognized through the ear. It is influenced by the special relationship between the speaker and the hearer in an 
oral setting.”; 100; 102: “An audience listening to an oral recitation or the reading of a composition in an oral 
setting would be particularly aware of these formulas”; 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 120, 125, 146, 159, 160.    
327 A view of the rhetorical situation can only be found regarding Phil 2.13, where Davis suggests that 
particular references in the verse “... may give a hint of disunity in the church” (157). See also, 158–9: “It has 
been stated in many sermons and books that the theme of Philippians is joy in the Christian life. There is a 
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There has been a great deal of debate concerning the identity of the adversaries whom Paul has in mind. It is 
my contention that their identity is of little concern to Paul in this letter (...) Whether the opponents are 
within or outside of the church in 1.28, Jews or Judaizers in 3.2, or Judaizers or libertarians in 3.18–19, is 
neither discernible from the letter nor important to his discussion (emphasis mine)328  
 
We seem to witness here an explicit denial of the importance of the role of adversaries in 
understanding the letter. Once more, this is remarkable in light of the historico-critical agenda and 
Kennedy’s method. Davis’s method is directed towards the understanding of the letter-equated-with-
(“canonical”)-text by the present-day reader in his unquestioned predominantly literate state of mind. 
As a result, his presentation of the structure of Philippians remains highly abstract and text-bound. His 
reading of the letter does not activate our imagination; the question, What is happening? does not 
immediately come to mind.   
In line with this critique, we must add another concern. In the opening sections of the first part of his 
book, the phenomenon of oral composition and oral performance was often encountered. When 
critically scrutinizing the steps of his method, however, we must conclude that they are not well-
integrated. This is also apparent in his emphasis on the “text” being “canonical.” What is the reason 
for this contradictory outcome? A clue may be found in Davis’s own words about those who actually 
did the writing of the New Testament literature/documents: 
 
The literature of the New Testament was composed predominantly by writers who had learned to write for 
practical reasons and had little, if any, training in aesthetics. They viewed literature as a practical means of 
communicating with others when they were absent but saw it as inferior to the spoken word. They expected 
their compositions to be read aloud to a gathered community, who would, in turn, use that material to 
establish dialogue among themselves and, especially in the case of a letter, with the reader, who was often the 
writer’s official representative.329  
 
Although “literature” was seen “as inferior to the spoken word,” this is not reflected in his approach. 
First, when we critically scrutinize concepts, such as “literature,” “writers,” “to write,” and the letter as 
“material,” we see once more that the matrix of text-as-known-to-us structures his reasoning. 
Moreover, he implicitly equates the “letters” with “literature.” In no way does he elaborate on what he 
means by, what is for us, such an overly familiar notion. When we use “literature” in an uncritical 
way, it will function in our predominantly literate state of mind as extra-historical thought, that is, 
everywhere, every time, and for everyone the same. He also does not consistently differentiate 
between the spoken or heard and the written word or “text.” He argues that, as we saw earlier, next to 
“literary” units, the “principles” of orality are related to “oral” units as well. It is meaningless, 
however, to argue that “principles of orality” influence “oral” units. Such principles do not affect but 
 
tremendous emphasis on joy in the letter. However, this joy is linked to the topic of unity. Paul needs to address 
some problems in the church resulting from disunity, specifically the difficulty between Euodia and Syntyche.”   
328 Ibid., note 93, 125–6.  
329 Ibid., 612.  
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constitute oral units; they influence literary units (consider Ong’s oral residue). These inner tensions 
provide answers to the second question which governs this Chapter – What can we learn from how the 
different media are related to each other? It illustrates once more that the use of certain concepts on the 
level of text (“oral,” “oral composition,” or “oral performance”) and propositions about the context 
(“the written material is inferior to the spoken word”) do not automatically direct or correct how the 
thoughts of the actual reader are structured on that same level. As stated in the Introduction, 
addressing adequately the role of the media of oral performance will infringe on the communicative 
process as constituted by the other media (text). In Davis’s study, we observe how text on oral 
performance can veil oral performance.  
 
 
H. David Rhoads: Biblical Performance Criticism 
 
In 2006, David Rhoads published his two-fold article “Performance Criticism: An Emerging 
Methodology in Second Testament Studies (Part I and II).”330  These articles now function as a general 
introduction to Biblical Performance Criticism as found on the website under the same name.331 The 
insight that drives Rhoads is the following: “Performances were a central and an integral part of the 
early Christian experience of the compositions that have now come down to us in written form in the 
Second Testament.” In this phrase, a layered distinction between media cultures comes to the fore: The 
“composition” was experienced then as “performance” and has come down to us in “written” form. He 
defines performance “in the broadest sense as any oral telling/retelling of a brief or lengthy tradition ... 
in a formal or informal context ... by trained or untrained performers.” This broad definition sheds 
light on the documents of the New Testament: “they [traditions] were either written ‘transcriptions’ of 
oral narratives that had been composed in performance or they were composed orally by dictation and 
written for use in oral performance.”332 One way or the other, the “compositions” were in fact “oral 
presentations.” This contextualization of the New Testament writings leads him to refer to them as 
“performance literature.” Note his use, without further explanation, of the term “literature.” 
Once having defined New Testament documents as “performance literature,” he asks “why Second 
Testament scholars do not function more like musicologists or dramatists.” He criticizes the praxis of 
biblical scholars who interpret documents “without ever experiencing performances of them.” 
 
330 David M. Rhoads, “Performance Criticism: An Emerging Discipline (Part I and II),” BTB 36 (2006): 118–
133, 164–184. 
331 See https://biblicalperformancecriticism.org/index.php. Note also the program unit in the annual meetings 
of the Society of Biblical Literature, “Performance Criticism of Biblical and Other Ancient Texts.” 
332 Rhoads, “Performance Criticism,” 118. 
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Therefore, “performance should be an important site for the interpretation of the biblical writings.”333 
It is important to note that he explicates the goal of his method as “interpretation.”  
The focus of Rhoads’s method is two-fold. On the one hand, he presents performance there-and-then-
to-them as an “object of study.” On the other, he introduces the practice of real-time performing here-
and-now so that we can grasp the meaning and rhetoric of these ancient writings.334 In his reasoning 
hitherto, the status and function of “text” as well as “interpretation” remain in need of further 
explication. Regarding “meaning,” we will see that he proposes a different understanding.  
After the opening statements, he briefly discusses how the precise mode of oral tradition has been 
neglected in form-, genre-, and narrative-criticism, in reader-response and rhetorical criticism, and 
similarly in orality and gender studies. He then explains why performance is a blind spot. In the 
contemporary Western world, one is only acquainted with private and silent reading of texts; in the 
scholarly community “we have not even thought about experiencing whole texts in a theatre 
setting.”335 Therefore, reflection on the “holistic, communal experiences of oral performance in the 
early church” is imperative. He advocates “doing a performance ourselves as an act of 
interpretation.”336  
After the presentation of this two-fold approach, Rhoads sketches the first-century Mediterranean 
world. No more than five to eight percent of the people were able to read. Even fewer were able to 
write, let alone both. Their world was constituted by the media of sound. Sound implies event. 
Everything that is learned or passed on takes place in conversation in a specific historical situation. 
Real time conversation is based on relationships: “Because speech is relational, the interaction is 
empathetic and participatory.” Over against our contemporary Western introspective and private 
values, the focus of people in oral cultures is outward and governed by the community. In oral 
cultures, knowledge is limited to and constituted by “what is shared and remembered by the 
community through social interaction.” One deals with a world “very different from our 
print/electronic culture.”337 There were manuscripts (for example, Scripture), professional scribes, 
limited educational practices, and writing as a means for authorities to govern and control. He rejects, 
however, designations such as “manuscript culture,” “scribal culture,” and “rhetorical culture,”338 
because they are not representative of life then and there. The vast majority of peasants did not have 
direct contact with manuscripts. If that were so, “the presence of a scroll, such as a scripture text, 
 
333 Ibid., 119. 
334 The repertoire of Rhoads himself includes all kinds of genres within the New Testament writings, such as 
the Gospel of Mark, the Sermon on the Mount, and Paul’s Letter to the Galatians. For a performance of the 
Letter to Philemon, see YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=48YWFNWvzK0.  
335 He adds the remark that “public reading that has fragmented the text into lectionary lessons in the context 
of parish worship and teaching” (120).  
336 Rhoads, “Performance Criticism,” 120. 
337 Ibid., 121. 
338 It does not become sufficiently clear what he means by “rhetoric” in this respect. 
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could serve as a symbol to enhance oral authority.”339 Rhoads minimizes the role or presence of “text” 
– as we are used to – up to the point of negation. He concludes: “Studying the Second Testament 
writings as performance literature will involve a radical shift from our exclusive focus on them as 
‘writings’.”  
In a following section, Rhoads pays attention to the act of performance in oral cultures. He states that, 
as a rule, public performers then were not dependent on manuscripts in the act of performing. To 
frame and envision how performers in antiquity prepared for performing, he draws a parallel to 
contemporary stand-up comedians, who prepare for lengthy televised monologues. In advance, they 
practice their material before many diverse audiences in different settings. Similarly, ancient 
performers composed and recomposed their material.  
Subsequently, Rhoads deals with the situation in which performers did use manuscripts.340 Despite 
some evidence for rote memorization, he questions the legitimacy of the comparison with modern 
actors learning a theatre script by heart. The question of freedom in improvisation concerning 
manuscripts can be understood as the dichotomy of “fixedness” and “fluidity.” In his depiction of first-
century oral cultures of the Mediterranean world, the latter supervenes the former: “So, the 
transmission and reception of the text did not go primarily from manuscript to manuscript but from 
audience reception to audience reception in memory.”341 Regarding the second sub-question of the 
present Chapter as to how the distinctive media are related to each other in these studies, and the third 
governing question in which we address the ramifications of the functioning of text here-and-now on 
our perception of the intended oral performances of the letters, we observe here that he distinguishes 
between “manuscript” and “audience reception,” on the one hand, and “reception of the text” on the 
other. So he seems to grant “text” also an existence independent of or at least severed from 
“manuscript.”   
As a next step, Rhoads turns to the gospels and the corpus Paulinum. Referring to several publications, 
he states that “we know that the letters of Paul were composed orally by Paul and recorded by a scribe 
or amanuensis, perhaps in several sessions – a possibility that may explain the stops and starts of a 
letter such as Philippians.” Regarding the emissary, he states: “It is likely that the emissary who 
delivered a Pauline letter was the one who performed it for the community,” and that the oral delivery 
of the letter was “presumably performed by heart or performed as a ‘reading’ in a public setting before 
a house church or other gathering.” Since the letters were also passed on to be presented to other 
assemblies, the performers may have adapted the letters/compositions to divergent audiences in 
 
339 Ibid., 122. 
340 Ibid., 123. 
341 Ibid., 124. The fixedness, typical of default text, is alien to this world then. Based on this rule of fluidity, 
he is even able to subvert the traditional picture of the scribe. Differences in the written traditions of Judaism and 
early Christianity can be explained as a result of scribes “who did not copy slavishly but who functioned like 
performers – recomposing the tradition as they wrote” (123/4). 
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different circumstances.342 In this way, the emphasis on “fluidity” becomes all the more clear. The 
point Rhoads wants to make is that oral performances formed the “primary medium” through which 
the original and intended addressees received the compositions now comprising the New Testament.  
Referring to Thomas Boomershine, Rhoads designates the present situation in biblical scholarship as 
“media anachronism.”343 We interpret the texts involved “in a written medium that is different from 
the oral medium in which they were first composed and performed.” He continues: “Indeed, to study 
these texts now as oral compositions that were performed in an oral culture can potentially transform 
our experience of the writings of the Second Testament and our picture(s) of early Christianity.” 
Regarding the third governing question, we rephrase that “our experience” of “the writings” can be 
“transformed” when we “study” the “texts” as “oral compositions” that “were performed.” The use of 
the past tense is significant as it implies oral performances there-and-then-to-them. So within this 
reasoning, our study of the text here-and-now is based on the intended performance there-and-then. 
The object of study is “the whole complex dynamics of a performance in the ancient (and 
contemporary) world.” In this definition of the object of study – that is introduced without warning 
and in parenthesis – performances here-and-now-by-us are surreptitiously introduced 
(“contemporary”). They are not only equated with those there-and-then, but also their nature or 
constitution is taken for granted. So, all the more, in Rhoads’s Biblical Performance Criticism we have 
to inquire as to the relationship between the functioning of “text” here-and-now-to-us and the 
functioning of oral performance there-and-then-to-them, as well as his advocated performances here-
and-now-to/by-us.  
Along the same lines, Rhoads transforms the frame of “meaning.” It is “not words on a page as 
understood by a reader,” but it is found “in the whole event at the site of performance – sounds, sights, 
storytelling/speech, audience reaction, shared cultural beliefs and values, social location, and historical 
circumstances.”344 The question comes to the fore: What does that mean for “meaning”? It is important 
to observe that he locates it somehow in the sensorially experienced realm of history. In this 
formulation, once more, the specificity of the realm of history does not become clear (either there-and-
then or here-and-now).  
In this reframing, Rhoads deals with several key components of the performance event. One of them is 
the notion of “The Composition-as-Performance”: One should not investigate the oral traces in the 
composition (for example, Achtemeier, Davis), but realize that the whole piece was performed. This is 
important, because the performances are constituted by the “power to transform.” “Therefore, we have 
to seek to understand how every part and how the whole ‘worked’ as a composition-in-
 
342 Ibid., 125. 
343 Thomas E. Boomershine, “Peter’s Denial as Polemic or Confession: The Implications of Media Criticism 
for Biblical Hermeneutics,” Semeia 39 (1987): 48–50 (see also the Introduction). Note that in the article itself 
Boomershine speaks of “media eisegesis” (48).  
344 Ibid., 126. 
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performance.”345 Now we can observe that two distinctive realms of history come together, namely, 
the imperative is related to our contemporary understanding, and the pronoun is significant here (“we 
have to seek to understand”) and the past tense (“worked”) is related to the audience of the 
performance there-and-then.  
In a similar vein, Rhoads implicitly and surprisingly changes the perspective regarding “the 
Performer.”346 Sidestepping the historically implied emissary, all of a sudden we are the “performers”: 
“By placing oneself in that position [performer], the contemporary exegete-performer enters the world 
of the story or letter through a fresh medium.” No attention is paid to the emissary as crucial historical 
constituent of the oral performance there-and-then-to-them. How the contemporary exegete-performer 
relates here-and-now to the physical artefact (text) is also not an object of study. So, despite the 
mentioning of a “fresh medium” on the level of text and the call to perform here-and-now, Rhoads – 
with his academic training and being part of this sociocultural context of hight literacy – still relates to 
the “text”-by-reading as the uncritical starting point to which one continuously returns. 
After dealing with the performer, Rhoads turns to “The Audience,” which, he deems to be intrinsically 
linked to the performer. He remarks, “We cannot separate audience from performer.”347 The 
performance is an interactive event: “As such, compositions may have anticipated audience response 
and, in turn, audiences were quite capable of shaping a performance as it went along.” So, he 
continues, we do not need to differentiate, because “performer” and “audience” come together in “the 
performance.” When we distinguish performer and audience as distinctive subjects (plural) in the 
intended communicative process, an interesting shift takes place – on the level of his text – to the 
solely singular “the performance,” which is an object, that is, his “object of study.” In combination 
with the earlier observed ambiguity of past and present, “the performance” becomes somewhat 
abstracted and, therefore, free-floating – being everywhere, every time, and for everyone the same.  
This tendency can also be seen in Rhoads’s emphasis on the communal character of audiences. Over 
against our deeply ingrained habit of individual and silent reading, he pleads for communal 
experiences of these writings as performances. In this way, the dynamics of “group response” can be 
investigated.348 In the flow of his reasoning, it becomes clear though that this observation is related to 
his advocated performing of these writings here-and-now. In his conclusion to part one of his 
methodology, he contends for the analysis of “all these elements of the performance event together.”349 
As a critical observation, we note that it does not become clear whether the performance event referred 
to lies in the past or in the present/future.350 In his argumentation, this is a recurrent issue. From this 
 
345 Rhoads, “Performance Criticism,” 127. 
346 Ibid., 128. 
347 Ibid., 128–129. 
348 Ibid., 129. 
349 Ibid., 131. 
350 Since part two (164–184) is not relevant to the present study, we will deal briefly with it here. According 
to Rhoads, performance criticism is not just another discipline alongside others. As a result of the media shift, 
performance criticism informs other disciplines and can transform their strategies, methods, and results (165). 
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perspective, though, he provides in the second part of his article an important key for our present 
approach and efforts to understand the text: “We often give interpretations of the text without ever 
asking: Could the lines be read in such a way that the hearer would understand the meaning you are 
giving to it?”351 Performance here-and-now-by-us as such may provide a way to test the limits of 
viable interpretations. 
We will turn now to a more detailed and critical evaluation of this methodology in the making. It is 
clear that Rhoads presents an unconventional agenda for biblical scholarship, calling for the 
performance of the New Testament documents here-and-now-by-us. In Rhoads’s approach, two 
aspects require clarification. The nature of “performance” as well as “text” demands further scrutiny. 
As repeatedly mentioned, his emerging methodology is comprised of two endeavours. He 
continuously phrases his two-fold focus on the reconstruction of oral performance there-and-then-to-
them and the contemporary praxis of performing here-and-now oneself as a new way for us to 
interpret the transmitted texts.  
In the first movement (the historical reconstruction of the originally intended performance), the media 
of the spoken word dominates his view of them. At the same time, present-day readers – also when 
performing themselves – still relate to the writings as “text” in real time. Rhoads does not answer the 
underlying question of how these two activities in their distinctive realms of history relate to each 
other (third governing question). In the passage in which he compares the New Testament scholar with 
musicologists and dramatists, he concludes, “When viewed this way, we realize that performance 
should be an important site for the interpretation of the biblical writings. Performance is the place 
where interpretations are expressed, interpretations are tested, and interpretations are critiqued.”352 The 
praxis of performing biblical material here-and-now is consequently framed by him as 
“interpretation”: his call to “perform” should help the biblical scholar to “interpret.” Since the nature 
or subject of “interpretation” is not thematized and “text” forms the starting point, the implicit 
presupposition seems to be that “interpretation” forms a pair with “text” and that as present-day 
readers, we are the subjects in actu. In the end, our thoughts become structured once more in line with 
the free-floating question, What does it mean? In this respect, the call of Rhoads to locate “meaning” 
 
After a short discussion of each discipline, he concludes that a new kind of commentary might emerge, that is, 
“to put flesh and blood on the skeletal remains of the text – by filling in and by filling out the many 
performance/orality dimensions of these Second Testament ‘scripts’” (173). Crucial to this viewpoint is the 
practice of performing here-and-now. The act of performing is as “a methodological tool for interpretation.” He 
comments, “We can never recover a first-century performance event, but we can experiment with twenty-first-
century ones” (173). For thirty years, Rhoads has been translating, memorizing, and performing New Testament 
writings. On this basis, he addresses several dynamics.   
351 Rhoads, “Performance Criticism,” 179. 
352 Ibid., 119. As suggested in the abstract of the paper, where Rhoads sets out his intentions: “I seek to 
identify the various features of a performance event – performer, audience, material setting, social 
circumstances, and so on – as a basis to construct and analyse performance as the site of interpretation for 
Second Testament writings” (118).  
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in the event of performance becomes even more urgent: What is the difference in the nature of 
meaning then? 
Subsequently, in Rhoads’s description of the historical realm there-and-then-for-them, the role of text 
is minimized or even obliterated:  
 
Again, written texts assisted in circulation. At the same time, because of the nature of performances, all these 
narratives, letters, and apocalypses may just as well have circulated orally, without the aid of a text, even 
after they were written down.353 
 
We observe, first, that “text” in Rhoads’s argumentation and praxis is an unquestioned given here-and-
now-to-us. On that basis, he can perform. These performances constitute his additive or corrective way 
of interpretation. Second, he argues that at most, text “assisted” performance there-and-then-to-them. 
The question is, How does Rhoads solve this fundamental reversal, namely moving from the situation 
of denial of text as independent media there-and-then to the given functioning of it to us – even in his 
praxis of live performances? An answer is found in Rhoads’s formulation of “performance literature.” 
So here the second governing question comes to the fore at a deeper level – What can we learn from 
how the different media are related to each other?  
Rhoads does not seem to be consistent or clear in this respect. The New Testament consists of 
“writings” or “texts” – apart from a single reference to “manuscripts.”354 More so, he describes them 
as “written texts.”355 So, while he seems to deny the existence of autonomous text there-and-then, he 
states at the same time that “text” equals “writings” which were present there-and-then. One could 
argue that in Rhoads’s argumentation text has a docetic nature in the realm of history there-and-then-
to-them (as noted with Joanna Dewey). On the one hand, “text” as mere assistant is usurped by oral 
performance. Put differently, although it is there it is not there. On the other hand, in his 
argumentation, and more importantly regarding his praxis of real-time performances, “text” is 
presupposed as an operational given; it is there, forming the starting point and thus a conditio sine qua 
non. In this way, a change in media – “orality” in distinction from “manuscripts” or “writings” – does 
not affect “text.” The problem is that the mental transformations of the technology of reading and 
writing are not taken into account. “Text” will be the same every time, everywhere, and for everyone. 
This extra-historical status fits perfectly with our operational familiarity with text. In conclusion, 
regarding the second governing question, we see once more how complicated our relation to and 
 
353 Ibid., 126.  
354 Ibid., 123. 
355 Ibid., 120, 124, 126. In terms of “writings,” Rhoads comments, “Studying the Second Testament writings 
as performance literature will involve a radical shift from our exclusive focus on them as ‘writings’” (123, 
emphasis mine); see also the paragraph entitled “Second Testament Writings in Relation to Performance” (124–
26, emphasis mine). With regard to “text”: “Our cultural experience of the Second Testament texts in 
contemporary Western world has been private and silent reading by individuals or public reading that has 
fragmented the text into lectionary lessons in the context parish worship and teaching. In scholarship, we have 
fixed our attention on written texts so exclusively that we have not even thought about experiencing whole texts 
in a theatre setting or about listening to the Greek Testament as a way to interpret” (119, emphasis mine). 
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subliminal dependence on “text” is – as indicated by the warnings in the Introduction to this thesis, 
and by Albert Lord and Walter Ong in Chapter 1.   
In a similar vein, “composer” and “composition” are not differentiated sufficiently enough by Rhoads. 
“Composer” represents the historical person with his intentions, mindset/way of thinking, specific 
relation with the original audiences, and specific historical context. The composer composes. There is 
an emphasis on the communicative process (becoming). Contrarily, in his reasoning, “composition” 
tends to emphasize the outcome or end-product (being). Once more two distinctive ways of structuring 
thought are fused here. One can recognize this tendency, in particular, in his section “Clarifying the 
Object of Study: The Performance Event.” Here Rhoads describes the key components of the moment 
of performance in real time. A section on the a priori process of composing, however, is lacking. 
Relating to the event of performance as object means that this event becomes isolated from the 
decisive and prior process of composition.  
On the level of Rhoads’s text, the “performance” functions separately from two explicit and distinctive 
historical and communicative contexts (there-and-then in distinction from here-and-now); it becomes 
one, remains unchanged and can float freely throughout time and place. His own experiences in 
performing here-and-now provide the determining horizon against which he himself interprets the 
biblical texts as texts. In this way, the final functioning of the letters as text-here-and-now-to-us-being-
vocalized-by-Rhoads usurps the originally intended one. Since Rhoads is performer and interpreter in 
one and the same person, Paul as anticipating composer, and the original addressees as participants in 
the moment of delivery become eclipsed. This specific structuring of thought on the level of text 
exemplifies a derailing dynamic. Here we touch on the contribution of the present study: by locating 
the anticipated performance there-and-then-to-them in the moment of composing by the apostle, a 
perspective in the realm of history there-and-then can emerge. Contrary to the free-floating 
“performance” of Rhoads, we can oversee and integrate different actors or subjects in actu in one 
intended and envisioned communicative process, namely, Paul as anticipating the participation of his 
intended audience in the envisioned moment of delivery regarding their rhetorical situation. 
  
 
I. Bernhard Oestreich: Performanzkritik der Paulusbriefe 
 
In 2012, Bernhard Oestreich published his monograph Performanzkritik der Paulusbriefe.356 In his 
introduction, he comments that he embarked on an exploration of a world “wo das in der Bibel 
Geschriebene nicht nur schriftlicher Text, sondern gemeinsam gelebtes Ereignis ist.”.357 Two key 
 
356 Bernhard Oestreich, Performanzkritik der Paulusbriefe, WUNT 296 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012); 
translated as Performance Criticism of the Pauline Letters, BPCS 14 (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2016). 
357 Oestreich, Performanzkritik, viii. On the one hand, he comments that he participated and learned much 
from the SBL seminar on “Performance Criticism of Biblical and Other Ancient Texts.” On the other, he does 
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notions are “schriftlicher Text” and “Ereignis.” Before the presentation of his method, Oestreich 
discusses “das Wesen der Performanz.”358 This seems to mean “performance” in and of itself or 
performance as being the same to everyone, every time, and everywhere. The perspective of “das 
Wesen” (being) is, therefore, in tension with performance as “Ereignis” (becoming). This atomizing 
tendency is confirmed by the fact that in this introductory section the moment of composition is not 
explicated or incorporated in any way.  
Regarding his method of performance criticism, Oestreich turns to John Austin’s “Performativität.”359 
This notion emphasizes the effect or outcome of speech-acts.360 Contrary to abstracted 
(außersprachliche) meaning, performativity structures understanding in terms of the goal(s) that are 
striven for. Language framed as speech-act always involves the one who is speaking as well as the one 
who is addressed.  
Oestreich then engages with the work of Richard Bauman in which the essence of performance is 
comprised of the following aspects: Materialität and Körperlichkeit, interaction with and also within 
the implied audience, social conventions, Emergenz and Ephemerität and Rückverweis auf bereits 
Vorhandenes.361 Regarding “matter-ness” (Materialität) and “bodily-ness” (Körperlichkeit), Oestreich 
observes that the original audiences of Paul always consisted of a plurality of persons. One has to 
consider – next to the relation between speaker and audience – that audiences consist of factions and 
groups. In this way, he concretizes the rather abstract “audience” to a greater degree.362  
The notions of emergence (Emergenz) and a very short life cycle (Ephemerität) require attention for 
the specificity and the changeability of actual performances. Here the perspective shifts from 
performance as object to performance as event. Based on the research by Bauman, he describes the 
consequences of the event feature of a performance:  
 
Auch die Aufführungen kultureller mündlicher Traditionen … oder traditioneller Theaterstücke, deren Text 
schriftlich vorliegt, werden unter Performanz-Gesichtspunkten nicht zuerst als Übermittlung eines 
permanenten Inhalts verstanden, sondern als unwiederholbare Präsentation der rhetorischen und 
darstellerischen Kompetenz der Akteure.363  
 
In a performance, the emphasis is placed upon “Akteure,” those who perform or read aloud.  
 
not explicitly frame his study as a contribution to Biblical Performance Criticism. In distinction to the broad 
agenda of Rhoads, his development of performance criticism concentrates on the corpus Paulinum. He delineates 
his proposal as being limited to the performance there-and-then as implied by the letters of Paul. More so, he 
contradicts the idea that this method also entails performances here-and-now-by-us (62). 
358 Ibid., 45–59. 
359 John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words: The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard 
University in 1955, ed. James O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1962). 
360 Oestreich, Performanzkritik, 46.  
361 Ibid., 46–59. References are made to Richard Bauman, Verbal Art as Performance (Long Grove: 
Waveland, 1977) and Story, Performance, and Event: Contextual Studies in Oral Narrative (Cambridge, New 
York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
362 Note that this structuring of thought (abstraction), which he wants to counter, seems to be implied by the 
singularity and oneness of this overly familiar concept. 
363 Oestreich, Performanzkritik, 55. 
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In this unrepeatable and unique historical event, the audience participates in an essential way. 
Following Erika Fischer-Lichte, who addresses the emergence of performance through the 
autopoietischen feedback-Schleife, he writes, “Alles, was in der Performanz geschieht, sowohl auf der 
Seite der Darsteller als auch auf der Seite des Publikums, wirkt zurück auf der Seite der Darsteller als 
auch auf der Seite des Publikums, wirkt zurück auf die Performanz selbst.”364 In short, every actual 
and unique performance should be valued in relation to itself (Selbstreferentialität). 
Two observations are in order. First, Oestreich builds on insights from performance studies. This 
discipline concentrates, however, on contemporary performances in actu; for example, one can go to a 
theatre and participate in a performance oneself in real time. When biblical scholars attempt to 
reconstruct past performances that took place approximately two thousand years ago, they touch on a 
boundary inherent in historical-critical research or performance criticism of the biblical texts. We 
must, therefore, distinguish between intended performances there-and-then-to-them, as envisioned by 
Paul, and actual performances taking place before our very own eyes.  
Second, we have to note – in line with Bauman – that the source of “kultureller mündlicher 
Traditionen” and the writer of “traditioneller Theaterstücke” do not play a significant role for the 
object of study. The focus is, after all, on the “unwiederholbare Präsentation der rhetorischen und 
darstellerischen Kompetenz der Akteure.” There is an emphasis on the actuality of the performance.  
As a result, the specifics of the prior process of composition by Paul – that is, with respect to his 
spiritual fatherhood, other teachers as opponents, and the danger of apostasy of the converts – tend to 
be marginalized. Not to mention the difference, in this respect, with composing and directing a theatre 
play in the twenty-first century.  
Regarding materiality and corporeality, Oestreich recapitulates the difference between “text” and 
“performance” as follows: 
 
die Aufführung [ist] zuerst einmal ein Erlebnis, nicht gleich und allein ein intellektuelles Verstehen eines 
Textes oder Stückes ... es erschliesst zusätzliche Deutungsmöglichkeiten, die über das hinausgehen, was im 
aufgeführten Stück oder präsentierten Text steht.365  
 
Oestreich provides a frame of understanding in which text is processed in the overly familiar way 
(“intellektuelles Verstehen”), but additional dimensions (“zusätzliche Deutungsmöglichkeiten”) 
should be discerned in the “Aufführung” of the text. So “texts” can be read, but more so these texts 
should be performed. However, in both procedures, “text” is the unquestioned starting point.   
Subsequently, Oestreich asks how these additional possibilities in understanding are related to “was 
der aufgeführte Text aussagt.” His answer is that “Die im Text liegende Bedeutung” or “ein 
intellektuelles Verstehen eines Textes” can be compared to “eine Abstraktion”:   
 
 
364 Ibid., 55. 
365 Ibid., 60. 
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So wie ein abstrakter Begriff (etwa “Kreis”) eine Fülle von konkreten Erscheinungen bezeichnet, aber als 
solche Abstraktion nicht existieren kann (den Kreis gibt es nicht, nur konkrete Ausführungen), so muss ein 
Text durch eine konkrete Person unter konkreten Bedingungen verkörpert werden, um in Erscheinung zu 
treten.366 
 
So text relates to actual performance as abstraction relates to concretization.367 More precisely, the text 
needs embodiment by a specific performer in a concrete situation to be able to appear (“in 
Erscheinung zu treten”). The latter phrase is synonymous with “the realm of history” as used in the 
present study. This train of thought implies a process. Initially, there is only text – that is, the letter as 
text (abstraction). Subsequently, it appears (concretization); the movement is from “abstraction/text” 
to “concretization/performance.” For example, in the text, a circle exists as an abstraction. In the 
performance, however, it has to appear to the participants as that specific circle to which they 
necessarily will relate. This line of thought has an important consequence. When the letter is equated 
with text in this way, Paul as “author” would have framed the term (“circle”) in a general and extra-
historical way, independent or even unknowing of and not interested in the specific situation of the 
concrete addressees. To the contrary, the present study would argue that instead of a free-floating 
“circle,” the apostle as composer anticipates from the start the specific circle vis-à-vis his intended 
addressees, which he wants to direct their attention to.  
Since it is inherent in Oestreich’s reasoning that the abstraction precedes and determines the 
concretization, one can ask – regarding the first question of this Chapter as to how the different media 
are related to each other – What are the consequences of this understanding and the primacy of “text”?  
First, regarding his section on “das Wesen der Performanz,” we signal that Oestreich does not address 
“das Wesen des Textes.” So, on and beyond the level of text, “text” is – a conceptually unquestioned 
given. Alongside appearances (plural) in performances there-and-then – which are his object of study 
– the “text” (singular) was there-and-then and is here-and-now the same. In his argument therefore, 
text does not become concretized either to the original addressees, or to the present-day reader. 
Whether the letters or Oestreich’s own publication, everything is “text.” Text enables and facilitates 
abstraction, but it does not become abstracted – or, better, concretized – itself (see Chapter 3, Section 
A.1. Textualizing text hic et nunc pro nobis).  
Second, Oestreich determines the role of text in performance criticism as follows: “Performanzkritik 
der neutestamentliche Texte geht davon aus, dass diese Texte auf das Ereignis ihrer Aufführung vor 
 
366 Ibid., 60. 
367 Consider, in this respect, Rafael Rodríguez, “Reading and Hearing in Ancient Contexts,” JSNT 32 (2009): 
151–78. In Rodríguez’s critique on the reasoning of Casey W. Davis, as found in his article “Hebrews 6.4–6 
from an Oral Critical Perspective,” JETS 51 (2008): 753–67, we see a similar situation: “Davis portrays the 
author of Hebrews as a cultural monstrosity who wishes to communicate complex (literate?) ideas but finds 
himself constrained by the inability of his audience to follow ‘analytic,’ ‘objectively distanced’ or ‘abstract’ 
discourse. Davis’s author, among other things, seems to grasp the truth he conveys in ways unconstrained by 
cultural or historical forces, and the tasks before him as he writes is to express that truth in terms that are 
accessible within the cultural limitations affecting his hapless readers” (153–4).    
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einem Publikum zielen und Zeugnisse solcher Ereignisse sind.”368 On the one hand, he argues that 
New Testament texts – in their genesis – point to a future performance. On the other, these same texts 
– as given products – are witnesses of these past events.369 In this one notion of “text,” two different 
communicative processes (textum and autonomously functioning text) become mixed. Also, the 
question as to who does relate to the letter receives two answers: “Ereignis ihrer Aufführung” for them 
and “Zeugnisse solcher Ereignisse” for the present-day reader. The autonomous way in which text 
functions – which is an operational given in the socio-cultural context of academia – dominates and 
determines the former: “Methodisch wird Performanzkritik vom Überlieferten Text ausgehen.”370 
Since his proposal of performance criticism starts with the text (which makes Paul an author who 
abstracts), the role of the emissary, the original addressees, adversaries, and also the apostle – while 
composing/envisioning the oral delivery – are addressed as separate aspects and do not become 
interlocked in one overarching approach.371  
 
 
J. Larry Hurtado: Oral Fixation and New Testament Studies? 
 
In 2014, Larry Hurtado published “Oral Fixation and New Testament Studies? ‘Orality’, 
‘Performance’ and Reading Texts in Early Christianity.”372 The article is rather polemical; the aim is 
to counter the agenda of the emerging discipline of Biblical Performance Criticism. Two years later, a 
response by Kelly Iverson was published.373 Hurtado responded to Iverson in the same issue.374  
 
368 Oestreich, Performanzkritik, 60.  
369 A similar tension is involved when Oestreich argues that texts “auf das Ereignis ihrer Aufführung vor 
einem Publikum zielen” (70). 
370 Ibid., 70. 
371 This critique is affirmed in the double way in which Oestreich uses “interpretation” in his reasoning. On 
the one hand, the present-day reader interprets the letters as texts. On the other, the public reader who addresses 
the gathered audience interpreted the letter at that moment: “Was aufgeführt wird, ist also trotz vorbereitetem 
Text eine jeweils eigene und einmalige Komposition, eine verkörperte Interpretation des Textes” (38, see also 
126 and 136). So “performance” seems to be categorized here as “interpretation” as well. Since the notion is not 
elucidated and explained, and in his reasoning “text” is free-floating, the equation of what the highly trained 
reader is used to do (“interpretation”) with how the emissary would have participated in the oral delivery 
(“interpretation”) is difficult to avoid. As a result, the intellectual endeavour remains directed by the question, 
What does it mean?  
372 Larry W. Hurtado, “Oral Fixation and New Testament Studies? ‘Orality,’ ‘Performance’ and Reading 
Texts in Early Christianity,” NTS Vol. 60/3 (2014): 321–340. 
373 Kelly R. Iverson, “Oral Fixation or Oral Corrective? A Response to Larry Hurtado,” NTS Vol. 62/1 
(2016): 183–200. 
374 Larry W. Hurtado, “Correcting Iverson’s ‘Correction’,” NTS 62/1 (2016): 201–206. The first correction by 
Hurtado of Iverson’s corrections is relevant to the present evaluation. The former writes: “Perhaps the 
fundamental problem is that Iverson mistakes my article as if it were some kind of broadside against the entire 
body of scholars and publications that refer to ‘performance’ of texts in early Christianity” (201; referring to 
Iverson, “Oral Corrective,” 183/4). Hurtado’s defence is the following – the emphasis mine: “I hoped to have 
made it perfectly clear that I was addressing problems in the work of ‘some scholars’ and ‘some of the crucial 
claims and inferences’ (abstract), referring to ‘some advocates’ (327, n. 34, 329), and ‘some studies taking a 
performance criticism approach’” (334) – as found in his “Correcting Iverson’s ‘Correction” (201). He 
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In the words of Hurtado, the movement of performance criticism consists of a small but increasing 
number of scholars who have postulated, 
 
that in early Christian circles texts were originally “performed,” by which they appear to mean something 
more than skilful reading, something more akin to ancient oratorical delivery and/or theatrical performances, 
involving (it is proposed) recitation of the texts from memory (not reading from a manuscript), animated or 
theatrical use of voice and bodily gestures/actions, and even various lively responses from the “audiences.”375  
 
Before we turn to the main idea of his paper, attention has to be paid to the first footnote in which he 
opts for a “more precise sense of the term of ‘performance’.”376 His point of reference is based on 
studies by Whitney Shiner and William Shiell: 
 
Shiner proposes ‘applause of different types, including waving hands, loud exclamations, and rhythmic 
clapping,’ people leaping from their seats and thumping the floor with their feet, and being ‘just as boisterous 
in condemning what they did not like’ (...) It is this more precise sense of the term of ‘performance’ that I 
engage here.377  
 
 
continues: “To reiterate this point for emphasis, I gave no indication that my article was some sort of 
comprehensive assessment of ‘performance criticism,’ and I made it rather clear, instead, that my purpose was to 
correct certain claims and assumptions made by some of those who identify themselves with this emphasis” 
(202, emphasis original). So, contrary to the complaint by Iverson of erecting “something of a straw man,” 
Hurtado ends his first section with the exclamation: “So, I really must complain of being misrepresented 
myself!” (“Correcting Iverson’s ‘Correction’,” 201). Several reasons can be provided that suggest and also seem 
to affirm Iverson’s impression that Hurtado wants to address or more so oppose the whole of this movement. 
First, regarding a paper of almost twenty pages in total, he can bring together only six rather common, dispersed, 
and in the original text not emphasized adjectives (“some” and “certain;” for four of them, see above). Second, 
when we consider the intentions of the paper as a whole, the overall impression is one of generality rather than 
specificity. The title, “Oral Fixation and New Testament Studies? ‘Orality’, ‘Performance’ and Reading Texts in 
Early Christianity” presents a horizon that is as broad as the mentioned notions of “Oral,” “New Testament 
Studies,” “Performance,” “Reading Texts,” and “Early Christianity.” There is no hint as to a restriction to 
specific (some) scholars regarding their specific perspective on orality/aurality or distinctive forms of 
performance criticism. This latter movement as a distinct field does not seem to be in view in the title. In terms 
of the abstract, the first sentence does indeed mention “some scholars” who “have asserted that in early Christian 
circles texts were ‘performed,’ not ‘read’ (and could not have been read), likening this action to descriptions of 
oratorical delivery of speeches (from memory) or theatrical performance” (“Oral Fixation,” 321), but in light of 
the title linking  “Oral Fixation” and “New Testament Studies,” one is inclined to frame this identified group of 
scholars as those within the community of New Testament scholarship as a whole who engage matters of 
“orality” and “performance.” In his response, Hurtado explains that this usage of “some” should be seen, 
however, as a restriction within those who represent performance criticism. This later remark is more or less 
necessary to read this sentence in this way. In the words of Iverson: “Though Hurtado, in places, seems to 
engage in a more qualified discussion with certain scholars, the title, abstract and introductory comments are 
articulated in a manner that depicts performance critics as a homogeneous group whose perspectives are 
represented in the following pages” (“Oral Corrective,” 188). Since we do not find any hint of a limitation in the 
rest of the abstract, the following formulation would have been more appropriate: “These claims as posited by 
some within the movement of performance criticism … ” If he had done so, however, the question does arise as 
to what the value and impact of this free accessible article would have been.  
375 Hurtado, “Oral Fixation,” 321–322. 
376 Ibid., 322. 
377 Ibid., 322, note 1. For the points of reference, see Whitney Shiner, Proclaiming the Gospel: First-Century 
Performance of Mark (Harrisburg-London-New York: Trinity Press International, 2003); William D. Shiell, 
Reading Acts: the Lector and the Early Christian Audience (Leiden: Brill, 2004).  
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In his polemic, “performance” entails a rather outspoken and narrow version of it. In this way, we 
touch on two main reasons why Hurtado’s polemical paper causes confusion and prompts responses 
such as that by Kelly Iverson. Not only does he restrict his usage of “performance” to an outspoken 
theatrical version of it, which is not self-evidently implied by the current usage of this key notion, but 
he explicates this important presuppositional matter simply in a footnote.  
In the same extended footnote, Hurtado also mentions the juxtaposed and broader definition of 
performance, “as to encompass practically any conveyance of Jesus tradition in any form.” The latter – 
despite the unexplained limitation to the Jesus tradition – is the broad definition as encountered, for 
example, in the articles by David Rhoads and as applied in the present study. He does not argue why, 
in view of this, he chooses to confine his definition to the outspoken theatrical kind of performance. 
Later on, we will observe that he juxtaposes a position of reading (out loud) with this theatrical kind of 
performance; instead of a continuum, a clear and simple opposition between (reading) “text” and 
“performance” is the result.  
We turn now to the start of his argumentation. The newly discovered oral dimension of the Bible has 
brought the origin of the gospel of Mark under debate. An increasing number of scholars claim that it 
was composed in the process of several oral performances delivered in various settings. Hurtado 
concludes, “So what we know as the Gospel of Mark is (in this proposal) perhaps only a transcript of a 
given performance, and/or a script to be memorised for subsequent performances.”378 Two 
observations can be made regarding his formulation. First, neither the media of “the Gospel of Mark” 
is defined – so uncritically we fill in “text” – nor is the relation between the subjects in actu – “we” 
here-and-now and those there-and-then dealing with “a transcript of a given performance, and/or a 
script to be memorised” – explicated. This is another example of the media muddle; from the start, 
both functionings, realms of history, and subjects in actu become muddled on the level of his own text. 
Second, he does not make any further exploration of the proposal that the product follows on from the 
production. He confines, then, (one-sidedly) his framing of performance in terms of the product 
preceding the production/performance. A subsequent confinement is his framing of performance 
solely to the latter, that is, the product precedes the production/performance. Regarding the first 
governing question on the effect of body-to-body communcation, we can observe that Hurtado equates 
ourselves with those who have to come to an understanding and, at the same time, he posits the Gospel 
of Mark as (free-floating?) text to be the starting point of his evaluation of performance criticism.  
Another preliminary observation can be made regarding the representatives of this approach. Hurtado 
identifies two particular scholars: Pieter Botha and David Rhoads. He addresses the latter’s call to 
actual performances of the New Testament writings by biblical scholars also in a footnote, 
commenting that this is “a matter I do not engage here.”379 Since he sidesteps this central appeal of 
 
378 Ibid., 322.  
379 Ibid., 322, note 3. 
 116 
Rhoads, he does not engage the agenda of performance criticism as posited by these scholars 
themselves. This prompts the question: What is his own agenda?  
Hurtado formulates the aim of his paper as follows:  
 
In this essay ... I show that key assumptions of ‘performance criticism’ advocates comprise a number of 
oversimplifications (and so distortions) of relevant historical matters, and that, consequently, the inferences 
drawn about the composition and use of texts in early Christianity are the more dubious.  
 
In stating that performance critics oversimplify and distort the realm of history there-and-then-to-
them,380 his own formulation gives rise to the observation that “texts” are constitutive of his grasp of 
early Christianity without further explanation. Subsequently, he affirms, referring to Werner Kelber, 
that the “appreciation of the spoken word” in the Roman era “may be taken now as widely accepted 
and not under dispute here.”381 He questions, however, “whether the prominence of this ‘orality’ 
should be taken as a basis for minimising the place of texts and the activities associated with them 
(writing, reading, copying etc.) in that same period.”382 Uncritically, “text” is once more located in the 
realm of history there-and-then-to-them. He adds that a kind of zero-sum game is at stake “in which 
emphasising the place of Roman-era ‘orality’ is at the expense of recognising the significant place of 
written texts and their various uses in that period.”383 This is the oversimplification that he wants to 
address, namely a mutually exclusive dichotomy between orality and “written texts” where, due to the 
dominance of orality, literacy could not inform the culture involved. Once more, we have to take 
recourse to a footnote to find an explanation for this allegation of oversimplification: “This may arise 
from their [advocates of performance criticism] construction of Roman ‘orality’ from anthropological 
studies and theories based on pre-literate societies, with insufficient attention given to relevant cultural 
specifics of the Roman era as illustrated in this essay.”384  
Let us now recapitulate and evaluate Hurtado’s train of thought hitherto. Within performance 
criticism, the reconstruction of the dimension of orality in Roman culture is based on research into 
pre-literate cultures. In this way, there is a lack of sensibility towards relevant cultural specifics of the 
Roman era as such, for example, in terms of the role of literacy there-and-then-to-them. Pre-literacy 
and the “orality” of the Roman era cannot be related in such an oversimplified way. On the one hand, 
 
380 Pieter Botha, in his “Letter writing” (see, in this Chapter, Section C.) – mentioned by Hurtado as one of 
the exponents of Biblical Performance Criticism – commences with exactly the same warning against 
oversimplification regarding the study of literacy in Greco-Roman society: “Furthermore, by not critically 
defining our concepts we can easily fall into the trap of facile oversimplification” (19).  
381 Hurtado, “Oral Fixation,” 323. He describes this sense of appreciation extensively: “Roman-era people 
valued the sound of words/speech, relished and promoted effective speaking (rhetoric), enjoyed lively recitations 
of poetry and performance of theatrical works, read literary texts aloud and enjoyed having these texts read to 
them, or used dictation (variously) as part of the process of composition. All these things seem to be the case. In 
these phenomena and others, certainly, we can characterise the Roman period as one in which an ‘orality’ (in the 
sense of the use and enjoyment of the spoken word) was a prominent feature.” (323) 
382 Ibid., 323. 
383 Ibid., 323–324. 
384 Ibid., 324, note 6. 
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this acknowledgement of actual interfaces between orality/aurality and literacy, in that specific realm 
of history (Roman era), is valid. On the other, we have to ask critically: To what extent does the 
implied conclusion mean that “pre-literacy” cannot be related to or shed light on (Roman) “orality”? 
The related and more fundamental question is, How can we – as products of a highly literate socio-
cultural context and actually working with (the biblical) text  – explore and know this distinctive (and 
rather unknown) context of orality in any absolute way, whether that orality is preliterate or in the 
first-century Roman context where all kinds and degrees of literacies were present? In some way, one 
would now expect a proposal to distinguish first-century Roman oralities from ancient Greek ones, 
and to explore and describe the specificities of the oral dimension in the Roman era. This, however, is 
not the case. Despite the call for historical sensibility, Hurtado does not engage the question as to what 
this presence or even dominance of orality-aurality in the Roman era means for the constitution of 
literacy there-and-then. In his argumentation, “orality” becomes dichotomously structured to “pre-
literacy”; they remain coarse, unrelated and, therefore, freischwebende categories. We will see that this 
is typical of his way of reasoning in general.  
We can also evaluate this part of his reasoning from another angle. When Hurtado states that the 
appreciation of the spoken word in Roman era is a communis opinio in biblical scholarship and, 
therefore, not a matter of dispute for him, he seems to ignore the primary point of emphasis of 
performance criticism. To quote Iverson,  
 
Of primary concern is that for the overwhelming majority of people in the ancient world, texts were 
experienced in an oral context. That is, although manuscripts may or may not have been present and/or used 
at times of presentation, the audience encountered ‘the text’ through oral recitation.385  
 
Therefore, Hurtado not only does not dispute this communis opinio, but he also does not engage in the 
debate on the consequences. In his response, Iverson introduces the specific perspective of the subjects 
in actu of performance there-and-then (body to body) in distinction from our overly familiar one of 
eye to text area. Instead, Hurtado calls for consideration to be given to the alleged problem that 
performance critics want to minimize, “the place of texts and the activities associated with them 
(writing, reading, copying etc.),” based on “the prominence of this ‘orality’.”386 In line with his earlier 
observed location of “text” in the realm of history there-and-then, he posits here – without explication 
or explanation – the product as the starting point. So, in his thought structure, the free-standing 
product overrules or transcends the historical process. Iverson comments on this reasoning as follows: 
“To confuse silent reading with public recitation ignores a host of interpretive issues and reflects a 
misunderstanding of media types.”387 Hurtado seems to advance his own agenda from the start. Since 
 
385 Iverson, “Oral Corrective,” 198.  
386 Hurtado, “Oral Fixation,” 323. 
387 Iverson, “Oral Corrective,” 199. 
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he does not explicate or justify his own presuppositions, constructive discussion becomes difficult or 
even impossible.  
Returning to the first main issue Hurtado raises as an oversimplification on the part of advocates for 
performance criticism, we now examine his own assessment of the claim of a first-century cultural 
bias in favour of the oral over the written. He counters this with the following assertion: 
 
As reflected in the many thousands of manuscripts that survive from the Roman period, the many literary 
works produced and circulated, the many inscriptions and the many kinds of ‘documentary’ texts (letters, 
contracts, business/commercial documents, et al.), writings were not mere appendages to the spoken word 
but were important in themselves as a major factor in many areas of life and among various levels and sectors 
of societies.388  
  
We start our scrutiny of this line of thinking with the premise of quantity, as reflected in the repeated 
use of the word ‘many’ in the above quotation. The difficulty with such data is interpreting the value 
of any quantity mentioned and it does not become clear on what basis Hurtado claims that we are 
dealing with a large quantity. He assumes this to be self-evident. Given the timeframe and area of the 
Roman empire, one could ask why this number could not be a sign of the opposite, that is, a sign of 
sparsity. Similarly, Hurtado offers little comment on the nature or function of these writings and 
whether they should all be quantified as being important “in themselves,” or whether are there also 
genres and categories that can be valued in line with manifestations of the spoken word 
(textum/“inscription of living speech”; see Excursus: Silent reading in antiquity?). In a more 
philosophical way, we can question whether the statement on the importance of these writings in 
themselves grants them this freischwebende status that we are concerned to identify in the present 
study as typical of the mindset of the socio-cultural context of academia.389  
A related difficulty that follows on from this lack of clarity in terms of quantifying texts, concerns the 
way such texts are then characterised. Since he has introduced the opposition of “orality” and “texts” 
and does not explain what he means by this phrase “(being) important in themselves,” the necessary 
 
388 Hurtado, “Oral Fixation,” 324.  
389 In an extended footnote, we turn to Rosalind Thomas, Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece (Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), to shed more light on the dimension and value of an 
argument on the basis of quantity: “The tendency to see a society (or individual) as either literate or oral is over-
simple and misleading. The habits of relying on oral communication (or orality) and literacy are not mutually 
exclusive … the evidence for Greece shows both a sophisticated and extensive use of writing in some spheres 
and what is to us an amazing dominance of the spoken word” (4). “Given the complexity of literacy and paucity 
of detailed ancient evidence, all we can say with any plausibility is that probably more people could read than 
write; the ability to read or write very simple messages, often in capitals was probably not rare and in cities like 
Athens … most citizens had some basic ability and perhaps ‘phonetic literacy’ was pretty widespread; but the 
written texts of poetry and literary prose had a reading audience confined to the highly educated and wealthy 
elite, and their secretaries” (11). In this respect, we can also quote John Miles Foley on the diversity within the 
concept of “literacy” – see How to Read an Oral Poem (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002): 
“brute measures like percentage literacy or the mere existence of some sort of writing must not lead us down the 
garden path of assimilating other cultures’ literacies to our own” (69). Regarding the reasoning of Hurtado, much 
more precision is needed in definitions of “literacy” and “orality” and more argumentation is required regarding 
the quantity and quality, or types, of literacy.  
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implication is that these physical artefacts functioned independent of the spoken word in an 
idiosyncratic or autonomous way. So the (unwarranted) claim of the large quantity of “writings” there-
and-then-to-them has to ground their status (quality) as autonomous text. If this analysis is valid, we 
are dealing with a category mistake.  
In an ensuing section, Hurtado refers to “exaggerated claims in some earlier and influential 
publications of classicists that subsequently have received justifiable correction.” Referring to studies 
by Holt Parker390 and Emmanuelle Valette-Cagnac,391 he writes in a polemical but also nuanced way: 
 
So, to reiterate the point for emphasis, the Roman period is better characterised as a time of rich interplay of 
texts and readers (both private and to/before groups), writers and speakers, and appreciation of both 
oral/aural and written expressions of thought and entertainment, and it is a fallacy to make the one 
subservient to the other in any generalising way.392  
 
Here Hurtado advocates for a more balanced paradigm: over against a dominance either of the 
spoken/heard or the written word “in any generalising way” one has to evaluate every specific 
situation in its own right.393 Following Valette-Cagnac, he emphasizes that exchange took place in 
both directions. So contrary to clear and simple oppositions, he calls, at the beginning of this section, 
to explore the continua between both media.  
The subsequent examples, however, show only one of the two directions implied – that is, from the 
written to the spoken word. He introduces Quintilian and Pliny who state that composition-in-writing 
produces the better results in the actual delivery of oratory.394 In short, the outcome of these examples 
is an extensive illustration of the dominance of the written over the spoken word. Once more, we see 
that the consistency of his argumentation is under strain.  
To undergird the implied dominance of the written word, Hurtado immediately continues with the 
following affirmation: “Indeed, in many cases the written text was simply intended to be read in its 
own right and by individuals” (emphasis mine).395 We recognize in the phrase “in its own right” a 
synonym of “being important in themselves.” In conclusion, the section on the first oversimplification 
moves from an explicit plea for mutual exchange between the two media, via examples which 
 
390 Holt N. Parker, “Books and Reading Latin Poetry,” in Ancient Literacies: The Culture of Reading in 
Greece and Rome, ed. William A. Johnson and Holt N. Parker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 186–
229.  
391 Emmanuelle Valette-Cagnac, La lecture à Rome: rites et pratiques (Paris: Belin, 1997). 
392 Hurtado, “Oral Fixation,” 325.   
393 Confusingly, this comment fits Iverson hand in glove! In this respect, we can ask to what extent or in what 
way can this reasoning be related to the previous point that all the writings that have survived from the Roman 
era are important in themselves. The latter structuring of thought would preclude mutual exchange a priori. So, 
what is the cogency of his article in this respect? 
394 This train of thought is directly based on Parker, “Books and Reading Latin Poetry,” 215. See also 
Parker’s comment: “It is not the case that the written text is considered a copy or record of the oral presentation. 
Pliny explicitly states [Ep. 1.20.9] that the opposite is true: the written text is the model and archetype for the 
speech as actually delivered” (225–6). The question is, though, whether these writings were perceived as being 
“important to themselves” and, as a result, in opposition to “speech” by Pliny.  
395 Hurtado, “Oral Fixation,” 325. Consider examples of poetic texts – once more provided by Parker – that 
are clearly intended for the eye: acrostics, picture poems, poems in the shape of eggs or wings etc. 
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consistently illustrate the dominance of one over the other, to an implicit conclusion (“[i]ndeed”) on 
the priority and dominance of the written word (being important in itself) over the spoken one in the 
Roman era.  
The second oversimplification Hurtado addresses is the claim by advocates of performance criticism 
“that Roman-era reading, even private reading, was almost always reading aloud.” Hurtado in no way 
wants to deny the practice of reading aloud. Notably though, this qualification of his opponents 
(“almost always”) is subsequently replaced with “often”: “Certainly, texts were often read out 
(aloud).”396 In particular, reading aloud was the case in elite circles, as well as sub-elite settings such 
as synagogues and early Christian gatherings.397 However, Hurtado claims that the implication of this 
practice for advocates of performance criticism is “that texts were radically subordinate to ‘orality’.” 
Despite the quotation marks, it is not clear what “orality” involves in this reasoning. “So it is simply 
misinformed to assert that texts were only (or even predominantly) read aloud in groups, and were, 
thus merely appendages to ‘orality’.” Implied in the structure of this proposition, one media (orality) 
always subordinates and neglects the other (text). 
We recapitulate the argument. First, the situation that texts were read out “almost always” is nuanced 
by Hurtado into “often.” Then, as next step, “often” is, suddenly, turned into “only”: performance 
critics claim that writings were only read aloud. This situation is then self-evidently and correctly 
rejected by Hurtado.  
At the end of this section, Hurtado provides a conclusion that seems to be presupposed from the start: 
“Even texts that were written to be read out (for example, Paul’s letters) were foremost texts, and what 
was delivered orally was the text” (emphasis original). We will scrutinize now the structuring of 
thought of this statement. This critical analysis will be in light of the dichotomy between the realm of 
history and that of extra-historical thought as set out in the Introduction to this thesis (Caution to the 
reader #2). Hurtado commences with “texts that were written to be read out (for example, Paul’s 
letters)” (plural). So, on the level of text, he starts by framing these “texts” as the historical artefacts 
that enabled public reading. The past tense makes clear that we have to locate them in the realm of 
history there-and-then (autographs). Subsequently, he defines these autographs “foremost” as the 
single un-explicated term in italics “texts” (plural). The adverb (foremost) structures hierarchy. 
 
396 Here he refers to several important “but insufficiently noticed” studies: Bernard M.W. Knox, “Silent 
Reading in Antiquity,” GRBS 9 (1968): 421–435; Andrei K. Gavrilov, “Techniques of Reading in Classical 
Antiquity,” CQ 47 (1997): 56–73; Myles F. Burnyeat, “Postscript on Silent Reading,” CQ 47 (1997): 74–76; H. 
Gregory Snyder, Teachers and Texts in the Ancient World (London: Routledge, 2000); William A. Johnson, 
“Toward a Sociology of Reading in Classical Antiquity,” AJP 121 (2000): 593–627; idem, Readers and Reading 
Culture in the High Roman Empire (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). Evidence can be found 
that it was usual practice to read letters silently. Regarding larger literary texts, plenty of evidence can be 
provided as well that these were read privately and silently. Valette-Cagnac has shown that the Latin verb legere 
appears to be used in contexts designating reading in silence and solitude. Gavrilov has demonstrated that 
Roman-era readers were well aware of the different features and also advantages of reading in public as well as 
in silence and solitude. As we argue in the present study, this evidence should not lead us to (uncritically) jump 
to the implicit equation with the socio-cultural context of present-day academia.  
397 Ibid., 326. 
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Notwithstanding the acknowledgement “being written to be read out,” their categorization of “texts” is 
the most prominent in rank. However, notwithstanding the use of italics, the term itself is repeated 
(“texts” becomes “texts”). Accordingly, the definition hinges on the omission of the specification “that 
were written to be read out” and the adding of italics. In the next phrase, he repeats the purport of his 
argument: “and what was delivered orally was the text.” Now plural (“texts”) has become singular 
(“text”) and the process or historical event (“was delivered orally”) is distinguished from the “what” or 
the essence: that is the text itself. The use of italics and the articulate singular (“the text”) structure our 
thoughts away from the specific realm of history towards the one of extra-historical thought. He 
argues that, despite an unfamiliar functioning there-and-then (public reading/oral performance), the 
text as such is the same everywhere, every time, and for everyone. Essence and historical 
manifestation or form and content are separated. In short, the text (articulated and singular) transcends 
the realm of history. Some reflections on this reasoning are offered. First, according to Hurtado, the 
provocative call of Rhoads to perform the New Testament here-and-now, along with the communis 
opinio on the appreciation of the spoken word in the Roman era, will not and cannot touch on the text-
ness of these documents. Second, as in the articles by Joanna Dewey and David Rhoads, we witness 
once more some sort of conflict between the status and role of “text” on the level of text and in the 
realm of history (beyond that level). Dewey speaks of text as aid to orality in distinction from text as 
having importance in itself, whereas Hurtado denies the importance of the aid to orality so that text 
will always have importance in itself. Third, when he states text as singular, articulate, and in italics on 
the level of text (as part of the realm of extra-historical thought) and has denied the importance – on 
that same level of text – of the oral delivery or public reading thereof, the actual functioning of text 
will be determined beyond that level (in his own realm of history here-and-now) – that is, as 
processing by reading. Fourth, this reasoning seems to represent in an intentional way the movement 
of textification: despite acknowledging the historical functioning of the New Testament documents 
(oral performance/public reading), their nature, content or essence is declared to be extra-historical 
(“the text”) and cannot, therefore, be subject to change (Introduction: Caution to the reader #4). Fifth, 
the structuring of this statement by Hurtado – that is, from the concrete or specific (“texts were written 
to be read out”) to the abstract and general (“the text”) – is precisely the opposite movement of 
detextification. Although logically flawed, this reasoning is rhetorically strong: somehow the deeply 
ingrained proposition in biblical scholarship – there is some “Greek text” from the start – has to be 
done justice (Introduction).  
In the following section, Hurtado elaborates on what he regards as another oversimplification, namely 
that reading was a physically demanding activity.398 In this section, the object of reading becomes 
historicized or concretized. He deals with features of the scroll book such as scriptio continua, how 
columns were formed, and the Roman-era educational process of learning to read. He continues, 
 
398 Ibid., 327. 
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Moreover, just as those intending to read a text publicly today do, people in the ancient setting who read a 
text aloud for a group did not approach the task ‘cold,’ trying to read it without first acquainting themselves 
with the text so that it could be read smoothly, with appropriate pauses, emphases and intonation.399  
 
According to advocates of performance criticism, the awkwardness of the scroll book should explain a 
general practice of the memorization of texts. Hurtado argues that this presupposition is not valid per 
se. The present-day reader should not impose his own reading habits or should not project his own 
acquaintance with the standard text area upon ancient readers.  
This practice of reading urges him to comment on memorization. He does so in a footnote: “this 
preparation to read literary texts out to a group did not typically involve memorisation, but instead a 
familiarisation with the text so that it could be read out competently.”400 Although this remark is an 
addition to the main argument of the paper, it remains a loose end. It prompts the questions: How does 
“reading out competently” relate to “public reading” and/or “oral performance”? What are the possible 
differences between reading in silence and solitude and this kind of reading? How does composition 
regarding reading out differ from reading in silence and solitude? One of the consequences is that 
Hurtado does not elaborate on research on memorization and memory; for that reason, he cannot 
penetrate the dimension of mindsets and how thoughts are structured. He acknowledges fundamental 
differences between the format, that is, scroll book and printed leaf book (product). Nonetheless, the 
process of “reading” is one and the same. So, from correcting one oversimplification on the part of 
performance criticism, we end with one on his side: the “reading” and the process of coming to 
understand there-and-then-by-them is the same as ours; there is no differentiation between media and 
mindsets. 
Subsequently, Hurtado proceeds to a third oversimplification, namely estimates of rates of literacy as a 
reason to minimize the role of literacy.401 This point has been critically engaged by Iverson in his 
article.402 Once again Hurtado’s reasoning commences with a view close to  the performance critics: 
“We may grant that it seems broadly correct that probably only a minority (perhaps a small minority) 
of the total population of the Empire were able to read easily and fluently, or at least able to read the 
more demanding literary texts with ease.”403 After acknowledging that only a (small) minority were 
literate,404 Hurtado urges us, however, to avoid oversimplification of the historical situation. He points 
to several recent studies of education in the Roman imperial era 405 and, in particular, in the city of 
 
399 Ibid., 330. 
400 Ibid., 329, note 4. 
401 Ibid., 330. 
402 Iverson, “Oral Corrective,” 189–192. 
403 Hurtado, “Oral Fixation,” 330. 
404 This statement casts light on our previous questions on the value he assigns to the quantity (“many 
thousands” as indicating large) and why this could not be a sign of sparsity. 
405 Teresa Morgan, Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); Raffaella Cribiori, Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman 
Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).    
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Pompeii.406 He summarizes them as follows: “[T]he period actually seems to have been one of 
comparatively wider and greater literacy than any time before it, and probably greater than in the 
subsequent medieval period as well, even if the majority of the Roman-era population may have been 
functionally illiterate.”407 At the end of this section, he turns to Wayne Meeks and his description of 
the typical member of the Pauline communities, commenting that  
 
This seems to me a rough fit with the sort of individuals depicted in the Pompeii paintings, the sort of people 
who would have, or want to acquire, a reading ability to advance themselves. Such individuals (probably not as 
rare as some have assumed) who embraced Christian faith would also have been able to read out texts to the 
Christian gatherings of which they were a part. 408  
 
This line of thought contains some unexplained leaps. From the general view that a majority of the 
Roman-era population was functionally illiterate, via an implicit interpretation of findings, graffiti, and 
persons depicted in paintings found in Pompeii, and the depiction of urban Christians by Wayne 
Meeks, he deduces the literate emancipation of the first urban Christians. Finally, Hurtado draws the 
conclusion of “widespread literacy” in the Roman era.409  
In his response, Iverson criticizes this unsubstantiated claim of “widespread literacy”, observing that 
“[u]nfortunately, Hurtado does not define what he means by ‘literacy’.”410 Iverson turns to the 
definition of “literacy” by Michael Macdonald: a society is literate when reading and writing has 
become essential to its functioning, independent of the majority who possibly do not possess the skills 
to read and write in any advanced manner.411 Iverson concludes, “In this respect, it is legitimate to 
describe Rome as a literate society, despite the fact that the majority of individuals would have been 
 
406 James L. Franklin Jr., “Literacy and the Parietal Inscriptions of Pompeii,” in Literacy in the Roman World, 
ed. Mary Beard, Alan K. Bowman and Mireille Corbeille (Ann Arbor: Journal of Roman Archeology, 1991), 77–
98; Kristina Milnor, “Literary Literacy in Roman Pompeii: The Case of Vergil’s Aeneid,” in Ancient Literacies, 
288–319; Alan K. Bowman and J. David Thomas, “Vindolanda 1985: The New Writing-Tablets,” JRS 76 
(1986): 120–3; idem, “New Texts from Vindolanda,” Britannia 18 (1987): 125–42. A subsequent argument of 
Hurtado in favour of a more widespread literacy is based on findings in Pompeii. First, an argument on quantity 
is again given, that is, the evidence of around 11,000 pieces of writing (331). Second, in terms of degree, 
widespread literacy is suggested by graffiti as found in Pompeii. These findings indicate that various sub-elites 
such as prostitutes, lower-class workmen and others were capable of reading and also some level of writing in 
Pompeii. He proceeds by highlighting the study of graffiti from Smyrna in ancient Greece by Roger Bagnall 
(Everyday Writing in the Graeco–Roman East [Berkeley: University of California, 2011]). He concludes that, 
despite a minority that was able to read and write, the use of written language was not limited to a small high-
status group. Writing was ubiquitous and several social strata were deploying writing in some fashion. Also, 
paintings as found in Pompeii support this view. “These paintings suggest that people of sub-elite levels prized 
abilities to read and write, including, so they claimed, the ability to read what looks like literary texts.” 
407 Hurtado, “Oral Fixation,” 331. 
408 Wayne A. Meeks, The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul; 2nd ed. (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, repr. 2003). 
409 Hurtado, “Oral Fixation,” 334.  
410 Iverson, “Oral Corrective,” 189. 
411 Michael C. A. Macdonald, “Literacy in an Oral Environment,” in Writing and Ancient Near Eastern 
Society: Papers in Honor of Alan R. Miljard, ed. Piotr Bienkowski, Christopher Mee and Elizabeth Slater 
(London: T&T Clark, 2005), 50. 
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incapable of reading or writing texts similar to those found in the biblical literature.”412 In this manner, 
he makes clear that Hurtado does not provide accurate definitions of “literacy” and “widespread 
literacy.” So, despite his initial confirmation of low literacy rates, Hurtado presents, in the end, a view 
of a widespread ability among early Christians to read written documents.  
After these three oversimplifications, Hurtado proceeds by thematizing two more problems. The first 
he defines as “the confusion of the reading of texts to groups with the actions of orators and/or actors.” 
He refers to visual evidence to confirm the clear difference between poets and “orators.” Poets are 
visibly reading manuscripts out loud to small groups of people. In his depiction, the emphasis is on the 
activity of reading (which might be characterised as the familiar eye to text area experience). The 
orators are depicted, however, with closed rolls in one hand and gesturing with the other. The 
emphasis is on sensorial experiences which are more in line with the theatre (which might be 
characterised as body-to-body communication). The relation between poets and orators is not 
elaborated. The outcome of his reasoning is dichotomous: either one is a lector dependent on 
text/reading literature or poems aloud or one is an orator without text/speaking freely and gesticulating 
abundantly. We see this more clearly in his final response to Iverson:  
 
So … I also hope now that scholarly discussion of ‘orality’ and ‘textuality’ in early Christianity can proceed 
on a more informed basis and with due recognition that we need to take full account of various activities without 
confusing them: strictly oral performances (for example, preaching), the ‘performance’ of written texts (reading 
aloud to groups), and the place of reading and study of texts as well.413  
 
In this categorization of activities, the first is constituted by “performance” and does not touch on the 
nature of the New Testament as “text,” the second and third are dependent on “text.” Instead of 
tentatively exploring continua between “text” and “oral performance,” Hurtado creates a clear-cut and 
simple dichotomy between them. It takes the shape of “text” versus “text-less oral performance.”      
Iverson reacts to this mutually exclusive categorization: “Though this assertion seems straightforward, 
Hurtado provides no specific examples nor does he interact with the performance literature.”414 
Iverson himself provides several examples of cross-fertilisation between different kinds of 
performances. First, he affirms the instances in which Quintilian (Inst. 11.3.182–4) and Cicero (De Or. 
3.59.220) openly refute the influence of theatrical arts on oratory to provide also several examples to 
the contrary.415 As a result, Iverson concludes as follows: 
 
To posit that early Christian communities in various regions were somehow insulated from the delivery and 
performative practices in the wider cultural area – either Greco-Roman or Jewish – or that they adopted a 
 
412 Iverson, “Oral Corrective,” 191. 
413 Hurtado, “Correcting Iverson’s,” 206. 
414 Iverson, “Oral Corrective,” 193. 
415 These examples include Demosthenes (Quintilian, Inst. 11.3.7), Cicero as described by others (Macr., Sat. 
3.14.12; Plutarch, Cic. 5.3), Quintus Hortensius (Val. Max. 8.10.2), and Pliny the Younger (Ep. 9.34). 
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uniform model of scripture reading ignores the diverse performative winds blowing from various quarters 
within the Empire.416 
 
So instead of affirming the simple and rigid dichotomy of Hurtado, Iverson calls us to take heed of 
diversity in performances.  
The other problem in the agenda of performance criticism, according to Hurtado, is the framing of 
“dictation”: “Finally, we should note the confusion over the use of dictation, as if this amounted to 
composition of texts in ‘performance’” (emphasis original). Disturbingly, the emphasis in this section 
is not on dictation but on composition. Contrary to the rejected assumption that dictation “amounted to 
composition of texts in ‘performance,’” he frames this practice as “a step in writing” (emphasis mine). 
Subsequently, a detailed depiction of the process of “dictation” – what one would be inclined to frame 
as or at least relate to “composition” – follows: 
 
This involved speaking thoughts, which were taken down by a secretary, after which the author worked up a 
complete draft of the poem, speech, letter or treatise. This draft might be read out to a circle of acquaintance 
for comments (recitatio), after which a final draft would be made for delivery/performance (for example, an 
oration) and/or for circulation (for example, poetry, prose writings).  
 
The process starts with the spoken word (“speaking thoughts”), but aims at (“by a secretary”) and is 
perfected in the written word (“the author worked up a complete draft”). No real attention is paid to 
this apparent first phase. Questions arise as to why “the author” does not skip this technically non-
logical and superfluous dictation phase – especially when thinking through the contemporary material 
aspect that rewriting would be factually writing oneself anew – and directly write and rewrite 
themselves, and whether there might be a difference between the mindset behind “speaking thought” 
and composing autonomous text. This neglect of the spoken word becomes clear once more in a 
subsequent conclusion: “But such a ‘performance’ of a speech or poem involved the oral presentation 
of the previously written text” (emphasis original).417 In his italicized phrase, we recognize again a 
clear hierarchy or the given dominance of “text” (singular, articulate, italics). 
In the next section, Hurtado turns to another feature characteristic of early Christian manuscripts, 
namely, nomina sacra. Because of the distinctive way in which they were written down, these words 
formed a visual expression of piety.418 The phenomenon is already present in the earliest Christian 
manuscripts. “My point here is that, along with an appreciation for oral/aural phenomena, the nomina 
sacra show a surprising early physical and visual dimension to texts in manuscript form in early 
Christianity.” Since they cannot be vocalized, nomina sacra emphasize the visual dimension for those 
who related to the manuscripts as artefacts themselves by reading. Rightly, he draws attention to this 
phenomenon – which does not become visible in the standard versions with which the biblical scholar 
 
416 Iverson, “Oral Corrective,” 197–8.  
417 Hurtado, “Oral Fixation,” 335. 
418 Ibid., 337. 
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is acquainted. On this basis, however, he suggests that from the beginning the visual dimension of the 
written word was prevalent.419  
A following argument is based on the presence of aids to reading in copied manuscripts. These aids 
originate from even earlier times. So specific attention to the act of reading is rooted deeply in the 
beginnings of Christianity. This format as predominant in Roman-era literature has led him in an 
earlier publication to argue “that the use of readers’ aids in Christian biblical manuscripts was 
intended to enable a wider spectrum of people to read them, including readers of sub-elite social 
levels.”420 These aids would have facilitated and unintentionally promoted the spread of “reading.” 
The implication is that “readers’ aids” in ancient manuscripts enhanced “reading.” The notion of 
“reading” is not explicated or explained here. Therefore operationally, it will be framed as the way of 
“reading” with which we are familiar here-and-now. As a result, our understanding of the text has to 
be identical with the one of the intended addressees. 
We can conclude that the argument of Hurtado is distinctive from Werner Kelber, Paul Achtemeier, 
Joanna Dewey, Casey Davis, and David Rhoads. They made a turn from process to product. Hurtado 
projects the product (“the text”) firmly and openly into the historical situation there-and-then-to-
them.421 For him, text is the unquestioned and ultimate starting-point of all research. In this respect, the 
close of his article is illustrative:  
 
As was the case for other Roman-era authors, NT writers often (typically?) composed their texts with a view 
to them being read aloud to groups and experienced aurally. But NT texts are the products of authors who 
wrote for readers and for those who would hear their texts read out.422  
 
Throughout his article, Hurtado explicitly uses vocabulary from the literacy matrix, such as “text,” 
“author,” “reading,” “reader, “writings,” and “to write.” These concepts do not in any way gain 
historical depth. In this final recapitulation, he defines – without argument – the creators of what is 
now perceived as the New Testament as “writers,” frames the end of the process of composition as 
“text” and objectifies the New Testament documents as free-floating “products of authors who wrote.” 
The outcome of his polemical treatise of performance criticism is fixed from the start. Unfortunately, 
remarks such as “with a view to them being read aloud to groups and experienced aurally” and “those 
who would hear their texts read out” remain empty epithets. They give the impression that he has 
 
419 In the first and last quotation, “manuscript” is not equated with “text” – c.f., “manuscripts of Christian 
texts” and “texts in manuscript form in early Christianity.” Hurtado creates a distinction between historical 
artefacts, i.e., manuscripts and texts. Text as freischwebendes or extra-historical thought is not as susceptible to 
historicization as manuscripts are. Later, we will pay explicit attention to this feature in his reasoning. On the 
nomina sacra see further Larry W. Hurtado, The Earliest Christian Artifacts: Manuscripts and Christian Origins 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 95–134. 
420 Larry W. Hurtado, “Manuscripts and the Sociology of Early Christian Reading,” in The Early Text of the 
New Testament, ed. Charles E. Hill and Michael J. Kruger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 49–62; 
“What do the Earliest Christian Manuscripts tell us about their Readers?”, in The World of Jesus and the Earliest 
Church, ed. Craig A. Evans (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2011), 179–92.  
421 Paraphrasing a famous biblical passage, one can say: “In the beginning was the text.” 
422 Hurtado, “Oral Fixation,” 340. 
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listened to his opponents, but this fixed-ness of “text” from the start will not only preclude any fruition 
of insights from the debate within performance criticism but more so will prevent any change taking 
place in the conceptualizations and practice of biblical scholarship. We are confronted – more clearly 
than in the other studies discussed in this Chapter – with an encompassing circular system of thought: 
when we begin with “text” in our own participatory realm of history (physical artefact) and on our 
level of text (concept) and we do so without explication, we will not only conclude with this situation 
there-and-then but we will also stay, operationally speaking, in this situation here-and-now. One could 
argue that a central and unquestioned pillar of biblical scholarship seems to be at stake, that is, “text” 
and, as a result, the “biblical text.” Despite acknowledging on the level of his text that these 
documents were “written to be read out,” “orally delivered,” and “composed their texts with a view to 
them being read aloud,” he implicitly declares them to be text, that is, our perception of, engagement 
with, or understanding of them cannot be influenced by the originally intended media functioning.     
 
 
K. Glenn Holland: “Delivery! Delivery! Delivery!” 
 
In 2016, Glenn Holland published, in the volume Paul and Ancient Rhetoric: Theory and Practice in 
the Hellenistic Context, his article “‘Delivery, Delivery, Delivery.’ Accounting for Performance in the 
Rhetoric of Paul’s Letters.” 423 He commences by emphasizing that in either Greek or Roman rhetoric 
“delivery – the actual performance of the speech before an audience – was among the most important 
aspects of the art of persuasion.”424 He refers to the story about Demosthenes. When somebody asked 
him what is most important in rhetoric,  he responded by exclaiming  three times, “Delivery! Delivery! 
Delivery!” By examining writings of Aelius Theon, the author of Rhetorica ad Herennium, and, in 
particular, Quintilian, Holland sets out that the attention to tone, volume, strength of voice, gestures, 
and movements of the body makes clear that delivery is all about the impression the orator makes on 
the audience. Consequently, the physical appearance of the orator should be in accordance with his 
status and should make him worthy of the attention given to him in oratory.425 The impression of 
authenticity, regarding age, profession, social status, and so forth, was imperative: “In fact, the way a 
speaker presented himself through both words and personal presence was believed to embody his 
moral worth as a person.”426 On the other side of the coin, is the audience and the occasion. Quoting 
Quintilian, Holland gives illustrations in which different styles of eloquence are required, for example 
 
423 Glenn S. Holland, “‘Delivery, Delivery, Delivery.’ Accounting for Performance in the Rhetoric of Paul’s 
Letters,” in Paul and Ancient Rhetoric Theory and Practice in the Hellenistic Context, ed. Stanley S. Porter and 
Bryan R. Dyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 119–140. 
424 Ibid., 119. 
425 Ibid., 120. 
426 Ibid., 121. 
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in speaking before the senate or the public, before various types of judges, or soldiers and farmers 
(Inst. 11.1.45).  
After having dealt with delivery from the perspective of the ancient sources, he turns to the delivery of 
Paul’s letters. In an extended footnote, he defines “performance” as “a reader giving voice to what was 
conveyed by the marks that made up the text in order that its contents could be heard and understood 
by others.” In that same footnote, he denies, with a reference to the article by Larry Hurtado (see 
before), more theatrical framings of the event and underscores that the task of the reader was not “to 
do anything other than convey a letter’s sense and content to an audience.”427 Although preferring 
“performance” over “reading” or “reading aloud” because of the emphasis on the oral/aural nature of 
the communicative act, we observe a framing of the act of delivery that centres on the “sense” and 
“content of the letter.” To this framing of the act of performance, he brings the earlier presented 
insights from ancient Greek and Roman sources. By reading the letter aloud, the reader spoke to the 
congregation “as Paul.” Holland stresses the fact that the apostle was dependent for the effectiveness 
of the delivery on the one who was reading. As a result, “the persona of the reader would affect the 
way the letter was heard and understood by its audience, either for good or for bad.”428 On the basis of 
the strong conviction in ancient rhetoric that the delivery itself was decisive, he expresses an 
interesting question: “[I]f Paul’s rhetoric was conveyed to an audience only through the vehicle of 
another person reading his letters aloud, how did Paul seek to ensure that it would have its desired 
effect upon the audience?” Thus, What were the possibilities open to the apostle in this respect?  
This vista leads to the subject of Paul as “author.” Since an author always writes with a specific 
purpose in mind, “he [Paul] had to deal with the nature of communication via letter read aloud by an 
intermediary who would help determine through performance how the contents of the letter – and Paul 
himself – would be (re)presented to its audience.”429 In this expressing the idea that Holland does not 
seem to see or envisage any active rol for the emissary in terms of being instructed on the nature of 
how they might carry out the delivery or in what ways they might embody the apostle, but the weight 
seems to be placed firmly on Paul’s writing capacities to see his intentions realised. Subsequently, 
Holland adds that the apostle would have composed with the performance in mind. What Holland does 
helpfully do in highlighting this, along with the observation that the composition of a letter in the first 
century CE was collaborative in the broadest sense, is to shift the notion of “author” for us. One 
should think not only of a “scribe” or “amenuensis” next to Paul as “author,” but should also consider 
the influence of the community of addressees on the common language, assumptions, perspectives, 
desires, and vocabulary – “[t]his common understanding made the communication of ideas through a 
letter possible.” Here more elaboration would be possible as to what kind of “author” and “writing” 
we are speaking about.  
 
427 Ibid., 123. 
428 Ibid., 124. 
429 Ibid., 125. 
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Then he hones in upon the “content” of the letter. First, he addresses the role of the letter carrier “who 
was in some cases presumably also the performer of the letter, [and] would often have received 
additional information from the writer and conveyed it to the audience to augment the letter.” 430 A 
letter carrier could elucidate the content and, during the delivery itself, he could feel forced to react 
and anticipate certain reactions from his audience: “Audience members would inevitable determine the 
ultimate ‘meaning’ of what they experienced for themselves.”431 Here his argumentation takes an 
interesting turn, because the earlier mentioned notions of “sense,” “content,” and “communication of 
ideas” become more contextualized and/or – one could say – are losing their absolute glare. The 
importance of the role of the audiences leads to the argument that the texts were subject to 
emendations, expansions, and other forms of editorial variation by the Pauline communities 
themselves, because they preserved and circulated these documents. He sees this affirmed in the 
appearance of variant placement of parts  and interpolations in Paul’s letters (think of the constitution 
of the so-called second Letter to the Corinthians). As a consequence, the operating assumption in 
biblical scholarship “to understand the texts of Paul’s letters as products of a long history of 
transmission” comes under strain. The texts of Paul’s letters are only partially from his hand, because 
“[t]he letters are what a series of audiences have made of them.” Instead of focusing on the autograph, 
textual criticism should do their reconstructive research against this background.432 
His conclusion starts with the statement that our efforts to discover the intentions of Paul in his writing 
activities are under strain because of “the limitations of rhetoric and delivery.” The texts at our 
disposal are transmitted versions of artefacts that emerged out of series of performances initiated by 
Paul and preserved by scribes, readers, and congregations. Subsequently, he states that “the most 
important determinant of the ‘meaning’ of those texts for their original audiences – their delivery in 
very specific circumstances by some person other than Paul – is lost to us and cannot be recreated.” 
Contrary to a rather absolute or single meaning of the letter, he bends his thoughts into the moment(s) 
of delivery and how the letter would have meant in the experience of the intended addressees. 
However, he declares this moment to be lost for us. This thought prompts another one: “Even if those 
circumstances and that performance could be recreated, however, the result would only be another 
performance.”433 Should we be able to recreate the complexities of the historical situation, we would, 
 
430 Ibid., 126. 
431 Ibid., 127. 
432 In the following sections, Holland turns to passages in the Corinthian correspondence and the Letter to 
Philemon. He draws attention to aspects in the text that can be related to the dynamics of these letters being 
performed. For example, in 2 Cor 10.1–11, Paul is accused of being “weak” face to face but “strong” when he is 
away. Holland makes the case that this is not a comparison of arguments but one of physical appearance in 
delivery. When embodied by a skilful reader, the contents of his letter would be perceived as being much more 
powerful (129). Another example is based on 1 Corinthians 5.3–5 in which his bodily absence is overruled by his 
claimed spiritual presence. In the cursing of the adulterous man, it becomes especially clear that this is a strategy 
of the author of the letter to wield power in the actual delivery (130–131). In this way, he provides some answers 
to the question which he earlier asked of/as to how Paul can anticipate in writing his letters his dependence on 
the sometimes poor quality of the performance of his letters by others than himself. 
433 Ibid., 140. 
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he suggests, not so much re-enter that specific performance of the letter involved, but just be 
participants in “another performance.” It would be one performance among many others, a 
performance with its own dynamic of appropriation because of that specific rhetorical situation. 
Let us now evaluate Holland’s analysis of the ancient evidence on the importance of delivery and 
thoughtful application thereof on the letters of Paul. Central to the ancient sources is that the event of 
delivery, and more precisely the quality thereof, is cardinal. Regarding the apostle and his letter 
writing activities, he first provides a definition of performance: instead of acting out the letter, the 
emphasis is on the “conveyance” of “the content.” For the effectiveness of this conveyance, Paul is 
dependent on those who read the letters aloud: Will their appearance and performance be perceived to 
be strong or weak? Holland asks the crucial question of what  possibilities does Paul have in the 
process of writing to anticipate a possibly weak delivery. So, he depicts here a situation in which Paul 
is distanced from the actual delivery and becomes tightly related to the activity of writing the letter as 
physical artefact. As we observed, in a following comment, he speaks of the letter carrier who could 
also be the one who performed the letter and could have been instructed to augment the content to the 
actual audience in the event of delivery. Now a situation is described by Holland in which the 
emissary is closely related to the content of the letter in the moment of delivery; the emissary is not 
only reading it aloud but is also able to explain it. Paul as writer and the letter carrier as performer 
seem to be connected in the content of the letter, their activities, however, are seen as separated from 
each other. Questions come to the fore: What would happen when the letter carrier, who will deliver, 
is perceived as a co-worker of Paul and projected into the former depiction of the apostle caught up in 
the process of composing the letter? Did the letter carrier convey the content of the letter by reading 
aloud in order to explain and elaborate on the content or did they wholeheartedly embody the 
collectively prepared rhetoric for this particular congregation? In this respect, there seems to be a 
tension in Holland’s argumentation: he commences by emphasizing that performance is only 
conveyance of the content and not forms of acting out; his reasoning also seems to be structured by 
addressing the search for the “intentions in writing” and “meaning” and “conveying” “the content” and 
“the communication of ideas.” Although, his conclusion is that the “meaning” of “those texts for their 
original audiences is lost to us and cannot be recreated.” In short, the purpose of Paul’s writing is to 
convey content or meaning, but this is (unfortunately) lost to us. This raises the obvious question: Why 
should one (still) study these texts? There is also an interesting shift in a subsequent conclusion. Even 
if we could recreate the historical situation of one of the many oral performances following on from 
the original reading aloud of, for example, the letter to the Romans, then we would only have one 
more performance in the series that finally constituted the texts of the letter as we know it. Some 
questions and observations arise: First, why does Holland not pose the recreation of the historical 
circumstances of the originally intended first reading of the letter to the Romans? What value or 
independent position has the originally intended or primary performance as envisioned by Paul in the 
moment of composition – according to Holland? Second, in line with the approach of detextification, 
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he seems to jump, in an indiscriminate and uncritical way, from the level of text to the concrete 
lifeworld. The first mentioned level or media is found not only in the composition of his own 
argumentation and the dissemination thereof as an article, but also in his reasoning that Paul wrote to 
communicate his ideas or convey content. The latter is indicated in the suggestion of the recreation of 
the historical situation in which one bodily or in real time can participate in the performance of this 
letter. What the present study seeks to do is locate this historically lost moment in the perspective of 
Paul in the very process of composition.  In this way, it becomes an integral part of the way in which 
the apostle composed the letter, that is, Paul himself envisioned how the emissary would perform and 





In this Chapter, we examined a selection of studies on Paul and the dynamics of orality. Besides the 
three governing questions from the Introduction, we did so according to two governing sub-questions: 
How do these studies relate the different matrix of a predominantly oral culture there-and-then (oral 
performance/public reading) to the overly familiar one in academia here-and-now (text)? What can be 
learned from this interplay?  
More generally, we observed that most of the studies tend to be separate and explorative endeavours 
into this new field of research, that is, orality studies. Biblical Performance Criticism is beginning, 
however, to bring scholars together and to generate debate in biblical scholarship. As introduced by 
David Rhoads, this methodology implies that the biblical scholar too should not only read the biblical 
text in silence and solitude, but should experience themselves these documents as performances – 
similar to musicologists and dramatists. We noted also that Larry Hurtado felt urged to address what 
he deemed to be several oversimplifications apparent in this movement. Notwithstanding the 
corrective intent of his article, he underscores the communis opinio on the predominantly oral 
background of the New Testament. At the same time, he argues that “performance” should not 
jeopardize the position and status of the biblical text as “text.” Thus, his polemical article suggests that 
the stakes are high.  
Regarding the first governing subquestion in this Chapter, we observed that a majority of the studies 
elaborate in some way on the unfamiliar media culture there-and-then. In particular, two theories were 
valuable. First, Werner Kelber pioneered what he called oral synthesis. In this theory, he emphasizes a 
specific feature of the spoken word: it is an act of inviting the hearer to participate in this 
communication. Arthur Dewey echoes the theory of oral synthesis as he describes a power struggle 
between Paul and his opponents for acoustic space and argues that it is the former’s intent to create an 
ethos of participation. So, in the present study, the dynamic of the participation of the intended 
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addressees has to be decisive in the proposed grasp of the letter as oral performance there-and-then-to-
them. Second, Louis Martyn enabled us to explore further the originally implied communicative 
process. Contrary to the letter as product, he frames his understanding in line with the intended aural 
event. Although no vocabulary from the field of orality studies was evident, he does perceive the letter 
from the perspective of Paul in the process of composition, who is envisioning the real-time delivery 
by his emissary to the specific audience. Thus Martyn highlights the aspect of anticipation. In line 
with this perspective, the other teachers in Galatia are integral to his reconstruction of the rhetorical 
situation. Instead of there being one or the “theology” of Galatians, Martyn argues that there must 
have been two “theologies” operative. Bringing both constituents together, we can conclude that Paul 
anticipates a specific participation of his intended hearers in the aural event of delivery (the first 
element in the first leading question).  
Botha forced us to make a distinction between the originally intended oral performance of the letter(s) 
as envisioned by Paul (composition) and how the actual performance or public reading takes place 
([f]actual delivery) and – once the letter started to circulate as an artefact – the reading, copying, and 
studying of it up until today (reception). In this way, “composition” does not become opposed to 
“reception,” but the former includes the apostle’s anticipated reception by the intended first addressees 
there-and-then in the aural event.   
Regarding the second governing sub-question, we paid attention to the function of “text” in these 
studies. Joanna Dewey and David Rhoads use this concept rather indiscriminately in their 
reconstruction of the historical situation there-and-then. So, according to their texts, there was “text” 
there-and-then-to-them. Both argue, however, that the latter functioned differently from text here-and-
now-to-us. Although affirming the operational distinction, we concluded that the nature of text in their 
argumentations is docetic: in view of the realm of history there-and-then, it is there (physical artefact) 
and not there (processing by reading in silence and solitude). Oestreich equates the letters-as-text with 
abstraction and the actual performance with concretization. The movement is from “text” to “oral 
performance.” The problem is that he does not differentiate between the letter as “text” there-and-then-
to-them (textum) and here-and-now-to-us (autonomous text). Since he relates “Paul” to “text” without 
further explanation, the apostle is for him “Autor”434 of an abstracted or autonomous text. This would 
imply that he does not consider nor is interested in how the addressees would concretize the used 
concepts in their direct environment (think of the “circle” as example; see Section I.). From the 
perspective of the present study, we ask rhetorically whether the apostle would not have anticipated 
 
434 This identification of Paul as “author” is congruent with the vocabulary used in handbooks on exegesis. 
When “text” is taken as a self-evident starting point, one necessarily has to speak of “author” as counterpart. For 
example, see Gordon D. Fee, New Testament Exegesis: A Handbook for Students and Pastors 3rd ed. 
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002), 27: “Exegesis, therefore, answers the question, What did the 
biblical author mean? It has to do both with what he said (the content itself) and why he said it at any given point 
(the literary context). Furthermore, exegesis is primarily concerned with intentionality: What did the author 
intend his original readers to understand?” (27; emphasis mine) 
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his audience’s concretization. In Hurtado’s article, we identified an underlying circularity in his 
reasoning as a whole: since “text” is a given from the start, it will constitute the conclusion. We 
concluded moreover that the article exhibited a systematic textification of the New Testament 
documents. These troublesome structurings of thought appear to be caused by the media muddle in 
biblical scholarship (Introduction).   
What appears from the literature is the persistent difficulty inherent in dealing with “text” in terms of 
our own experience. On the level of text, one can explicate the original functioning of the letters – the 
gathered addressees exposed to and participating in the construal of the oral delivery by the emissary – 
while the functioning of these ancient documents in our own actual practice remains unchanged 
(“text”). The main cause of this effect is that the word “text” floats freely from the description of the 
realm of history there-and-then-to-them to the one here-and-now-to-us; it is constantly just there 
without explanation. In the Introduction, we framed this mechanism as the implicit equation of “letter” 
and “text.” In light of this critical observation, we see first the warning of Albert Lord and Walter Ong 
affirmed on the difficulty of entering the rather unknown, predominantly oral universe of Paul 
(Chapter 1). Second, the systematic thematization of the role of “text” on the level of the text of these 
publications (this is the concern of the second sub-question) discloses the related kind of structuring 
thought on that level (Introduction).  
In several instances, we witnessed this implicit equation of letter and text in actu. A notable 
illustration of this can be found in Kelber’s exposition of Paul’s letters. The preceding description of 
oral synthesis did not prevent him from equating his own way of understanding the letter as text with 
the understanding of the original audiences in the oral performance. In Achtemeier’s article, we 
encountered a similar paradox in his dealing with the problem of the “visual format” of the letters. In 
the first part of his article, he historicizes extensively the way in which the letter should have 
functioned to the original addressees. In the second part, all of a sudden, a situation is implied in 
which the present-day reader themselves relate immediately to the letter in the way they are used to 
(text area). In this way – we concluded – this visual format becomes problematic to us – not to Paul or 
the emissary. From a formal treatment of the process of production there-and-then (becoming), 
Achtemeier turns out of the blue to the letter as product (being) in his own practice. In the study of 
Casey Davis, we also observed this turn. In the first part of his monograph, he emphasizes the 
importance of the rhetorical situation, that is, the question of to whom was the letter directed originally 
and what kind of situation had they been caught up in. When he finally presents his Oral Biblical 
Criticism, however, this whole process of production is missing. He is only concerned with identifying 
oral principles in the letter to the Philippians as product. Since media and mindset in the originally 
intended communicative process are not explicated, the givenness of text and his own highly literate 
state of mind determine the whole process of coming to an understanding. Once more, we witness that 
Davis is caught up in the actuality of the media muddle. 
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We conclude that the previous examples exhibit dynamics of freischwebendes Denken. Thought is 
structured away from the concrete realm of history there-and-then-to-them. We might point to 
Rhoads’s reasoning on “performance,” “composition,” and “interpretation.” He moves back and forth 
between the letter in the situation of the apostle and his own advocated practice of performing the 
biblical text here-and-now. Since the biblical documents as “text” form the starting point of his 
advocated vocalizations here-and-now, we demonstrated that in all instances his own text-based 
practice usurps the (possibly distinctive) processes of “performance,” “composition,” and 
“interpretation” there-and-then-to-them. We also observed this mechanism in Kelber’s “oral 
hermeneutics.” In the end, the present-day reader is still preoccupied vis-à-vis the text with the 
question: What does it mean?; rather than the original addressees, we ourselves, in our predominantly 
literate mindset, are the knowing subjects in actu. The communicative dynamic of anticipated 
participation is eclipsed. This critique does not imply that Rhoads’s approach or Kelber’s perspective 
are not enriching for our understanding of the New Testament documents, but the conviction is that 
differing ways of “performance,” “composition,” “interpretation,” and “hermeneutics” deserve an 
explicit appraisal.  
Based on these observations, we turn now to the third governing question as set out in the 
Introduction: Can we deepen our insight into the impact of literacy on our grasp of orality? The 
distinction between “production” and “product” reflects the distinction between “becoming” and 
“being.”435 Production describes the realm of history (inner-historical). Once the letter has reached the 
state of product, though it travels around unchangingly and independent of time and place – it reaches 
us in this state. In this way, we witness that, implicitly and unwittingly, a process of textification takes 
place. Despite explorations in the realm of history there-and-then, the documents receive on the level 
of text the status of “the text” and, as a result, their actual functioning here-and-now to the biblical 
scholar equates with the media of autonomous text. The dynamics of oral performance become veiled 
by the structuring of thought on the level of text. 
There are two consequences involved. First, the only remaining dimension of the process of 
production that can be looked for in the product consists of an “oral overlay” (Achtemeier), “oral 
principles” (Davis), or “oral qualities” (Hurtado). Second, as long as the historical emergence of the 
letters is described, the reconstruction is directed by an unfamiliar process: the question of what is 
happening there-and-then-to-them. At the moment that the scholar themselves turn to the letter as 
physical artefact in front of them, the scholar relates in real time to the overly familiar product – What 
does it mean? None of the previous studies identifies or explicates this fundamental shift from 
describing a specific process to participating oneself in a different processing of the product. A link is 
 
435 This conclusion pertains also to the following studies that were researched for this Chapter, but not 
subsequently included: John D. Harvey, Listening to the Text: Oral Patterning in Paul’s Letters, ETS Studies 1 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Books/Leicester: Apollos, 1998); Akio Ito, “The written Torah and the Oral Gospel: 
Romans 10.5–13 in the Dynamic Tension between Orality and Literacy,” NovT 3 (2006): 234–60. 
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missing. A leap is involved from the level of formalization to one’s own actual realm of operation 
(Introduction). We conclude that a self-evident logic in this turn is lacking. Without any apparent 
specific or explicit logic in evidence, we seemingly just do it, jumping from the formal level to the 
operational realm. Are we confronted here with an anomaly or a cognitive dissonance in biblical 






3. Detextifying Paul’s letters 
 
The initial aim of this Chapter is to develop further the leap encountered in the previous Chapter, from 
the description of the process of production there-and-then (oral performance) to the product as such 
and/or the latter as floating freely from there-and-then-to-them to here-and-now-to-us and back (text). 
This analysis is concerned to deepen our grasp of the impact of autonomous text on our typical way of 
understanding (third governing question). Parallel to this analysis, we can turn to how we might bring 
an alternative perspective, namely the approach of detextification itself. In order to make as thorough 
an exploration of this approach as possible, the Chapter then examines two necessary movements 
concerning the historicization of text, that is, textualizing history (Section A.) and historicizing text 
(Section B.). 
To deepen our grasp of the impact of autonomous text on our typical way of understanding (third 
governing question), the work of John Miles Foley is highly relevant. In his online Pathways project, 
he draws attention to the force of ideologies, because “[t]hey short-circuit critical thinking by 
automatically defaulting to familiar, comfortable, pre-designated positions.”436 He states that “critical 
thought” is cut off by an uncritical and “familiar position.” Once we are exposed in real time to the 
text area, this mechanism is at work: 
  
 … how often do we stop to contemplate just what we’re doing when we scan the lines and turn the pages of 
a book? Instead, we conventionally skip the preliminaries and get down to reading – all without giving much 
if any thought to precisely what we’re doing. … In other words, reading habits trump comparative analysis of 
media. It’s precisely because we don’t pause over how texts work … that we’re able to use them so well. 
Like any medium, the book and page require that we categorically ignore other realities in favour of the 
reality they construct and represent.437 
 
Foley puts his finger on the deeply ingrained nature of our reading habits: in the participatory realm of 
history – in which we study the Bible in real time – one always starts with the “biblical text.” This is 
the “familiar position.” Once exposed to the text area in real time, the trained reader by habit will start 
(from then on) his critical processing of what it means. The functioning of text remains beyond critical 
awareness. So, this process in real time – that which is actually taking place beyond the level of text 
(right now by you regarding the current text!) – precedes formalization; we do it uncritically, it is a 
blind spot. One could wonder whether this situation is too obvious to be stated or, recalling the 
 
436 John Miles Foley, “Ideology of the Text”, Pathways Project, 3 June 2019, 
http://www.pathwaysproject.org/pathways/show/Ideology_of_the_Text 
437  Ibid. 
 
 137 
warnings by Albert Lord and Walter Ong, it is too complicated to be grasped without further 
systematic explication. 
In the present study, we differentiate between the realm of history and the one of extra-historical 
thought (see Caution to the reader #1 in the Introduction). However, within the realm of history 
(singular) we distinguish between the realm of history here-and-now-to-us and the one there-and-then-
to-them (plural). The daily practice of biblical scholarship is located in the former, whereas the 
original functioning of these documents belongs to the latter. As mentioned earlier, the situation in 
biblical scholarship is that, in a historical-critical approach, these texts prompt the search for their 
original historical context,438 also – as the studies discussed in Chapter 2 demonstrate – for their 
original media functioning. The description of this unknown situation is categorized in the 
terminology as context. Regarding the Pauline letters, the realms of the intended oral performances are 
not (immediately) accessible to us through our senses. It is worth noting the contrast here with the 
fieldwork of Milman Parry (Chapter 1). When one is present oneself in a situation and able to 
critically describe the processes involved, the level of concretization and accessibility is rather high. 
When there is a huge gap in time, as is the case in view of the biblical documents, then the relation 
between presence and representation changes: these representations become more abstract and less 
attuned; consider, for example, the “Greek” and “Byzantine world” of which Ricoeur speaks 
(Introduction). The point to make is that since we, as biblical scholars, cannot be present ourselves in 
that realm of history there-and-then-to-them, “context” is always an abstracted form or representation 
of history. So, in this text-context scheme, there is a fundamental difference between “past,” 
“representation,” and “absence” (context) and “present,” “physical object,” and “presence” (text). 
The crucial leap now is that these proposals of the “context” are available in scholarly publications 
(“text”). Next to these “texts” on the context, we also have – at the same time and in the same 
functioning – the biblical text as “text” at our disposal. So, in addition to the formal dichotomy of the 
text-context scheme, there is an operational similarity: “context” and “biblical text” both function to us 
as text. They are (uncritically) mediated on the same level of text. We can argue and state – on the 
level of text – that the letters were orally delivered, yet the consequences do not automatically reach 
beyond that level into our own daily media practice. That is to say, we are still dealing with the 
 
438 For example, see Paul R. Trebilco, “Jewish Background,” in Handbook to Exegesis of the New Testament, 
ed. by Stanley E. Porter, 3rd ed. (Boston and Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2002): “Any study of New 
Testament texts needs to be informed by an understanding of the Jewish world of the first century. Jesus and his 
disciples were a part of this world, many details of which feature in the texts, and the main agents of the spread 
of Christianity into the Gentile world were Jews who continued to see themselves as part of God's chosen 
people” (359); David W.J. Gill, “The Roman Empire as a Context for the New Testament,” in Handbook to 
Exegesis: “Any reading of the New Testament background needs to take account of the local setting as well as 
the broader issues of empire” (389); Gordon D. Fee, New Testament Exegesis: A Handbook for Students and 
Pastors, 3rd ed. (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002): 96: “The very nature of Scripture demands 
that the exegete have some skills in investigating the historical-cultural background of NT texts. The NT, after 
all, does not come in the form of timeless aphorisms; every text was written in a given first-century time/space 
framework. Indeed, the NT authors felt no need to explain what were for them and their readers common cultural 
assumptions.” 
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biblical text as text that has to be read by us. And precisely here is the turn from describing the process 
of production there-and-then-to-them on the level of text to participating oneself in the product here-
and-now as level of text: everything is representation. Hence we touch on one of the conclusions in 
Caution to the reader #1 (Introduction): in distinction to the traditional hermeneutical gap, this gap is 
between the uncritical operational level (presence/realm of history) and the critical realm of 
formalization (representation/level of text/realm of extra-historical thought). I would suggest that we 
touch here on the main cause of the earlier mentioned veil of text. 
Besides considering the letters of Paul in terms of their original functioning there-and-then, we will 
approach the product in its operational matrix here-and-now as well, as part of the process of coming 
to understand by reading. Therefore we propose that, contrary to the text-context scheme, we are 
dealing solely with context.439 Put simply, “text” as “product” also has a context; it involves a 
“process” or “functioning” in our realm of history here-and-now as well (processing by reading).440  
In the Introduction, we related our roles as readers and historians to each other. In this stance, we find 
a solution to both activities or roles: stating that there is solely context is similar to giving priority to 
the historian and the question: What is happening? For this reason, we continue by explicating two 
intellectual movements that enable us to detextify our understanding of the Letter to the Galatians. We 
will textualize the participatory realm of history here-and-now-to-us (the functioning of text) to make 
it subservient to our understanding of the one there-and-then-to-them (public reading or oral 
performance of the letter). This complex and layered stance towards the totality (totum) of history 
defines the first movement of textualizing history (Section A): we move from the realm of extra-
historical thought into specific realms of history (A.2.), such as the realm of the Galatian converts 
being exposed to the emissary delivering Paul’s letter, as well as the biblical scholar studying this 
letter in the available (scholarly) editions of the New Testament (A.1.). The second intellectual 
movement is related to the concrete object (pars) in the realm of history here-and-now-to-us, more 
precisely, the moment in which we turn to the letter as “text” and “our reading habits trump 
comparative analysis” (Foley). This movement is intended to counter the mechanism whereby the 
 
439 One could recognize here an aspect, which we discussed earlier, from the thinking of Jacques Derrida in 
his Of Grammatology (translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak with preface by translator; rev. ed.; Baltimore 
and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997; translation of De la Grammatologie. Paris: Les Editions de 
Minuit, 1967). As indicated earlier, he argues that the typical tendency in metaphysics is to structure thought in a 
system of oppositions (9). In this instance, we discuss the text-context scheme as such an opposition. He 
proposes a new situation to think of speech in terms “of its subordination within a structure of which it will no 
longer be the archon.” In this line of thought, he posits the grammè as “[a]n element, whether it is understood as 
media or as the irreducible atom, of the arche-synthesis, of what one must forbid oneself to define within the 
system of oppositions of metaphysics, of what consequently one should not even call experience in general, that 
is to say the origin of meaning in general” (9, emphasis mine). So, according to Derrida, the origin of meaning is 
found beyond oppositional structuring. According to the approach of detextification, understanding the 
anticipated participation of Paul’s letters is found beyond the opposition of text and context.  
440 In Caution to the reader #4 (Introduction), we speak of textification when, intentionally or unintentionally, 
the New Testament documents are declared to be or exist as text as such. For that reason, we could designate the 
stance as described in the main text as contextification, that is, everything is context. This starting point or 
preposition enables the approach of detextification.   
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reader becomes the knowing subject in actu (Caution to the reader #3 and 4 in Introduction). In the 
present study, this second movement is called historicizing text (Section B). After expounding these 
two intellectual movements, the approach is presented in an Infographic to visualize the realms of 
history, distinctive movements between them, and key terms in detextification (Section C).   
 
 
A. Textualizing history  
 
In this Section, the first intellectual movement of textualizing history will be explored more in-depth, 
beginning with an inquiry into the structure of this endeavour. On the one hand, the functioning of text 
here-and-now-to-us will be textualized (A.1.) and, on the other, oral performance or public reading 
there-and-then-to-them (A.2.). Later, it will become clear that this latter direction has to be pursued in 
two sequential phases. The logic of this repetitive procedure is related to the fact that this past realm of 
history has vanished. We need text and representation to approach the presupposed presence in that 
realm. As present-day readers, we first have to grasp the implied structure of this communicative 
process there-and-then-to-them in a more general way. Via this structure, we can represent presence, 
that is, the intended oral performance of specific passages from the Letter to the Galatians (Chapter 4).  
The first phase is based on the reasoning of John Miles Foley as dealt with in Chapter 1. Instead of the 
common question What does it mean?, he argues that the acknowledgement of the presence of 
different media (plural) prompts the preliminary question How does it mean? Since in the present 
study, we problematize the tight relation between processing text and construing meaning by the 
reader (“What does it mean?”), we will use in Foley’s question the verb “to function” instead of “to 
mean”: How does it function? In this way, the intellectual movement of textualizing history gains 
more depth. In light of our stance towards the realm of history, and in terms of doing justice to it, this 
is a major step to make. So, by textualizing history and historicizing text, the subliminal media 
monopoly of (autonomously functioning) text in the socio-cultural context of academia can be 
hopefully overcome.  
Already at this stage there is a need to step back. Several times we have used the notion of “media.” 
On the level of text, this term is adequate and valid. However, the intellectual movement of 
textualizing history urges us to consistently contextualize or push concepts beyond the level of text. In 
this light, we can observe that the word “media” can remain to a greater degree freischwebend or 
extra-historical. Namely, there is a difference between the situation that we ourselves relate to the 
words “oral” and “performance” (referring to a specific media) on the level of text, and the situation to 
which we are ourselves exposed in terms of an actual performance of some sort – beyond the level of 
text. The latter experience involves all our senses in real time and takes place in a communicative 
situation, in which we do not relate to reality through text: we do not represent, we are present! This 
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was expressed in the agenda of Biblical Performance Criticism (Chapter 2). The differences become 
even more fundamental when we realize that we ourselves relate on the level of text to the originally 
intended addressees who were, in their turn, familiar with this other specific media beyond that level. 
Thus the word “media” on the level of text and the real time experience of “media” beyond that level 
implies different subjects in actu: regarding “text,” we deal with the “reader,” regarding “oral 
performance” there-and-then with the “original addressees.”441 In the light of Foley’s question, this 
example of textualizing “media” provides an important extension. When we locate “media” in 
whatever concrete and participatory realm of history, the question is extended: How does it function to 
whom?  
As a following step, another presupposition has to be dealt with. We turn here to the acknowledgement 
that these subjects in actu there-and-then may know theoretically in a different way than the present-
day reader. In the Introduction, we argued for a predominantly oral mindset. This illustrates the 
complexity of the intellectual endeavour to cross the gap in time, place, and subject in actu and 
textualize history there-and-then-to-them as adequately as possible (Introduction). As we observed in 
the studies by Casey Davis and Larry Hurtado amongst others (Chapter 2), the identification of 
“readers” there-and-then with those here-and-now led to an implicit equation of the originally intended 
understanding with our own understanding. In the formulation of the question, this results in another 
extension: How does it function to whom in what mindset?442 
As observed earlier in the Theory of Metonymical or Traditional Referentiality (Chapter 1), however, 
the singer, as well as their audiences, are veiled in the mist of history. In this respect, “Homer” 
(singular) – or the original group of bards – can function as a clear example: we know so little about 
him (them), let alone the innumerable audiences we presuppose he (they) sang for. There is only 
 
441 Now one could object that present-day readers as knowing subjects can give different interpretations. This 
is true. On the one hand, we see then an affirmation in the present study of the validity of textualizing history: 
diversity is integral to the realm of history and we need to inquire into the various distinctive interpretations 
given. On the other hand, since these interpretations tend to be conserved in writing, transmitted by, and 
available in academia in text, the readership is limited to those in the socio-cultural context of academia. The 
implied media entails one and the same mindset or communicative process – all these interpretations are 
structured by and presented at the level of text. Explicating “media” on the level of text is not the same as 
relating specific media to the actual participants in the implied communicative processes on their own terms – 
compare the original addressees of Paul in the moment of oral delivery, which is beyond the level of text, over 
against the present-day reading of these letters as text in silence and solitude. As a result, one has to ask more 
specifically: How does it function to whom? 
442 Given this element, we can hear once more reminiscences of the earlier mentioned (Introduction) form-
critical distinction between “epistle” and “letter” made by Adolf Deissmann: “Der Brief ist ein Stück Leben, die 
Epistel ist ein Erzeugnis literarischer Kunst” (Deissmann, Licht vom Osten: Das Neue Testament und die 
neuentdeckten Texte der hellenistisch-römischen Welt [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 41923], 159). Since he framed 
the corpus Paulinum as letter instead of epistle, a radically different approach emerged. This distinction, 
however, is not a communis opinio anymore (see Thomas Johann Bauer, Paulus und die kaiserzeitliche 
Epistolographie: Kontextualisiering und Analyse der Briefe an Philemon und an die Galater, WUNT 276 
[Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011], 1–8). An increasing number of contemporary Greek and Jewish letters have 
been studied. Contrary to Deissmann’s suggestion, the results lead to the conclusion that Paul had a sophisticated 
Bildung and actually must have received some sort of epistolary training. In the present study, the value is 
emphasized of the fundamental differentiation between a generalized and abstracted readership (epistle) and the 
historically specific and originally intended addressees of these documents involved (letter).  
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limited ground to textualize them; both necessarily remain on a high level of abstraction. There is a 
difference regarding the corpus Paulinum.443 Scholarship has devoted energy to dealing with the 
specificities of Paul’s addressees who lived centuries later and also in different cultural contexts 
(Galatian, Roman converts and so on). Moreover, we can identify him as the composer. So, in 
situations where there is a greater degree of historical identifiability, another layer can be added to 
Foley’s theory. We know the source behind this referentiality; it is this apostle who wants his 
audiences to understand in a specific way. We have to approach the intended addressees and their 
realm of history, therefore, from the perspective of the apostle. We can formulate the question now as 
follows: How does it function to whom in what mindset from whose perspective?  
Based on this line of thinking, conclusions can be drawn regarding Paul’s letters. First, we see how 
crucial it is not only to distinguish between the realm of extra-historical thought and the realm of 
history, but also to take the latter as the criterion or starting and end point (Introduction: Caution to the 
reader #1). Second, the extensions to the question which we have formulated hitherto, circle around 
the intended original addressees, that is, the specific knowing subject in actu (that you, as present-day 
reader, are not while reading the letters as text); with his body as the focal point, we can represent 
layers in the realm of history there-and-then-to-Paul-and-his-addressees. Through these elements, we 
as present-day readers can structure our understanding of how the letter originally was intended to 
function. Instead of a hermeneutical circle in the realm of extra-historical thought, we can follow a 
textualizing spiral into the realm of history involved.444 We see that the more questions and 
dimensions addressed, the deeper one can enter the aural event there-and-then-to-them. This 
textualizing history will overcome to a certain extent the way in which the letters as text function to 
us. 
 
1. Textualizing text hic et nunc pro nobis 
We will attempt now to systematically contextualize the functioning of text here-and-now-to-us. 
According to the purport of the present study, we will concentrate on reading prosaic and academic 
 
443 For a description of differences between the letters of Paul and the genre of the gospels, see footnote 8. 
444 The distinction between the realm of history and the realm of extra-historical thought, as proposed in 
Caution to the Reader #1 (Introduction), sheds an interesting light on the notion of “meaning.” One can state that 
(the search for) meaning is omnipresent not only in academia but throughout our concrete lifeworld. In the 
Introduction, we set out the automatism embedded in text that evokes the question: “What does it mean?” Since 
the reader in actu as well as the text as actual object is necessarily singular, the outcome is also expected to be 
singular, that is, the meaning of the text. This reasoning is extra-historical in nature. In the realm of history, that 
is, in biblical scholarship as well as in the Christian church, a singular text can carry a plurality of meanings. 
More so, this plurality of meanings is openly admitted and debated. Regarding “meaning,” one could argue, 
therefore, in line with the approach of detextification, that there is a short circuit at stake between an extra-
historical presupposition (singular/being) and inner-historical experiences (plurality/becoming). We see the 
presupposition that meaning is singular and absolute confirmed in Jacques Derrida’s Of Grammatology. 
Contrary to a metaphysical system of oppositions, he posits the grammè as “the arche-synthesis, … that is to say 
the origin of meaning in general” (9, emphasis mine). In this way, an apparently absolute nature is granted to 
“meaning” by Derrida.  
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texts. This section will be mainly built on the study of oral tradition, the subsequent debate on orality 
and literacy, and the article by Paul Ricoeur, “What is a text?” (see Introduction).445  
 
How and to whom: “Text” has to speak for itself to the reader 
The impetus to contextualize text makes us start with an external perspective. Imagine a student in 
theology who is studying in the college library. He sits behind a desk with a laptop and an open book 
in front of him. His attention is directed towards the book. He is holding a mug of coffee in his left 
hand. More students are sitting (or slumping?) behind desks. This description of this imagined real-
time situation can be spun out endlessly. When we try to imagine this situation, we have to disengage 
ourselves somehow from the words and sentences of this very text area – hic et nunc pro tui et mei. At 
the same time, we still engage this external perspective through the previous lines in one and this same 
text area. An important difference is that in this external perspective our senses and imagination 
become (somewhat) activated automatically – we somehow see this student, hear a stifled cough, and a 
page being turned. Here the formal level and operational or participatory level intrude on each other 
and can interact; we can look over the gap between them. 
Let us imagine the student again. Apparently, not much seems to happen. More so, in every library, 
one is cautioned and conditioned to be silent. Nothing should happen there. At least nothing that could 
distract or attract one’s attention. From this particular silence, we can learn that someone who reads 
engages in a solitary activity. When reading – ideally speaking – one does not hear, see, smell, or 
sense anyone or anything else. This silence enables the particular activity of reading and makes clear 
that one is not (directly) dependent on others. We can conclude that the overly familiar kind of reading 
here-and-now is a solitary activity which takes place in silence. In the student who is reading, we find 
an obvious answer to the element of “to whom”: the actual reader. We also find an indication or 
aspect of the element of “how,” namely autonomously functioning text is meant and designed to be 
processed by reading in silence and solitude.446  
When we return to the external perspective, however, we should not overlook another rather obvious 
constituent: we can imagine a “reader” only vis-à-vis a physical artefact of some sort. It is this thing 
that makes this activity possible or recognizable for us. In this way, we find another indication of how 
text “means” to us. The physical object – such as the book, pile of papers, or screen which is read – is 
necessary. So “text” cannot “mean” to us when it is not physically available in the participatory realm 
of history.  
 
445 In footnotes, we will also take into account the earlier mentioned study by Umberto Eco, The Role of the 
Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts, AdvSem (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), 3–46.   
446 Self-evidently, there are situations in which biblical scholars, students and, in particular, believers read the 
biblical text aloud and together. The point to make is that the media of text in general is meant to be processed 
by the individual reader and designed so that it can be processed without the necessity of vocalization.       
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This observation can be deepened. The texts, with which we are familiar in academia, are composed 
and edited to be printed or disseminated and published. They are explicitly meant to be severed from 
the physical presence and guidance of the writer. In a similar way, the intended reader is abstracted 
from the writer in the very process of writing itself. Since writer and reader are distanced from each 
other in time and place, we find a reason why text has to function as a thing in the realm of history. It 
has to bridge the gap in time(s) and place(s) between writer and readers. As mentioned earlier, Paul 
Ricoeur distinguishes in his article “text” from “writing” – which he defines as “the inscription of 
living speech.” According to him, living speech is structured by dialogue. The act of reading is 
fundamentally different however:  
 
It does not suffice to say that reading is a dialogue with the author through his work, for the relation of the 
reader to the book is of a completely different nature. Dialogue is an exchange of questions and answers; 
there is no exchange of this sort between the writer and the reader. The writer does not respond to the 
reader.447 
 
He elaborates on this relation between writer, reader, and book, when he describes the experience of a 
live encounter with the author as “a profound disruption of the peculiar relation that we have with the 
author in and through his work.” He goes as far as claiming that a book becomes complete when the 
author is dead. “The author can no longer respond; it only remains to read his work.”448 The 
disseminated text is predestined to live a communicative life of its own. Therefore, we can formulate a 
partial or initial answer to the question: How does it function, to whom, in what mindset, and from 
whose perspective? In its own manner – distanced from living speech and dialogue – text has to speak 
for itself.449  
 
447 Paul Ricoeur, “What is a text? Explanation and Understanding,” in Hermeneutics and the Human science: 
Essays on Language, Action, and Interpretation, ed., trans. and introduced by John B. Thompson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1981), 146. 
448 Ibid., 147.  
449 In The Role of the Reader, Eco reports, regarding the tradition of structuralism and contemporary literary 
criticism, that “in a structuralistically oriented milieu, the idea of taking into account the role of the addressee 
looked like a disturbing intrusion, disquietingly jeopardizing the notion of a semiotic texture to be analysed in 
itself for the sake of itself” (3). We see here that he criticizes structuralism, because in this movement text is 
approached as an autonomous media which functions independent of writer or reader – cf., “a crystal” (4, 5). On 
the other hand, though, and contrary to the role of the reader, Eco mentions “the author” only a few times in his 
own semiotics. He argues that “to make his text communicative, the author has to assume that the ensemble of 
codes he relies upon is the same as that shared by the possible reader … supposedly able to deal interpretatively 
with the expressions in the same way as the author deals generatively with them” (7). Thus, the writer in his 
activity, that is, “the generative process,” has to mirror somehow the reader, that is, “the interpretive 
cooperation.” In general, he formulates his sentences in such a way that “the text” is the subject: “At the minimal 
level, every type of text explicitly selects a very general model of possible reader … But at the same time text 
creates the competence of its Model Reader” (7, emphasis original). We also find another perspective on how 
the author relates to the text. Contrary to other communicative processes (for example, closed texts) in which 
sender and addressee are grammatically manifested by the message – “I tell you that … ” – he states that “as far 
as a text is focussed qua text, and especially in cases of texts conceived for a general audience (such as novels, 
political speeches, scientific instructions, and so on), the sender and the addressee are present in the text, not as 
mentioned poles of the utterance but as actantial roles of the sentence” (10). Based on Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations, in which the latter speaks of “I,” Eco concludes that “Wittgenstein is nothing else 
but a philosophical style, and his Model Reader is nothing else but his capability to cooperate to reactualize that 
philosophical style” (11). So, according to Eco, text has to function as such and of itself. 
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In what state of mind: “Text” (singular) and texts in real time (plural)    
We can continue this exploratory textualization by rephrasing the question: How does text speak to the 
reader? In the above introduction to this Section (A. Textualizing History), we provided an exemplary 
textualization of “media.” In a comparable way, we can look at the specific formulation of the 
question above. When we reason about “text” and the “reader,” nobody will immediately utter 
complaints or objections; the usage of these nouns is common and valid. When we bend our thoughts 
into the realm of history and ask where this specific text or “the text” can be found, we can point to the 
printed letters and sentences of a text area in an opened book or as pixels on a screen in front of us. 
Pressing this question regarding the realm of history, there exists a problem when we argue that “text” 
functions as a singular. Because in the realm of history, we deal with “texts” (plural) which are printed 
in editions of hundreds or thousands of copies, or appear on different screens throughout the world. 
We touch here once more on the paradox between on the level of text and what exists beyond.  
Concerning the “reader,” we can offer a similar line of reasoning. We all know and somehow sense 
that the “reader” does not mean that there will and can only be one reader found in the world or course 
of history. We fill in that the singular reader on that level represents a plural or group beyond. The 
“reader” means everyone who can – technically speaking – read in a basic manner, notably so 
everywhere and every time. Furthermore, we intuitively make a distinction between a five-year-old 
child, who just starts to vocalize the letters of the alphabet in a children’s book, and the trained 
academic reader. This rather trivial observation leads to an important conclusion on the functioning of 
text to us. On the one hand, this specifying intellectual movement (distinguishing a five-year-old 
reader and an academic reader) is self-evident and part of academic training – it is critical thinking in 
practice. On the other hand, though, we could not effectively develop or even start an argument if we 
had to mention all the different types and levels of “readers” in all places in past and present, when 
we want to argue on “reading.” Vis-à-vis text, we are somehow caught up in this paradox. 
We can observe this same movement when Paul Ricoeur argues that discourse is only fully 
meaningful in relation to the circumstantial milieu: “the return to reality is ultimately a return to this 
reality, which can be indicated ‘around’ the speakers, ‘around’ … the instance of discourse itself.”450 
Thus, extra-historical or highly abstracted statements should be – in the end or as criteria – relatable to 
the realm of history. Therefore, on the level of text, we need to start with a presupposed basic or rough 
referential matrix – for example, “reader” and “text.”  Subsequently, we have to ask critically how far, 
or for how long, the implied level of abstraction is adequate and (still) in line with the realm of history; 
we apply the golden rule of Walter Ong (Chapter 1). In the present study, we argue that these concepts 
of text and reader do not suffice anymore; they hinder an adequate and accurate textualization of the 
original functioning of Paul’s letters.    
 
450 Ricoeur, “What is a text?”, 148. 
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In this respect, our attention is drawn once more to the argument of Eric Havelock concerning Plato’s 
Republic (Chapter 1). Regarding the Theory of Forms, we can recognize the fixed matrix of oneness, 
unchangingness, and being when we consider the “text” and the “reader” (singular). When we 
structure our thoughts in this way, we reach a high level of clarity and abstraction. When we 
intentionally bring our thoughts on the “text” and the “reader” into the realm of history, the inevitable 
plurality of handwritten, printed, or digitalized versions and distinctive forms of literacy activities 
represent the flux and complexity inherent in the category of becoming (realms of history). In 
retrospect, we recognize the ideal situation, which Plato strived for. His search for absolute truth 
resembles the way we, as present-day readers in academia, have been trained in essence to structure 
our thoughts on the level of text. We do so beyond critical awareness. In light of the Allegory of the 
Cave, we can say that the academically trained reader has become accustomed to looking in the clarity 
of sunlight – in the present study formulated as structuring thought on the level of text or in the realm 
of extra-historical thought. The emerging communis opinio and the related media muddle urges us, 
however, to take the hazy shadows into account because of the flickering flames of the fire in the cave. 
These flickering flames are the differences between a five-year-old child who just learns to identify 
letters written down and pronounce simple words in that way and the highly trained academician, who 
are both objectified as “reader” on the level of text.  
Now the element of “in what state of mind” comes to the fore. Text can only mean to us in the mindset 
in which these singular and formal concepts do not cause cognitive problems. This mindset is 
governed by (levels of) abstraction. Even when we increase the focus and concretize – as we did in the 
previous paragraph, this level or realm is still “drawn away” [ab-strahere] from the concrete lifeworld. 
Even when abstracted on the lowest levels imaginable or made as concrete as possible, there is a 
fundamental transition at stake. Still we relate via the text area (level of text) and not immediately and 
uncritically through our senses to “reality” or the “world” around us.  
 
From whose perspective: The same for writer and reader 
We now proceed to the element “from whose perspective.” In textualizing text, the perspective is in 
line with the level of text. Because of training and habit, the reader should be able to take the same 
perspective or technical approach as the writer. Put shortly, the perspective on how (a) text means is 
bound to the particular state of mind which defines both writer and reader. As John Miles Foley states: 
“It’s precisely because we don’t pause over how texts work.”451       
We step back now to draw another conclusion. First, we observed the nature of the differences that 
come into play when thought is structured not on the level of text – that is with a free-standing and 
singular use of concepts such as “media,” “text,” “writer,” and “reader” – but is structured along the 
 
451 Foley, “Ideology of the Text.” 
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parameters of the realm of history. Vis-à-vis text, the imaginary starts to play a role only when the 
thoughts of the reader are structured into the realm of history. This is the point to make: it is the writer 
who decides whether or to what extent the structuring of thought is intentionally directed towards the 
realm of history or remains freischwebend. Regarding the polemical article by Larry Hurtado, we saw  
that even his argumentation as a whole aims at stating the extra-historical nature of “the text” (see 
Chapter 2, Section J. Larry Hurtado: Oral Fixation and New Testament Studies?). In this respect, the 
perspective of the writer tends to determine that of the reader.452 Earlier, we saw that Umberto Eco 
describes a similar process regarding certain poetic or narrating texts: open texts cannot be used as the 
reader suits, but the real-time process of interpretation is a structural element of the generative process. 
It is the writer who plays “upon the prerequisites of such a general process” to determine the 
perspective of the reader.453  
 
The inner-historical “text” as portal to extra-historical thought       
We now pursue further the tension between “text” (formal, that is, as concept functioning on the level 
of text) and “texts” (operational, that is, functioning to us in the realm of history or our own praxis as 
things). What happens when text – on the level of text – is implicitly equated with the physical object 
of a book or pixels on a screen? The consequence is that this free-standing object in the extra-historical 
realm of thought functions, all at once and at the same time, as a sensorially available and inner-
historical artefact; from the formal, it suddenly functions on the operational level to us. This is the 
mechanism behind the turn from describing the process of production to the product as such (see, 
Chapter 2, Section K. Conclusions). When this is indeed the case, we are dealing – in biblical 
scholarship as well – with a continuous and uncritical transition from “text” as singular formal concept 
to the numerous artefacts available. The former (“text”) is part of the realm of extra-historical thought; 
to the latter (artefacts) we relate bodily in real time. This transition occurs all the time without 
explication or explanation. Since taking place beyond critical awareness, the structuring of thought on 
the level of text will dominate and suppress the structuring of thought in line with participation in the 
realm of history. This is in essence the veil of text. Ricoeur describes the usurpation of the concrete by 
the abstract as “the emancipation of writing” or “the birth of the text.” He observes, “The 
emancipation of the text from the oral situation entails a veritable upheaval in the relations between 
language and the world.”454 When someone addresses another person, they say something about 
something, someone, himself, or the other: “In speech, the interlocutors are present not only to one 
 
452 Of course, we should note here that historical-criticism entails the possibility to and many examples of 
scrutinizing the perspectives taken by writers. However, detextification advocates this approach in a systematic 
manner: The perspective of every writer or every text should critically be related to the inner-historical realm.  
453 Eco, Role of the Reader, 5.  
 
454 Ricoeur, “What is a text?” 147.  
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another but also to the situation, the surroundings and the circumstantial milieu of discourse.” In this 
situation, discourse is only meaningful regarding this “circumstantial milieu.” (This is reminiscent of 
homeostasis as framed by Ong in the Chapter 1.) Despite the mentioned intrinsic abstraction in the 
function of language, “namely the separation of signs from things,” Ricoeur argues that all discourse is 
reconnected to the world: “For if we did not speak of the world, of what should we speak?” Regarding 
living speech – we could add textum and, therefore, the biblical documents – he states that spoken 
language turns back into the participatory realm of history, that is, the concrete lifeworld of the 
participants. There is an important difference or transition when autonomous text takes the place of 
living speech. In living speech, “the ideal sense of what is said turns towards the real reference, 
towards that ‘about which’ we speak” (emphasis original). He does not state that text is without 
reference, though the act of reading is to fulfil and look for the reference; it is (inner-historically or 
uncritically) not self-evident anymore. This changes the nature of the referencing. The relation to the 
context has changed, it is not anymore necessarily the direct circumstantial milieu. Important to notice 
is that in the function of language in text he introduces his view on “interpretation”: 
 
The suspense which defers the reference merely leaves the text, as it were, ‘in the air’, outside or without a 
world. … each text is free to enter into relation with all the other texts which come to take the place of the 
circumstantial reality referred to by living speech. This relation of text to text, within the effacement of the 
world about which we speak, engenders the quasi-world of texts or literature.455 
 
Ricoeur makes clear that in the relation of text to text(s) we come to a specific understanding of 
them.456 This understanding (“referentiality”) takes place in an independent or extra-historical realm 
(“in the air”). According to him, interpretation is the process in which we do not allow language to 
refer to what is self-evidently and clearly “around” the speaker, but lingers in the ever-expanding 
universe of text.457 
Especially in a “civilization of writing,” the circumstantial milieu or participatory realm of history can 
become eclipsed by this independent realm: that is to say, “the world itself is no longer what can be 
 
455 Ibid., 148. 
456 Despite a comment that semiotics “deal[s] with various sorts of texts,” Eco, Role of the Reader, focuses 
his attention on “verbal texts” (vii). In this focused limitation, he wants to “examine how the procedures of 
aesthetic manipulation of language produce the interpretative cooperation of the addressee” (vii). We can add 
that Eco distinguishes between “interpretation” as “unforeseeable” and “possible ‘aberrant’ decodings” as well 
as the earlier mentioned “cooperative interpretation” as inscribed in the generative process. In his view, the latter 
kind of interpretation is clearly superior to the former. Both kinds of interpretation, however, are related to 
“verbal texts.”  
457 In his semiotics, Eco attributes to the Model Reader an “intertextual competence.” Next to “co-textual 
relations” present in “the linear text manifestation” he speaks of “contextual selections” which “are only virtually 
present in a given text” (19). The reader is only able to make these selections based on an “encyclopedia” – that 
is, “the system of codes and subcodes provided by the language in which the text is written” (17). Referring to 
Julia Kristeva, he concludes that “the encyclopedia also encompasses an intertextual competence …: every text 
refers back to previous texts” (19). In section 0.6.1.6. Inferences by intertextual frames, he elaborates on this 
aspect: “No text is read independently of the reader’s experience of other texts.” (21).         
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shown in speaking but is reduced to a kind of ‘aura’ which written works unfold.”458 In this respect, he 
refers to the “Greek” or “Byzantine world” (see discussion in Introduction to this thesis). The 
independent media of text prompts its own rather abstracted relation to the “world.” The inherently 
abstracted “world” of representation stands in opposition to the concrete lifeworld to which we relate 
by our senses, bodies, and primary reflexes. So – on the basis of the element “how” – the agenda of 
the present study urges to textualizing that the trained reader enters the formal realm or level of text 
via the physical object in front of him (text). In line with Ricoeur’s analysis, we conclude that “text” – 
in how it functions here-and-now-to-us (text area) – seems to form a physically given portal to an 
independent realm of extra-historical thought.459 
  
Hypervisuality: More than to “see” and the “eye” 
We have moved away from the opening example of the student sitting in the library. At this stage in 
our textualization no imagination is involved. As we bring the image into view again, we suggested 
that actually nothing seems to happen: the student is reading in silence and solitude. When we zoom 
in, however, we can observe that something is going on: it is rapid movement of the eyes over the 
words and lines on the page or screen. Instead of limiting our formulation here to the “eye” as such, or 
defining the activity as “seeing” as such, we will spiral deeper and ask, What is happening to and by 
our vision when we read?  
Let us start by referring to this kind of seeing as the “reading modus.” Since we designated the 
circumstances of silence and solitude as typical, our vision becomes disconnected and isolated from 
the other senses. To process text, we must exclude sensorial input from our direct context (concrete 
lifeworld). We have to get confined within the boundaries of the text area. This explains why words 
such as to “see” and the “eye” remain vague or inadequate in view of the functioning of text. “Seeing” 
someone walking by, a mouse running, or a photograph posted on social media is explicitly not what 
we mean. We come to a deeper textualization of this historical activity when we acknowledge that our 
 
458 Ricoeur, “What is a text?”, 149. 
459 This formulation can be seen as contradictory: How can the ultimately abstract can ever be concrete at the 
same time – or how can the signifier fall together with the signified? This way of structuring thought 
presupposes an independently existing realm of extra-historical thought. As argued before, in the present study, I 
see the conceptual matrix of freischwebendes Denken located in and determined and governed by the 
participatory realm of history. I use, however, for the sake of reasoning, both realms. In this respect, we can see a 
similar movement in Jacques Derrida’s Of Grammatology. In the first chapter, Derrida calls for the 
deconstruction of the philosophy of the West or the epoch of the Logos. In deconstruction, there is also a tension. 
He says, “Perhaps it [the age of the sign] will never end. Its historical closure is, however, outlined” (14). In 
short, through his interpretation of, in particular, Nietzsche, the dominance of the Logos in a certain historical 
period is explicated. Subsequently, he states regarding the economy of the Logos that “it is not a question of 
‘rejecting’ these notions; they are necessary, and, at least, nothing is conceivable for us without them” (13) and 
“within the closure … it is necessary to surround the critical concepts with a careful and thorough discourse – to 
mark the conditions, the media, and the limits of their effectiveness” (14). One could summarize that 
historicizing the realm of extra-historical thought does not necessarily imply the disqualification of the use of the 
related thought structures of this realm.    
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sight vis-à-vis text transforms in a concentrated kind of attention. Vision transforms into 
hypervisuality: the seeing in itself becomes abstracted – that is, drawn away from the perception of the 
concrete lifeworld in its primary and naïve sensorial way. Once more, we find another fragment of the 
answer to the question: How does it mean? Dichotomies like “eye”/“ear,” “reading”/“hearing,” or 
“literacy”/“aurality”, “literacy”/“orality” are lacking depth in the participatory realm of history. In this 
study the preference is to textualize in light of the understandings that “text means by hypervisuality” 
or “text perceived as text area.” It is not possible to explicate these terms of reference in detail on 
every occasion because the reading then becomes arduous. For the sake of ease of reading, when the 
term hypervisuality is used, the damping of all our senses is indicated, and also the daily modus of 
“seeing.” 460 It counters imagination and vice versa. Through hypervisuality – in silence and solitude – 
we enter the formal realm or level of text.  
 
Context: An abstracted context which comes with “text” 
In addition to this deepening of the question of how, we must consider the elements of “to whom” and 
“in what state of mind.” Once one is caught up in the level of text via hypervisuality, we suggest that 
“text” is expected to provide its own abstracted context. Similar to text in and of itself, this implied 
abstracted context is free-standing in nature. With text as the visible counterpart, it seems to float 
freely around, independent of the dimensions of time and place.  
For example, let us recall the reasoning on the circle by Bernhard Oestreich (Chapter 2). Since he does 
not explicitly differentiate between the composition of text and the composition of oral performance, 
we can recognize here the presence of this abstracted context. In his reasoning, the “circle” exists as 
abstraction for Paul in the process of composing, as it does as particular experience of that/a specific 
circle in the concrete lifeworld of the hearers. In this way, we see that the abstraction of the “circle,” as 
ascribed by Oestreich to Paul, can exist for the apostle because of an abstracted context inherent in 
autonomous text. We saw the same dynamic in the article by David Rhoads regarding the notions of 
“hermeneutics,” “interpretation,” and “composition.” Since he does not explicate possible differences 
between these activities in the realms of history there-and-then-to-them and here-and-now-to-us, their 
status in his argumentation is free-floating, that is, they function in this implied and abstracted context.   
We conclude that in the abstracted context which comes with text we have formulated our deepest 
answer to the question “How does it mean?” Via hypervisuality – in damping the everyday senses – 
text means in the abstracted context. It is a small step to relate or expand this context to the ever-
expanding universe of texts. More so, we stated earlier that the communicative dynamic in text and the 
question, What does it mean? imply that the elements of “how,” “to whom,” “in what state of mind” 
 
460 For an accessible introduction to hypervisuality from a neuroscientific perspective, see Maryanne Wolf, 
Proust and the Squid: The Story and Science of the Reading Brain (New York: Harper, 2007), chapter 4, “The 
Beginnings of Reading Development, or Not,” 82–107 and in particular the section, “What’s in a Letter’s 
Name?”, 90–4.    
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and “from whose perspective[s]” have already been filled in. In an uncritical manner, they are 
determined by the knowing subject in actu, that is, the reader. Thus, all these elements are constituted 
and filled in by this abstracted context. For the present study, this is a crucial observation (see also 
Introduction: Caution to the reader #3 and 4).  
 
A meta-perspective on the perspective: Manifestation of thought  
In this process of textualizing text, attention again needs to be given to the element of “from whose 
perspective.” Earlier, we argued that this perspective for the present-day reader is related and, more 
importantly, confined to the level of text. But how can we take this perspective on that perspective? A 
meta-perspective enables us to step back and describe this aspect in the functioning of text. We did so 
before in the illustration of the student of theology. This meta-perspective is located within the 
participatory realm of history.461 In this way, “text” becomes textualized-text-to-us or text-functioning-
on-the-level-of-text being pushed beyond that level. It is this meta-perspective that puts solid ground 
under our feet to ask the governing question: How does the letter (it) mean, to whom, in what state of 
mind, and from whose perspective? In the subsequent section, it is this meta-perspective that enables 
us to textualize the letter also as performance there-and-then-to-them; namely, from within the realm 
of history.  
Although we have forged (textualized) ourselves a way into the realm of history by this meta-
perspective, in a certain manner this meta-perspective also represents the opposite: this textualization 
is still an abstraction constituted by the abstracted context. We can take this meta-perspective also on 
the abstracted context of autonomous text: How does the latter become sensorially attainable to us?462 
The answer seems to be simple. When we structure our thoughts on the level of text, then – sensorially 
speaking – they should also become visible in the text area. The “abstracted context which comes with 
autonomous text” is, therefore, mirrored in the text area and ripples out in the ever-expanding and 
ever-available universe of text(s).  
 
 
461 When we relate this ultimate location, in the present study, to Derrida’s Of Grammatology, we might 
wonder whether or how Derrida relates his approach of deconstruction/differance to the participatory realm of 
history. An important line of thought is that logocentrism/phonocentrism “merges with the historical 
determination of the meaning of being in general as presence” (12). Presence organizes the related system of the 
Logos: “presence of the thing to the sight as eidos, presence as substance/essence/existence (ousia), temporal 
presence as point (stigmè) of the now or the moment (nun), … and so forth” (12). He consistently, therefore, 
denies “presence” and speaks of the “absence of presence” or, positively, the trace of a presence (18). This 
represents, in a fundamental way, the deconstruction of the “totality of the … signified” (18). This enables the 
“liberation of the signifier” (19). This reasoning seems, however, to be differently related to the interplay of 
“signifier” and “signified.” In this respect, the approach of detextification prompts the question of what will 
happen when we push the “sign” or the “signifier” (“the signified always already functions as a signifier” [7]) 
beyond the level of text. In other words, What happens when we detextify deconstructionism?    
462 In a personal conversation, Prof. Martinus de Boer provided me with this insight. 
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‘Hail text and abstraction!’ 
At this juncture, we return to the warning given to those who are highly literate in trying to relate to 
the rather unknown “universe of orality” (Lord and Ong, Chapter 1). We can add now the enormous 
difficulty of even entering the actually present and overly familiar universe of high literacy.  We read 
all the time without any difficulty – technically speaking – but to critically reflect on and textualize 
what is happening in this actual process is rather a complicated and demanding intellectual labour. 
The “universe of orality” is not only lost to us, but can only come into existence (or perhaps re-
emerge) because of our highly developed state of mind and due to the independent media of text. So, 
on the one hand, we have to critically create a distance between ourselves and our participatory and 
overly familiar socio-cultural context of academia and on the other, this is only possible on the level of 
text or because of the operational constituents of autonomous text (media) and high literacy (mindset). 
In short and once more: we need text to detextify (Introduction). 
  
Subject-object scheme and the subject in actu 
After having paid attention to “text,” we turn now to the “reader.” When the reader in actu encounters 
the “reader” on the level of text, there is a tension between the realm of operation and the formal level. 
We can take the subject-object scheme into account here. The object (text) – which is perceived and 
experienced in and as text area – generates and absorbs all critical attention; the subject (reader) in 
actu remains somehow out of sight. This imbalance seems to be inherent in the scheme. Since the 
subject is the participating (knowing) human being, the latter’s attention is directed to the “object.” So, 
in terms of the present study, the reader (subject) is caught up in the text (object). From this, we can 
draw three conclusions. First, a certain hierarchy is involved: The subject in actu pays attention and 
the object receives or stands in the centre of that specific attention. At the same time though, the 
subject activates or realizes in real time the object as “object,” or lifts it to that level of critical 
observation. So there is a fundamental difference between them in the participatory realm of history. 
On the level of text, however, the nouns “subject” and “object” are equals in form and function. In 
reading these concepts, they both receive the same attention, they are both in the centre of the real-
time subject’s attention. The reading subject in actu realizes the (concept of) “subject” on the level of 
text – note though that it then functions as an object. The dominance – or spell – of text means that the 
subject on the level of text persists as the lead actor in structuring our thoughts. In view of the earlier 
line of thought, the problem is that in the uncritical identification between the actual reader and the 
subject-on-the-level-of-text, the latter does not adequately represent the former: the structuring of 
extra-historical thought trumps or eclipses the dynamic of the realm of history.    
Second, another conclusion can be drawn on the dampening of our imagination. In this scheme, the 
subject is framed as the “knowing subject.” Since the reader feels called to come to a kind of 
understanding themselves – especially vis-à-vis text, in an operational way – they resemble the 
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knowing subject in optima forma. Thus, one is inclined to fill in oneself in this scheme.463 At least, this 
will be the case when the group of actual participants, to which the subject refers, automatically 
identify themselves as the “reader.” So we witness here a clash between the “subject” in extra-
historical thought and in the realm of history. Readers in actu, in their concrete lifeworld, do not (first) 
have to textualize their specific realm of history; they do not need any form of justification or 
explanation among each other: they just read – as they are trained and used to do. Since this 
intellectual activity is deeply and communally internalized, there is no problem conceived in that 
community. This critical endeavour to push both the “reader” and “subject” beyond the level of text 
leads to the opposing stance: we have to debate the consequences of the dominant media and mindset 
in biblical scholarship for how we come to understand. 
In this respect, we come back to the article by Larry Hurtado (Chapter 2). He commences with 
juxtaposing “oral performance” with “public reading” to disqualify the first regarding the New 
Testament documents. Subsequently, he does not thematize possible differences between “public 
reading” and “reading,” let alone the differing socio-cultural contexts of these practices. In the end, the 
element of “public” loses its value in his argumentation. The readers of his article are dealing in 
“public reading” with the familiar activity of “reading.” We concluded that, in this structuring of 
thought, Hurtado funnels the original functioning of the documents into the one in which we 
participate ourselves all the time, and there is not even a hint of a problem in this, we are the subject! 
Contrarily, the explicit differentiation between media and mindset requires that the original addressees 
of Paul’s letters function as and need textualization as the “subject(s)” – note, in their own realm of 
history. Once more, we recall the effect of notions such as “performance,” “interpretation,” and 
“composition” in the article by David Rhoads (Chapter 2). Regarding the latter, he sidesteps an 
explicit textualization of “composing” there-and-then-to-them. Instead, he jumps to the level of text 
from the start of his argumentation. Subsequently, in his advocated praxis of real-time performance of 
these ancient documents by the biblical scholar, he takes this free-floating version of “composition” as 
the starting point. As a consequence, he implicitly equates “composition” on the level of text with the 
uncritically given media and physical artefact, that is, the available edition of the New Testament here-
and-now (“text”). So, the biblical scholar vocalizes the documented wording. As a result, the subjects 
in actu and their mindset in the original process of composition – Paul, emissary/public reader, 
original addressees, and other teachers – become eclipsed and are replaced in his model and praxis by 
ourselves as (still) highly literate “knowing subjects” asking What does it mean?  
 
 
463 Here we can refer to Umberto Eco’s The Role of the Reader as an outstanding concretization of the 
process in which the reader (Model Reader) participates in the process of coming to understand vis-à-vis text 
(literature). Several aspects would also apply to the original addressees in the aural event. When we refer to 
“encyclopedia,” we could say that collective memory is a constituent of this notion. We also point to section 
0.6.1.7. “Inferences by common frames” (21–2). His description of “frames” is valuable and fitting for our 
purposes as well. The same applies to the section on “Forecasts and inferential walks” (31–9).       
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Recapitulation 
This textualization of text hic et nunc pro nobis will be closed by recapitulating and answering the 
governing question: How does (the letter as) text function to us in our predominantly literate state of 
mind from the perspective involved? The present-day reader is caught up in the text area of the printed 
or digital versions available. In this way, the reader relates to the signs, not just by seeing them but by 
the developed technique of hypervisuality. Since functioning as concrete and available artefact as well 
as concept, “text” forms the hybrid portal from the participatory realm of history here-and-now, in 
which the biblical scholar exists in real time, to the realm of freischwebendes Denken. At the moment 
that one passes through this portal, the basic senses by which one relates to the concrete lifeworld are 
dampened; in a fundamental way, thoughts are abstracted away from the participatory realm of 
history. The latter realm, as context, has been superseded by an abstracted context which comes with 
autonomous text. When one thinks in this context, thoughts become mirrored on the level of text. In 
the abstracted context, all the elements in textualizing history – “how,” “to whom,” “in what state of 
mind,” and “from whose perspective[s]” – are already fixed and filled in. As long as the readers (and 
writers) of texts like these do not problematize or engage in debate on the distinctive processing of this 
media, self-evidently they will have the same text-related perspective and will come to an 
understanding themselves within the related mindset (interpretation).464   
 
464 Regarding the textualization of the biblical text here-and-now-to-us – particularly given its functioning – 
one could ask about the role or phenomenon of genre. Historically speaking, genre as qualification emerges from 
nineteenth-century study of literature. The French term genre originates from the Latin term genus and means 
“type,” “sort” or “kind.” In short, when literary works or texts share specific characteristics, then they can be 
categorized into one of the existing genres. As characteristics, one can think of form, content, structure, literary 
technique, style, tone etc. Later when the Bible was studied increasingly as a collection of literary works, this 
approach became also current in theology. The historico-critical tradition especially has given rise to this literary 
approach. Instead of a strictly theological reading of a monolithically perceived holy text (singular), it became 
apparent that there are differences between these biblical documents (plural). One came to distinguish between 
sorts (genres) of texts: historical narrative, law, wisdom, psalms, prophecy, apocalypse, gospel and letter. For the 
modern academic reader, genre is related to text(s) or literature; through genre, biblical scholars can structure 
their thoughts on the earlier mentioned plurality and diversity in the Bible. Thus they provide theoretical 
frameworks to help us study these transmitted texts. When we formulate in this way, we recognize the presented 
media muddle. In addition, we observe that the present-day reader (to whom) vis-à-vis text (how) is still the one 
who is coming to an understanding himself (in what state of mind/from whose perspective). The mental 
dimension – how the originally intended participants would have structured their thoughts regarding these 
specific sorts of documented wordings in their originally intended operational matrix (genres?) – remains 
eclipsed (in what state of mind). We can conclude that these “genres of texts” function in an absolute way; how 
the original addressees would have participated in them is not distinguished from our own (how). In this way, we 
can textualize genre here-and-now-to-us. We can also formulate the question: How does genre mean to the 
original addressees – for example, regarding the Letter to the Galatians – in their predominantly oral state of 
mind from the perspective of Paul? First, regarding the situation in his Galatian congregations, we presuppose 
that the apostle did not have a choice between different genres, such as gospel, apocalypse, letter etc. In such a 
situation, the custom was to compose a letter, instruct an emissary, and send that emissary to deliver in the name 
and spirit of Paul. To the contrary, the choice of this particular genre provided him with the means as such and 
the range of possibilities involved to regain influence over his former converts. Second, since the apostle wants 
to change the course in their communal life and regain influence over them, the literary category of genre – as 
applied by us to come to an appropriate understanding – is to the apostle as a means to an end. So, from this 
angle, we could recognize and textualize the free-standing category of “genre” in the approach of text here-and-
now-to-us as “anticipated participation” there-and-then-by-Paul-in-the-process-of-composition. 
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2. Textualizing oral performance illic et tunc pro eis 
We will turn now to the distinctive media culture of oral performance there-and-then-to-them. We start 
with the external perspective once more: we imagine the actual event in which the letter will be 
delivered – note that this is the perspective of Paul in the process of composition. Since we cannot 
relate immediately or more self-evidently to our familiar concrete lifeworld, we will ask questions to 
activate our imagination: Where does Paul locate these Galatian congregations?465 Did his converts 
live in rural areas or cities? Did they come together in modest or palatial Roman houses? Did Paul 
envision a big gathering at one location, or would his emissary visit all these smaller communities 
separately? What kind(s) of gathering would be at issue? Did it resemble religious (akin to synagogal), 
cultic, or political meetings? How lively would it have been? He was familiar with what they did in 
these gatherings: was there singing, praying, admonition, teaching, reading Scripture,466 and so forth? 
Would Paul have known whether these other teachers would still have been among them in the 
delivery of his letter? On another level, we can ask: How would Paul have anticipated the general 
feeling among these converts towards him? The (rather uncritical and self-evident) envisioning of the 
apostle prompts many questions to us: What kind of experiences would the Galatians have had with 
emissaries and moments of public reading as ekklesia? Would the delivery be a monologue or more 
dialogical? Since the notions of “letter,” “text,” and “reading” are important to the present study, we 
can ask regarding the implied physical artefact: Would the emissary have opened a book roll to start 
reading it aloud? Or – although the roll was open – would he have looked his audience in the eyes and 
addressed them directly, extempore to be sure to capture their attention?467 Or did he hold the rolled-
up letter in one hand, or was it even lying somewhere nearby so that he would be able to gesture with 
both his hands? The present study presupposes that the ultimate goal of Paul was that the emissary 
would captivate his audience by his bodily presence and performance; in that way, he could reach their 
hearts and change the course of their communal life.  
By means of such questions, we come to the abstracted structure that a group of people is gathered 
around someone at whom their attention is directed – they are listening (and interacting); this person in 
the centre is addressing them by reading aloud or speaking directly to them – with the letter as 
physical artefact in his proximity.  
 
 
465 The exact location of these “communities in Galatia” (Gal 1.1) is beyond the scope of the present study. 
For information, see Stephen Mitchell, The Rise of the Church, vol. 2 of Anatolia: Land, Men, and Gods in Asia 
Minor, ed. Stephen Mitchell (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993); Cilliers Breytenbach, Paulus und Barnabas in der 
Provinz Galatien: Studien zu Apostelgeschichte 13f.; 16.6; 18.23 und den Adressaten des Galaterbriefes, AGJU 
38 (Leiden: Brill, 1996) and the introductions to the commentaries on Galatians as discussed in Chapter 4. 
466 In Chapter 2, we saw that Joanna Dewey disputes the role of (reading) the Jewish holy scriptures in the 
Pauline congregations.  
467 In Chapter 2, in Section C. Pieter Botha: Letter writing and oral communication in antiquity, I explained 
the position taken on the possible distinction between an emphasis on free speech by and autonomy of the 
emissary in the actual moment of delivery, and the limitation to and guidance by the documented wording of the 
letter as representation of Paul’s envisioned delivery.  
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How (1): The letter as embodiment of Paul 
Let us start with the letter as physical object. The movement of textualizing history overrules the 
structuring of our thoughts about the letter as free-floating object or product.468 In this way, we prevent 
ourselves from jumping to our concrete lifeworld and uncritically fill in aspects or even the structure 
of the communicative process. In the external perspective on the oral performance there-and-then-to-
them, the emissary or public reader is – technically speaking – the one who is reading. Since the latter 
is a means, the end is formed by the originally intended addressees. In this section, we will textualize 
the relation between the artefact and the latter. The previous Chapter discussed the strong probability 
of high rates of non-literacy.469 The assumption seems justified that most of the Galatian converts 
could not read (on such a sophisticated level as the letter required, let alone on a level comparable to 
reading in academia). But even if this assumption were false, then those who were able to read were 
dependent – in the process of delivery itself – on the emissary to hear the letter in the actuality of 
vocalization. As mentioned earlier, the same pertains more or less to us when we are exposed to a 
captivating performance ourselves (a TED Talk, for example). In short, in the aural event, the original 
addressees were not exposed to the so-called text area (see Introduction). 
This confirms the suggestion that the letters of Paul were an “aid to orality” (J. Dewey) and 
“composed with a view to them being read aloud to groups and experienced aurally” (Hurtado). 
Contrary to the functioning of autonomous text, the participants are bodily present to each other, that 
is, body-to-body communication (Introduction). We can fill out, from the external perspective, that 
 
468 In this respect, one could ask what perspective is taken, for example, by Jerome Murphy-O’Connor in his 
Paul the Letter-Writer: His World, His Options, His Skills, GNS 41 (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1995). 
Especially, in the first chapter “Putting Pen to Paper” (1–41), it becomes clear that he spirals deep into the realm 
of history there-and-then: He describes the materials used and technical processes of production into detail. The 
historical validity of the information is not under dispute here. One could wonder, though, whether the focus and 
horizon of his book is determined by his own uncritical and self-evident relation to the letter as object or product. 
Thus, it appears as if he explains historically the production of the so-called text area and the later dealings with 
the created artefact. In the approach of detextification, we want to push our understanding beyond the level of 
the letter as object or text area. We pursue another perspective on the functioning of the letter: to textualize the 
reciprocity between Paul in the process of composition, on the one hand, and the intended and envisioned 
emissary and addressees in the process of the oral delivery thereof on the other. For this reason, the perspective 
of the present study can be seen as an addition to the one as found in Jerome Murphy-O’Connor, Paul the Letter-
Writer; M. Luther Stirewalt Jr., Paul, the Letter Writer (Grand Rapids and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2003); E. 
Randolph Richards, Paul and First-Century Letter Writing: Secretaries, Composition and Collection (Downers 
Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2004) and Jeffrey A. D. Weima, Paul the Ancient Letter Writer: An Introduction to 
Epistolary Analysis (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2016).     
469 Earlier, we witnessed the broad range of different kinds of literacies and, therefore, the difficulty to define 
“literacy” (Chapter 1). Note that in a reversed manner this is also valid for “illiteracy.” In a similar vein, we can 
make differences between the intended audiences of Paul’s letters. For example, the relation of the apostle to the 
intended addressees of his Letter to the Romans would have been different from the one to his Galatian converts. 
Not only because he never visited the communities in Rome before sending his letter, but also because we can 
imagine a higher level and greater spread of literacy regarding the latter. This exploration is outside the scope of 
the present study. Nonetheless, based on the differences between the media of oral performance there-and-then-
to-them and text here-and-now-to-us (in combination with the implied mental transformations throughout the 
history of the West) we uphold this distinction regarding the whole collection of Paul’s letters. In conclusion, we 
consequently juxtapose the realm of history illic et tunc pro eis with the one hic et nunc pro nobis. Therefore the 
proposed rates of non-literacy remain valuable for this study.   
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during the delivery one experiences the sphere and the tension: What is happening in (factions of) the 
group? Crucial in this dynamic is whether the emissary is listened to and gains influence. So, the one 
who is sent to speak in the name of Paul bodily represents the apostle as sender. Regarding the 
element of “how,” it becomes clear that the letter means as an embodiment of Paul himself. In this 
way, another dimension can be added to our previous imaginative exploration via the external 
perspective – as envisioned by Paul: the Galatian converts were relating in the emissary to their 
spiritual father; Paul himself was addressing them at that moment via the body and voice of his close 
associate or friend they were relating to.470 Since their attention was not usurped by the text area, we 
conclude that the original addressees “saw” the letter from a distance in the hands of the emissary, 
while the latter attempted to engage them and win their attention in his performance.  
 
How (2): The letter as token 
How can we deepen this broad perspective on the letter as a thing? First, when we imagine that the 
emissary travelled with the letter, we might deduce that he could be identified or affirmed in that role 
because of this specific object. Not only literally but also figuratively, the letter held what Paul wanted 
to say to the Galatian community as his converts. We can imagine that, before the delivery, they were 
anxious to know what their spiritual father had to say (From Paul’s perspective asked, Were they 
excited and hopeful? Or anxious because they sensed trouble?). In that way, one could argue that the 
physical presence of the roll constituted the authority of the emissary. It functioned as a visible mark. 
The artefact – that which Paul had to say to them – and the emissary – who would perform it – came 
together in the aural event: the emissary embodied the letter in the delivery.  
When reading represented a rather exclusive technology, we can textualize the element “how” in 
another way. The letter as written media, even if it functioned as textum, made non-literate addressees 
dependent on those who were literate. In this way, the former were faced with their lower social status 
(e.g., Gal 6.1).471 So the letter could also have an intimidating effect on (a section of) the addressees. 
From the perspective of the letter as physical object, a similar effect is advocated by Lee A. Johnson in 
her article “Paul’s Letters as Artifacts: The Value of the Written Text among Non-Literate People.”472 
She examines the use of written “texts” by non-literate cultures in the ancient world and beyond. In 
particular, her analysis of defixiones, lamellae, and other written magical charms makes her challenge 
“the long-standing devaluation of Paul’s written correspondence.”473 It is her conviction that 
 
470 See Richards, Paul and First-Century Letter Writing, 13-14: “Letters were in some way a substitute for 
being there in person”; Robert W. Funk, “The Apostolic Parousia: Form and Significance,” in Christian History 
and Interpretation: Studies Presented to John Knox, ed. William R. Farmer, Charles F.D. Moule and Richard R. 
Niebuhr (New York-Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 249–68. 
471 Chris Keith, “‘In My Own Hand’: Grapho-Literacy and the Apostle Paul,” Biblica 89 (2008): 39–58. 
472 Lee A. Johnson, “Paul’s Letters as Artifacts: The Value of the Written Text among Non-Literate People,” 
BTB 46 (2016): 25–34. 
473 Ibid., 32. 
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any supposed rhetorical disadvantage that Paul might have suffered by acting as an apostle in absentia was 
counteracted by the artifact of the written text that endured after the message was first delivered. Instead, one 
ought to imagine Paul’s letters as “gifts” that would bestow a sense of worthiness on his communities … The 
letters were part of the culture’s proclivity to endow illegible markings with the power to provoke results that 
spoken requests could not produce.474 
 
We can broaden this textualization. The communis opinio is that the other teachers in Galatia were 
Jewish. Since reading, debating, and appealing to the Jewish holy scriptures was important to 
contemporary Jewish religious life, the following questions come to the fore: How had these other 
teachers with their Judaizing agenda used the Jewish scriptures in their performances? And how did 
Paul anticipate these possible Scripture proofs in the rhetoric of his opponents? But also, What role did 
the physical presence of written artefacts play in their performances? Consider the several instances in 
the letter where Paul uses the introductory formula. One can imagine that this is also an echo from the 
performances of these teachers: “For it is written!” This kind of appeal grants authority to those who 
employ it. When framed within this matrix (the letter or another form of “that which is written”), then 
the “letter” becomes an outward sign of power and authority.475 For this reason, we will refer to the 
letter as physical artefact there-and-then-to-them as token.    
 
To whom: Subject-object becomes subject-subject scheme 
When we take once again the external perspective on oral performance, we see that certain persons are 
together. Note that the present-day reader does not participate themselves in this event. It is in another 
(also represented) realm of history that this event takes place (and is textualized on that basis). It is, 
therefore, constituted by different participants. In this way, we can fill in the element of “to whom”: in 
terms of coming to a certain understanding of the letter in the aural event, the Galatian converts – and 
possibly also these other teachers (see the discussion of Martyn and de Boer in Chapter 4) – are the 
subjects in actu; Paul anticipates them coming to a certain understanding.   
When we compare this analysis with the external perspective on the functioning of text, we seem to be 
dealing here – contrary to the traditional scheme of an object (text) in relation to a subject (reader) –
with a subject-subject scheme (emissary and gathered crowd). This communicative process is solely 
constituted by human beings. Contrary to the subject-object scheme, they all have to be valued as 
knowing subjects in actu or even in interactu. Everyone is interlinked and everything is process 
(becoming). In the present study, the heuristic claim is that in this communicative dynamic there is no 
 
474 Ibid., 33. 
475 We recognize statements as found in Chapter 2 as made by Joanna Dewey in Section E.: “In a world in 
which most were non-literate, writing was both an instrument of power and a symbol of power” (Joanna D. 
Dewey, “Textuality in an Oral Culture: A Survey of Pauline Traditions,” Semeia 65 [1994]: 144), and by David 
Rhoads in Section H.: “the presence of a scroll, such as a scripture text, could serve as a symbol to enhance oral 
authority” (David M. Rhoads, “Performance Criticism: An Emerging Discipline [Part I and II],” BTB 36 [2006]: 
122) 
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product or object (being) comparable to text-as-known-to-us. So, when we bring the letter and a 
subject-subject scheme together, the implicit equation of “letter” and “product” is excluded from the 
start.  
 
From whose perspective[s] (1): Singular becomes plural 
After this exploration, we turn to the element of “from whose perspective.” As long as the emissary 
succeeds in holding the attention of his audience, their thoughts will be structured in line with his 
perspective. We textualize the obvious when we ascribe this perspective to Paul; he is the composer of 
the letter; we are dealing with the rhetoric and the related agenda of the apostle. Imagining the 
Galatian converts gathered in the aural event, we can turn our attention to these other teachers as well 
– if present. Once more, it is obvious that the letter does not represent their perspective. Not without 
reason, they are commonly described as “opponents” and “adversaries.” By their prior performances, 
they have gained influence over (at least a part of) these Galatian communities. In his article, Louis 
Martyn comments, “Paul knows that the Galatians will hear his letter with the Teachers’ words still 
ringing in their ears, indeed with the Teachers themselves sitting in their midst, doubtless more than 
ready to assist them in interpreting the missive.”476 This dynamic in the aural event becomes 
imaginable.  
Therefore, the perspective of these other teachers must have governed the concrete lifeworld of the 
originally intended addressees when the emissary started his delivery – as envisioned by the apostle. 
For the process of composition of the letter, this is of greatest importance. In line with the communis 
opinio on their Jewish background, we have to reckon that terms such as “God,” 
“justification/rectification,” “law,” “to be a Jew,” “Abraham,” “faith,” “Jesus Christ,” and so forth 
resonated amid these Galatian converts in their performances. Paul’s hearers are not tabulae rasae. 
Much is going on in their minds, bodies, and hearts: controversial loyalties, associations, feelings, and 
opposed opinions will cause tension in and among them. (Would Paul imagine them looking anxiously 
around to other [factions of] hearers or to the other teachers, if indeed they were present?) Therefore, 
we suggest that the perspective of his opponents comes to the fore in Paul’s own perspective. As a 
result of this spiralling into the realm of history there-and-then, a single and unchanging structuring of 
thought is broken open. One perspective turns into a plurality: “from whose perspective[s].”  
 
 
476 J. Louis Martyn, “Events in Galatia. Modified Covenantal Nomism versus God’s Invasion of the Cosmos 
in the Singular Gospel: A Response to J. D. G. Dunn and B. R. Gaventa” in Pauline Theology Vol I. 
Thessalonians, Philippians, Galatians, Philemon, ed. Jouette M. Bassler (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 
161. 
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From whose perspective[s] (2): Rhetoric and counter rhetoric 
The two competing perspectives constitutive of the oral delivery lead to the following claim: the 
rhetoric of these teachers must be countered by Paul’s in the aural event.477 We will refer to this 
dynamic as the structure of rhetoric and counter rhetoric. As a result, when the emissary vocalizes 
certain terms in the oral performance, Paul – in the process of composition – knows that his hearers 
will structure their understanding on those themes, in first instance and self-evidently, in line with this 
framing of his opponents.  
As a first example of this counter rhetoric, we categorize negative rhetoric or rhetoric of denial. In the 
next Chapter, we will identify several examples. Here we refer only to Gal 2.16: 
  
Yet we know that a person is justified not by the works of the law but through faith in Jesus Christ. And we 
have come to believe in Christ Jesus, so that we might be justified by faith in Christ, and not by doing the 
works of the law, because no one will be justified by the works of the law (emphasis mine).  
 
A continuously repeated thought structure in which “justification/rectification” “by (the works of) the 
law” is openly negated and also radically disqualified by “the faith of Christ.” (διὰ/ἐκ πίστεως ̓Ιησοῦ 
Χριστοῦ). (Would Paul anticipate frowning, bafflement, anger, or relief in this moment of the delivery 
on the part of the hearers?) Also a rhetoric of confusion will be identified regarding Paul’s reasoning 
as found in Gal 2. The apostle creates this confusion on purpose by relating fundamental propositions 
from the distinctive rhetorics of his opponents and himself. In this way, they short-circuit and the 
hearer is left in despair to be led into clarity and the truth. 
In Chapter 4, we will also see more subtle forms of counter rhetoric. In deepening our understanding 
from the external perspective, we must reckon with the intended addressee’s – or at least, a substantial 
part of them (Kelber) – loyalty to these teachers. Thus, we conclude that the apostle chooses not to 
disqualify their teaching as a whole. Conversely, he tries to subtly change or adjust the framing of his 
opponents on the side of his hearers. We coin this strategy as Umdeutung or reframing. An example is 
provided by Martinus de Boer in his commentary on Gal 2.19–21 (see Chapter 4). First, he identifies 
Gal 2.16a as a fixed missionary formula – “yet we know that a person is justified not by the works of 
the law but through faith in Jesus Christ.” According to de Boer, these teachers had appealed to this 
 
477 Let us presuppose that, in their turn, these teachers gained power in these Galatian communities after Paul 
had left. We suppose that they did so in relation to the original teaching (performances) of Paul himself. If this is 
the case, then the framing of these teachers will have been – partially, at least – a reframing of Paul’s initial 
rhetoric itself. As a consequence, we can extend this reasoning further back in time. When Paul arrived in 
Galatia, besides introducing new themes, figures, and metaphors, he possibly reframed familiar themes in the 
contemporary worldview of his converts – for example, “Kurios.” In the realm of history as such, we will find 
nobody who is a tabula rasa in an absolute way. So the historical rule is that what we frame here as “framing” 
on the level of text is in fact often (partial) reframing itself. For heuristic purposes, however, we prefer to 
designate the performances and rhetoric of these teachers as the starting point – “framing” and “rhetoric.” As a 
consequence, the communicative agenda of the apostle is, therefore, understood as “reframing” and “counter 
rhetoric.” Rightly, one could argue here that we use a higher and more self-evident level of abstraction than the 
participatory realm of history involved allows us to do. Given Baron Munchausen, we can pull ourselves little by 
little out of the mire but never fully.  
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formula. Paul uses the formula as well. His framing of the phrases “out of works of the law” and “out 
of faith” is the same as of his opponents. When it comes to “justification,” however, Paul attempts to 
achieve an apocalyptic redefinition of it. So we have to keep in mind that at the beginning, the framing 
of “justification” by the other teachers is still ringing in their ears and determining their understanding 
(collective memory). Regarding the level of text, we should be warned: on that level we do not find 
indications for such a process. This is a dynamic which is in conflict with the rules of autonomous 
text. It is rare to read a text that starts regarding a certain term with a specific frame of reference, but 
later sees that very frame of reference changed without explication on the level of the text.  
It is also evident that not every term, theme or reasoning in the performance has to be changed in that 
way. Paul will assume that his original performances (rhetoric) are also and still part of the Galatian 
collective memory – although in need of recall and also (partial) reframing (see Chapter 4). Certain 
themes or reasonings of these teachers will be valid for the apostle as well, for example, the element of 
“God,” “circumcision,” and “out of works of law.”  
Also, the introduction of new terms and topics can be at issue. When Paul envisions that his emissary 
will be introducing the audience to a new phrase, reasoning, or theme, this implies that he has to 
introduce and elaborate on it explicitly. So we can formulate that when a sound group is brought in 
without any explication or introduction, the addressees will have been familiar with a certain 
understanding; Paul would only need to anticipate on that framing.  
 
In what state of mind (1): Collective memory  
The introduction of different perspectives in the realm of history there-and-then breaks open the 
element “in what state of mind.” The rhetorical dynamic of Umdeutung is constitutive of living speech 
and, contrariwise, not familiar in the communicative process of autonomous text – especially prosaic 
and academic ones. So we have to keep this subtle communicative dynamic in mind. But how can we 
grasp the related process of understanding by the original addressees? Can we distinguish within the 
realm of history there-and-then a mental context against which background this process or reframing 
can be textualized by us? We are in search of an alternative for the abstracted context vis-à-vis 
autonomous text. As a constituent of the element “in what state of mind,” we can textualize this 
process through the implied collective memory478 – as envisioned by Paul. This can be explored in line 
with questions such as, What had gone before? What was going on? What did they have gone through 
as a community/communities? How did they see themselves, as “Galatians” (for example, Gal 3.1)? 
How did they relate to other groups, such as “Jews,” “Gentiles,” or other converts in Antioch? What 
was their weakness or need? What was their longing? Regarding the presence and performances of 
these other teachers, one can ask more specifically, What had impressed the Galatian converts? What 
 
478 For the use of this particular term, see note 94.  
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terms, themes, or arguments were still ringing in their ears (Martyn)? What role did the Jewish holy 
scriptures play in the performances and presences of Paul and also these teachers?479 How did they 
perceive these other teachers? What was their original view of Paul? How did this view develop 
because of the presence of these teachers – for example, did they only reconsider Paul or was their 
view of him diminished? Every single word and phrase as documented in the letter was meant by the 
apostle to resonate with this collective memory of his Galatians audiences. In conclusion, collective 
memory forms the basis and matrix of the participation as anticipated by Paul. 
In the second example in Chapter 4 following, we will see that this perspective will be decisive. 
Regarding that which is “around” the speaker (Ricoeur) in Gal 2.18–20, we can relate the specific 
terms “co-crucifixion” and “to die/to live” to the ritual matrix of baptism. In this way, the collective 
memory of the original addressees frames the phrases of the letter as encountered by the present-day 
reader. In this way, we start to be able to imagine, although still abstracted to a certain level, their 
trains of thought. 
As a result, we can push our textualization of the oral performance of the letter to the Galatians further 
into the realm of history there-and-then-to-them. Every specific sound group makes us ask, Through 
what sensorial experiences and/or lasting memories could they have related to it? Regarding the Letter 
to the Galatians, we can think in terms of physical artefacts ( “letter” as token and/or “law” as book 
rolls), rites (“baptism,” “circumcision”), rhetorical themes (“justification,” “sons of Abraham”), 
experiences (“receiving the Spirit of God,” “living as a Jew”), specific human interactions 
(performances) or ways of wielding power (introductory formula: “For it is written”), thought 
structures (syllogism), narratives (Jesus’s crucifixion, Peter’s visit to Antioch) and/or figures 
(“Abraham,” “Cephas/Peter,” “Jesus Christ,” “Kurios”). In collective memory and concrete thought, 
sensorial experiences, and for us imagination, comes to the fore. 
 
In what state of mind (2): Collective memory and synonymous and antonymous metonymy 
In the constituent of collective memory, we can explore how the original addressees were intended to 
structure their thoughts. In his Theory of Referentiality, Foley explains that in traditional oral poetry 
meaning is negotiated by structural elements (see Chapter 1). These elements command fields of 
reference – for the intended audience – that are much larger than the passage in which they occur. 
They entail “the invoking of a context that is enormously larger and more echoic than the text or work 
itself, that brings the lifeblood of generations of poems and performances to the individual 
 
479 As mentioned earlier, one can deny the role of Jewish scriptures in the communal life of the Galatians 
(see, Chapter 2, Section E. Joanna Dewey: Textuality in an Oral Culture: Pauline Traditions). However, when 
these documents are constitutive of the collective memory of the intended addressees, then the study by Richard 
B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989, rev. 
and repr., 1993) is of significant value.      
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performance or text.”480 Metonymy involves the following mechanism: the part stands for the whole 
(pars pro toto). It forms the subliminal structure through which understanding of the audience is 
directed by the poet in a live performance. A contemporary example is the pars of “9/11” and as totum 
the matrix comprising of images of an airplane crashing into one of the Twin Towers up to the 
consequence of the War on Terror and fundamentalist forms of Islam. Regarding the envisioned 
delivery of Paul’s letters, the structural elements of terms, themes, thematic matrices, reasonings, 
narrative fragments, rituals, logia of Jesus, echoes of the Jewish scriptures,481 and so forth, evoke in a 
certain way the collective memory of the intended addressees as totum. Much more is involved in the 
term to “live,” or the “law,” then the abstracted definition of the concept, that is, the level of text. Here 
we can think of the proposal of David Rhoads to locate meaning in the sensorially experienced realm 
of history (see Chapter 2, Section H. David Rhoads: Biblical Performance Criticism). 
In light of this dynamic, Foley’s theory can be expanded to synonymy and antonymy. In this way, the 
implied structuring of thought comes to the fore. We recognize, in this broadening of the dynamics of 
metonymy, the oral psychodynamic of redundancy (Chapter 1): synonymous and antonymous 
metonymy.  
Given metonymy, we can frame synonymy as pars pro parte pro toto. A certain word, sound group, 
enthymeme, or theme can be replaced by another one, while leaving its framing more or less 
unchanged. At the same time, a synonym will not be used without a reason; it is used for a certain 
aspect and/or effect on the hearer. We sense in such an instance the subtleties with which Paul wants 
 
480 John Miles Foley, Immanent Art: From Structure to Meaning in Traditional Oral Epic (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1991), 7. 
481 In Echoes, Hays introduces the notion of echo or metalepsis: “When a literary echo links the text in which 
it occurs to an earlier text, the figurative effect of the echo can lie in the unstated or suppressed (transumed) 
points of resonance between the two texts” (20). In the opening chapter “the Conversion of the Imagination: 
Scripture and Eschatology in 1 Corinthians,” in his Conversion of the Imagination. Paul as Interpreter of 
Israel’s Scripture (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2005), 2, he states: “Metalepsis is a rhetorical and 
poetic device in which one text alludes to an earlier text in a way that evokes resonances of the earlier text 
beyond those explicitly cited. The result is that the interpretation of a metalepsis requires the reader to recover 
unstated or suppressed correspondences between the two texts.” On the one hand, metalepsis is a particular form 
of metonymy; the part, that is, the allusion or quotation, evokes the totum, that is, the passage from Scripture and 
in, therefore, the authoritative corpus as such. On the other hand, we observe that Hays argues in absolute terms 
such as “text,” “reader,” and “interpretation.” His definition of metalepsis as well as his intertextual approach 
seems to be bound to the functioning of the documented words as “text” to the present-day reader, who is asking:  
What does this echo mean in this text beyond the words explicitly cited? Since the reader relates directly and 
solely to the words as text, the perspective of Paul’s anticipated participation of the originally intended 
addressees in the moment of delivery seems to be virtually absent. In line with detextification, we prefer to 
designate these echoes, not as “texts” from the Jewish scriptures as found in the “text” of the letters, but as 
“sound bites” surrounded by “sound bites” in the body-to-body communication of the oral delivery. When the 
Jewish scriptures would have played an important role in the presence and performances of Paul himself and, 
therefore, in the oral performance of his letters, we have to ask: How does the apostle anticipate his addressees to 
relate to echoes or fragments of stories, prophecies, sayings, etc. to which he alludes from the Jewish scriptures? 
If they would have been already familiar with these quotations and echoes, the following questions have to be 
asked: By whom did they get acquainted with these scriptural words? How was it used or What kind of framing 
was involved? Regarding the presence of introductory formulae (“for it is written”), the question has to be asked 
how echoes relate to explicit quotations? Detextification implies that we do not relate the “text” as such to the 
“reader” as such, but that we ask how Paul envisions the “documented wording” as sound bites to affect the 
originally intended addressees in the moment of delivery. 
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to (repeatedly) direct his hearers in the desired direction. In a similar vein, we can grasp antonymy as 
pars anti partis pro toto. The same aspect of the implied whole is used from an opposite stance. Also, 
here we should be aware that it will be chosen because of a specific anticipated participation on the 
side of the hearers. We can give some examples from Galatians. In this metonymic structuring, the 
theme of the “sons of Abraham” is synonymous to the “ones who are righteous” and “Jews” (the first 
themes are in the first instance in line with the rhetoric of the other teachers). In contrast, the latter 
functions as an antonym to “sinners” and “Gentiles.” We start to imagine – once more compatible with 
the level of text – how the original addressees were intended and conditioned to understand. We can 
broaden the dynamic to thematic matrices. For example, when the emissary mentions “the law” the 
hearer will relate this pars to the matrix or totum of phrases such as “works of the law,” “regulations 
of the fathers” (implying a multitude of rules governing everyday life), “to Judaize,” “the faith of 
Abraham” (at least from the perspective of these other teachers), and the act of circumcision (Gal 2–
3). Another kind of example will be provided in Chapter 4: premises and enthymemes of a singular 
and simple syllogistic reasoning are recalled (Gal 3.10–12). Introduced by these other teachers, Paul is 
forced to respond to this syllogism. The apostle only needs to mention explicit parts (major/minor 
terms, major/minor premises, conclusions) to let his intended addressees recall the reasoning as a 
whole (syllogistic structure as such). In line with the dynamic of synonymous and antonymous 
metonymy, we will demonstrate that this one syllogism recurs more than twenty times throughout Gal 
2–3.  
In this way, we may find an answer to the question how we as present-day readers can relate the 
explicit parts to each other – as they appear to us on the level of text. To use the content-form scheme: 
collective memory represents the content, whereas synonymous and antonymous metonymy structures 
the way thought is anticipated by Paul (form). In this way, the elements of “how,” “to whom,” “in 
what state of mind,” and “from whose perspective[s]” come together in an inner-perspective on the 
anticipated stream of consciousness of the audience caught up in the performance. 
 
Recapitulation 
Now we attempt to answer the governing question: How does the letter (as oral performance) function 
to the original addressees in their predominantly oral state of mind from the perspective of Paul who is 
taking the perspective of the other teachers into account? The first key response from the above 
discussion is that in terms of this question, the letter means as dialogue or living speech. Embodied 
soundbites invite bodily participation on the side of the original addressees. The emissary somehow 
resembles the earlier exposure of the Galatian converts to these other teachers; where he now stands 
and speaks to them, earlier these teachers stood and addressed them more or less in a similar way (in a 
performance). Their presence and performances form the starting point for Paul, so his rhetoric has to 
counter the impact of their rhetoric (rhetoric-counter rhetoric scheme). In responding to his opponents, 
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he wants to reach hearts and regain influence so that his spiritual children will change the course of 
their communal life. By metonymy, we can textualize the intended process of understanding. More 
precisely, the structure of synonymous and antonymous metonymy connects for us the uttered sound 
groups (partes) and the collective memory of the original addressees (totum).482    
 
 
B. Historicizing text  
 
The proposed approach of detextifying the letters of Paul is constituted by two intellectual movements. 
The first movement concentrated on the textualizing of context or the realm of history. The second 
movement of historizing text is related to the physical artefact in the realm of history here-and-now, 
that is, the printed or digitalized versions.  
This second movement should overcome the fallacy of a technical and implicit equation in real time: 
historicizing text implies relating in real time to the text of the letter on the one hand, while not being 
caught up in the abstracted context of autonomous text on the other. This latter process gives rise to a 
form of abstraction which is incompatible with how Paul envisioned that his hearers would structure 
their thoughts. Therefore, we historicize text to be able to textualize history. The latter process takes 
place in two phases. The first phase has been set out in the first part of this Chapter: this textualization 
of oral performance illic et tunc pro eis was on a higher level of abstraction and provides the basic 
structure for the second one. This next phase – which is discussed in the following Chapter – is more 
concrete; it is directed towards specific passages in the letter: Every term that appears to us as on the 
level of text has to be located in the oral performance which is resounding in the concrete lifeworld of 
the intended audiences.483 Their process of coming to understand can be textualized by the dynamic of 
 
482 Given this external perspective, an implication is that this hoped-for change itself lays beyond the moment 
of delivery itself. This aim of Paul has to be projected in the moments or days following the actual performance. 
We can imagine debate (during and) after the oral performance, that the emissary would have conversed with 
individual members, etc. The relation between the actual moments of the intended delivery of the letter and this 
longed-for future change is found in the original addressees, or – more correctly – has to become manifest in the 
course of their subsequently lived lives. This sheds another light on the element of “in what state of mind.” The 
goal is that the latter will change (in certain aspects) because of the aural event. 
483 From a discourse analytical perspective, David I. Yoon also identifies and works with “elements” in his 
study, A Discourse Analysis of Galatians and the New Perspective on Paul, LBS 17 (Leiden: Brill, 2019). His 
discourse analysis is governed by Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL). He distinguishes three components, 
namely, the field (what is the discourse about?), the tenor (the interpersonal dimensions of the discourse), and 
the mode (the general outline of the discourse) (88–133). In the mode of discourse, he maps out a general outline 
by identifying the “thematic” and “prominent elements” of each section. In the next Chapter (Chapter 4), we will 
recognize many of his elements, such as, “faith,” “law,” “rectification,” “Abraham,” “heritage” etc. In the field 
of discourse, he discerns “processes,” “participants,” and “circumstance” (33–65). In them, we can recognize 
constituents of and the explicit terms as used in the approach of detextification. As becomes clear in his chapter 
5, however, Yoon identifies these historical constituents on the level of the text of the letter (191–225). Without 
explanation, he makes the text of the letter the portal and realm of his discourse analysis; the text is granted a 
freischwebende status. In his study, he does not engage in a discussion on the role or interface of the letter 
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synonymous and antonymous metonymy. This second intellectual movement is like a crowbar. It has 
to be applied in the actuality of reading ancient documents such as the Letter to the Galatians. We use 
this metaphor, because a crowbar implies the activity of forcing oneself a way into a realm that is not 
normally accessible. The crowbar has to be applied also to the abstracted context which comes with 
text through questions in line with the elements of “how,” “to whom,” “in what state of mind,” and 
“from whose perspective[s].” The aim is not so much to answer the numerous questions, but to break 
the spell on us of the implied and abstracted context of the letter functioning as autonomous text to us.  
 
 
C. Infographic  
 
The previous Sections are brought together now in this Infographic. The intellectual movements of 
textualizing history (central framework in the middle; see, in this Chapter, Section A), historicizing 
text (great black arrow; see Section B), together with the key terms constitutive of both (small blue 
frames), and also the development of the textification of textum (small black arrow) are positioned to 
each other and/or in relation to the realms of history there-and-then-to-them and here-and-now-to-us. 
The concern is to provide an overview of the presented approach: the detextification of our 




functioning as oral performance/public reading/textum there-and-then-to-them and as autonomous text here-and-








This Chapter focused on the implicit equation of “letter” and “text” and the related turn from 
production to product. The leading question was, How can we do justice to the letter as intended aural 
event there-and-then to the Galatian addressees in accordance with their predominantly oral state of 
mind, while we are trained and used to perceiving the document as “text” while looking for its 
meaning in a mindset formed by a predominantly literate context? To find a way out of the media 
muddle in biblical scholarship, the Chapter contended that we had to relate ourselves to the totality of 
history on the one hand, while on the other, we need to relate to the letter as artefact through our 
senses. Bringing these two extremely opposed positions together (extra-historical versus inner-
historical; representation versus presence, and level of text versus beyond that level) – which makes 
the present study into an endeavour in the philosophy of biblical studies – we arrived at the intellectual 
movements of textualizing history and historicizing text which lead to the detextification of Paul’s 
letters. 
The operational dimension of reading in the related mindset – as we are taught, trained, and used to 
doing484 – has to penetrate the level of text. The functioning of the text-context and subject-object 
schemes on that same level hinder us from doing so. Instead of a dichotomous understanding of “text” 
and “context,” “text” also needs to be “contextualized.” In short: the functioning of the “level of text” 
to us has to be pushed beyond that level as well. In a similar vein, we criticized the subject-object 
scheme: the functioning of the subject on the level of text is uncritically projected onto the actual 
subject in the realm of history. In this way, extra-historical structuring of thought supresses a more 
adequate and accurate representation of the dynamics of the concrete lifeworld. Once we grasp how 
the reader – as technical knowing subject in actu – construes meaning in their own typical mindset, the 
reader can step back to understand (textualize) how the originally intended knowing subjects were 
intended to understand in the oral performance.  
We now turn to the different steps made in this Chapter to draw some more specific conclusions. First, 
we commenced to textualize text hic et nunc pro nobis. Imagining a student in theology sitting in a 
library, we concluded that reading takes place in silence and solitude. To the reader, text has to speak 
for itself (“how”, “to whom”). When we are reading in real time, we become, bodily or sensorially, 
abstracted away. We termed this as hypervisuality. As an operational result of this reading modus, an 
implied abstracted context comes with this media. In this context, how, to whom, and in what state of 
mind certain concepts mean are fixed in advance (“in what state of mind,” “from whose perspective”). 
They are constituted by the reader as knowing subject in actu. We concluded that in “text” – in the 
hybrid combination of physical artefact and concept on the level of text – we pass through the inner-
 
484 In a similar way, the original addressees just participated in the construal of oral performances in their 
predominantly oral cultural context.  
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historically present portal to the realm of extra-historical representation. Therefore, in the functioning 
of “text” to us, two realms seem to come together that cannot do so by definition. As a result, the 
structuring of thought on the level of text supresses or veils the dynamics of the concrete lifeworld. 
This led to a major conclusion of the present study: when we – as trained readers in the socio-cultural 
context of academia – process the letter as autonomous text in an uncritical way, inevitably the 
abstracted context will govern our understanding. It is, therefore, imperative not only to be aware of 
this abstracted context, but also to look over the edge into the sensorially determined, circumstantial 
milieu in which the letter functions/-ed. 
Since we give priority to the historian and subject the realm of extra-historical thought to the one of 
history, the question came to the fore, Where do we sensorially encounter extra-historical thoughts or 
this abstracted context here-and-now? When hypervisuality is restricted by the text area, the implied 
structuring of thought is mirrored in the text area.  
The second direction in textualizing history related to oral performance there-and-then-to-them. In 
light of the subject-object scheme, this aural event is constituted by the emissary and his hearers as 
subjects in interactu (“how”/“to whom”), thus leading us to better speak of a subject-subject scheme. 
In this historical situation, the letter as physical artefact is perceived by the original addressees as a 
token, that is, a signal of power and authority. The addressees were not meant to be exposed to the text 
area as such (“how”). We combined Foley’s Theory of Metonymical Referentiality with the crucial 
notion of collective memory: when Paul explicates a theme, term, metaphor, or part of a reasoning 
(pars), the intended hearers recall the implied whole (totum). We extended this dynamic to synonyms 
and antonyms. A crucial conclusion was, therefore, that synonymous and antonymous metonymy 
provides the mindset in which thought is construed in the moment of delivery (“in what state of 
mind”). Further, we noted that the presence and performances of these other teachers are crucial in this 
respect. In their teaching, a different perspective is operative. We argued that this perspective, or their 
rhetoric, governs the rhetorical situation, that is, the starting point of the aural event. Since the apostle 
has to undo their influence, his rhetoric is counter rhetoric (“from whose perspective[s]?” [plural]). On 
this basis, we textualized the final goal of the letter: by countering the influence of these adversaries, 
the apostle wants his addressees to change their view on and stance in their realm of history according 
to his will.  
In view of the turn from the process of production there-and-then to the available product in front of 
us, we argued for the need to historicize text. In this second movement, we structure our understanding 
of the documented themes, terms, reasonings, or phrases – to which we are exposed in the moment of 
reading them in the text of the letter – in line with synonymous and antonymous metonymy. By 
continuously asking questions that connect the terms and themes (partes) to their collective memory 
(totum), our thoughts are bent into the implied historical situation – and the pull of thinking in line 
with the abstracted context is countered. Our imagination will help us to textualize their collective 
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memory and the way in which they (are intended to) understand. We will embark now on two test 



























485 At the end of this Conclusion to Chapter 3, we can take a more fundamental or precise stance: when we 
claim that we can overcome the abstracted context which comes with text, this is relatively or gradually. Since 
the present study positions itself within the critical tradition and socio-cultural context of academia, it is highly 
indebted to the technology of reading. More so, the operational media and outcome of this particular research 
project is “text” – as activated by you in this very moment of reading these words on this page[!]. So the 
detextification of two concrete passages in Galatians as presented in the next Chapter, functions as autonomous 
text and comes with a necessarily abstracted context as well. The difference is that, by thematizing this given 
abstracted context of autonomous text, we can explicitly broaden it. The elements in the governing question push 
our understanding beyond the isolated level of text into the realm of history itself. In line with the golden rule of 
Walter Ong, we can scrutinize our abstractions on their level of concreteness. So, like Baron Munchausen, we 
can pull ourselves further out of the mire – but never fully. For that reason, we repeat that the proposed approach 
in the present study is heuristically motivated. The goal is to overcome possible confinements – notably the veil 
of text – and move beyond the functioning of the letter as text to us. This is what the examples in the next 




4. Detextification: Testcases in Galatians 2–3  
 
In this Chapter, I will present two examples of the proposed procedure of detextifying Paul’s letters: 
Gal 2.19–20 and 3.10–12. Both parts start with a presentation of relevant publications on the passages 
involved. The evaluation of these academic studies is according to the elements in the question which 
governs the practice of textualizing history: How does the letter function to whom, in what state of 
mind, and from whose perspective[s]? Attention is also paid to possible illustrations of the earlier 
introduced media muddle. Subsequently, we carry out a textualization of the two passages in line with 
the operational matrix as oral performance there-and-then-to-them.  
The first example revolves around how Paul reasons. The point of departure will be formed by a locus 
classicus, Gal 3.10–12:  
 
For all who rely on the works of the law are under a curse; for it is written, “Cursed is everyone who does not 
observe and obey all the things written in the book of the law.” Now it is evident that no one is justified 
before God by the law; for “The one who is righteous will live by faith.” But the law does not rest on faith; 
on the contrary, “Whoever does the works of the law will live by them.”  
 
In this somewhat laborious passage, one thing is clear: Paul is reasoning. He refers three times to 
phrases from the Jewish holy scriptures. In the scholarly community, the nature of this reasoning is 
identified as syllogistic. The two case studies will show that the coherency of this syllogistic logic, 
however, is not immediately evident. We will encounter free-floating and rather complicated proposals 
fleshed out on the level of text. In line with the proposed communicative structure of anticipated 
participation, we will attempt to textualize the originally intended understanding of this supposedly 
syllogistic reasoning. We start with this passage from Gal 3 because we will encounter traces of the 
underlying reasoning throughout Gal 2–3; it implies an overview of the rhetorical situation.  
This will be helpful in the second example, where an exposition will be given of Gal 2.19–20:  
 
For through the law I died to the law, so that I might live to God. I have been crucified with Christ; and it is 
no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me. And the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the 
Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me.  
 
In this somewhat mystical passage, several verbs are used referring to “dying” (3) and “living” (5). So 
a specific thematic matrix can be discerned. One has to look for how the intended audiences were 
anticipated by Paul to participate in this matrix. Radically, we will relate these terms to their 
sensorially based collective memory (Chapter 3). As a consequence, new light will be shed on the 
anticipated construal of thought at the moment of delivery.   
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A. Example 1: How does Paul reason in Gal 3.10–12?  
 
As stated before, Gal 3.10–12 is known for its complex or laboured reasoning. In his commentary, 
Martinus de Boer introduces remarks on the part of the letter to which 3.10–12 belongs as follows:  
 
Paul’s argumentation in this section resists systematization. The precise relation between the reception of the 
Spirit, believing, justification, and baptism into Christ remains largely inchoate and unarticulated, as does the 
precise relationship between promise, inheritance, descent from Abraham, and divine sonship. … Paul’s form 
of argumentation here is not systematic, but associative. 486  
 
This reading experience as described by de Boer can be explained by the mechanism of implicit 
equation and/or the media muddle in biblical scholarship (Introduction). Thus, we will pursue an 
explicit differentiation of media and mindsets or the two communicative processes involved: one in 
which we participate ourselves real-time (text) and one in which the original addressees were intended 
to participate (oral performance). First, two understandings of this passage will be reviewed.  
 
1. Moisés Mayordomo: Argumentiert Paulus logisch? 
In his monograph Argumentiert Paulus logisch? Eine Analyse vor dem Hintergrund antiker Logik, 
Moisés Mayordomo seeks to contribute to the clarification of the logic behind the reasoning of Paul.487 
His reconstruction of Gal 3.10–12 is first presented. According to his procedure of logical analysis, he 
begins with identifying the possible propositions in the text:488  
 
(6) Die Nomosmenschen sind unter einem Fluch. (3.10a)   NaK489 
(7) Jeder, der nicht alle Gebote erfüllt, ist ein Verfluchter. (3.10b)  OaK  
 
In the first proposition, we recognize the original wording: “For all who rely on the works of the law 
are under a curse” (Gal 3.10a).490 As is the case in the second: “for it is written, ‘Cursed is everyone 
who does not observe and obey all the things written in the book of the law’” (3.10b). Given this hotly 
debated verse, Mayordomo argues: “Wenn sich die Aussage in 3.10a aus der Aussage 3.10b logisch 
 
486 Martinus C. de Boer, Galatians: A Commentary, NTL (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 168.  
487 Moisés Mayordomo, Argumentiert Paulus logisch? Eine Analyse vor dem Hintergrund antiker Logik, 
WUNT 188 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005). 
488 Mayordomo, Argumentiert Paulus, 151. 
489 Since his attempt is governed by formal logic, Mayordomo uses term place holders (capitals) and infix 
operators (lowercase letters). The former designate the middle term, predicate (or major term) and subject 
(minor term). The latter indicate the categories of universal affirmative (a), universal negative (e), particular 
affirmative (i) or particular negative (o). In this particular layout, capital O refers to the middle term, N to the 
subject, and K involves the predicate of the conclusion. Therefore, NaK involves the conclusion, and OaK 
entails the major premise. As a result, the minor premise would be then implicit in this reasoning of Paul. See 
Simon Blackburn, “Syllogism,” in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Simon Blackburn, 2nd ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996) 
490 Unless otherwise specified, all biblical quotations are taken from the NRSV. 
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herleiten soll, dann muss eine Zusatzprämisse hinzugedacht warden” (emphasis original).491 He does 
not indicate who should supply or add this extra premise: Does he mean the original addressees caught 
up in the aural event or the present-day reader vis-à-vis the letter as text? “To whom” – as an element 
of the governing question – is not problematized. This observation is in line with the other element of 
“from whose perspective[s].” We get the impression that, due to the implicit equation of “letter” and 
“text,” he himself is in the process of coming to understand vis-à-vis text. This means that the 
communicative process in actu lays beyond critical awareness. 
Let us now focus more closely on the analysis of Mayordomo. First, he notices that Gal 3.10b conveys 
an explicit quotation (Deut 27.26). He states that, as a consequence, this proposition has to function as 
a Scripture proof (premise). Thus the implicit presupposition is that when “the Scripture” is used, it 
has the function and status of a proof. He does not explain or explicate why or how, to whom, in what 
state of mind or from whose perspective[s] this is the case.492 In the ever-expanding universe of text – 
especially in combination with a Christian background – “Scripture” functions as the highest in 
ranking. This ultimate text among all other texts seems to absolutize the functioning of the media 
involved. Second, he identifies three terms (O, K, and N) in the two propositions which constitute Gal 
3.10. In verse 10b, term K is repeated (to be cursed). Since this term is constitutive of the Scripture 
proof, K has to be identified as the major term. For that reason, he construes the implicit minor 
premise as NaO. What is important here is that this premise is not found on the level of the text in the 
documented wording. He subsequently does not explicate where we could locate this premise, other 
than it not being present on the level of text, although ideally, this should have been the case.  
Mayordomo comes to the following formal reconstruction of the syllogistic reasoning in Gal 3.10 (this 
is the Barbara model493): 
 
 OaK (7) Jeder Gesetzesübertreter ist ein Verfluchter.    (3.10b) 
 NaO Jeder Nomosmensch ist einer, der nicht alle Gebote erfüllt.        
 NaK (6) Jeder Nomosmensch ist verflucht.     (3.10a) 
 
 
491 Mayordomo, Argumentiert Paulus, 159. 
492 In his “Reticentia in der Argumentation: Gal 3.10–12 als Stipatio Enthymematum,” in Das Urchristentum 
in seiner literarischen Geschichte: Festschrift für Jürgen Becker zum 65. Geburtstag, BZNW 100, ed. Ulrich 
Mell and Ulrich B. Müller (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), 27–39, Peter Lampe has the same presupposition: 
“Ferner nimmt Wunder, inwiefern das Schriftzitat 3.12b den Vordersatz 3.12a zu begründen vermag. 
Offensichtlich soll ein Begründungszusammenhang hergestellt werden. Denn warum sonst zitiert Paulus in 3.12b 
noch einmal autoritative Schrift?” (27–8, emphasis mine). Also, as discussed in the next section, Michael 
Bachmann, “Zur Argumentation von Gal. 3.10-12,” NTS 53 (2007): 524–44 values these quotations as 
“Axiome” (537). 
493 In this field, the types of syllogistic structures or possible forms are named. Each name indicates a 
particular syllogistic structure. Barbara involves the structure of AAA-1 and can be seen as the basic structure. 
These three capitals (A) indicate that the major premise, minor premise and conclusion are all universal 
affirmative. The number (1) refers to the first of four (or three) figures that provide the possible structures within 
syllogistic reasoning. Figure one has the following structure. Major premise: middle term – predicate; minor 
premise: subject – middle term; conclusion: subject – predicate. Therefore, in the layout of Mayordomo, O 
involves the middle term, K involves the predicate, and N entails the subject.   
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He then identifies two problems: First, “die Frage was diese implizite Prämisse aussagt, ist keine 
Frage der Logik, sondern der Exegese” (emphasis original).494 This implicit premise NaO causes a 
considerable exegetical problem. Regarding the historical or rhetorical situation, it appears to be 
contradictory: “Die Prämisse in V. 10, dass kein Gesetzesmensch alle Gebote erfüllt, ist gerade im 
Rahmen allgemeiner jüdischer Vorstellungen über den Bund und den Segen der Vergebung kaum 
einsichtig.”495 Second, he draws attention to the question of how the first conjunction γάρ in Gal 3.10a 
functions. In line with his specific procedure he has to reason:  
 
Wenn es in seiner vollen begründenden Funktion ernst genommen werden soll, dan würde das heißen, dass in 
3.10 eine Prämisse gefunden werden muss, die einen Schluss auf 3.9 erlaubt; d.h.: ‘Weil alle 
Gesetzesmenschen unter einem Fluch stehen, sind die Glaubensmenschen gesegnet.’ Ein solcher Schluss ist 
nur sehr schwer zu rekonstruieren.496  
 
Notwithstanding this difficulty that the premise in Gal 3.10 is lacking to affirm the conclusion as 
perceived by him in Gal 3.9, he presents a reconstruction (Camestres model497): 
 
 KaN Alle Verfluchten sind Nomosmenschen.     (Das sagt 3.10  
nicht aus!) 
 PeN Kein Glaubensmensch ist ein Nomosmensch.   (vgl. 3.12a) 
 PeK Kein Glaubensmensch ist verflucht.    (3.9            
umgewandelt) 
 
Mayordomo remarks that this reconstruction is implausible; in his own words: “Das sagt 3.10 nicht 
aus!” For him the conjunction γάρ cannot function in this way. He concludes: “Der Übergang von 6–9 
zu 10–12 weist logische Brüche auf,”498 and later on: “Der Übergang von V. 9 zu V. 10 (mit dem 
irreführenden einleitenden γάρ in V. 10) ist nicht klar.”499 His proposal also does not explain the 
disturbed order, which he addresses: the major premise is located in verse 10, the minor premise in 
verse 12a and the conclusion should be found in verse 9. 
Proceeding to Gal 3.11–12, he starts with the following presupposition: “Wieder ist das erste 
Schriftzitat als Prämisse zu lessen.”500 Once again – without argumentation on “how,” “to whom,” and 
“in what mindset” – the words from the Jewish scriptures (Gal 3.11b) are designated as a premise. In 
search of possible propositions in Gal 3.11–12, he remarks: “Die Formalisierung der beiden Sätze in 
 
494 Mayordomo, Argumentiert Paulus, 160.  
495 Ibid., 166. 
496 Ibid., 160. 
497 This syllogism has the structure of AEO-2: The major premise is universal affirmative, the minor premise 
is universal negative, and the conclusion is particular negative. The second figure has the following structure. 
Major premise: predicate – middle term; minor premise: subject – middle term; conclusion: subject – predicate. 
When we compare this layout with the one of Mayordomo, his conclusion seems to be universal instead of 
particular negative. However, he argues that “beide Verse lässt sich in der zweiten Figur (Camestres) mit einer 
Implikation herstellen” (160).    
498 Mayordomo, Argumentiert Paulus, 161. 
499 Ibid., 165. 
500 Ibid., 152.   
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V. 12 ist deswegen schwer, weil ein Mittelterm kaum auffindbar ist” (152). Five possible propositions 
are found by him. We notice that the propositions as phrased in lines 11a and 11b are both based on 
one and the same verse, Gal 3.12b: 
 
 (8) Kein Gesetzesmensch ist ein von Gott Gerechtfertigter. (3.11a) NeD 
 (9) Der Gerecht(fertigt)e ist ein aus Glauben Lebender. (3.11b)  DaP 
 (10) Kein Nomos(mensch) ist ein Glaubens(mensch). (3.12a)  NeP 
 (11a) Der Nomosmensch ist ein Tatmensch. (3.12b)   NaT 
 (11b) Der Tatmensch ist ein Lebender. (3.12b)    TaZ 
  
To reach a syllogistic figure, he has to rearrange lines 8, 9 and 10 as 9, 10 and 8 (Camestres):  
 
 DaP (9) Der Gerechtfertigte ist ein Glaubensmensch.  (11b) 
 NeP (10) Kein Nomosmensch ist ein Glaubensmensch  (vgl. 12a) 
 NeD (8) Kein Nomosmensch ist ein Gerechtfertigter.   (11a) 
 
In a way, Mayordomo feels forced to rearrange the originally documented sequence of verses. Line 
11a and 11b – which are both paraphrases of Gal 3.12b – do not fit in this reconstruction. He states: 
“Die Funktion von 12b ist nicht ganz deutlich.” While not elaborating on this obscurity as such, he 
turns to other scholars and how they understand this verse: “Gerne wird das Zitat als direkte 
Begründung von 12a gelesen.” Thus, this apparent quotation from Scripture is in general conceived as 
a proof and, therefore, premise for syllogistic reasoning. Contrary to his earlier approach to Deut 27.26 
(Gal 3.10b), he argues now – remarkably regarding Gal 3.12b – against this presupposition: “Dagegen 
dürfte aber der Anschluss mit ἀλλά (statt γάρ oder ὁτι) sprechen.” He draws the following implicit 
conclusion: Paul’s use of this adversative (ἀλλά) instead of causal conjunction (γάρ/ὁτι) excludes the 
possibility or – at least – plausibility that Gal 3.12b can function as a premise. Asking the relevant 
parts of the governing question – to whom and from whose perspective does it mean? – clarifies the 
free-floating nature of Mayordomo’s line of reasoning. He himself, as reading subject vis-à-vis text 
here-and-now in academia, attempts to construe a fitting syllogism on the level of text. He continues, 
 
Das Schriftzitat aus Lev 18.5 [as found in Gal 3.12b] kann vielmehr als ‘Definition’ dessen verstanden 
werden, was einen ‘Nomosmenschen’ ausmacht … Offenbar möchte die Argumentation darauf hinaus, Tun 
(12b) und Glauben (11b) streng als zwei ‘Lebenswege’ voneinander zu trennen. Logisch lässt sich jedoch 
daraus nichts ableiten.  
 
Since these considerations are exegetical in nature, they exceed his original agenda of a strictly logical 
analysis. Notwithstanding his rejection of Gal 3.12b as premise, his agenda apparently compels him to 




501 Ibid., 161.  
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 TeP  Kein Tatmensch ist ein Glaubensmensch.    (unde?) 
 NaT (11a) Jeder Nomosmensch ist ein Tatmensch.   (3.12b) 
 NeP (10) Kein Nomosmensch ist ein Glaubensmensch.  (12a) 
 
Necessarily, this major premise has to be implied by him in line with his analytical approach. It leads 
to a separation between “doing” and “believing.” He has to conclude, “Die strikte Trennung in V. 12 
von Tun und Glauben wird nirgends begründet.”  
The paraphrase of verse 11b on the one who will live (for example, line 9 “aus Glauben Lebender”) 
has not been integrated in this syllogistic reconstruction of Gal 3.12b. Presupposed by his own agenda, 
however, all the terms and phrases should have fallen into place. These reconstructions uncover, 
according to himself, a problematic reasoning: “Nach meiner Wahrnehmung ‘rettet’ das Kerygma die 
Argumentation dort, wo sie am schwächsten wird, bzw. wo sie nicht weiter begründet werden kann: 
Handeln und Glauben sind zwei unterschiedliche Prinzipien.” 
In this respect, also another evaluative remark can be made. We observed not only the necessity of 
rearranging almost all the lines in Gal 3.6–14 (except for verses 6–7), but also this specific procedure 
as such is not justified. He just does so. Regarding the anticipated participation of the original 
addressees, this implies that nearly all the time they have to relate the propositions in a different 
sequence to each other than the one in which these phrases reach their ears in the moment of delivery. 
More so, while rearranging the position of these propositions, they also have to figure out at the same 
time whether they function as premise or conclusion in the syllogism. How could they have been able 
to do so? In this respect, the rule as formulated by David Rhoads is highly relevant: Could the 
formulations on the level of text, as presented by biblical scholars in their publications, be 
understandable for the originally intended addressees with their specific mindset in the actual moment 
of delivery (see Chapter 2, Section H. David Rhoads: Biblical Performance Criticism)? No answer is 
given by Mayordomo. A fundamental question arises: Why would Paul encode his reasoning in such a 
laborious way when it should serve the higher end of regaining influence over his hearers? Why 
pursue such an annoying and alienating path to fulfil such a straightforward rhetorical goal?  
This becomes obvious in a concluding consideration on the logic of Gal 3.6–12: “Dass aber Prämissen 
rekonstruiert werden, die u.U. nicht auf allgemeine Akzeptanz hoffen durften, macht die 
Argumentation nicht unlogisch, sondern schwächt höchstens im konkreten Kommunikationskontext 
ihre persuasive Kraft.”502 This comment appears to be a loose end. First, he provides reconstructions of 
the formal logic on the level of text. A posteriori and secondarily, these extra-historical reconstructions 
are read into the historical context in which they should have functioned. We recognize – but now in 
reversed order – the turn from production to product. We can conclude that this final remark reveals 
that the intended addressees and their specific way of participating in the delivery of the letter do not 
 
502 Ibid., 166.  
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validate his own decoding process. So, in this approach, the context is subservient to understanding the 
text as autonomous text (Chapter 3).  
At the end, Mayordomo concludes, “Im konkreten Fall von Gal 3.6–12 lässt sich eine logische 
Argumentation nur mit unausgesprochenen Hilfsprämissen rekonstruieren.”503 Here the adverb nur 
(only) makes clear that Paul’s reasoning cannot live up to the expectations of the present-day reader. 
Mayordomo’s intellectual endeavour ends in confusion: “Besonders verwirrend sind die 
stillschweigende Gleichsetzungen, die hinter der Argumentation immer wieder vorgenommen werden. 
Die vertauschung von Subjekt und Objekt wäre zwar ein logischer Fehler, aber es ist ebenso möglich, 
ein wirkliches Überzeugungssystem (wenn auch ein recht eigensinniges) dahinter zu vermuten.” And 
because of these confusions, he adds, “Gal 3.6–14 zeigt jedoch deutliche Grenzen solcher 
Konstruktionen.”504  
Two critical issues come to mind. First, what is the reason that Paul does not provide a clear and 
inevitable reasoning on the level of the text of his letter? How do we know that echoes from the 
Jewish scriptures must function as a premise for the originally intended addressees? More so, why did 
the apostle compose a logically inferior “text”? Second, why does Mayordomo not come to the point 
of critically questioning his own perspective on “formal logic”? Is logical analysis per se bound to the 
objectified text of the letter? Or – as will be the case in the alternative view below – should the implied 
logic in the oral performance (media) be placed against the background of a predominantly oral culture 
(mindset)?505 A meta-perspective on the media and mindset of his own concrete academic lifeworld is 
missing; it lays beyond critical awareness. Unintentionally, his approach of the letter suffers from 
textification (see, Introduction, Caution to the reader #4). 
 
2. Michael Bachmann: Zur Argumentation von Galater 3.10–12 
In his article “Zur Argumentation von Galater 3.10–12,” Michael Bachmann wants to achieve the 
following objective:506 “mit mehr oder weniger formalen Beobachtungen eine These zur 
Gedankenfolge in Gal 3.10–12 . . . zu entwickeln.”507 He puts forward the thesis of a construction 
(Ineinanderfügung) of two syllogisms that commence with their conclusion (“mit jeweils 
voranstehender proposition”) so that the following phrases have to offer the proof in reversed order 
(“von hinten nach vorne”):508 
 
503 Ibid., 164–5. 
504 Ibid., 165. 
505 In particular, the qualification “besonders verwirrend” illuminates the unreflected relationship of 
Mayordomo to the letter as text. He does not explicate “to whom” these implicit synonyms (stillschweigende 
Gleichsetzungen) are confusing. This is the case for him as present-day reader. He does not reconstruct how the 
originally intended addressees would have participated in the event of delivery there-and-then. 
506 Michael Bachmann, “Zur Argumentation von Gal 3.10–12,” NTS 53 (2007): 524–44. 
507 Bachmann, “Zur Argumentation,” 526. 
508 Ibid., 537. 
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Diese Verkettung, bei der die Prämissen die Korrektheit der propositio sozusagen von hinten nach vorne 
absichern, fußt … auf vorgegebenen Formulierungen, genauer: auf drei von Paulus in recht spezifischer 
Weise zitierten Schriftworten … Sie werden vom Apostel … als wahr eingeschätzt. … Dabei kommt Gal 
3.11a eine doppelte Funktion zu: Es handelt sich einerseits um die durch den hinten plazierten Syllogismus 
V. 11–12 abgesichterte Aussage, um dessen propositio … Andererseits gehört V. 11a nicht allein (als 
propositio) zu diesem Syllogismus ... Vielmehr ist V. 11a auch dem vorangehenden Syllogismus 
zuzurechnen ... hier indes als Prämisse.509  
 
Bachmann presents his thesis in the form of a layout in which he follows the sequence of the originally 
documented wording, but represents the syllogisms by starting with the conclusion:510 
  
Gal. 3.10a:  Jeder, der aus Werken/Einzelregelungen des Gesetzes ist, ist ein Verfluchter.  
Gal 3.10b: Jeder Verletzer von (mindestens einer der) Einzelregelungen des Gesetzes ist ein 
Verfluchter [s. Dtn 27.26]. 
Gal 3.11a:  Jeder, der im Gesetz/aus Werken/Einzelregelungen des Gesetzes ist, ist Verletzer von  
(mindestens einer der) Einzelregelungen des Gesetzes [s. Gal 3.11b–12]. 
 
Gal 3.11a: Jeder, der im Gesetz/aus Werken/Einzelregelungen des Gesetzes ist, ist nicht ein 
Gerechter  
Gal 3.11b:  Jeder Gerechte wird leben/ist aus Glauben [s. Hab 2.4]. 
Gal 3.12a(–b): Jeder, der im Gesetz/aus Werken/Einzelregelungen des Gesetzes ist, ist nicht aus 
Glauben (sondern wird leben in/ist aus Einzelregelungen des Gesetzes) [vgl. Lev 18.5] 
(539). 
 
Regarding this proposal, we ask once more: How, to whom, in what mindset, and from whose 
perspective do “propositio,” “Prämisse,” and “doppelte Funktion” mean here? First, we must critically 
scrutinize the reasoning itself. Since a preliminary discussion of the possibly different media 
functionings of the letter illic et tunc pro eis and hic et nunc pro nobis is not found (Chapter 3), we 
take it that the “mehr oder weniger formalen Beobachtungen” seem to be identified by him on the 
level of the letter approached as text. Also, the formulation “zur Gedankenfolge in Gal 3.10–12” 
implies that thought is related neither to Paul in the process of composition nor to his addressees in the 
aural event, but it is located “in Gal 3.10–12”; it seems to affirm that the letter as an independent 
media has to speak for itself – to everyone, everywhere, and every time in the same way.  
Second, Bachmann presents both syllogisms as in reversed order. The implied audience, however, 
does not receive any indication of this reversal. His justification is the following: “Syllogismen 
werden umgekehrt antiken Menschen recht gut vertraut sein.”511 Although not uncommon in antiquity, 
we do not hear what the reason is that the apostle has reversed the standard order in these instances.   
Not only the reversed orders but, in particular, how the two syllogisms are intertwined requires 
consideration. In this double function, Gal 3.11a has to serve as closing MinP (not C) of the first 
syllogism and as opening C (not MajP) of the second one. The situation of the original addressees is 
 
509 Ibid., 537–8. 
510 In the present study, the following abbreviations will be used for the basic structure of syllogistic 
reasonings: the major premise will be referred to as MajP, the minor premise as MinP, and the conclusion as C. 
511 Bachmann, “Zur Argumentation,” 544. 
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even more complex. Bachmann has to rephrase Gal 3.11a (the one who is rectified) as C to make it 
(transgressor) function as MinP: at one and the same moment, the implied audience has to actively 
hear in the “(nicht) Gerechter” of Gal 3.11a an echo of the “Verletzer” in Gal 3.10bA. Once more, the 
criterion of David Rhoads on the comprehensibility of a presented exegesis for the originally intended 
hearers in the moment of delivery comes to mind (Section H. in Chapter 2) 
Since Bachmann needs to flesh out two paraphrases of Gal 3.11a on the level of his text to grasp this 
particularly intricate reasoning, not only an extremely high level of abstraction is required, but the role 
of the independently functioning media of text is quintessential in his approach. 
Bachmann himself comments in the following way: “Diese These zur Argumentation von 3.10–12 
kommt also ohne die Annahme von impliziten Prämissen aus und ist insofern von dem 
Rekonstruktionsversuch P. Lampes deutlich zu unterscheiden, aber auch von dem jüngst durch M. 
Mayordomo vorgelegten” (emphasis mine).512 The German adverb also (therefore) distinguishes his 
proposal from those of Moisés Mayordomo and Peter Lampe. The strength of his proposal lies in this 
lack of implicit premises; all the components of the syllogisms are explicit and are identified on the 
level of the text. This reflects the fact that the letter has to live up to the expectations typical of an 
autonomous text.513  
At the end of the article, Bachmann quite unexpectedly turns to the perspective of the intended 
addressees there-and-then: “Ob das Schriftgelehrte Argument von Gal 3.10–12 – und näherem 
Kontext – seitens der Adressaten als überzeugend empfunden worden ist, lässt sich natürlich schwer 
sagen.”514 Notwithstanding incidental remarks on the rather abstracted level of “Juden,” 
“Judenchristen,” and “Heidenchristen,” he does not bring in the originally implied addressees in his 
own processing of Gal 3.10–12. That the Galatian addressees could have understood in a way that is 
different from ours is not suggested at any moment; it seems to be excluded from the start. His own 
freischwebende syllogistic reasonings – explicated and made accessible in the presented layouts in his 
own text – seem to crash like asteroids into the historical realm of the intended addressees there-and-
then.  
In an illuminating manner, we observe here that the context (“Addresaten”) is only invoked after the 
text itself has been understood by him as such. The approach and product of Bachmann are governed 
by the text-context scheme. In this reconstruction, the biblical scholar is acting in real time as 
 
512 Ibid., 538. 
513 It is important to note that Bachmann completely passes over the explicit argumentation of Lampe on the 
reason behind these Brachylogien – and, therefore, the absence of certain parts in the reasoning. This explication 
is found in the second part of Lampe’s “Reticentia in der Argumentation”: “Die ausgeführte Syllogismus-Form 
stand in der Gefahr, sterbenslangweilig zu sein, so daβ sie besonders im polemisch spritzigen Galaterbrief nich 
paβte” (37) and – with references to Quintilian – “Solange die Beweisführung durchsichtig blieb (perspicua), 
durfte der Schreiber nach Galatiën in Brachylogie davonstürmen” (38). In the first part of his article, Lampe 
concludes on his presentation of the enthymematic reasoning in Gal 3.10–12: “Hat Paulus in 3.10–12 das 
akzeptable Maβ der Auslassung (detractio/reticentia) überschritten und seine antiken Leser bereits überfordert?” 
(35).    
514 Mayordomo, “Zur Argumentation,” 543–4. 
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“knowing subject” in the communicative process as constituted by the letter as autonomous text in the 
context of the ever-expanding universe of text. Having finished and presented his understanding in 
text, he turns to the original addressees with his objectified layouts. This is an illuminating observation 
regarding the goals of this research project. As an example of historicizing text, one can ask, Why 
does Bachmann not integrate the two syllogisms as such in the whole of Paul’s rhetoric? What is the 
reason for the apostle to use syllogistic reasoning in the first place? Since Bachmann limits the 
presence of syllogistic reasoning to this passage, we further enquire as to why he uses it all of a sudden 
and only here in this ongoing and already intricate reasoning, and why this reasoning presents itself to 
us present-day readers in this laborious way. How would Paul have anticipated the participation of his 
original addressees?  
In recapitulation, neither Mayordomo nor Bachmann relate their search for the syllogistically 
structured reasoning to the implied audience (to whom) nor do they distinguish between logical 
reasoning on the level of text and in the participatory realm of history there-and-then-to-them (in what 
state of mind). Uncritically, “text” is approached as operating autonomously or text in se (how).515 The 
following discrepancy is involved: clearly, their incidental historical considerations are related to 
historical people other than themselves, that is, Jews, Christian Jews, Gentiles, and the implied 
Galatian converts (context). It has become clear in the previous analyses, however, that in an 
unreflected way the “text” (the letter) is related to themselves in the activity of reading (in the present). 
Once again, the fallacy of implicit equation or unintentional textification is at issue. Since the 
transmitted document is perceived as autonomous text, how both scholars come to understand it 
usurps how the implied audience would have understood it in the moment of oral performance. We 
will now pursue the governing question: How does the reasoning function to whom, in what state of 
mind, and from whose perspective[s]?  
 
3. An alternative grasp: Gal 3.10–12 as enthymematic reasoning 
In line with the intellectual movement of historicizing text, we have to contextualize syllogistic 
reasoning – from the perspective of Paul in the process of composing: In what way are the originally 
intended addressees familiar with syllogistic reasoning in general? Who used this kind of reasoning 
 
515 The same can be concluded regarding Lampe’s “Reticentia in der Argumentation.” Notwithstanding the 
argument on the enthymeme as oratorius syllogismus (37), he implicitly equates the letter with “Text,” Paul with 
“der Schreiber nach Galatiën,” and the Galatian converts with “die (antike?) Leser.” The Galatian converts, their 
concrete lifeworld, the oral delivery or these other teachers are not mentioned at all by him. The reasoning as a 
whole remains rather abstracted. We see this in relation to the apparent contradiction between Gal 3.10a en 10b. 
Namely, it can be solved “[n]ur dann, wenn stillschweigend ein weiterer Gedanke mitgedacht wird: ‘Niemand 
erfüllt alle Gebote faktisch” (29). From the perspective of the present study, the question of anticipated 
participation should be asked now: On what basis can Paul reckon his addressees to fill in this typical 
(Protestant) though implicit premise in the moment of delivery of Gal 3.10? Differently put, how should they – 
as a community – have come to this premise? When, why, and in what way did this process of internalization 
take place?     
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there-and-then? Under what circumstances or on what occasions was this common? Did the Galatian 
converts reason themselves in that way? Could they have been impressed by this kind of rhetoric? 
Contrary to the abstracted context which comes with text, we relate this reasoning to their collective 
memory: What is already known to them of this particular reasoning? In his former performances, had 
Paul been teaching his Galatian converts with the help of syllogisms, and, perhaps, even specifically 
the ones mentioned in the letter? What role did this rhetorical device play in the teaching of his 
opponents? In this respect, we recall the dynamic of metonymy as well (Chapter 3): What did they 
need to hear (partes/structural elements) to construe the totum? What is the function of this kind of 
reasoning in the intended oral performance? An obvious question comes to the fore: Why does Paul 
want to reason in this way? Regarding the letter as counter rhetoric, we will explore the possibility that 
the apostle is reacting to his adversaries: When the other teachers used syllogistic reasoning (framing), 
in what way does Paul counter the impact of this specific rhetoric? How does one reframe an 
internalized and given syllogism in the setting of an oral performance? As argued before, asking such 
questions is more important than answering them. We need to historicize text to be able to textualize 
the oral performance there-and-then-to-them of the documented wording in Gal 3.10–12.  
 
Not logical but rhetorical syllogisms: Enthymeme 
When we do not explicitly differentiate the media and mindsets involved, the fundamental differences 
between participation in the realm of history there-and-then-to-them and the one of extra-historical 
thought will not become clear. When syllogistic reasoning is located on the level of text and becomes, 
therefore, equated with freischwebendes Denken, the nature of the former is fixed from the start. As a 
consequence, bound to the media of autonomous text, the common distinction between logical 
(formal) and rhetorical syllogisms will be out of consideration. Already before the days of Paul this 
distinction was heard. In On Rhetoric 1.2.8–13, Aristotle argued as follows:  
 
In the case of persuasion through proving or seeming to prove something, just as in dialectic there is … the 
syllogism and the apparent syllogism, so the situation is similar in rhetoric; for … the enthymema [is] a 
syllogism … Thus it is necessary for an enthymeme … to be … drawn from few premises and often less than 
those of the primary syllogism; for if one of these is known, it does not have to be stated, since the hearer 
supplies it: for example, [to show] that Dorieus has won a contest with a crown it is enough to have said that 
he has won the Olympic games, and there is no need to add that the Olympic games have a crown as the 
prize; for everybody knows that (emphasis mine).516 
 
The logical syllogism functions in the technical setting of formal logic (as, for example, in the 
approach of Mayordomo), whereas the rhetorical one functions in the real-time setting of oratory. We 
recognize different elements from the governing question of textualizing history. Contrary to the 
 
516 Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. with introduction, notes and appendices by 
George A. Kennedy, 2nd ed. (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 42. 
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implied generalized reader (to whom/in what state of mind) of text (how), Aristotle relates the 
enthymeme (how) to “the hearer” as the specifically intended participant (to whom); when premises 
(explicit parts) are known to the hearer, they should not be expressed “since the hearer supplies it” (in 
what state of mind). In the explanatory remark that “the Olympic games have a crown as prize; for 
everybody knows,” the dimension of collective memory comes to the fore (in what state of mind) – 
which implies the dynamic of pars pro toto. So enthymematic reasoning is structured by explicit parts 
presupposing an implied whole (the syllogistic structure), on the one hand, and is meant to persuade 
the audience on the other.517  
Given this emphasis on the end of rhetorical syllogistic reasoning, we can turn to the article by David 
Aune, “The Use and Abuse of the Enthymeme in New Testament Scholarship.”518 He comments on 
the word “syllogism” in Aristotle’s On Rhetoric:  
 
The conventional rendering of συλλογισμός as ‘syllogism’ . . . is problematic, however, for it obscures the 
important difference between deduction and syllogism which has led to misunderstandings of Aristotle’s 
logic; συλλογισμός regularly means ‘deduction’ or ‘deductive argument’ in Aristotle and almost never 
‘syllogism’ in the technical sense.519  
 
Formal syllogisms serve a different purpose than in the context of (oral) rhetoric. Aune remarks, 
“While dialectical syllogisms are either valid or invalid, rhetorical syllogisms are either convincing or 
unconvincing.”520 Therefore, the decisive question is whether the presented reasoning is convincing to 
the participants in the oral performance there-and-then or not – that is, not to us here-and-now in our 
predominantly literate mindset vis-à-vis text. 
 
Opponents: “Message” or “rhetoric”?  
When it is of utmost importance that Paul’s reasoning is convincing to his audience, according to the 
structure of rhetoric and counter rhetoric, our attention is drawn to these other teachers once more. In 
Gal 1.7 and 6.12 we encounter fierce polemic: “not that there is another gospel, but there are some 
who are confusing you and want to pervert the gospel of Christ” and “It is those who want to make a 
good showing in the flesh that try to compel you to be circumcised – only that they may not be 
 
517 In his article “Reticentia in der Argumentation,” Lampe presents the following framing of enthymeme: 
“Das Enthymema stellt eine verkürzte, logisch unvollkommene, aber akzeptable Form des Syllogismus dar. In C. 
Iulius Victors Ars Rhetorica heiβt es: Im Enthymema, ‘einen unvollkommenen Syllogismus,’ ‘ist es nicht nötig, 
zuerst zu behaupten, dann Beweise anzuführen und endlich zu schlieβen (concludere), sondern er wird gestattet 
sein, entweder die anfängliche Behauptung auszulassen … oder doch wenigstens die Schluβfolgerung 
(conclusio) wegzulassen und es den Sinnen des Richters [also des Hörers] zu überlassen, die Folgerung 
zusammenzusammeln (colligere)’” (28).   
518 David E. Aune, “The Use and Abuse of the Enthymeme in New Testament Scholarship,” NTS 49 (2003): 
299–320. 
519 Aune, “Use and Abuse,” 302–3. 
520 Ibid., 305.  
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persecuted for the cross of Christ.” In the historical-critical tradition the question on the identity of 
these teachers has come to the fore: Who were these people? 
We step back here. When we textualize the preceding section we can ask, How, to whom, in what state 
of mind, and from whose perspective does this looked for “identity” mean? In all elements, the 
question is answered in line with the functioning of autonomous text to us. The present-day reader or 
biblical scholar wants to know and elaborate on this identity through and on the level of text. When we 
textualize history there-and-then-to-them, contrariwise the original addressees should have been overly 
familiar with these other teachers. Given their presence and performances, the “knowledge” of the 
Galatian converts is participatory and uncritical in nature (Chapter 3). For them, there is no need to ask 
this question; they know them beyond critical awareness. We should keep this explicit differentiation 
in mind. 
In the debate on the identity of Paul’s opponents in Pauline scholarship, several proposals have been 
put forward.521 This quest has followed the difficult path of mirror-reading the letter. The main 
problem is that if one perceives the letter – whether in the functioning of a text or in the setting of an 
oral performance/public reading – as a re-action of Paul to dissociate the Galatian communities from 
these teachers, the images of these adversaries have to be considered unreliable almost by definition. 
As a scholar here-and-now one needs an unbiased entrance there-and-then to these teachers.  
In his article “Mirror-Reading a Polemical Letter: Galatians as a Test Case,” John Barclay structures 
his thoughts in such a way that we can get more solid ground under our feet in the realm of history 
there-and-then-to-them:  
 
We must take into account, that Paul is likely to caricature his opponents ... This is not to say that Paul could 
have wholly misrepresented his opponents and their message. If he was attempting to persuade the Galatians 
to abandon the ‘other gospel,’ what he says about it must have been both recognizable and plausible in their 
ears.522  
 
Contrary to providing a caricature of these teachers, Paul cannot completely distort their “message” – 
as argued before we prefer the notion of “rhetoric.”523 Given the implied dynamic between rhetorician 
 
521 For an overview see Jerry L. Sumney, “Studying Paul’s Opponents: Advances and Challenges,” in Paul 
and His Opponents, PAST 2, ed. Stanley E. Porter (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 17–24; Ian J. Elmer, Paul, Jerusalem, 
and the Judaisers: The Galatian Crises in its Broader Historical Context (PhD diss., Australian Catholic 
University, 2007), 12–37.   
522 John M.G. Barclay, “Mirror-Reading a Polemical Letter: Galatians as a Test Case,” JSNT 31 (1987): 73–
93; 76. 
523 We hold this preference for the following reasons: First, we encounter as a rule the term “message” on the 
level of text and, therefore, in the ever-expanding universe of text. When this context is not explicated, 
“message” will also be perceived to function as “text” – recall not only the earlier addressed implicit equation 
but also the statement of Eco that the message is usually a text (Introduction). Second, on the level of text and 
the extra-historical, thought as such is also structured by the content-form scheme. According to this scheme, 
“message” is categorized as “content.” As a consequence, the “message” (content) can exist independent from 
“form,” that is, the media in actu. Also in this way, “message” tends towards freischwebendes Denken and – 
fleshed out on the level of text – can become an end in itself. Conversely, “rhetoric” is a historical means more 
than an extra-historical end – that is, an end in itself mirrored and grasped on the level of text. This critical 
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and audience, the emphasis is on the effect by the former on the latter. Traditionally, this effect is 
constituted by pathos, ethos, and logos. Therefore, the rhetoric of Paul’s opponents includes a logical 
dimension. At the moment the letter is delivered, this logical, reasonable dimension is dominant. So 
the apostle has to do justice to the logical dimension in the “rhetoric” of his opponents to counter the 
impact on his Galatian converts. In this dimension, we find solid ground to portray the identity and 
teachings of these other teachers there-and-then, which has to be textualized by us: the logos enables 
us to textualize aspects of their presence and performances.  
 
Criteria to mirror-read the Letter to the Galatians (Barclay) 
In his article, Barclay provides seven criteria to determine the outcome of mirror-reading the Letter to 
the Galatians. The first five criteria are bound to the level of the documented wording. The first 
criterion is designated as type of utterance. He distinguishes between an assertion, a denial, a 
command, and a prohibition. Regarding each type of utterance, a scale is presented which ranges from 
at least up to at most. For example, concerning the utterance of a denial he writes,  
 
If Paul makes a denial, we may assume that, at least, those whom he addresses may be prone to regard what 
he denies as true, and at most, someone has explicitly asserted it; again between these two extremes there is a 
range of other possibilities.  
 
Thus, he textualizes the range of possible scenarios in Paul’s anticipated participation of the audience 
in that specific moment of delivery. The second criterion is tone. The range is set between the urgency 
of a statement and a casual mentioning of an issue. Regarding emphasis, “we may conclude that he 
[Paul] perceives this to be an important and perhaps central issue.” The third criterion is frequency: “If 
Paul repeatedly returns to the same theme it is clearly important for him; conversely, an occasional 
remark probably signals what he considers to be only a side-issue.” The fourth one is clarity which is 
related to reconstructing statements of these teachers. So, reconstructions should neither hinge on 
ambiguous words or contested textual problems, nor be based on polemically distorted depictions of 
his adversaries. In this way, these possible sound groups (themes) and phrases (reasonings), which 
originate from these other teachers, should be clear. The fifth criterion is unfamiliarity:  
 
While taking into account our limited knowledge of Paul’s theology, we may be entitled to consider the 
presence of an unfamiliar motif in Paul’s letter as a reflection of a particular feature in the situation he is 
responding to.524  
 
 
exposé of a term like “message” is once more an example of how decisions on vocabulary or terminology are 
part of the critical process of textualizing history (Introduction). 
524 Barclay, “Mirror-Reading,” 84. 
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Familiar themes are related to “Paul’s theology,” but unfamiliar themes are related to “a particular 
feature in the situation he is responding to.” We critically note here that Barclay is apparently 
structuring “the theology of Paul” (text?) in juxtaposition to “the situation he is responding to” 
(context). Given his prior presence and performances among his addressees, would Paul’s “theology” 
not be constitutive (already) of that particular situation? As a second remark, we add that the structure 
of rhetoric and counter rhetoric involves the possibility that the apostle, as well as the teachers, use the 
same and, therefore, familiar themes.  
The last two criteria go beyond the level of the documented wording of the letter and structure our 
thoughts directly into the realm of history there-and-then-to-them. The sixth criterion is consistency: 
“Thus the results of the previous criteria may be tested to see if they amount to a consistent picture of 
Paul’s opponents.” As argued before, we will relate this criterion to the logic of their rhetoric. The last 
criterion is historical plausibility. Once aspects of the realm of history involved are reconstructed, 
general historical knowledge of that time has to be invoked: “If our results are anachronistic or 
historically implausible for some reason, we will be obliged to start again.”525 The criteria offset out by 
Barclay can regulate attempts to textualize history and put ground under our feet in the realm of 
history there-and-then-to-them.  
 
John Barclay meets John Miles Foley  
Regarding the logos of these teachers, we have to transpose the Theory of Metonymical Referentiality 
by John Miles Foley (Chapter 1) to this setting of rhetoric and counter rhetoric (Chapter 3). Through 
explicit parts – argumentative phrases – Paul anticipates and also actively evokes the implied whole – 
the logos of the rhetoric of these teachers. This logos forms the governing rationale. On the one hand, 
explicit parts of the argumentative structure in the aural event can be found by us in the documented 
wording. On the other, we relate the implied whole of this structure to the collective memory of the 
Galatian converts. In this way, the present-day reader can get before the functioning of the letter as 
text to us, that is, enthymemes. We scrutinize the documented wording of the letter for threads of 
reasoning and ask, What is not fully explicated that the implied hearers would need to have had in 
mind to grasp the logic of these thoughts?  
 
Historicizing text: Gal 3.21cd 
These introductory considerations should pave the way for textualizing the oral performance there-
and-then-to-them of Gal 3.10–12. As a first step, we search for key terms that constitute the laborious 
reasoning involved: the “law” is mentioned up to four times; the thematic matrix of “curse” is 
 
525 Ibid., 85. 
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constituted by two explicit parts; the same pertains to the matrices of “rectification,”526 “l/Life,”527 and 
“faith.” The discussion of the studies by Mayordomo and Bachmann made clear that how these key 
terms relate to each other is not self-evident to us.  
These terms are found throughout the argumentative section of Gal 2–3. When we scrutinize this part 
of the letter, we touch on a peripheral though interesting passage, Gal 3.21cd. Here three of the crucial 
terms in Gal 3.10–12 are constitutive of a single argument: “For if a law had been given that could 
impart life, righteousness would certainly have come by the law.” In Pauline scholarship so far, the 
logic of Gal 3.21cd has not drawn particular attention.528 In commentaries, the causal conjunction, the 
key terms (“law,” “Life,” and “rectification”) and the logical relations between them have, in our view, 
not been sufficiently scrutinized.  
Regarding Gal 3.21cd, we will start by historicizing text: What went before in the intended delivery? 
In the opening of the letter, Paul opposes the teaching of implied adversaries, “a different gospel – not 
that there is another gospel, but there are some who are confusing you and want to pervert the gospel 
of Christ” (Gal 1.6–7). What is this teaching about? In the description of his address to Cephas in 
Antioch (Gal 2.15–21), we find clues. Paul openly refutes here the validity of the “Jewish law” as a 
means of “rectification” for his “Gentile” converts (“not out of law”). In the same breath, he 
introduces the only true way of rectification for those who are in Christ (“out of faith”). This 
juxtaposition is found three times. Because of the frequency (Barclay’s third criterion), we can 
conclude that this topic is important to Paul (Gal 2.14–21; Gal 3.2, 5; 3.10; 3.11). The controversy 
seems to hinge on how “rectification” for God takes place. Structured by this juxtaposition – in which 
law functions prominently – his reasoning positively culminates in Gal 3.14b in the theme of the 
“promise of the Spirit.” The theme of the “promise” is elaborated on in Gal 3.15–18.529 This elaborate 
train of thought is related to the question who will share and who will not share in the inheritance of 
Abraham. Since the implied audience could conclude that Paul juxtaposes the “Jewish law” with the 
“promise,” this blunt antithesis needs an explanation. More so – as Louis Martyn comments on this 
 
526 Especially in view of my Protestant background, the translation “justification”/“to justify” seems to be 
more appropriate. In this example, however, I will use “rectification”/“to rectify” for two reasons. First, this 
rather unfamiliar rendering creates a distance to, theologically speaking, a Protestant Vorverständnis. This 
estrangement should prevent the present-day (Protestant?) reader from jumping to the uncritical conclusion that 
he already knows what Paul means – at least in the attempt to detextify his understanding of the passage. Second, 
in this preference, I also follow the vocabulary of Louis Martyn in his commentary on Galatians. Since his work 
has been of great influence on my research project, I can also in this way pay tribute to him.     
527 In this test case, I make a distinction between “life/to live” with the opening letter in lowercase and 
“Life/Alive/to Live” with the same letter capitalized (this pertains also to the synonymous “Blessing”). In this 
way, I am not only inspired once more by Martyn, but I am also concerned to do justice to the assumed Jewish 
apocalyptic worldview. That is to say there is an important distinction between the category of “life/to live” in 
terms of one’s deeds on which one will be judged (“living according to the Jewish law” and “living like a 
sinner”), and the reward and promise of the “Life” in the eschaton which comes with the judgement of the way 
of living (Day of Judgement).   
528 As far as I know, one short article has been published on this passage. The scope of that study, however, is 
intertextual in nature. See Raik Heckl, “Ein Bezugstext für Gal 3:21B,” NovT 65 (2003): 260–4.  
529 On word chain, see John D. Harvey, Listening to the Text: Oral Patterning in Paul’s Letters, ETSS 1 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Books; Leicester: Apollos, 1998), 103–4. 
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verse – these teachers could pick this up as a loose end and depict Paul as juxtaposing the God-given 
law and the promises of God.530 Martinus de Boer even proposes that “[v]erse 21b ... most likely 
conceals in its form the standpoint of the new preachers in Galatia, who are Christian Jews.”531 So the 
apostle needs to address the exact relation between “law,” “promises,” and “God.”  
Here we arrive at Gal 3.21a where Paul frames this standpoint of his opponents as a question: “Is the 
law, against the promises of God?” An emphatic negation follows (Barclay’s second criterion): 
“Absolutely not!” (3.21b). Here we come to the heart of the matter, namely the function of the “law” 
for the Galatians who once had converted to Paul’s gospel of Jesus Christ. In Gal 3.21cd, Paul 
substantiates this important negation with a conditional reasoning:  
 
Because if law had been given that has the power to make Alive, (c)  
then would be out of law the rectification (d) (translation mine). 
 
The reasoning of the verse is an interplay of two forms of logic. First, the postpositive γάρ (because) is 
heard (verse 21c). This conjunction relates this reasoning as a whole to the preceding negation (the 
juxtaposition of “law” and “promise”). Second, the reasoning as a whole is framed as a conditional: a 
premise εἰ (if) in verse 21c in combination with a conclusion ἄν (then) in verse 21d. It is a second 
class or contrary-to-fact conditional clause.532 The logic is constituted by three terms: “law” (Gal 3.21c 
and 21d), “to make Alive” (21c), and “rectification” (21d). The vast majority of commentaries do not 
touch on the logical dimension of this reasoning. This cluster of relations, however, lacks logical self-
evidence or clarity vis-à-vis the letter as text: What has rectification to do with the power to make 
Alive? How is the law related to both these themes? It is also unclear why Paul construes it as 
contrary-to-fact.  
 
Textualizing oral performance there-and-then-to-them: Gal 3.21cd 
As a starting-point, we propose that Paul anticipates his intended addressees to be able to follow this 
layered reasoning without further instruction. Instead of finding this laborious and frustrating, he 
assumes that they will experience a clear reasoning and that he will be able to reach their hearts. 
On this basis, we will textualize the understanding of the original hearers in five steps. First, the two 
phrases of this contrary-to-fact conditional will be framed as factual statements. Second, the question 
about the origin of this implied factual reasoning must be answered. Third, we will scrutinize how the 
terms of the reasoning are connected. Fourth, the logic behind this interrelatedness will be 
investigated. Fifth, we will reconstruct this denied reasoning as a logical unity.  
 
530 J. Louis Martyn, Galatians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 33A (New York: 
Doubleday, 1997), 358.  
531 Martinus C. de Boer, Galatians: A Commentary, NTL (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 233.  
532 See Stanley E. Porter, Idioms of the Greek New Testament, BL: Greek 2, 2nd ed. (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1994), 259–261. 
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If we transpose the contrary-to-fact conditional into a factual statement, the result is the following:  
 
A law has been given that has the power to make Alive 
Therefore, out of law is rectification 
 
In this way, we find a logical, self-evident, and characteristically Jewish argument. Since the effect of 
Paul’s conditional is to deny this statement, the intended audience should have heard before about the 
power of “the” or “a” law to make Alive.533 Now we can ask: Where does this claim come from? 
Once we are aware of this implication of Gal 3.21cd, the answer is rather obvious: Since Paul firmly 
denies the two statements, he will not be the one who has brought these claims into the Galatian 
communities. The call to law obedience culminating in the act of circumcision has been brought into 
the Galatian congregations by these implied adversaries. This outcome is in line with Barclay’s first 
(type of utterance), fourth (clarity), and fifth criteria (unfamiliarity). We can also point to Barclay’s 
criterion of historical plausibility. Therefore, in these two claims, we hear an echo of the teaching of 
his opponents.534 This is the first step to understand how the apostle intended his original addressees to 
process these phrases in the aural event: They had become familiar with and had internalized these 
statements. Paul leads them in a reasoning which is questioning their validity.  
A second step has to be made: How are the terms “law,” “rectification,” and “the power to make 
Alive” logically related to each other? Since Paul uses the law in both elements of his reasoning, this 
term will function as a key in our search. In the protasis (verse 21c) the law is defined by the 
dependent clause ὁ δυνάμενος ζῳοποιῆσαι. This dependent clause describes a property of the law – 
that is, to make Alive. In other words, the law itself has the ability or power to make human beings 
Alive.535  
Now we will proceed with the apodosis (verse 21d). Here the consequence of the condition is 
constituted by the substantive ἡ δικαιοσύνη. “Rectification” is grammatically related to the law 
through the preposition ἐκ.536 The law is a medium or means through which humanity can be rectified 
 
533 The term that connects the protasis and apodosis of this second-class conditional is the anarthrous 
substantive νόμος. One could, therefore, translate “law in se” or “any given law.” The anarthrous substantive can 
also refer to a specific and already known item. See Porter, Idioms, 104; Richard N. Longenecker, Galatians, 
WBC 41 (Dallas: Word, 1990), 143. As we argued above, Paul is counteracting the teaching of his implied 
opponents. Since he frames the call to circumcision in combination with the law (most often articular) in a 
Judaistic or Jewish way (for example, Gal 2.14–16, 3.6–18), we suppose that the audience hears in Paul’s 
(anarthrous or articular) “law” a reference to the regulations of the “Jewish law.”  
534 We repeat that since we take the perspective of Paul, this reasoning is also valid even if he had 
misunderstood or would have been misinformed about these teachers and their performances or rhetoric. 
535 In oratory, thematic and synonymous relations are decisive. In this respect, the infinitive aorist evokes the 
theme of “l/Life.” Paul has already dealt with this theme in the preceding verses Gal 2.19–20 and 3.11–12. We 
encounter here an example of amplification. Thus Paul does not express in Gal 3.21cd a new thought. The focus 
becomes, therefore, how he uses this already familiar and introduced thought in relation to his implied audience 
at that moment in his oral performance. This is important, especially, in light of the possibility of Umdeutung 
(Chapter 3). 
536 We can see that the audience has heard before the theme of rectification concerning the instrumental role 
of the law: Gal 2.16, 19, 21; 3.2, 5, 10, 11, 18. 
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before God.537 Rectification is, therefore, not a property or power of the law, but is related to a status 
or quality that is granted to a human being in relation to God because of the relation of that human 
being to the law. When these considerations on the protasis and apodosis are brought together, the 
following related reasonings are heard: 
 
the law is the medium through which one is rectified (Gal 3.21d)   
the law has the power to make one Alive (Gal 3.21c).  
 
Two explicit parts have been identified. These parts are like threads, structural elements (Foley), or 
traces on the level of the documented wording. As a third step, we ask: What is the logic behind the 
two statements? For the implied audience, the relation between the apodosis and protasis has to be 
found in the function of the “law.” First, humankind is the object and Life is the end: the law has the 
power to make one Alive.538 We can recognize the thought-pattern of Judaism – for example, Lev 
18.5: “You shall keep my statutes and my ordinances; by doing so one shall live: I am the Lord.” In 
this way, Barclay’s criteria of historical plausibility and consistency are validated. Second, in the 
apodosis it becomes clear that the law is a means so that rectification can come to humanity. Thus, one 
hears about the law as a means (to rectify before God) and an end (to make the one who is rectified 
Alive). If this is valid, a connecting premise is operative in the reasoning of this verse: the medium 
through which one becomes rectified before God, has the power to make Alive. Since it is not 
expressed on the level of the documented wording, this logical relation is suppressed. We can identify 
in this argumentative phrase the major premise of a primary syllogism. As a consequence, both earlier 
reconstructed elements form the minor premise and conclusion. Therefore, we can affirm that the 
reasoning as implied in Gal 3.21cd is syllogistic in nature.539 In the following way, the explicit parts 
form a valid and solid implied whole:  
 
MajP: The means through which one  
is rectified before God [X],   has the power to make Alive [Z] 
MinP: The law [Y]    is the medium through which  
one is rectified before God [X] 
C:  Therefore, the law [Y]   has the power to make Alive [Z] 
  
 
537 See Porter, Idioms, 154–6. 
538 In the light of Paul’s preceding reasoning, we assume that this Life-giving power is directed towards 
humanity. See Martyn, Galatians, 359; J. Christiaan Beker, Paul the Apostle: The Triumph of God in Life and 
Thought (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1980), 260 and 261. 
539 Regarding this kind of reasoning, a concise explanation will be given now how it is used here: the major 
premise of a logical or categorical syllogism – in the basic structure of AAA-1 (Barbara) – contains the major 
term [Z], that is, the predicate of the conclusion. The predicate [Z] refers either to a property of a certain entity or 
to a relation between entities. The minor premise contains the minor term [Y], that is, the subject of the 
conclusion. These two premises, that is, major and minor, have the middle term [X] in common. This term [X] 
conveys the category of things that will be specified in the minor term [Y]. The predicate [Z] and the subject [Y] 
are related to each other in the conclusion. Subsequently, this conclusion is either true and affirmed, that is, 
modus ponens, or false and denied, that is, modus tollens.  
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In the construal of oral performance in actu, the original addressees do not process w-o-r-d-s as fixed 
and visible things in the text area, as we do, but they identify in continuously changing sound groups 
units of meaning (Chapter 1). For that reason, the terms can also be related to each other in a diverging 
way while still meaning the same:  
 
MajP: The one who is rectified before God [X],  he will Live [Z] 
MinP: The one who is out of law [Y]  he is rectified before God [X] 
C:  Therefore, the one who is out of law [Y]  he will Live [Z] 
 
We will use now the former layout to frame Paul’s incomplete syllogistic conditional as found in Gal 
3.21cd. In this way, we will recognize the minor term [Y] twice and the major term [Z] once. In verse 
3.21d – the apodosis of Paul’s conditional – we encounter the minor premise. In the protasis (3.21c) 
the conclusion is heard:  
  
MinP: The law [Y]    is the medium through which  
one is rectified before God [X] 
 
Gal 3.21d:  Minor Term     Middle Term 
MinP:  “then would be out of law [Y]   the rectification [X]” 
 
C:  Therefore, the law [Y]   has the power to make Alive [Z] 
 
Gal 3.21c:  Minor Term     Major Term 
C:   “Because if law had been given [Y] that has the power to make Alive [Z]” 
 
If the construal by the original addressees is governed by the rationale as reconstructed above, the 
intended impact of Gal 3.21cd has to be appraised as an example of negative rhetoric. Paul uses a 
contrary-to-fact conditional, because he wants to deny the logos of his opponents (“You have to obey 
the law [means] so that you will become partaker in the promised Life [end]”).540 The sixth 
(consistency) and seventh criteria of Barclay (historical plausibility) confirm this understanding.  
Once we are aware that this syllogism (which Paul denies) forms the backbone of his adversaries’ 
performances, the conclusion (C) can be regarded as their crucial means of power, namely, “a law has 
been given that has the power to make Alive.” When these teachers would have gained influence over 
the Galatian communities through this syllogistic argument, it is not surprising that Paul takes the C of 
their syllogism as his point of departure (Gal 3.21c). He construes his reasoning in such a manner that 
this negated C functions as premise (“if a law had been given that has the power to make Alive”). In 
this way, he can draw his own conclusion (“then the rectification would be out of law”). His own C 
implies the disqualification of their MinP. The apostle is therefore not interested in disqualifying the C 
of his opponents, but in falsifying the MinP of their implied rhetoric (logos). More precisely, his 
 
540 In this, we recognize the structure of the reasoning as described by Beker, Paul, 260: “To the Jew, the 
Torah is the sole means of maintaining righteousness, just as righteousness is the sole means of obtaining life.” 
See also de Boer, Galatians, 207. 
 190 
negative rhetoric hinges on the crucial minor term [Y]. Paul wants his audience to recognize that the 
internalized minor term makes the reasoning a fraud. Simply put, “out of law” has to be rejected by his 
addressees – in favour of “out of faith” (Gal 2.16; see below).  
If this reconstruction of the syllogistic nature of Gal 3.21cd is valid, we can draw three conclusions. 
First, the structure of the reasoning as a whole is implicit. In the realm of history there-and-then-to-
them, the suppressed major premise is part of the collective memory in a self-evident way; while 
composing his letter, Paul anticipates the familiarity of his audience with this logic. This way, we 
recognize Barclay’s argumentation on the necessity of a reliable representation of the rhetoric of his 
opponents. Second, by asking for the origin of this reasoning, we as present-day readers spiral into the 
realm of history there-and-then-to-them. In this way, we move before the letter functioning as text to 
us. Therefore, if these claims stem from these implied adversaries, the unravelled syllogistic reasoning 
represents a basic structure in their teaching and preaching – as conceived by Paul. Third, we have to 
conclude that Paul is not concerned in Gal 3.21cd with the C of his opponents, but with denying and 
overthrowing the middle term [Y] of their MinP, as illustrated by the high frequency of the 
dichotomous “out of law” and “out of faith” in Gal 2.16. This is an important insight concerning other 
threads. The majority of terms in Gal 2.14–3.14 constitute this MinP. 
 
Textualizing oral performance there-and-then-to-them (2): Gal 2.16, 2.21, and 3.11 
In keeping with the fundamental oratorial feature of amplification,541 similar threads of this reasoning 
will be pursued now. The first syllogistic thread is found in Gal 2.16 (MinP). Here the thread is strong 
as a twine. The terms of the MinP – “rectification” [X] and “law” [Y] – are mentioned three times. 
Recall Barclay’s criterion of frequency. We also notice that for the first time in the oral performance 
the explicit utterance of “law”542 and also “rectification” is heard here.543 A translation of Gal 2.15 and 
16 is presented below in which the terms of the reconstructed MinP are italicized:  
 
We, Jews by birth, and, not, from the Gentiles, sinners, 
[we] knowing that a human being is not rectified out of works of law,  
 
541 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 1.9.35–41, 1.15.23 –33, and 3.6.1 –7. 
542 Note, however, that in the preceding part of the letter we have heard related utterings: “Judaism” (Gal 
1.13, 14), “traditions of my fathers” (Gal 1.14), “to eat [as Jews] together with the Gentiles” (Gal 2.12). The 
same pertains to synonymous themes: “To be/live like a Jew” (Gal 2.13, 14, 15), “circumcision” (Gal 2.3, 7, 8, 9, 
12). 
543 Furthermore, in comparison with Gal 3.21cd, the instrumental phrase “out of law” is extended to “out of 
works of law.” Since in line with oratory both phrases recollect the broader theme of law, this extension is not 
considered to be decisive for the present investigation. For this expression, see Michael Bachmann, “4QMMT 
und Galaterbrief: תורהה עמש  und ΕΡΓΑ ΝΟΜΟΥ,” ZNW 89 (1998): 91–113; de Boer, Galatians, excursus 8, 
145–8; David I. Yoon, A Discourse Analysis of Galatians and the New Perspective on Paul, LBS 17 (Leiden: 
Brill, 2019) and his section excursus: The Meaning of ἔργα νόμου: A Response to Dunn Considering Lexical 
Semantics and Case Semantics, 212–25; Yoon takes a stance against James Dunn’s claim that this expression 
would essentially imply covenantal nomism. 
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if not through faith of Jesus Christ, (a) 
also we have placed our faith in Christ Jesus (b)  
so that we might be rectified out of faith of Christ, and not out of works of law (c)  
because out of works of law shall not be rectified all flesh (d) (translation mine). 
 
The three explicit parts or threads that emerge can now be displayed in tabular format below:  
 
MinP: The one who is out of law [Y]  is rectified before God [X] 
 
[16aB] “a human being out of works of law [Y],  [16aA] is not rectified [X]” 
 
[16dB] “not out of works of law [Y],   [16dA] so that we might be rectified [X]”                   
 
[16dB] “because out of works of law [Y],   [idem] shall not be rectified all flesh [X]” 
 
On the level of the present text, in this tabular format, we, as present-day readers, are able to identify 
the minor premise. In detextification, the focus is on the way in which Paul anticipated his originally 
intended addressees to understand. For that reason, we return to the documented wording, as found in 
the letter, in order to add a plausible way of structuring thought by the addressees in the performance 
of this specific passage – as envisioned by Paul in the process of composition, and textualized by us 
here-and-now. The addition of this anticipated participation is necessary in order to understand how 
the actual hearers would have understood the argumentation. So the explicit parts of the logos, which 
are placed in italics, will be accompanied by the proposed participation, which is underscored and 
placed between dashes: 
 
We, Jews by birth, and, not, from the Gentiles, sinners, 
[we] knowing that a human being is not rectified out of works of law, 
– and, therefore, that those who are out of works of law will not Live – 
if not through faith of Jesus Christ, (a) 
also we  
– those who are Jews by birth, and, therefore, rectified on the basis of the law – 
have placed our faith in Christ Jesus (b)  
so that we might be rectified out of faith of Christ, 
– and, therefore, will Live out of faith of Christ – 
and not out of works of law (c) 
because out of works of law shall not be rectified all flesh (d). 
– and, therefore, it should be clear that no Life will be granted– 
 
Contrary to “What does it mean?”, this detextified perspective provides an answer to the question: 
How does it mean, to whom, in what state of mind, and from whose perspective[s]? In conclusion, 
Paul is once more labouring in Gal 2.16 to deny the validity of the minor term in the MinP for his 
implied Gentile audience (modus tollens).544  
 
544 Contrary to Gal 3.21cd, however, Paul does not deny here the MinP in an argumentative way. He does so 
based on knowledge that he shares with Cephas (εἰδότες). Since Peter is the leader of the congregation in 
Jerusalem (Gal 2.7, 8), this knowledge is charged with his authority and, as a result, rhetorically powerful. 
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We continue to scrutinize the letter for similar threads. In this respect, Gal 2.21b has to draw our 
attention – the “law” functions here as the means through which (διά545) humanity is rectified. The 
emissary declares (the related terms are italicized),  
 
I do not nullify the grace of God! (a) 
For if through law – there is rectification, (b) 
then Christ died for nothing! (c) (translation mine) 
 
Paul feels urged to defend himself: “I do not nullify the grace of God!” In this exclamation, the echo 
of a possible charge against him can be recognized. Recall Barclay’s first (type of utterance) and in 
particular second criterion (tone). The rhetorical situation becomes intelligible when this allegation is 
ascribed to his adversaries.546 Their teaching disqualifies – either explicitly or implicitly, either 
irenically or pejoratively – Paul and his gospel. They call the Gentile converts to circumcision and 
make them obey certain rules and, therefore, submit to their authority.  
With this context in mind, we proceed to Gal 2.21b. Here the minor [Y], as well as the middle [X] 
term, can be heard. The postpositive γάρ (“for”) introduces an explanatory sentence. It supports and 
explains Paul’s statement of denial.547 This explanatory phrase – “For if through law there is 
rectification” – is framed as the protasis of a first-class conditional clause (εἰ, without verb). 
Grammatically speaking, this means that the condition is either factual or true or construed for the 
sake of argument.548 We do not find, however, in Gal 2.21c the apodosis of this conditional. Through 
the inferential particle ἄρα with aorist verb, a conclusion is drawn. Instead of the expected second part, 
Paul utters this exclamation in agony: “then Christ died for nothing!” One could argue that the 
implication of the apodosis suffices here as an example of the element of “in what state of mind.” In 
this disruptive way, the apostle makes clear that the protasis cannot be true. He denies its validity for 
his Gentile audience who are out of faith.  
In the following table, the MinP of the opponents’ syllogism becomes clearer: 
 
MinP: The law [Y] is the medium through which  one is rectified before God [X] 
 
[21bB] “[For if . . .] through law [Y]  [21bA] there is rectification [X]” 
 
 
Therefore, this is a different rhetorical means of power in comparison with the one under discussion, that is, the 
syllogistic rationale on and in itself. 
545 Porter, Idioms, 148–50. 
546 Three possibilities can be discerned. First, this charge could have been uttered explicitly by the 
adversaries. Second, Paul anticipates that this allegation could come to the minds of the hearers when they hear 
this argumentation based on what his opponents have taught them. Third, the teachers – who would be 
considered to be still amid his Galatian converts – explain this passage to them in this way (Martyn, de Boer). 
547 Longenecker, Galatians, 95.  
548 Porter, Idioms, 256–7. 
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Once the governing rationale is recognized, we as present-day readers can textualize how the implied 
audience was intended to participate in order to understand: 
 
I do not nullify the grace of God! (a) 
For if through law – there is rectification, (b) 
– then the law would have the power to make Alive,  
but this is not the case, and, even worse, – 
then Christ died for nothing! (c) 
And that is blasphemy, because it is through his death only that God makes us Alive! 
 
We conclude once more that the premise of Gal 2.21b has to be constitutive of the realm of history 
there-and-then-to-them and/or the collective memory of the original addressees (“through the law – 
there is rectification”).  
When we continue to hover over the letter, we reach Gal 3.11. In the two phrases, all three terms of the 
syllogistic reasoning are there. One can recognize the minor term “law” [Y] once in verse 11a. In a 
similar vein, the middle term “to rectify/rectification” [X] can be identified twice, as a verb in verse 
11a and as a noun in 11b. Finally, one can recognize the major term “to Live” [Z] once, as a verb in 
verse 11b. Regarding the described dynamics of grasping units of meaning, we note that the usage of 
the verb “to Live” instead of “to make Alive” recalls the same theme. In the following translation, the 
relevant elements are italicized:  
 
And because no one can be rectified before God in the law,  
it is evident,549 that the one who is rectified550 out of faith, he will Live (translation mine). 
 
549 For this syntactical understanding of Gal 3.11, see Ben Witherington III, Grace in Galatia: A Commentary 
on St Paul’s Letter to the Galatians (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 234; Richard B. Hays, “The Letter to the 
Galatians,” in 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, 1 & 2 Thessalonians, 1 & 2 
Timothy, Titus, Philemon, ed. Leander E. Keck; vol. 11 of The New Interpreter’s Bible (Nashville: Abingdon, 
2000), 259; Andrew H. Wakefield, Where to Live. The Hermeneutical Significance of Paul’s Citations from 
Scripture in Galatians 3:1–14, SBL Academia Biblica 14 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003), 163–
67; de Boer, Galatians, 202–3; Ben F. van Veen, “Een staaltje van paulinische hermeneutiek: Een onderzoek 
naar het gebruik van de Heilige Schriften door Paulus in Gal 3.6–14” (MTh thesis, Vrije Universiteit, 2001), 
excursus: Is er een verband tussen hoti … dhlon en het aanhalen van oudtestamentisch tekstmateriaal door 
Paulus?, 51–3. 
550 In “Apocalyptic Hermeneutics: Habakkuk Proclaims ‘The Righteous One’,” as republished in his The 
Conversion of the Imagination: Paul as the Interpreter of Israel’s Scripture (Grand Rapids: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing, 2005): 119–142, Richard B. Hays suggests that ὁ δίκαιος functioned in those days as a 
messianic designation. In this way, the reasoning in Gal 3.11 would focus not so much on the addressees 
themselves but on Christ as “The Righteous One”: “When Paul … read Hab 2.3–4 in the LXX, a text that 
already carried apocalyptic/messianic resonances for Jews of his time, how did he understand it? My contention 
is that he understood it as a messianic prophecy, just as he understood – in a way quite startling to us – Gen 17.8 
as messianic prophecy (Gal 3.16). This sort of divinatory reading is a direct and natural consequence of the 
apostle’s apocalyptic hermeneutical perspective: those who have experienced the apocalypse of the Son of God 
now find the veil taken away from Scripture so that they can perceive its witness to him, including its witness to 
him as the Coming/Righteous One” (141). In line with the approach of detextification, we can explicate a crucial 
presupposition in this intriguing proposal. Hays’s argumentation is based on Paul in relation to the LXX version 
of Hab 2.3–4 (“reading”). Regarding this perspective on Paul and Scripture, we ask: How do the actual 
addressees have to participate in this understanding of ὁ δίκαιος as “The Righteous One,” while caught up in the 
moment of delivery of Gal 3.11? First, we remark that these words (sound units) are not explicitly introduced as 
coming from the Jewish scriptures (“for it is written”); article and noun form an integral part of the documented 
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In this rendering, we observe a deviation from the one found in Gal 3.21d and 2.21b. In spite of the 
usage of ἐκ with genitive in Gal 3.21d, Paul uses in this verse ἐν (dative): “Its [ἐν] basic meaning is 
‘in’ or ‘in the realm of’.”551 Thus, next to the instrumental relation of the law to humanity, Paul also 
conceives a spherical one. Humankind can live in the realm or – when the dimension of power is 
pressed – under the dominion of the law. These different senses of the law together constitute the 
thematic matrix of the law.  
Having said that, we turn to the reasoning of the verse itself. We notice that the intended addressees in 
Gal 3.11a hear the reasoning as structured by a MinP and in Gal 3.11b as structured by a C. In this 
table, the usage of the different prepositions will be followed:  
 
MinP: The one who is in law [Y]   he will be rectified before God [X] 
 
[11a]  “because in the law [Y]    no one can be rectified before God [X],”  
  
C:  Therefore, the one who is out of law [Y] he will Live [Z] 
  
[11b]  “It is evident that  
   the one who is rectified out of … [Y],  he will Live [Z]”  
  
Regarding the governing rationale, we can reconstruct the original wording of Paul and intimate how 
the implied addressees would have participated to understand his words-in-the-event-of-delivery: 
 
And because no one can be rectified before God in the law, 
– and, therefore, will Live in that way –  
it is evident that the one who is rectified out of faith, he will Live. 
 
We observe that Paul denies once more the validity of the minor term “law” [Y] for his implied 
Gentile audience. After this modus tollens, we notice a change to the modus ponens: in the C of Gal 
3.11b, the denied minor term [Y] in verse 11a (the law) is replaced by another one, πίστις (faith). In 
 
reasoning. So the addressees should already have been familiar with this specific passage as coming from 
“Scripture.” Second and as a result, in the moment itself – since no indication is found in the stream of sound 
bites – they should have been aware that the simple notion of ὁ δίκαιος functions as this specific title of Christ. 
Thus, a minimal anticipation of Paul requires here a maximal participation of his addressees. Third, in the 
preceding passage, the matrix of “rectification” is consistently related to the Galatian converts themselves. So, 
when we detextify this intertextual understanding, the conclusion is that Hays’s proposal is not self-evident.  
551 Porter, Idioms, 156. The following commentaries relate this spherical understanding to the citation from 
Deut 27.26 (Gal 3.10b) and Lev 18.5 (3.12): Betz, Galatians, 146; Martyn, Galatians, 312; de Boer, Galatians, 
203. Notwithstanding the prevalent locative senses of ἐν, there is also an instrumental one possible. In this way, 
Gal 3.11a could form a parallel to Gal 3.21bc, i.e. “through the law.” This instrumental sense of the dative case 
in Gal 3.11a, however, seems to be unlikely based on the following observations: First, the sense in which the 
audience will understand ἐν is plausibly intended to be guided by the twofold usage of the same preposition in 
the directly preceding verse (Gal 3.10b). Second, in Gal 2.19 the implied audience has already heard the 
rendering διὰ νόμου νόμῳ. Given this phrase, the instrumental sense of the dative – in comparison to the genitive 
case of the law – is rendered unintelligible. Since in the oral performance Gal 2.19 precedes 3.11a, the audience 
has already been brought into the modus of hearing the preposition in the locative sense.  
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the preceding reasoning of Gal 2.16, these terms have been introduced more than once in an 
antithetical way: in the rebuke of Cephas, the “law” is denied up to three times in favour of “faith.” So 
this interchange of minor terms against the background of this syllogistic structure is conceivable and 
manageable for the implied audience in the aural event.552  
In this way, we can deepen our textualization of the realm of history there-and-then-for-them. When 
Paul disqualifies the crucial minor term “law” of his opponents to put “faith” in its place, we can 
construe the following counter-syllogistic reasoning:  
 
MajP: The one who is rectified before God [X],  he will Live [Z] 
MinP: The one who is out of faith [YPaul]  he is rectified before God [X] 
C:  Therefore, the one  
who is out of faith [YPaul]    he will Live [Z]553 
 
Four conclusions can be drawn regarding Gal 3.11, 2.21b, and 2.16. First, the approach of 
detextification neither compels one to find complete formal syllogisms on the level of text (so 
Bachmann) nor to reconstruct incomplete ones (so Mayordomo). We can argue with de Boer that the 
argumentation is not systematic on the level of the text. Once we explicitly differentiate between the 
letter-functioning-as-text-to-us and textualization in the realm of history involved, however, another 
kind of systematization becomes possible, namely, textualization of the originally intended 
understanding of the argumentative threads in the anticipated aural event.  
Second, the present-day reader encounters up to four instances in which the terms of the crucial MinP 
are present. In all of the instances, the related terms are clearly – and in Gal 2.16 even redundantly – 
denied. Between the lines, we hear Paul exclaim, “The law does not lead to rectification!” This 
fourfold observation of denial leads to the conclusion – in line with Barclay’s first criterion of type of 
utterance – that “at most, someone has explicitly asserted it.” In only one instance, we have identified 
the structure of the C. Here the minor term “law” [Y] is replaced by the juxtaposed term “faith” [YPaul]. 
Based on the related amplification in Gal 2.16, this conclusion coincides with Barclay’s third as well 
as fourth criterion, namely frequency and clarity. The structure of rhetoric and counter rhetoric – 
culminating in the crucial minor term/MinP – becomes more and more visible.  
Third, the medium through which one is rectified, the law [Y], is crucial to the teaching of Paul’s 
opponents. Law obedience culminates in circumcision. The apostle is taking pains to derail this 
 
552 This understanding implies that Paul’s allusion to Hab 2.4 in Gal 3.11b [C] neither forms a premise 
(MajP, MinP) nor a proof per se. These invoked words from Jewish holy scriptures entail the C that opposes the 
one of these teachers and validates Paul’s gospel. As argued, regarding the reconstruction of this working of 
these words from the Jewish Bible, we have to be able to differentiate between freischwebendes Denken – that is, 
Scripture proof in se – and textualization of the distinctive communicative process of the intended oral delivery 
there-and-then. 
553 In Gal 2–3, synonymous traces typical of the apostle can be found: as minor term think of [fill in and 
construe: the one who is] “in Christ” (2.17), “to die in and through the law” (2.19a), “to be co-crucified with 
Christ” (2.19c), “’I’ do not live anymore” (2.20a), and “to be baptized” (3.27a); as major term: [fill in: he will] 
“(to) l/Live in God” (2.19b), “Christ lives in me” (2.20b), “to clothe oneself with Christ” (3.27b) and “to be one 
in Christ” (3.28d). 
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explicit part of their “bewitching” reasoning (Gal 3.1). In this way, we see Barclay’s sixth criterion 
being met as well (consistency): “Thus the results of the previous criteria may be tested to see if they 
amount to a consistent picture of Paul’s opponents.”554  
Fourth, we observe that – instead of disqualifying his opponents’ reasoning as a whole – Paul follows 
their logos and even affirms the predicate of their C. The desire which has been awoken in the 
Galatian converts by these teachers is affirmed by the apostle – that is, “to live” and/or to gain “Life.” 
Therefore, he only denies and reframes their MinP: over against “out of law” he states and points this 
other way to “l/Life,” namely, “out of faith.”    
 
Textualizing oral performance there-and-then-to-them (3): Gal 2.15–17, 3.1–5, and 3.6–14   
Since amplification forms a central feature of the predominantly oral state of mind, we now must 
pursue the identification of synonyms or antonyms of “law,” “rectification,” and “Life.” Contrary to 
the textualization of text here-and-now-to us, we have to be sensitive to this specific communicative 
dynamic. We can detect these references to the major, middle, and minor terms through the social 
memory of his implied addressees, for example, contemporary Graeco-Roman culture and, in 
particular, Judaism. A textualization on this basis will be strengthened by Barclay’s two final criteria, 
namely, historical plausibility (6) and consistency (7).  
From this perspective, we will look into Gal 2–3 once more. We start with Paul’s address to Cephas in 
Gal 2.15–21. The apostle recalls here in a redundant way the thematic matrix related to the minor 
term: “out of law,” “to be a Jew,” and “to live like a Jew” [Y].555  
 
If you – who are a Jew with all the privileges involved – (14a)  
live like a Gentile and not like a Jew (14b)  
how can you force the Gentiles to live in a Jewish way (to Judaize)? (14c)  
We, Jews by nature and not, from the Gentiles, sinners, (15)  
(...) 
If we – who seek to be rectified in Christ – (17a) 
have been found ourselves to be sinners, (17b) 
then does that suggest that Christ is a servant of sin? (17c) 
Absolutely not! (17d) (translation mine) 
 
If a thematic equation of “law” and “Judaism” (“to live like/be a Jew”) is valid, we should be able to 
rephrase the MinP in the reconstructed syllogistic structure as follows:  
 
MajP: The one who is rectified [X]  he will Live [Z] 
MinP: The one who is/lives like a Jew [Y] he is rectified before God [X] 
C:  Therefore, the one  
who lives like a Jew [Y]   he will Live [Z] 
  
 
554 Barclay, “Mirror-Reading,” 85. 
555 Paul has already referred to this thematic matrix in Gal 1.13–14 (ἐν τῳ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ).  
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We can then hone in on the explicit parts in Gal 2.14–15:  
 
MinP: The one who is/lives like a Jew [Y] he is rectified before God [X] 
  
[14aA] “you, who are a Jew  
   with all the privileges involved [Y]” – and being, therefore, rectified before God [X] – 
 
[14bB] “and not live like a Jew [Y]”  – implying that you are   
        not rectified before God [X] –  
   
[14cB] “to live in a Jewish way [Y]”  – to be rectified before God [X] – 
 
[15A] “We, Jews by nature [Y]”   – we are rectified before God [X] – 
  
We hear four times the MinP of the implied adversaries. Note that in Gal 2.14 and 15 Paul’s usage is 
fully in line with the syllogistic logic of his opponents, but in Gal 2.17 it runs counter to theirs.  
The antonymous theme is also present, that is, “to be a Gentile” and “to live like a Gentile” [Y-anti]. 
Since these antonymous themes are both related to the central question of “rectification” [X], another 
theme can also be added to the syllogistic structure: “to be a sinner” (Gal 2.15, 17a) and “sin” (2.17b) 
[X-anti].556 This theme is the antonym of “to be rectified/rectification.” In this way, we can construe 
the following antonymous syllogism:  
 
MajP: The one who is sinner [X-anti]  he will not Live [Z] 
MinP: The one  
who is/lives like a Gentile [Y-anti]  he is sinner before God [X-anti] 
C:  Therefore, the one who is/  
lives like a Gentile [Y-anti]  he will not Live [Z] 
 
We turn to the documented wording once again: 
 
MinP: The one  
who is/lives like a Gentile [Y-anti]  he is sinner before God [X-anti] 
 
[14bA] “[If you …] live like a Gentile [Y-anti]” – then you are a sinner (not  
       righteous) [X-anti] – 
 
[15Ba] “We . . . not, from the Gentiles, [Y-anti] [not] . . . sinners [X-anti]”  
 
 – When we (Paul and Cephas)  
have table fellowship with Gentiles/ 
live like Gentiles [Y-anti] –     [17b]  “we have been found    
        ourselves to be 
        sinners [X-anti]” 
 
 
556 See Bachmann, “Zur Argumentation,” 534.  
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While reproducing the wording of the letter, we can textualize the anticipated participation of the 
Galatian addressees – as intended by Paul: 
 
If you – who are a Jew with all the privileges involved– (14a) 
– and being, therefore, rectified before God –   
live like a Gentile and not like a Jew (14b) 
– and, as a result, are sinner/not rectified before God – 
how can you force the Gentiles to live in a Jewish way (to Judaize)? (14c) 
– to become rectified before God –  
We, Jews by nature  
– who are rectified before God – 
and not, from the Gentiles, sinners, (15)  
(...) 
If we  
– as Jews who have to live accordingly –  
– who seek to be rectified in Christ – (17a) 
have been found ourselves to be sinners, (17b) 
– because we live like Gentiles (for example, have table fellowship with them) –  
then does that suggest that Christ is a servant of sin? (17c) 
– so that we will not Live? –  
Absolutely not! (17d) 
 
Here the MinP of the syllogistic reasoning of the implied opponents is found up to seven times.  
In this line of thought, we can scrutinize other passages of the letter as well to find synonymous 
threads. The first is Gal 3.1–5. In verses 2 and 5, we encounter once again the antithesis between 
“faith” and “law” (for example, Gal 2.16). This juxtaposition revolves around the theme of the 
“reception of the Spirit”:  
 
This is the only thing, I want to know of you, (2a) 
out of works of law did you receive the Spirit, (2b) 
or out of hearing faith? (2c)  
(...) 
The one granting you the Spirit and working powers among you, (5a)  
[does he do so] out of works of law or out of hearing faith? (5b) (translation mine) 
 
Since the “reception of the Spirit” has not been mentioned before in the oral performance of the letter, 
one has to ask for how the audiences will relate to it when they hear it here for the first time. We recall 
at this juncture the second intellectual movement of historicizing text (Chapter 3): What is the 
Vorgeschichte of the intended addressees with the “Spirit”? Or – related to experiences/senses and 
collective memory – what does the “reception of the Spirit” involve? Who introduced them to this 
theme and in what way? Barclay remarks, “One could also draw up an interesting list of points on 
which Paul and his opponents would have agreed ... The Spirit has been given to the people of God 
who believe in the Messiah.”557 Although once introduced and experienced by Paul, this theme is also 
constitutive of the teachers’ rhetoric. If this is the reason that Paul recollects this theme here without 
any introduction, we can attempt to frame it in terms of the uncovered syllogistic rationale. Given the 
 
557 Barclay, “Mirror-Reading,” 89. See also Martyn, Galatians, 284; de Boer, Galatians, 173.  
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relation to the minor term “out of law” [X], the possibility comes to the fore that “reception of the 
Spirit” is synonymous with the major term “to Live” [Z]. Gal 3.1–5 can be reconstructed as follows:  
 
MajP: The one who is rectified [X]  he will receive the Spirit [Z] 
MinP: The one who is out of works of law [Y] he is rectified [X] 
C:  Therefore,  
the one who is out of works of law [Y]  he will receive the Spirit [Z] 
 
In these verses, we encounter the C of the implied primary syllogism: 
 
C:  Therefore,  
the one who is out of works of law [Y]  he will receive the Spirit [Z] 
 
[2b]  “out of works of law [Y]   [did] you receive the Spirit [Z] [?]” 
 
[5bA] “out of works of law [Y]   [5a] The one granting you the Spirit [Z]?” 
  
In this reconstruction, two times the two key terms come together, namely the specifying minor term 
“law” [Y] and the major term “to receive the Spirit” [Z] – synonymous with “Life.” 
Recalling Gal 2.16, in which “out of law” is consistently opposed and ruled out by “out of faith,” we 
can recognize in this reasoning once more the counter reasoning of Paul: the one who is out of faith, 
he will receive/has received the Spirit (C). In every juxtaposition of “out of law” and “out of faith,” 
Paul’s alternative and – more important – only true syllogistic reasoning is strengthened.   
In the next unit Gal 3.6–9 and 14a the audience is led into another thematic matrix. This is the theme 
of the patriarch of Israel, “Abraham”:   
 
[It is] as [with] Abraham, (6a)  
he had faith in God and it was reckoned to him as righteousness. (6b) 
You know, therefore, that the ones out of faith, that these are the sons of Abraham. (7) 
And foreseeing that God rectifies the Gentiles out of faith, (8a) 
the Scripture was able to gospel-preach Abraham beforehand [saying]: (8b) 
‘Blessed will be in you all the Gentiles.’ (8c) 
So then those out of faith are Blessed together with the faithful Abraham. (9)  
(...) so that the Blessing of Abraham might come to the Gentiles in Christ Jesus (14a) (translation mine) 
 
Before this passage, the theme of “Abraham” is neither introduced nor mentioned in any way. Many 
commentators argue that this thematic matrix originates from the teaching of the implied opponents.558 
If this is correct, we have to relate the key word πίστις here in the first instance to these teachers and to 
 
558 See Charles K. Barrett, “The Allegory of Abraham, Sarah and Hagar in the Argumentation of Galatians,” 
in Rechtfertigung: Festschrift für Ernst Käsemann, ed. Johannes Friedrich, Wolfgang Pöhlmann and Peter 
Stuhlmacher (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1976), 6–8; Barclay, “Mirror–Reading,” 87, 88; Ernest de Witt Burton, 
A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, ICC (Edinburg: T&T Clark, 1921; repr. 
1971), 153; Longenecker, Galatians, 109–11; James D.G. Dunn, The Epistle to the Galatians, BNTC (London: 
A&C Black, 1993) 159; Martyn, Galatians, 296–8; de Boer, Galatians, 186–7. Contrariwise, Witherington, 
Grace in Galatia, 218–9.  
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their performances as well. In a Judaizing context this term – in a particular framing – fits his 
opponents like a glove: In Judaism, the faithfulness of Abraham is seen in his obedience to the 
commandments of God. In particular, the act of circumcision illustrates the thematic matrix of “law” 
and “to live like/be a Jew” – compare Barclay’s seventh criterion (historical plausibility).  
From the perspective of these teachers, we can perceive the following underlying syllogistic structure. 
Both synonymous middle terms will be explicated and combined: “Sons of Abraham” is described as 
X1 and “rectification” as X2:  
 
MajP: The one who is son of Abraham [X1]/       
The one who is rectified before God [X2]  he will be Blessed in Abraham [Z] 
MinP: The one who is faithful as Abraham [Y] he is son of Abraham [X1]/ 
       he is rectified [X2] 
C:  Therefore,  
the one who is faithful as Abraham [Y]  he will be Blessed in    
      Abraham [Z] 
 
We encounter the MajP, MinP as well as the C – the MajP with X1 (son of Abraham) in Gal 3.8c, the 
MinP with X1 in 3.7, the MinP with X2 (rectification before God) twice in 3.6 and 8a and the C in 3.9: 
 
MajP1: The one who is son of Abraham [X1] he will be Blessed in    
       Abraham [Z] 
 
[8cB] “‘In you (in your offspring) [Y]  [8cA] will be Blessed [all the Gentiles]’ [Z].” 
 
MinP1: The one who is faithful as Abraham [Y] he is son of Abraham [X1] 
 
[7]  “You know, therefore,  
   that the ones out of faith [Y]  that these are the sons of Abraham [X1]” 
 
MinP2: The one who is faithful as Abraham [Y] he is rectified [X2] 
 
[6b]  “he [Abraham] had faith in God [Y] and it was reckoned to him as righteousness [X2]”  
 
 
[8aC] “out of faith [Y]    [8aB] God rectifies [the Gentiles] [X2]”  
 
C:  Therefore,  
the one who is faithful as Abraham [Y]  he will be Blessed in    
      Abraham [Z] 
 
[9]  “So then those out of faith [Y]  are Blessed  
        together with the faithful Abraham [Z].” 
 
Thus, all the terms of the reconstructed syllogism of the implied adversaries are present in Gal 3.6–9. 
More so, everything is stated in the modus ponens. Paul seems to let one of the themes of his 
opponents resound according to their own reasoning! This time no juxtaposition with “law” or a denial 
of the reasoning (MinP) is heard. What is Paul doing? Instead of an open refutation (negative 
rhetoric), the apostle follows the rhetorical strategy of Umdeutung (Chapter 3). In the intended 
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construal of thought in the aural event, the original addressees should grasp this familiar reasoning on 
the “faith of Abraham” differently; this should be the moment that one way of structuring thought is 
transformed into another. The prior juxtapositions of “law” and “faith” and the explicit exclusion of 
the former should cause them to frame this theme (“faith”) not any longer in line with these other 
teachers – as obedience to “the law” – but solely as Paul’s earlier advocated trust in God. 
In Gal 3.10 and 13, the theme of “curse” occurs. In Gal 3.13, the matrix is explicitly phrased as the 
“curse of the law.” Thus, according to Paul, the “law” is related to “curse.” The present-day reader vis-
à-vis the text of the letter encounters “curse” for the first time in Gal 3.10. The term is used by the 
apostle, however, without any form of introduction or explication. In line with the proposed approach, 
we may assume that the implied addressees are familiar with this specific theme: so to speak, the 
threat of curse – which is activated in and by the spoken word – is hanging in the air. 
 
For all who are out of works of law (10a) 
are under curse, (10b) 
for it is written:  
“Cursed everyone who does not remain in all things written  
in the Book of the law to do them.” (10c) 
(...)  
Christ has bought us out from the curse of the law (13a) 
by becoming for us curse, (13b) 
for it is written: “Cursed everyone who is hanged on a tree” (13c) (translation mine) 
 
Through the conjunctive γάρ (for), the “curse of the law” is connected with the preceding verses on the 
“Blessing of Abraham” (with Mayordomo; against Bachmann). Moreover, the “curse of the law” is an 
antonym of the “Blessing of Abraham” (see also Mayordomo; Bachmann). Therefore, if the 
reconstructed syllogistic rationale of the opponents’ teaching is valid, the theme of the “curse of the 
law” can be unfolded according to the same pattern:  
 
MajP: The one who is not rectified before God [X] he will be cursed by the law  
        [Z-anti] 
MinP: The one who is not out of works of law [Y]  he is not rectified before God  
        [X] 
C:  Therefore,  
the one who is not out of works of law [Y]   he will be cursed by the law  
       [Z-anti] 
 
In Paul’s own statement of Gal 3.10a, a denial is missing this time. Thus, the implied audience hears 
the C of the opponents bluntly turned upside down.  
 
C:  Therefore,  
the one who is not out of works of law [Y]   he will be cursed by the law  
       [Z-anti] 
 
[10a] “all who are [not] out of works of law [Y]  [10b] are under curse 
        [Z-anti].” 
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In the following alleged Scripture proof (Gal 3.10c), however, the addressees will recognize once 
again the unaltered C of these other teachers:  
 
[10cB] “‘everyone who does not remain in all things  
  written in the Book of the law to do them [Y] [10cA] Cursed!’ [Z]” 
 
When the syllogistically structured reasoning governs the implied realm of history, this rationale has 
to direct the implied addressees in their participation in the construal of the performance at this point. 
For that reason, the present-day reader is no longer (subliminally) forced to harmonize this laboured 
argumentation on the level of the text. Just as the original participants understood beyond critical 
awareness, one is compelled, however, to understand the effect of this blunt contradiction in keeping 
with the appearance and performances of these other teachers. In Gal 3.10, we can discern the C two 
times. The first time the C is stated by Paul in the modus ponens – in line with the opponents (Gal 
3.10c). Another time the C is formulated in the modus tollens (Gal 3.10a). How does the audience 
participate in this clash of bluntly contradicting conclusions? Since these C’s are not logically related 
to each other, the answer to this question is not within the scope of the present study but worth 
pursuing.559  
 
Textualizing oral performance there-and-then-to-them (4) 
The interesting point is that the reconstructed primary syllogism functions as text to us (see the 
previous tables). Also, this example of textualizing the oral performance there-and-then of Gal 3.10–
12 is caught up in layouts of the documented wording. As we have stated before, however, the realm 
of history of the original addressees lacked these textualized tables. Therefore, detextification aims to 
bend our thoughts into that specific realm of history in line with the senses. After Paul had left, the 
Galatian communities became challenged in their convictions, practices, and social hierarchy. The 
presence and performances of others who claimed leadership (the other “teachers”) formed the 
incentive to a process of change in the communities. Were they able to answer questions which had 
risen after the apostle had left? Were convictional or practical loose ends troubling the converts? First, 
we assume that this specific syllogistic reasoning of these teachers on “law,” “rectification,” and 
“l/Life” has been newly introduced in their concrete lifeworld. Second, once a growing number of 
 
559 In his commentary, Martyn reasons that the implied opponents had already used these words from Deut 
27.26. So these soundbites would have had their impact on the Galatian converts prior to the oral performance of 
the letter. Once this perspective is introduced, this Scripture proof (on the level of text/in se?) cannot be 
understood anymore as being absolute or freischwebend. In this respect, the structure of rhetoric-counter rhetoric 
seems to be more promising. For a proposal to understand this contradiction in line with anticipated 
participation, see Ben F. van Veen, “Een staaltje van paulinische hermeneutiek: Een onderzoek naar het gebruik 
van de Heilige Schriften door Paulus in Gal 3.6–14” (MTh thesis, Vrije Universiteit, 2001).  
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them had understood and internalized the logos of their reasoning (collective memory), it would have 
sufficed for the teachers to reaffirm time and again this syllogistic reasoning in an enthymematic way. 
That is why Paul can relate to it without much preparatory work. Regarding this anticipatory approach 
of the apostle, Martyn even presents a fully-fledged proposal for one of their sermons. In direct 
speech, he offers one on the descent of Abraham.560 Although results will always remain tentative or 
suggestive, this approach is legitimate and helpful. It directs our thoughts deeper into the realm of 
history there-and-then-to-them.561 Third, this repetitive syllogistic reasoning did not only structure 
their performances (rhetoric), but this emphasis on the “law” was affirmed in their own daily presence 
among the Galatian converts: the latter became familiar with Jewish religious regulations – consider 
“works of the law,” “circumcision,” and “not to have table fellowship with Gentiles.” Sociologically 
speaking, these outstanding practices function as identity markers; they bring hierarchy and distinction 
in communities. Implicitly, this kind of presence/way of living as Jews reflected their superior status 
in distinction from “Gentiles” who are “sinners.”  
 
Conclusions 
In Gal 2.14–3.14, we discern up to twenty-one threads of identical, synonymous, and antonymous 
terms in one syllogistically structured reasoning. In this enthymematic way, a consistent basic issue 
comes to the fore: that is, the call of these other teachers to live in obedience to the Jewish law, 
culminating in the act of circumcision. In this way, Barclay’s overarching criterion of consistency is 
met:  
 
Unless we have strong evidence to suggest that Paul is responding to more than one type of opponent or 
argument, we should assume that a single object is in view. Thus the results of the previous criteria may 
be tested to see if they amount to a consistent picture of Paul’s opponents.562  
 
 
560 Martyn, Galatians, Comment #33: The Teachers’ Sermon on Descent from Abraham, and Paul’s 
Modulation of that Theme into Descent from God,” 303–6: “Listen Now! It all began with Abraham. Looking 
beyond the fascinating movements of the heavenly bodies he was the first to discern that there is but one God. 
Because of that perception, …” 
561 In line with the approach of detextification, we can comment that this sermon – as presented to the reader 
of his commentary on the level of text (media) – resembles a present-day sermon from the pulpit in a traditional 
Protestant church. Critical analysis of the composition of this proposal prompts the question whether the 
intricacies of real-time communication in a predominantly oral culture are done justice. Since the present study 
anticipates a preceding and reversed form of rhetoric by these teachers, the structure of rhetoric and counter 
rhetoric would then be as follows: Paul’s original presence and performances (rhetoric) is countered by the 
presence and performances of these teachers (counter rhetoric). In conclusion, in how Martyn presents this so-
called sermon (singular) of these teachers we miss the explicit differentiation of media and mindset once more. 
How would this sermon look (hear!) in the light of the teachers’ anticipated participation of the Galatians and 
their prior experiences with Paul? In line with the call to textualize history, we would propose to explicate in the 
structure of such a “sermon” the oral-aural communicative dynamics of synonymous and antonymous metonymy 
as well as the specific collective memory of the original addressees at that moment. So the element of anticipated 
participation and/or metonymical disclosure of the specific collective memory of Paul’s Galatian converts seems 
to be lacking in Martyn’s composition.  
562 Barclay, “Mirror-Reading,” 85. 
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In line with the proposed approach, we observe that this textualized totum reaches also into the realm 
of history there-and-then-to-them and becomes imaginable in how these teachers must have been 
active among the Gentile converts in Galatia. From a sociological point of view, one can argue that 
this syllogistically structured reasoning must have impressed the Galatian converts; as means of 
power, this reasoning could help to explain how these teachers had gained influence over Paul’s 
addressees. This clear and continuously repeated structuring of thought would have indoctrinated 
Paul’s Galatian converts. We conclude that the apostle does not deny the reasoning as a whole, but he 
disqualifies and replaces the minor term. We can even explicate the syllogistic counter reasoning 
which governs his anticipated participation: “Therefore, the one who is out of faith, he will Live” 
(conclusion; see Gal 3.11b). In sum, in this detextification, we did not so much say new things nor 
provide an answer to the question, What does the text say? We scrutinized and textualized the 
distinctive functioning of the documented wording there-and-then-to-them: How do these 
(documented) phrases in the oral delivery of the letter mean to the originally intended addressees in 
their predominantly oral state of mind from the perspective of Paul – who has integrated the rhetoric 
of his opponents?563 In view of the warnings of Albert Lord and Walter Ong, we conclude that we can 
textualize – to a considerable extent – the originally intended structuring of thought implied in Gal 2–
3. To strengthen our thesis, we will discuss a second example of our approach in the next section. 
 
 
B. Example 2: Freischwebende theology or rhetorical strategy in Gal 2.18–20? 
 
The following example of detextification is related to the role ascribed to the senses of the intended 
addressees. This example deals with Gal 2.18–20:  
 
For, if I would rebuild anew that which I broke down, (18a) 
I show myself to be a transgressor. (18b) 
For I myself died through law in [the realm of the] law, (19a) 
so that I will Live in God, (19b) 
together with Christ, I have been crucified. (19c) 
Not any longer do I live, (20a) 
but Christ, he Lives in me: (20b) 
And that which I now live in [the realm of the] flesh, (20b) 
I Live in faith, (20cA) 
 
563 In light of the critical evaluation of the text-context scheme in Chapter 3, we can observe the following 
hermeneutical dynamic: since the anticipated whole (totum) is constitutive of the communicative process there-
and-then in actu, this implied collective memory is not explicated on the level of text; it will not, therefore, 
automatically arise from the freischwebende context of the letter functioning as autonomous text here-and-now-
to-us. Conversely, it is firmly bound to the originally intended subjects in actu there-and-then. These actors exist 
per se beyond the level of text. Therefore textualizing – in the elements of “to whom” and “in what state of 
mind” – their participation is a necessary step so that the biblical scholar comes to an understanding of how the 
original addressees were intended to understand. In this way, it becomes clear that “context” – that is, 
textualizing history – has to precede the real-time functioning of the letter as “text” to the present-day reader. 
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the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me. (20cB) 
I do not nullify the Grace of God! (21a) 
For if rectification is through law, (21b) 
then Christ died in vain! (21c) (translation mine) 
 
Verse 18 contains an antonymously structured metaphor on “building” and “breaking down” (a wall or 
a building perhaps?). From verse 19 onward, Paul continues his argumentation with several verbs – 
which are also related to each other – ἀποθνῄσκω (to die), ζάω (to L/live), συσταυρόομαι (to be co-
crucified), and παραδἰδωμι (to be handed over; in the implied framing of Christ’s voluntary death at 
the hands of human beings). Perceiving the letter as intended aural event, we can state that this 
thematic matrix has not been heard before. Since the theme of “life” and “to live” is heard frequently 
before, an also antonymously structured theme comes to the fore: “dying” and “living/Living.”  
In this example, the role of the senses by which the originally intended addressees participate in their 
realm of history cannot be underestimated. This is, however, not a legitimation for unbridled fantasy. 
Imagination is structured by historicizing text.  
The following steps will be taken. First, an evaluation will be presented of four more recent and 
influential commentaries.564 Second, a detextification of Gal 2.19–20 will be undertaken. Although not 
always congruent with each other, we aim to provide a historical-critical deepening of the dimension 
of media and mindsets in current understandings of this passage. Again, it is not so much the “what” 
but the “how” of Paul’s rhetoric which is at issue in this example. 
 
 
564 This selection of commentaries is based on the frequency of occurrences in scholarly publications and on 
the way in which they have left their mark on the scholarly debate. For commentaries published over the last 
forty years, see Frederick F. Bruce, Galatians, NIGCS (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1982); 
Joseph B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians, 10th ed. (London: MacMillan, 1986); Franz Mussner, 
Der Galaterbrief; Auslegung, HThKNT 9, 5th ed. (Freiburg: Herder, 1974); Ronald Y.K. Fung, The Letter to the 
Galatians, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1988); Joachim Rohde, Der Brief des Paulus 
an die Galater, ThHK 9 (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt 1989); Frank J. Matera, Galatians, SPS 9 
(Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1992); John Ziesler, Galatians, ECS (London: Epworth Press, 1992); Scot  
McKnight,, Galatians, NIVAC (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1995); Sam K. Williams, Galatians, ANTC 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997). Philip F. Esler, Galatians, NTR (London and New York: Routledge, 1998); 
Ben Witherington III, Grace in Galatia: A Commentary on St Paul’s Letter to the Galatians (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 1998); Jürgen Becker and Ulrich Lutz, Die Briefe an die Galater, Epheser, und Kolosser, NTD 8/1 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1998); Richard B. Hays, “The Letter to the Galatians,” in 2 
Corinthians, Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, 1 & 2 Thessalonians, 1 & 2 Timothy, Titus, 
Philemon. Vol. 11 of The New Interpreter’s Bible, ed. Leander E. Keck (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2000), 139–
348; Charles B. Cousar, Reading Galatians, Philippians, and 1 Thessalonians, LTC (Macon: Smyth and Helwys, 
2001); Dieter Lührmann, Der Brief an die Galater, ZBKNT 7, 3rd ed. (Zürich: Theologischer Verein Zürich, 
2001); Mark D. Nanos, The Irony of Galatians: Paul's Letter in First-Century Context (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2002); James A. Fowler, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians: The Gospel versus Religion, CCC 
(Fallbrook: C.I.Y., 2006); Thomas R. Schreiner, Galatians ZECNT (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2010); L. Ann. 
Jervis, Galatians, UBCS (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2011); David A. DaSilva, The Letter to the Galatians, 
NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2018); Craig S. Keener, Galatians, NCBC (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018). Cardinal A. Vanhoye and Peter S. Williamson, Galatians, CCSS (Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2019).  
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1. Hans Dieter Betz: Galatians (Hermeneia) 
It has become practically axiomatic since the appearance of the commentary by Hans Dieter Betz that 
study of the argument and structure of Galatians begins with classical rhetoric.565 In his introduction, 
he states, 
 
Paul’s Letter to the Galatians can be analysed according to Greco-Roman rhetoric and epistolography. This 
possibility raises the whole question of Paul’s relationship to the rhetorical and literary disciplines and 
culture, a question which has not as yet been adequately discussed.  
 
As a historically attested amalgam of the letter-form and the genres of autobiography and apologetic 
speech, Betz categorizes Galatians into the “apologetic letter genre.”566 This type of letter presupposes 
the situation of a “court of law.” This framework (court) provides a structure for Paul to envision how 
his addressees will participate in the actualization of his letter. Paul anticipates his Galatian converts to 
participate as a “jury” who will “judge” him as a “defendant” because of the “accusations” made by 
these other teachers. 
In view of historicizing text, several questions come to the fore: How do the original addressees know 
their role (judge) and participate accordingly in the delivery of the letter? And if so, what would the 
outcome or verdict of the jury imply? In terms of imagination, we ask, What does Paul expect to 
happen? How does this complicated and layered process look like in the realm of history there-and-
then-to-them? No clear directives or indications are encountered on the level of the documented 
wording of the letter itself. So, in line with the dynamic of anticipated participation and/or metonymic 
referentiality, we must ask, When absent words should form the partes, how can the totum (court of 
law) be reconstructed by the addressees themselves in the moment of delivery?  
Betz continues that in this framework of the court the letter becomes “a self-apology, delivered not in 
person but in a written form.” Regarding the original use of the letter, he writes, “Since it is simply a 
lifeless piece of paper, it eliminates one of the most important weapons of the rhetorician, the oral 
delivery.” Since no further elaboration of the “lifeless piece of paper” is found, the letter seems to 
function as text there-and-then-to-them as it does here-and-now-to-us (how). The dimension of 
performance or a real-time event of delivery or public reading seems to be absent. So it becomes even 
more difficult to imagine the actual functioning of the letter as a “court of law.” Regarding the 
participants who are reading the letter as text, we ask, Do they do so in silence and solitude, all of 
 
565 Hans Dieter Betz, Galatians: A Commentary on Paul’s Letter to the Churches in Galatia, Hermeneia 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979). Since this paradigm shift took place more than forty years ago, see for a 
recent and balanced evaluation Carl Joachim Classen, “Can the Theory of Rhetoric Help Us to Understand the 
New Testament, and in Particular the Letters of Paul?”, in Paul and Ancient Rhetoric: Theory and Practice in 
the Hellenistic Context, ed. Stanley E. Porter and Bryan R. Dyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2016), 13 –39.  
566 Betz, Galatians, 14. Given Greco-Roman epistolography/rhetoric, he determines the following structure: 
I. Epistolary Prescript (1.1–5); II. Exordium (1.6–11); III. Narratio (1.12–2.14); IV. Propositio (2.15–21); V. 
Probatio (3.1–4.31); VI. Exhortatio (5.1–6.10); VII. Epistolary Postscript/Conclusio (6.11–18). As a 
consequence, Betz identifies Gal 2.18–20 as part of the Propositio. 
 207 
them at the same time (multiple copies available) or one after another (single autograph)? When, how, 
and under whose supervision would they discuss that which they have read and come to a verdict in 
the “court of law”?567 Betz continues his reasoning by asserting that since the advantages of oral 
communication are lost, the art of persuasion has to take place through “rational arguments.” This leap 
makes us ask once more: Do these arguments function on the level of text to the generalized reader of 
the letter? This question seems to be answered in an earlier comment by Betz, namely, that the Letter 
to the Galatians functions in an ongoing debate: “Because of the fundamental issues under discussion, 
the readers do not simply include the Galatian churches but all churches. … In principle, therefore, 
even the present readers of the letter are participants in this debate.”568 The implication is that, 
historically speaking, Paul – as author and origin of this letter – would have anticipated, in the moment 
of composition, the whole history of reception (hitherto or perhaps even centuries beyond) of his 
letters as “text”-functioning-independently-of-time-and-place. Once more we add that we do not state 
that this “ongoing debate” is not useful or is inadequate (in terms of the question what does it mean), 
but we want to thematize and discuss two media cultures involved in this process of coming to 
understand: that is, oral performance there-and-then-to-them over against autonomous text in the later 
history of Western Christian theology.  
Notwithstanding the inherent value of rhetorical analysis, these leaps in his own argumentation, that is, 
from the setting of a “court of law” there-and-then, via the letter as “lifeless piece of paper,” up to the 
point that he remarks that “all churches … even the present-day readers are participants in the debate,” 
make clear that Betz does not take one clear perspective in the realm of history, neither there-and-then-
to-them nor here-and-now-for-us.  
We turn to the passage under scrutiny. Betz considers Gal 2.18–20 to be composed mainly of 
“doctrinal abbreviations.” He observes that “these abbreviations are difficult to translate. Commenting 
upon them means that they must be resolved into the doctrinal statements which they intend to 
abbreviate.”569 Neither it is clear how he comes to this conclusion on the presence of “doctrinal 
abbreviations” nor who (to whom) relates in what way (how, in what state of mind) to these 
abbreviations. Nonetheless, we recognize a metonymical structure in his observation. The 
abbreviations function as the parts that should recall the whole (doctrine).  
Here we step back for a moment. Textualizing history implies scrutinizing familiar terminology: What 
are the consequences of using “doctrine” regarding the collective memory of the original addressees? 
 
567 At the end of his commentary, we find a line of reasoning on the realm of history there-and-then. Betz, 
ibid., says that Paul hopes that his letter re-enacts his former apostolic parousia in their midst: “The difference is 
that at the beginning they were confronted as to whether or not they should accept the ‘gospel of Christ,’ while 
now they are asked to remain loyal to it and not bring upon themselves the curse of apostasy” (325). Comparable 
to the evaluation of Bachmann’s article, this remark is not only a minimal and still a highly abstracted form of 
textualizing history there-and-then-to-them, but this context is also explicated independent of and after the 
processing by him of the letter as text.  
568 Ibid., 24. 
569 Ibid., 115. 
 208 
This notion – like, for example, “theology” – tends towards the frame of a fixed, coherent, and free-
standing belief system. This structure is perhaps fitting in our Western theological tradition and 
predominantly literate state of mind vis-à-vis the letter as text and its reception throughout time, but 
what about a predominantly oral mindset in the original intended aural event and the purpose to 
change the communal course of life in these congregations (inner-historical)?  
In Gal 2.15–16, Paul elaborates on “the doctrine of justification by faith in Christ.” Based on the 
participle εἴδοτες in verse 16 (“we know/knowing”), Betz makes the case that one is a Christian by 
this “theological conviction” – unlike being a Jew, what a person is by birth.570 What are the 
implications of this doctrine for Gentile Christians? In verse 17, Paul constructs a false and 
vehemently denied argument: Gentiles – even when they have become Christian – are sinners until 
they come under the Torah. “The question is whether Paul himself has merely invented this idea or 
whether he has adopted a slogan from his opponents.”571 Here we see that Betz bends his thoughts into 
the realm of history there-and-then-to-them (from whose perspectives).  
In Gal 2.18, Paul continues with an explicit legal critique of this false argument. The terms of 
“building,” “annulling,” and “rebuilding” emerge. Betz offers a helpful paraphrase here: “If I want to 
regard the Gentile Christians as ‘transgressors’ of the Torah and ‘sinners’ in the Jewish sense of the 
term, I have to first reinstate the Torah as the law which then the Gentiles would be obliged to obey.” 
As a consequence, “the doctrine of justification” would collapse. On a logical level, this paraphrase is 
clarifying and solid to us as readers of his commentary here-and-now – especially when one is 
(theologically) raised in a Protestant environment. It remains unclear how this reasoning, as explicated 
on the level of his text, would have functioned in the aural event.  
We see this confirmed in Betz’ interpretation of Gal 2.19–20 where Paul provides “the basic elements 
of his own theological position” in four theses. Betz relates the verb “I have died” to “co-crucifixion” 
without further elaboration or justification. He only mentions that the verb “in a metaphorical way 
points to some kind of death experience.”572 Neither does he explicate to whom this metaphorical 
death experience should mean nor how, in what state of mind, and from whose perspective; is it 
related to the original addressees (collective memory) or the present-day (Christian?) reader 
(doctrine)?  
In the second thesis, Betz relates the abbreviated phrase “I have been crucified together with Christ” 
(2.19b) to Rom 6.1–10. A majority of the older commentaries also structure their readings in view of 
this parallel text.573 However, Betz explicitly denies the ritual of baptism to be a possible interpretative 
framework. His argument is that baptism in Galatians is only mentioned once (3.27): “Strangely, in 
 
570 Ibid., 115–9. 
571 Ibid., 120. 
572 Ibid., 121. 
573 In this respect, Betz explicitly refers to the commentary by Heinrich Schlier, Der Brief an die Galater, 
KEKNT 7, 6th rev. ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1989). In note 636, we briefly discuss his 
reading of Gal 2.18–20. 
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3.27 Paul does not mention the dying together with Christ, while in 5.24; 6.14, when he speaks of the 
death together with Christ he does not mention baptism.” The horizon of this argument is as broad as 
the level of text allows. Betz places the notion of “co-crucifixion” against the background of the 
abstracted context which comes with text. What would happen if we were to imagine these words 
sounding in an aural event, that is, when we imagine that Paul is anticipating a specific participation 
by his Galatian converts there-and-then? 
Another argument against the relatedness of Romans 6 is the observation that nowhere in Galatians 
does Paul mention Christ’s resurrection or any other of the concepts as used here. We see this affirmed 
in another line of reasoning: 
 
It is only in Romans 6 that Paul interprets the ritual of baptism in terms of death and resurrection together 
with Christ. That interpretation must be secondary and cannot be tied entirely to baptism in the way Schlier 
does. In fact, it may be just the other way around; Gal 2.19 may contain the theological principle by which 
Paul interprets the ritual of baptism in Romans 6.574 
 
It is questionable why Betz would limit Paul’s activity of “interpretation” to the documented wording 
in the so-called authentic letters in the corpus Paulinum – for example, “It is only in Romans 6 that 
Paul interprets the ritual of baptism in terms of death and resurrection together with Christ.” What role 
do the presence and performances (baptisms?) of the apostle play in all the places which he visited on 
his several journeys? Alternatively, we can ask, On what grounds does Betz relate the Letter to the 
Romans to the one to the Galatians and vice versa? How would this relation have looked to the 
original addressees in the realm of history there-and-then, more so, in the event of oral performance? 
No argument is given. Should we conclude that Betz – as writer of his commentary on Galatians as 
text – is simply working uncritically in the ever-expanding universe of texts? This small detour leads 
to a viewpoint from which we see fundamental differences between Betz’s perspective on the letter 
and the approach of detextification.  
As commented before, the reconstructed reasoning by Betz is insightful and solid in the abstracted 
context of text or as freischwebendes Denken. However, from the perspective of textualizing history or 
sensorial manifestation in the participatory realm of history there-and-then-to-them, we must ask, In 
what way would the Galatian converts (or even Christians here-and-now?) relate to this beneficial 
death by the Christ? How does this death manifest itself to them in their concrete lifeworld? In Betz’ 
interpretation, “[t]he doctrine of justification by faith in Christ” and “the death of the ‘I’” remain 
highly abstract notions. He presents an absolute understanding (being) which does not leave much 
room for a distinction between the first-century original addressees caught up in the aural event in 
their concrete lifeworld, and the twentieth or twenty-first-century academic reader vis-à-vis the letter-
as-text (becoming). Therefore the governing question – How does it function, to whom, in what state 
 
574 Ibid., 123. 
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of mind, and from whose perspective[s]? – will be answered to come to a historically more plausible 
understanding of the issues involved.   
 
 
Excursus: Ancient rhetorical sources and oral performance 
 
Since the rhetorical approach of Hans Dieter Betz in his Hermeia commentary has become 
paradigmatic, we will turn now to some ancient sources on rhetoric to inquire into oral performance: 
How important is this aspect in and what role does it play in ancient rhetoric?  
Regarding ancient Greece, it is well-known that Socrates (c. 470–399 BCE) and Plato (c. 427–347 
BCE) distrusted the teachings of poets, sophists, and the writers of handbooks.575 They considered 
their practices not only morally irresponsible but also unrelated to the search for Truth. Also Aristotle 
(384–322 BCE) was dismissive of this kind of oratory. In his On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic 
Discourse,576 he remarks that “delivery seems a vulgar matter when rightly understood” (3.1.5), 
“[delivery] has great power … because of the corruption of the audience” (3.1.5), and he depicted 
poets as “speaking sweet nothings” (3.1.9). Nonetheless, he had a different stance in recognizing that 
“rhetoric as an art of communication was morally neutral, that it could be used for either good or 
ill.”577 In his lectures on rhetoric, on which On Rhetoric is based, he wanted to teach his students to 
understand the dangers of sophistic rhetoric, on the one hand, but he also wanted them to be able to 
defend themselves and to be effective in public life, on the other.578  
In view of the leading question in this Excursus, we will turn to book three, in which he addresses the 
theme of delivery (hypokrisis). Analysing effective speech, he differentiates between the “facts,” the 
“composition” thereof in “language” (style [lexis] and arrangement [taxis]), and the last element “that 
has the greatest force but has not yet been taken in hand, the matter of the delivery [hypokrisis]” 
(3.1.3). Because of this “great power” and the small place in teaching hitherto, he qualifies the 
delivery of oratory as an art (3.1.5). Although comprising almost the whole book, the treatment of 
style and arrangement functions as a means to the end of delivery. This is important to note. Although 
the intellectual legacy of Aristotle could last until today because it was recorded in writing and in that 
way transmitted throughout the ages, we should not uncritically identify the philosopher with this 
media, even as in writing a speech for effective delivery. As Daniel Melia argues in his article “Orality 
 
575 For example, in Plato’s dialogue Gorgias, Socrates criticizes rhetoric as a form of flattery. In the Republic. 
Plato even identifies it with “poison.” In Chapter 1, Section D. Eric Havelock: Birth pangs of a new state of 
mind, the role of the poets and Plato’s reaction to them will be dealt with extensively.  
576 Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, transl. with introduction, notes and appendices by 
George A. Kennedy, 2nd ed. (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 195. 
577 George A. Kennedy, prooemion to On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, by Aristotle, transl. with 
introduction, notes, and appendices by George A. Kennedy, 2nd ed. (New York-Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), x. 
578 Ibid., xi. 
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and Aristotle’s Aesthetics and Methods; Take #2”: “Unlike many contemporaries and later Classical 
rhetorical handbooks, Aristotle’s Rhetoric is concerned not with how to compose a speech in advance 
– how to write it down – but with how to access material that is already in one’s head exactly when 
needed.” (see Chapter 2, Section E.2. Ancient rhetoric as speech art)579   
In ancient Rome, Aristotle’s book On Rhetoric reached Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BCE).580 He 
also wrote extensively on rhetoric. Aristotle’s emphasis on delivery can be recognized in book three of 
De Oratore.581 Here Cicero describes the speech of Lucius Licinius Crassus who attempts to persuade 
the Roman people to replace the Senate with a new council. In this elaborate speech, Cicero makes 
Crassus at a certain moment comment, “But the effect of all of these oratorical devices depends on 
how they are delivered. Delivery, I assert, is the dominant factor in oratory; without delivery the best 
speaker cannot be of any account at all, and a moderate speaker with a trained delivery can often outdo 
the best of them” (3.56.213). So, Cicero emphasizes the need and impact of training in delivery, even 
for those who are gifted in speaking. 
In his Institutio Oratoria, Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (35–100 CE), dealt with De Oratore of 
Cicero.582 In book nine, he hails the study of artistic structure as conducted by Cicero. He does so by 
subsequently opposing a number of writers who “contend that language as it chances to present itself 
in the rough is more natural and even more manly. If by this they mean that only that is natural which 
originated with nature and has never received any subsequent cultivation, there is an end to the whole 
art of oratory” (9.4.4). He describes what these “first men” missed, namely “[t]hey knew nothing of 
introducing their case by an exordium, of instructing the jury by a statement of facts, of proving by 
argument or of arousing the emotions” (9.4.4).583 In this summary, we recognize the approach of Hans 
Dieter Betz as applied to the Letter to the Galatians (see above) and, more important, see the aptness 
thereof affirmed. Once more Quintilian lauds Cicero’s study of structure by concluding, “And for this 
reason all the best scholars are convinced that the study of structure is of the utmost value, not merely 
for charming the ear, but for stirring the soul” (9.4.9). The persuasive power of oratory is constituted 
by the weaving together of rhythm, melody, and eloquence (9.4.13; see Introduction, Section D.5. 
Etymology of text: Between textum and text-as-known-to-us).584 The rest of the book is dedicated to a 
minute study of the artistic structure. Based on the elements of comma, colon, and period and the 
qualities of order, connexion, and rhythm, the activity of writing becomes implied in his own dealing 
with artistic structure. Thus, at this stage in his exposé as present-day readers we enter familiar 
 
579 Daniel F. Melia, “Orality and Aristotle’s Aesthetics and Methods; Take #2,” in Oral Performance and its 
Context, Mnemosyne 248, ed. Chris Mackie (Boston and Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2003), 122.  
580 For example, see the tables and discussion as provided by Sara Rubinelli, Ars Topica: The Classical 
Technique of Constructing Arguments from Aristotle to Cicero, AL (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 93–109. 
581 Cicero, On the Orator: Book 3, On Fate, Stoic Paradoxes, Divisions of Oratory, LCL 349, transl. by Harris 
Rackham.  
582 Quintilian, The Orator’s Education, vol. IV: Books 9–10, LBL 127, ed. and transl. by Donald A. Russel 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), 507. 
583 Ibid., 509. 
584 Ibid., 512. 
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ground. However, it is paramount that writing is utilized by him in view of the oral delivery of 
rhetoric. So, the documented testimonies to this science – the transmitted handbooks that we can study 
in the ever-expanding universe of text – did not impair but enhance and served the art of delivery, that 
is, the specific context of speaking to captivate the heart of the hearers in order to wield power over 
them. In conclusion, the examined cross section of ancient rhetorical evidence is not only directed 
towards but also by the dynamics of real-time oral performance.   
 
2. Richard Longenecker: Galatians (WBC) 
The second commentary under scrutiny is by Richard Longenecker.585 It consists of two parts, an 
introduction and a text and commentary section. In the first part, he describes the reception and 
historical context of Galatians. Important for the following discussion is that in this section we find an 
elaborate description of the Galatian addressees and Paul’s opponents, that is, the other teachers.586 In 
the second part Longenecker offers his exegesis of the verses, passages, and chapters of the letter.  
Regarding Gal 2.19–20, he notes its “highly compressed language.”587 We encounter neither the 
question of the reason for nor the effect on Paul’s implied audience of this kind of compressed 
language. Since he does not explicitly address the media-dimension, we suppose that he does so as 
“reader” of this passage framed as “text.” In line with Betz, he approaches this passage (Gal 2.19–20) 
as part of the larger section 2.15–21: “For if the probatio contains the proofs or arguments introduced 
by the propositio, we must look to Paul’s probatio of 3.1–4.11 for an understanding of how to unpack 
the terms of the propositio of 2.15–21.”588 So Gal 3.1–4.11 should disclose the preceding passage 
2.15–21. Operationally speaking, this proposal is dependent on the typical fixedness and availability 
of, and continuous backlooping589 in the letter-as-text to us (how).  
Before we hone in on the theme of “dying” and “living” 590 in Longenecker’s commentary, we first 
make some observations in line with the approach of detextification. Regarding Gal 2.19, he 
comments, “Paul presents in encapsulated form the essence of his own theology vis-à-vis Jewish 
 
585 Richard B. Longenecker, Galatians, WBC 41 (Dallas: Word, 1991).  
586 Longenecker, Galatians, xcvi–viii. 
587 Ibid., 80. 
588 Ibid., 81. 
589 The meaning of “backlooping” is here that the text is physically available to the reader, as book or on a 
screen, and that, when they have difficulty in following the line of reasoning while reading, they can go back and 
linger over the preceding lines and parts of that text to find clues to come to an understanding of the difficult or 
obscure section.    
590 First, Paul introduces to his hearers the theme of “dying” and “living.” Subsequently, he mentions the 
“cross of Christ” (Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωμαι). Without further explanation, Longenecker relates, however, this 
preceding thematic matrix to the crucifixion of Christ. The point we can make here is that the mechanism of 
synonymy is uncritically operative in his own understanding. As experienced and skilled a Christian 
commentator with his Vorverständnis (Gadamer) or encyclopaedia (Eco) as Longenecker is, he participates in 
the intended construal of meaning. Hence, we advocate concerning detextification that we should always ask 
explicitly – if this dynamic is operative – what the prerequisites are on the part of the original addressees and/or 
their collective memory that would cause this to be the case. In this way, the communicative structure of 
anticipated participation by Paul in the process of composition becomes constitutive of our understanding. 
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nomism.”591 The formulations of “Paul’s own theology” and “Jewish nomism” imply that we are 
dealing with two belief systems that can be compared with or even contrasted with each other on that 
abstracted level. Regarding the original addressees – especially in the aural event of the delivery – one 
can ask whether they were trained for and attuned to such a highly literate or typically “academic” 
endeavour (what state of mind).  
Similarly, some remarks prompt the question for the element “to whom.” Longenecker offers the 
following stipulation of the law: “the law’s purpose was to work itself out of a job and point us beyond 
itself to fuller relationship with God,” and continuing with a spatial metaphor, this was in order “ ... to 
bring us to a place of being no longer dependent on its jurisdiction ... ” (emphasis mine).592 Regarding 
the matrix under scrutiny in this example, he states, “Christ’s death on the cross and our spiritual 
identification with his death affects freedom from the jurisdiction of the Mosaic law” (emphasis 
mine).593 The pronouns “us” and “our” betray some sort of generalized Christian reading community 
(to whom).  
Now we can focus on the theme of “dying” and “living” itself. According to Longenecker, “Christ’s 
death” is framed as “spiritual identification.” He argues, 
 
The σύν- prefix of the verb συνεσταύρωμαι highlights the believer’s participation with Christ in his 
crucifixion. Paul is undoubtedly not here thinking of a literal physical death on the part of the Christian, but 
of his or her spiritual identification with Christ’s death on the cross. The perfect tense of the verb signals the 
believer’s once-for-all act of commitment, with that act having results and implications for the present 
(emphasis mine).594  
 
Once more we see that possible differences between the original rhetorical situation there-and-then-to-
them and the one of the present-day reader are not made explicit. Longenecker’s reasoning starts with 
the crucifixion of Christ – that is, the “participation” in it of the “believer.” Since he rejects the 
thought of “a literal physical death,” the suggestion of “his or her spiritual identification with Christ’s 
death on the cross” becomes abstracted to an extremely high degree. It cannot appeal to the senses of 
the present-day reader here-and-now, let alone to the original Galatian addressees, who must have 
been familiar with it in their concrete lifeworld. No connection is found anymore to crucifixion as a 
historically specific and humiliating form of Roman execution or martyrdom.  
The exposition of Longenecker is surprising in the light of his own introduction. In this description of 
the addressees, date, opponents, situation, and epistolary and rhetorical structures we find a clear 
example of textualizing history (Chapter 3). In the text and commentary part, however, the original 
addressees have become generalized and abstracted into free-floating “Christians/believers;” similarly, 
“co-crucifixion” becomes abstracted (or maybe spiritualized) beyond imagination. This (co-
 
591 Longenecker, Galatians, 91. 
592 Ibid., 90. 
593 Ibid., 91. 
594 Ibid., 92. 
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)“crucifixion” is severed from the typically Roman practice of crucifixion. This can be seen as a telling 
example of the turn from production to product: his commentary starts with this historical exploration 
of forty pages (process of production); then he turns, also on the level of the text, in the second part, to 
the “text” of the letter (product); once caught up himself on this level, he offers his own understanding 
or commentary. In this transition, he somehow loses the perspective of the reconstructive historian and 
becomes the actual reader who is involved in answering the deeply ingrained question, What does it 
mean – to me/us (Christians)?  
 
3. Louis Martyn: Galatians (AB) 
The third commentary, published in 1997, is written by J. Louis Martyn.595 He understands the letter 
against the background of the Jewish-apocalyptic worldview of Paul. The thematization of this 
worldview touches on aspects of the distinctive mindset and collective memory of the original 
addressees and forms an example of textualizing history. We will start our discussion with some 
illustrations of this approach. Martyn ascribes an important role to the other teachers who gained 
influence over the Galatian converts. Their presence among the gathered addressees in the aural event 
forms a structural feature in his understanding of the letter: “... as they [the Galatians] listen to the 
speech as he [Paul] addressess the Teachers ...” So the apostle, Martyn suggests, wants to address 
these teachers more than the Galatians themselves. Once more, in line with textualizing history, we 
recognize the structuring elements of “to whom” and “from whose perspective[s].”  
As we saw already in Chapter 2, Martyn frames Paul’s communicative strategy in terms of 
“theology”/“theologies” – Paul versus these teachers. We pause here for a moment. On the one hand, 
we observe a clear intellectual movement into the realm of history there-and-then: Martyn describes an 
apocalyptic worldview there-and-then contrary to our given present-day one and also the theology of 
Paul there-and-then in reciprocity to the one of his opponents there-and-then. On the other hand, when 
these other teachers become the actually intended hearers, the collective memory of the Galatian 
converts – in their relation to and experiences with Paul’s former presence and performances in their 
midst – becomes superseded. The apostle would then anticipate the participation of these Jewish 
teachers and their collective memory.  
Martyn also provides comments in which he thinks through the participation of the Galatians 
themselves. We see this in his comments on Gal 2.17c, where Christ is charged to be a servant of sin: 
“Is ‘servant of sin’ an expression Paul quotes rather than coins?” He argues that this expression is 
“coined,” it originates from the apostle himself. If “quoted,” he would refer to the rhetoric of these 
other teachers:  
 
 
595 J. Louis Martyn, Galatians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 33A (New York: 
Doubleday, 1997). 
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the best route lies in the assumption that Paul can take for granted comprehension on the part of the Galatians 
(as they listen to the speech he addresses to the Teachers) because he is borrowing several of his expressions 
from things the Teachers are saying about him.596  
 
Martyn’s formulation – the apostle has borrowed “several of his expressions from things the Teachers 
are saying about him” – entails the phenomenon of collective memory of his Galatian converts. 
Regarding Gal 2.19c, Martyn states that Paul’s initial perspective coincides with the one of his 
opponents. This is affirmed in how he tackles the charge that Christ would increase “sin.” Contrary to 
an unchanging and absolute (theological?) grasp of “sin,” Martyn textualizes two opposing ways of 
understanding “transgression” in the rhetorical situation there-and-then.  
 
The Law can play a role leading not to the defining and vanquishing of transgression, but rather to 
transgression itself! Specifically, Peter in Antioch and the Teachers in Galatia uphold the food laws in order, 
they think, to avoid transgression. In fact, however, they follow a new route towards transgression.597     
 
Anticipating their own understanding, Paul wants these teachers (as addressees) to participate in the 
construal of the letter and seduce them, as it were, to follow his reasoning instead of theirs. In this 
way, they should come to a radically opposite valuation of “sin”: the law – framed in how they preach 
– does not protect against, but leads necessarily into sin. The phrase “to rebuild the wall that one has 
torn down” (translation by Martyn) should lead to a radical redefinition of “transgression” on the part 
of his hearers. Now the perspectives of Paul and his adversaries become diametrically opposed. In the 
implied aural event, this is an example of Umdeutung or reframing. 
Another relevant example set out by Martyn in which we get before the letter functioning as text is 
found in Gal 3.26–29. Here he locates the crucial theme of “sons of God” in baptismal liturgy. 
 
If this identification was already part of the baptismal formula, and if Paul had used that formula in his 
evangelistic work in Galatia, he now knows that the Galatians will recall having been addressed at their own 
baptism as “sons of God,” an address to which they presumably responded by the exclamation: “Abba, 
Father” (see 4.6 below). Affirming the corporate existence already given to the Galatians, therefore, Paul can 
boldly say: “You are sons of God.”598  
 
This is a clear example of historicizing text – to let “sons of God” resound in the realm of history 
there-and-then-to-them – and also textualizing history, when he describes the anticipated participation 
by the Galatian converts of Gal 3.26–29. We recognize the dynamic of metonymy: the “sons of God” 
functions to the intended hearers as pars pro baptism as toto.  
We now hone in on the theme of “dying” and “living” in the passage under scrutiny. Martyn 
comments, “I have died to the Law … meaning to be separated from that thing by the event of one’s 
 
596 Martyn, Galatians, 254. 
597 Ibid., 256. 
598 Ibid., 375. 
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own death,”599 adding that the (Jewish) “Law” should be seen as existing in its paired existence with 
the “Not-Law” (living like a Gentile).600 When we step back now, we critically scrutinize this 
proposed understanding according to anticipated participation: this argument would mean that the 
addressees themselves (teachers?) should fill in this whole dichotomous structure of the “paired 
existence of Law and Not-Law.” Questions come to the fore: How would they have become familiar 
with this typically “Jewish apocalyptic” scheme? By whom would they have been so taught? What 
does a process look like in their concrete lifeworld in which the original addressees could have 
internalized such a thought structure? A fundamental implication would be that to Martyn these 
teachers will think in terms of “Law and Not-Law” when the simple and central term of “law” is 
heard. 
The following phrase “through the Law” makes clear that the law played an independent role in the 
death of Christ: “It pronounced a curse on Christ, effectively, taking up its own existence and carrying 
out its own activity apart from God.” Paul’s dying with Christ on the cross (Gal 2.19c) is 
“participation in the event in which the Law acted against God’s Christ!” It is the “law” that “cursed” 
Christ: 
 
One can scarcely think of a statement more highly foreign to the theology of the Teachers (and to Jewish and 
Jewish-Christian theology in general). It is not an exercise in mere fantasy to imagine, that, as Paul’s 
messenger finished reading v 18, the Teachers jumped to their feet, loudly charging Paul with blasphemy!601  
 
In comment number thirty, Martyn enquires as to the origin of the “participatory language” of “co-
crucifixion” (Gal 2.17c). One of his considerations is related to baptism:  
 
When was this participatory language expanded to include not only Christ’s resurrected life but also his 
death? It is probable that the thought of participating in Christ’s death and burial was tied to the act of 
baptism prior to Paul (Rom 6.3–8). It may have been Paul himself, however, who forged an indelible link 
between the motif of participation in Christ’s death and the expressions “with Christ” and “in Christ.”602  
 
Martyn suggests a possible relation between Paul’s participatory language of co-crucifixion and the 
rite of baptism. Related to the experience of the Galatian converts, it should be reckoned to be part of 
the social memory in the Jesus movement then and there. How this general assumption relates to the 
anticipated participation of the addressees (teachers?), however, is left open. In his explication of Gal 
2, baptism does not play any role.  
Martyn’s interpretation of Gal 2.18–21 hinges on the process in which the “old human being” has 
suffered death and the “eschatological one” has been brought to life. This explains, according to 
Martyn, the remarkable turn from “we” (Gal 2.15–17) to “I” (2.18–21):  
 
599 Ibid., 256. 
600 J. Louis Martyn, “Apocalyptic Antinomies in Paul’s Letter to the Galatians,” NTS 31/03 (1985): 410–425. 
601 Martyn, Galatians, 257.  
602 Ibid., 279.  
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Using the first person, Paul presents himself as the paradigm of this human being. Crucified with Christ and 
thus experiencing mortal separation from the Law, this anthrôpos does not any longer have an identity given 
by the Law. He is neither Jew nor Gentile. Thus vis-à-vis the old collectives called Jews and Gentiles, this 
eschatological human being can no longer say “we,” but rather has to say “I,” speaking of his own death to 
these collectives. 
 
From the perspective of detextifying the letter, we have to notice that this thought structure – on “old” 
and “eschatological human being” – is not found in the documented wording in the passage. As a 
consequence, Paul must have anticipated the presence and actuality of this specific thought structure 
on the part of his hearers. Therefore, in terms of metonymy, the two parts of “we” and “I” – as overly 
common personal pronouns and not introduced in any way – should evoke and carry this fairly 
abstracted reasoning as a whole in the aural event. Martyn’s proposed understanding can be evaluated 
as an anticipatory minimum and a participatory maximum. In the presented detextified perspective, we 
will provide a basis in the presupposed concrete lifeworld of the Galatian converts, and in that way 
strengthen this thought structure.   
Martyn then elaborates on the “eschatological human being.” He argues that the motif of Gal 2.19–20 
is not “union with divine nature, but rather the resurrected Christ’s powerful invasion, seen on a 
personal level.”603 The governing question pushes us to ask, How does this “personal level” look like 
for the original addressees? Or how does Christ’s powerful invasion become personal to them? He 
does not clarify what this “personal level” means. Martyn also alludes to the famous passage on 
baptism in Galatians, “neither Jew nor Gentile” (Gal 3.27–28). On a more abstracted level, he relates 
the expression to “baptism,” but in the concrete reasoning on “Jew” and “Gentile” in the passage under 
scrutiny he does not take this dimension into account. What is the reason that he leaves it out of his 
reconstruction of the aural event of this passage as anticipated by Paul? The omission leaves us still 
uncertain as to whether the apostle anticipated the soundbites on “neither Jew nor Gentile” (pars) 
evoke somehow the experiential matrix of “baptism” (totum) on the side of his original addressees at 
that moment in the oral performance or not. We conclude that to Martyn, the “theology” of Paul seems 
to function here on a different level than his rhetoric does in the aural event. Of course, they do not 
need to be related in such a direct way. But on all accounts, we think it is important to historicize text 
in a systematic way, that is, to relate specific (theological?) terms, phrases, and thought structures to 
the senses and collective memory of the intended addressees.  
Evaluating his commentary, we conclude that in several instances Martyn’s way of thinking spirals 
deep into the realm of history there-and-then. The present study is heavily indebted to his 
understanding of the Letter to the Galatians. However, what was notably lacking, and in terms of this 
study disappointingly so, the explication of elements such as “how,” “to whom,” “in what mindset,” 
 
603 Ibid., 258. 
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and “from whose perspective[s].”604 These elements become explicit only incidentally, not as part of 
any systematic study. 
 
4. Martinus de Boer: Galatians (NTL) 
The last commentary to be discussed is by Martinus de Boer, published in 2011.605 De Boer is a 
doctoral student of Louis Martyn and critically engages with the understanding of his Doktorvater.606 
According to de Boer, Gal 2.15–21 can be divided into three units: verses 15–16, 17–18, and 19–21. 
The second unit consists of a refutation to an accusation – “But if by seeking to be justified in Christ, 
we ourselves were found also to be sinners, is Christ then a servant of Sin? Of course not!”607 He 
places this unit between brackets, because the last unit (19–21) picks up, with the word “law,” the 
argument begun in the first unit (15–16): 
 
The new preachers are Christian Jews, accepting Jesus as the Messiah but still taking their theological 
bearings from the law ...; on the other hand, Paul has become a Jewish Christian, no longer taking his 
theological bearings from the law but from Christ, in particular his death on the cross (2.19–21).608 
 
In the passage as a whole, Paul aims at a redefinition of “justification.” In verses 15–16, this 
redefinition is still inchoate. The passage ends “with an argument for the absolute incompatibility of 
the law and the death of Christ in the matter of ‘justification’ (dikaiosyne).”609 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, de Boer takes verse 16a (“because we know that someone is not justified 
based on works of the law but through the faith of Jesus Christ,” his translation) as “a quotation whose 
content was known to, and perhaps even given its specific formulation by, the new preachers in 
Galatia.”610 In this way, this missionary formula becomes severed from the level of the text-for-us and 
is brought into the realm of history there-and-then-to-them, that is, we hear these teachers say it to the 
Galatian converts in their prior performances. In line with the element of “from whose perspective[s],” 
de Boer equates the referential meaning of “rectification,” “works of the law,” and “faith of Jesus 
Christ”611 by the new preachers with the one of Paul himself at this stage of the letter. So, as an 
 
604 Now a decisive question comes to the fore regarding aspects of the historical situation as textualized by 
Martyn: Would it have been the rhetorical goal of Paul to win his adversaries for his gospel (as Martyn 
suggests)? Or – as we will presuppose – is his goal to dissociate his converts from these teachers and discourage 
them to obey their call to circumcision? We will deal with this aspect later on in this section. 
605 Martinus C. de Boer, Galatians: A Commentary, NTL (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011). 
606 See Martinus C. de Boer, The Defeat of Death: Apocalyptic Eschatology in 1 Corinthians and Romans 5, 
JSNTSup 22 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1988).  
607 De Boer, Galatians, 140. 
608 Ibid., 139.  
609 Ibid., 140. 
610 Ibid., 143. See also Martinus C. de Boer, “Paul’s Use and Interpretation of a Justification Tradition in 
Galatians 2.15–21,” JSNT 28/2 (2005): 189–216. 
611 Ibid., 145. 
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example of detextification, this particular perception should govern the rhetorical situation which Paul 
confronts in his letter.  
Then de Boer focuses on one referential aspect of “justification”: Paul and the teachers agree on it as a 
divine activity. However, “they do disagree on an important point: the reference of the word 
‘someone’ (anthropos).”612 According to the new preachers, the word only refers to a Jew or an 
Israelite; the formula does apply to Gentiles only to the extent that they also become part of Israel and 
“live like a Jew.” In his train of thought, de Boer now relates “observing the law” to “justification” and 
explains, “In the apocalyptic Judaism of Paul’s time, justification had come to have a distinctly 
eschatological dimension.” Since the new preachers limit the possibility of justification to the Jew, 
they are telling the Galatian converts to observe the law, beginning with circumcision, in order to be 
declared righteous at judgement day. De Boer argues that Paul’s converts must have internalized this 
thought structure of the teachers constitutive of the contemporary Jewish worldview: 
 
In the view of the new preachers, justification is something that will occur for the law-observant believer in 
the future ... This faithful death did not put an end to law observance for Jewish believers, but it obligates 
those so forgiven now to obey it all the more, to reach a level of law-based righteousness ... surpassing that of 
other (nonbelieving, non-Christian) Jews.613  
 
In hindsight, we note that this whole explanation is based on the implicit reference to “someone.” At 
the end of his discussion of the first unit (Gal 2.15–16), de Boer recapitulates that Paul does not 
discuss the precise definition of “justification,” but for that moment leaves intact the meaning as 
attributed to it by his adversaries in Galatia: “He contents himself with rhetorically separating 
‘justification’ (however defined) from law observance and binding it instead and exclusively to 
Christ’s faithful death.” This observation discloses the structure of Umdeutung (Chapter 3).  
After the digression in Gal 2.17–18, Paul – in the first-person mode of discourse which he began in 
verse 18, “I through the law died to the law, that I might live to God” – presents himself “not as an 
example (as in v. 18) but as a paradigm of the born Jew who has come to believe in Christ (v. 16b).”614 
Similarly, de Boer stresses “[t]he apocalyptic discontinuity between ‘then’ and ‘now’.”615 Here we 
note that this structuring scheme of “then” and “now” – which is located on the level of text in his 
commentary – is necessary to structure the understanding on the part of the intended hearers. In the 
present study, we advocate that the related and decisive question has to be asked, How does this 
scheme manifest itself to them sensorially or how is it activated by them during the course of the oral 
performance? Put differently, what participatory basis does Paul anticipate? 
Because of the apocalyptic discontinuity, de Boer distinguishes between an old and new identity: “it is 
thus his nomistic ‘I’ – the ‘I’ that finds its identity and its hope of justification (5.5) in (the 
 
612 Ibid., 151. 
613 Ibid., 153. 
614 Ibid., 156. 
615 Ibid., 157. 
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observance) of the law – that has died.”616 Regarding this exposition, which will be recognized in our 
detextified perspective, we have to ask about the relation between the explicit parts and the implied 
whole which is called upon by the apostle. Once again there seems to be minimal anticipation by Paul 
and maximal participation on the side of the addressees in this scheme of an “old” and “new 
eschatological human being.”  
Later in his commentary, de Boer links the line of thought on an old (“nomistic ‘I’”) and new identity 
(“coming to believe in Christ”) to the theme of “justification/rectification.” With regard to the 
redefinition of “justification” by the apostle, he says, 
 
God not only justifies (declares right) in the future, but also rectifies (makes right) in the present; God does 
so concretely by joining believers to the death of Christ, thereby separating them from the powers that 
enslave: Sin (v. 17; cf. 3.22) and the law (cf. 2.4; 4.1–5).617  
 
The novelty in Paul’s reasoning is that “justification” is not only related to the future (teachers), but 
already takes place in the present. This is the paradigmatic eschatological human being. Regarding his 
transition from “old” to “new,” Paul anticipates the participation of his addressees: “Paul refers to 
himself, but he expects the new preachers and the Galatians also to say it after him and to apply it to 
themselves.”618 In this way, de Boer pays explicit attention to the dimension of participation 
(“participationist language”).  
Now we take a moment to scrutinize de Boer’s conclusion that Paul primarily addresses the new 
preachers. First, similar to Martyn’s commentary, we do not find a clear answer to the reason behind 
this presupposed communicative strategy of the apostle. The implication is that when Paul is able to 
convince his adversaries and win them over for his interpretation of the missionary formula 
(“someone,” v. 16a), the Galatians will follow. So the apostle wants to wield power, according to de 
Boer, by focusing on the cognitive level, that is, by seeking to achieve some sort of “theological” 
consent. However, in the present study, the conviction is that in a process of conversion more seems to 
be needed – in the concrete lifeworld. Cognitive consent is only one aspect of radical change in the 
identity, loyalties, and lives of the former Galatian converts (or, as Martyn and de Boer primarily see 
it, of these new preachers) – even if it would be the most important one.  
Second, the association of the Galatian converts with these other teachers is a new situation. Paul – 
who is their spiritual father and already well-known to them for years – can better attempt to dissociate 
his spiritual children from these teachers than first win the theological consent of his adversaries, see 
them submit to his authority in order that, in their turn, the Galatian converts will follow the now 
radically new course of these other teachers. (In terms of activating our imagination, we could ask, 
Had Paul hoped that they would come to some sort of public conversion or repentance among the 
 
616 Ibid., 159. 
617 Ibid., 164. 
618 Ibid., 163. 
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Galatian converts?) Alternatively, we suggest that the aim is to re-establish and reaffirm the undivided 
loyalty of the Galatian converts towards Paul and his co-workers by rejecting the authority of these 
other teachers and their pressing call to circumcision, and to expel them from their midst.  
In terms of Paul’s participationist language, we continue with de Boer’s explanation of the term “co-
crucifixion” (Gal 2.19–20):  
 
Paul’s claim to ‘have been crucified with Christ’ (v. 19b) cannot be taken literally. His language is 
metaphorical and hyperbolic, yet also realistic and serious (cf. 5.24; 6.14); it is not just a figure of speech, but 
a vivid interpretation of a truly painful and real experience (…) everyone who ‘has come to believe in Christ 
Jesus’ (v. 16a) participates in … this all-embracing cosmic, apocalyptic event … through which human 
beings are delivered ‘from the present evil age’ (1.4), after which they can truly ‘live to God.’619 
 
When one asks how one is to participate in the “dying” and “Living of Christ,” de Boer provides a 
clear answer regarding the apostle himself: “Paul’s death to the law was no self-chosen path; it 
occurred in his being ‘crucified with Christ,’ an event that took place on the Damascus road.” In terms 
of anticipated participation, we first ask, How should the originally intended hearers relate Paul’s co-
crucifixion to his conversion on the Damascus road? In the documented wording, no indication in that 
direction is found. So, regarding his prior performances among his Galatian converts, the term 
(structural element [Foley]) “co-crucifixion” should bring to mind the whole of his conversion story as 
also documented in the book Acts. The second question is, What about the intended addressees of the 
letter? How do these teachers and Galatian audiences participate in this “metaphorical and hyperbolic, 
yet also realistic and serious”620 death of Christ? How do they die to their nomistic “I” and how is 
Christ born in them?  
This is the moment where de Boer remarks that the new preachers and the Galatians should “say it 
after him and … apply it to themselves.”621 When one presses and employs the intellectual movement 
of textualizing history, however, the question remains unanswered of how would Paul have envisioned 
this “saying after him” and “applying it to themselves”? We find a clue neither on the level of the 
documented wording nor on the level of the text of de Boer’s commentary. Should we presume that 
before the aural event the emissary provided an instruction as to this intended effect? Or – in line with 
systematically bending our thoughts into the realm of history there-and-then-to-them – should the 
intended addressees already have been familiar with the notion of such a particular participation in 
“dying with Christ” (rite)? What, in other words, is the hoped-for consent that Paul anticipates here?  
Later in de Boer’s commentary, “baptism” is related to receiving this “new identity.” On Gal 3.26–28 
de Boer argues, “In the formula, as for Paul, being baptized ‘into Christ’ involves ‘putting him on’ as 
if he were an article of clothing ... The new article of clothing – Christ – bestows a new identity (cf. 
 
619 Ibid., 161. 
620 Ibid., 160. 
621 Ibid., 161. 
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2.20).”622 In this section, however, he subsequently separates this bestowing of a new identity from 
this rite: “The citation of the baptismal formula thus serves to remind the Galatians of their new 
identity in Christ ... the identity bestowed not through the baptismal rite itself but, according to Paul, 
‘through this faith,’ the faithful death of Christ.”623 So “bestowing,” “new identity,” and “the faith of 
Christ” become severed from the prior ritual of baptism. What then is the function or value of the 
baptismal rite itself to Paul, according to de Boer? And how does the apostle anticipate his (baptized?) 
Galatian converts to frame this rather abstracted transition from “old” to “new” at the moment of 
delivery? According to the Boer, we have to conclude that apparently two separate historical moments 
are involved regarding “co-crucifixion,” namely, the future act of participation “to say it after him 
[Paul] and apply it to themselves”624 and past events of baptism.625   
Moreover, in footnote 241, de Boer states explicitly that baptism and co-crucifixion are not connected 
here to each other: that “Paul’s ‘participationist’ language is not here sacramental (as for many 
commentators who read Rom 6.1–10 into Gal 2.19), but informed and shaped by the categories and 
motifs native to Jewish cosmological apocalyptic eschatology.”626 He juxtaposes the anachronistic 
category of “sacramental” with the Jewish worldview there-and-then and he also does not explicate 
this adjective for his intended readers here-and-now. This reveals that his understanding of the letter is 
uncritically directed to the present-day reader. In view of the originally intended addressees (to 
whom), we must, therefore, ask, How does “sacramental” mean to them in their concrete lifeworld? 
How do they relate sensorially to “sacraments”? Thus, de Boer does not structure consistently this 
“participation language” of Paul into the realm of history. Since the senses do not come into play, 
“sacrament” seems to function in an extra-historical way or solely on the level of text – in the 
accompanying abstracted context – to his own readers.  
Second, a free-floating structuring of thought (“sacramental”) is juxtaposed to a historical one 
(“Jewish cosmological apocalyptic eschatology”). As the previous questions suggest, detextification 
urges for a historicization of “sacrament” and “baptism” as well. De Boer’s language represents here 
higher forms of abstracted thinking – that is, for everyone, everywhere, and every time being the same. 
In detextifying our understanding of Gal 2.19–20, the question comes to the fore: How do the 
soundbites “through faith of Christ” and “co-crucifixion” mean to the Galatian converts (to whom) 
against the background of their specific collective memory (in what state of mind), according to Paul, 
in the process of composition (from whose perspective)? In what sensorial, concrete, or experiential 
way can the original addressees relate to these terms or to this theme? 
So the remark on the participation in the dying of the nomistic I there-and-then-to-them – “to say it 
after him” and “to apply it to themselves” – seems to be a loose end. Nonetheless, “baptism” as matrix 
 
622 Ibid., 243. 
623 Ibid., 245. 
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625 Ibid., 243. 
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for textualizing history – as proposed in the following section – brings several aspects and lines of 
thoughts together as encountered in the commentaries by Martyn and de Boer.  
 
5. Detextified understanding: The recall of baptism countering the call to circumcision 
We now attempt to get before this part of the letter functioning as autonomous text to us (Gal 2.18–
20). We will take the words (sound groups) of the letter as partes pro toto. The totum of the collective 
memory of the original addressees will frame our understanding. In accordance with metonymy, 
redundancy is constituted by synonymy and antonymy (see Chapter 3). As a result, we will attempt to 
textualize the oral performance there-and-then-to-them of this passage.  
When we studied the various commentaries on Galatians, we continuously asked what participation 
Paul would have anticipated in his characteristic parlance on ἀποθνῄσκω (to die), ζάω (to live), and 
συσταυρόομαι (to be crucified together).627 Which parts would have been known by everyone at that 
time and which were limited to the collective memory of the intended addressees?628 By whom then 
were they introduced to these latter themes and arguments? By Paul himself, by the other teachers, or 
by someone else? Which terms were new to them? Can we identify the related dynamic of explicit 
introduction and explanation in the intended aural event? These questions open up the intellectual 
movement of historicizing text. We will start with ἀποθνῄσκω. Gal 2.19 is the first instance in the 
delivery when this particular soundbite reaches the ears of the addressees. This is also the case with 
συσταυρόομαι. Moreover, these verbs are immediately and tightly related to the antonym ζάω (to 
live). This verb has been heard just before in Gal 2.14c: “If you, though a Jew, live [ζῇς] like a Gentile 
and not like a Jew, how can you compel the Gentiles to live [ζάω] like Jews?” So we see that the 
theme of ζάω is introduced in the letter as “living according to Jewish religious regulations (law).” 
This frame is clearly in line with the rhetoric of Paul’s adversaries (from whose perspective 
[singular]). We posit that this framing of “to live” constitutes the reconstructed syllogistic rationale 
which structures the thoughts of (a section of) the addressees at the start of the delivery (see the 
previous example in this Chapter). It forms the pivotal minor term [X].629 
 
627 Regarding Gal 2.20 (“who loved me and gave himself for me”) we could also think of the verb 
παραδἰδωμι (to hand over). Since we confine this example to the notion of “co-crucifixion,” we will only 
mention this related term in a later note. 
628 As argued regarding the commentary of Martyn and also applicable to the one of de Boer, we will adhere 
to the following formal communicative structure of the letter: in the process of composition, Paul anticipates the 
participation of the Galatians as his spiritual children in the moment of delivery. As a result, the assumed grasp, 
presence or reactions of these other teachers in the aural event are subservient to this perspective. In other words, 
we answer the question of “To whom does it mean?” by pointing at Paul’s Galatian converts as intended 
addressees. 
629 In this way, we recognize the thought structure as textualized by de Boer (see above): in Jewish 
apocalyptic eschatology, the distinction is pivotal between “now” and “then.” The implied question is the 
following: How does one live [lower case] in the present evil age (now) to Live [uppercase] in the age to come 
(then) – Gal 1.3? The answer to this question by the teachers is to live like a Jew, that is, according to the 
regulations of the Jewish law, to be a partaker in the promises to Abraham and be Blessed with him in the Life to 
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After this first exploration in historicizing text, we continue by setting out what went on before the 
mentioning of “to die” and “to co-crucify.” In Gal 2.14–16 – as argued by Martyn and de Boer – the 
apostle labours to detach “rectification” from “the works of the law,” which is synonymous with “to 
live like a Jew.” His rhetorical aim is to connect it with the antithetical phrase “out of the faithfulness 
of Christ.” This repetitive antithesis has to function as a shibboleth or crowbar. The apostle to the 
Gentiles posits the two formulae as mutually exclusive. We named the repetitive denial of “out of law” 
as negative rhetoric (Example 1).  
We notice that this antithetical reasoning is framed by Paul in direct speech, notably in his address to 
Cephas in Antioch in Gal 2.16–21. Preparatory to this represented speech – in the process of the aural 
event – Paul narrates what he observed in Antioch: First, Peter did not “live” in accordance to the 
Jewish regulations in his fellowship with the Gentile converts there. Later on – at the start of a second 
phase – “certain people came from James.” As a result, Paul comments that the leader of the mother 
community started to change his attitude and presence – “he drew back and kept himself separate” 
(Gal 2.12). In this way, as Paul describes it, in the Antioch community, the distinction between those 
who were Jewish and those who were Gentile became apparent (“even Barnabas was led astray”). So, 
at the start, all were united and one; this was apparent in table fellowship.  
Presumably, Paul would anticipate his hearers recognizing how he as Jew had lived with them in their 
midst. When Peter arrived in Antioch, he initially did not present himself (lived) like a “Jew.” The 
leader from Jerusalem was not there as someone who was “circumcised” but – like Paul and the 
Galatian converts themselves – as a “brother” among “brothers” (Gal 1.2). All were one. In a next 
phase, however, a clear division became apparent between Jews and non-Jews/Gentiles. Some were 
circumcised and obeyed the law, others were not/did not. So, in an exemplary way, Peter (in his 
second phase) embodies “to live out of law.”  
Using Peter’s changed behaviour as a warning signal, Paul will have anticipated his addressees 
recognizing these other teachers. They represent Peter in this second phase. The powerful though 
conditional promise of “Blessing” and “Life” makes the difference between “haves/winners/those who 
are saved” and “have-nots/losers/those who are lost” clearer. The social dynamic of this framing is 
obvious: everyone wants to belong to the former group; the initiation into this group is through 
receiving circumcision. As a result, this persistent and demonstrative acting (living) of these other 
teachers brought a fundamental pressure to bear on the everyday life of the communities.  
It is given this emerging situation of separation that Paul introduces himself while addressing Peter in 
Antioch. As direct speech, Gal 2.16–21 culminates in a blunt rebuke of this representative of the 
mother community in Jerusalem. In terms of the anticipated imagination of the addressees in the 
moment of delivery, they see Paul standing alone in Antioch over against Peter, who is grouped with 
the other Jews. Although the addressees know that the apostle is a Jew himself, they see him standing 
 
come. We recall that this rhetoric or eschatological vista could explain the impact of the performances and call of 
these other teachers amid Paul’s Galatian converts. 
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isolated and alone. So, on another level, the Galatian addressees feel how the apostle addresses the 
teachers and those loyal to them through the figure of Peter.630  
The rebuke is based on the antithetical reasoning of “out of law” versus “out of faith.” Paul 
commences by appealing to “knowledge” of both him and Peter (εἰδότες, 2.16a). In this framing of the 
antithesis as shared knowledge, we can recognize a way of wielding power. This public announcement 
has to function as a clear indication to both Jews and Gentiles that Paul’s position is the only true one. 
Although being a circumcised Jew, Paul did not “live” according to the law concerning Gentile 
converts. A knowledge shared and (originally) lived out by the leader of the mother community as 
well. Thus, the primary situation of unity, in which there was as yet no awareness of division or 
hierarchy and all lived in the same way, embodies the “knowledge” of “not out of law but out of 
faith.”       
Paul’s vivid description of the Antioch incident is antithetically structured. As a prism, the two phases 
involved have to shed light on the developments in the community of the Galatian converts. The first 
phase under the influence of Paul was without distinction. Even as a Jew by birth the apostle himself 
along with other Jews on the one hand, and Gentiles on the other, lived together and were all one. The 
second phase which has been caused by the presence and performances of the other teachers causes a 
division between those who obey the regulations of the Jewish law and those who do not. In light of 
his antithetical formula, we must conclude that according to them “out of law” is right – “from what 
perspectives (plural).” The goal is that everyone should live like Jews. Only then can Gentiles be 
allowed to eat with them and take part in the “promises to,” “Blessing of Abraham,” and “Life.” This 
group embodies a new set of criteria for being one/oneness – on the basis of a subtle form of 
exclusion.  
This textualization of the realm of history there-and-then regarding the formula “out of law” can be 
expanded. In Gal 2.17, Paul uses the notion of “sinner” and “sin” for the first time in the letter (v. 15b; 
next to the related and pejorative identification of those who are not Jews as “Gentile sinners”). In an 
antonymous way, we can frame this term in line with the rhetoric of these other teachers: “sin” equals 
“not to live in accordance to the law.” Therefore, we can paraphrase the accusation: to have table 
fellowship with the non-circumcised and to violate other Jewish regulations means “sinning” against 
the law (that is, not to be out of law). Regarding “how does it mean,” we textualize that Paul 
anticipates that at the start of the aural event “sin” as soundbite still echoes in the ears of the intended 
addressees as framed by the rhetoric of these teachers. Now, as a kind of short circuit, Paul connects 
the embodiment of the gospel by Peter in Antioch (to have table fellowship/first phase) with this 
specific condemnatory rhetoric. What Peter did before the arrival of some from James is “sin” 
 
630 We can press this sensorial dimension and propose the following anticipated participation by Paul in the 
moment of delivery: as Paul stood alone in Antioch (or formed a minority), so does his emissary in the aural 
event in actu. The latter embodies the apostle. As a consequence, Cephas and the many who joined him in his 
change of attitude are represented by these other teachers and those who adhere to their call. 
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(wrong)! He confronts his perspective (“out of faith” [right]) with how his adversaries wield power: 
When one does not live according to the Jewish law (sin) but in obedience to Christ (to have table 
fellowship with Gentiles), is Christ then “a servant of sin”? The apostle turns the accusation against 
himself – “Paul is a servant of sin; he is disobedient to the regulations of the law!” – towards Christ. 
The apostle puts the one who is above both parties at the centre. All of a sudden, one has not to decide 
whether Paul or Peter/the teachers are right, but to emphatically deny the conclusion: it is, of course, 
impossible to condemn the Lord as someone who calls to “sin”!631 We can characterise this intended 
collision of both reasonings as rhetoric of confusion. In an exemplary way, the element of “from 
whose perspective[s]” is constitutive here of the realm of history as such. 
Paul will probably expect his hearers to hold their breath at this point. Based on the antithetical 
formula, however, the solution is already implied. Paul has to guide his hearers out of this confusion 
into clarity and “the truth of the Gospel” (Gal 2.5b). As a climax in the aural event, this incongruous 
conclusion is rejected by an emphatic denial – “Absolutely not!” (2.17d). This is what went on before 
the passage to which we return now (Gal 2.18–20).   
Based on this anticipated confusion, the apostle launches – as we will call it – a three-stage-rocket 
rhetoric. The aim is to disqualify his opponents’ frame of ζάω as “obeying the law.” To change the 
grasp of this theme on the part of his intended hearers, he introduces in Gal 2.18 the metaphor of 
“building (anew)” and “destroying.” As a first phase in his rhetorical strategy, he evaluates the 
narration on Peter and his actions in Antioch in light of these metaphors. Once the law was “built” 
with a specific purpose for the Jews (Gal 3.17–20). For the Galatian converts, however, Paul’s 
narration should make clear that the initial unity with Peter – as a circumcised Jew having fellowship 
with Gentiles – demonstrated that the law had been rightly “destroyed.” The law does not count 
anymore – for example, “there is neither Jew nor Greek” (3.27). Later on – think of the second phase 
after the coming of some from James – Peter all of a sudden begins to “build up again” this dividing 
wall; he starts anew to live according to the Jewish regulations (Martyn). So Paul wants his hearers to 
understand that Cephas contradicts himself in his opposed ways of acting (living). 
In this way, we find an answer to the question of manifestation in the concrete lifeworld of the original 
addressees. Peter in person, in the second phase in Antioch, represents the whole matrix of the 
teaching of Paul’s opponents – consider “circumcision,” “out of law,” “living like a Jew [not a sinner 
from the Gentiles],” “being a son of Abraham,” amongst other phrases. The actual presence of these 
teachers constitutes the experiential dimension of the teaching on “out of law.” So we assume that 
these teachers appealed to “Peter” as a Jew who self-evidently lived according to the Jewish 
regulations (also) among Gentiles. In blunt opposition, Paul condemns this specific behaviour as 
wrong. More so, he states that Peter’s initial behaviour among the Antiochean Gentiles was right: he 
 
631 As phrased by James Fowler, Galatians, 79: “The character of Christ, as God, is absolute righteousness. 
Christ was sinless, is sinless, cannot sin, does not sin, and does 2.17 80 not lead the Christian to sin (cf. James 
1:13).” 
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had table fellowship with them. The apostle turns the world, according to his adversaries, upside 
down: they call to “build up” the law, whereas Paul states that “destruction,” which has already taken 
place in the death and resurrection of Christ, is the only right thing to do.  
We proceed to Gal 2.18b. Earlier we referred to the rhetorical impact of “sin” on the Galatian 
converts. The previous Umdeutung has to reverberate here as well. We will recognize the line of 
thought as provided by Betz and Martyn in their commentaries. In this verse for the first time, the 
expression “to be a lawbreaker” (παραβάτης) is heard. Since this term is so perfectly suited to these 
teachers, Paul anticipates that this pejorative qualification will echo in the ears of his audience as well. 
In “sin” and “lawbreaker,” we recognize the social dynamic by which the Galatian converts are put 
under pressure: “when you do not live in accordance to the law, you are a παραβάτης!” Paul turns this 
apotropaic term against these teachers themselves: “you, who qualify the initial fellowship of Peter as 
Jew with Gentile converts as ‘sin’ are truly ‘sinning’ yourselves!” (paraphrase mine).  
In this way, we textualize the first phase in the three-stage rhetoric: a process of division is taking 
place within the communities, at least from Paul’s perspective. Through these accusations, the Gentile 
converts are placed in a field of tension. In terms of the syllogism in the previous example, they have 
to become “rectified” and “sons of Abraham” to take part in the “promises,” “Blessing of Abraham,” 
or “Life.” In conclusion, they have to cross the Rubicon of circumcision into the realm of the law. 
When we turn to the next verse (2.19), we see that Paul proceeds to counter the rhetoric of his 
opponents but now more profoundly. The metaphor of “building” and “destroying” is not absolute. 
One actually can wrongly rebuild what has been rightly destroyed; this is what the leader of the 
mother community did in Antioch. In reversed order, Peter crossed the line marked by circumcision.  
In launching his rhetorical rocket, we witness here the second stage. Now the apostle introduces the 
more irrevocable metaphor of “dying.” Paul (“I”) has to oppose the leader of the mother community: 
ἐγω γάρ διὰ νόμου νὸμῳ ἀπέθανον. Echoing his adversaries (“to live”), the apostle invokes the 
antonymous theme of “dying.” Paul turns their rhetoric upside down: contrary to Cephas and those 
who “live out of law,” he presents himself as the one who “died in and through the law.”  
In line with the governing question, we can recollect here once more the aspect of manifestation: How 
is this “dying” sensorially mediated there-and-then-to-them? Note that in the statement the sequence of 
“dying” and “living” is reversed. Normally, one first “lives” and then “dies.” In a provocative manner, 
the apostle starts his rhetoric of Umdeutung: he interchanges “living” with “dying” and explicitly 
states the counter-reasoning – that is, “to die to the regulations of the Jewish law.” Now the logic 
behind the earlier observed reversed order of “dying” and “living” comes to the fore. There is no room 
for doubt anymore: Paul has separated himself from Peter – embodying in his second phase in Antioch 
these teachers in Galatia – and this is as radical as “death” and “dying” itself! In one and the same 
remarkable phrase (verse 19b), the apostle introduces his distinctive and juxtaposed frame on “living”: 
“so that I might l/Live in God” (θεῳ ζήσω).  
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The following implicit consequences are involved. In a radical way, the apostle tears “law” and “God” 
apart. Contrary to the given perception hitherto, “living” cannot mean anymore “living by the Jewish 
law/as a Jew.” Moreover, the “law” cannot be related to “God” positively or constructively anymore. 
In this respect, we recognize this mutual exclusion in the final exclamation of this passage: “I do not 
nullify the grace of God; for if justification comes through the law, Christ died for nothing” (Gal 2.21). 
In conclusion, the world as construed by these other teachers (“law”) is annulled (“destroyed”).  
Second, a radical reframing of “to live” is pronounced. Since the addressees had come under the 
influence of these teachers and their framing of this term – that is, “to live” is based and dependent on 
the “law” – disorientation and panic must be the anticipated result on the side of the hearers. All of a 
sudden, their loyalty to these teachers becomes (all the more) under strain. The apostle has to guide 
them out of this confusion. When they identify with him (“I”), as Gentiles who have died in and 
through the law, they will “Live” with him. As an additional observation, we note that “to live (in 
God)” represents the opposite of “out of works of the law.” For the Galatian converts, “to live” should 
not be to obey a set of rules. To the contrary, “to live [in God]” is per se after the abolishment and 
outside the dominion of the law, and, therefore, as representatives thereof, these teachers. Thus, the 
hearers are confronted with a radical and absolute antithesis between two realms, that is, between “the 
law” (wrong) over against “God” (right). 
As a consequence, Paul condemns the social dynamic instigated by his opponents. He attempts to 
evoke a question on the side of his hearers: When this is the case, how do we get beyond the law so 
that it becomes possible to “live in God”?632 Another Rubicon that has to be crossed is involved. The 
answer is provided in the following synonym of to “die” in verse 20a. In the aural event, this verb has 
not been heard until now: συσταυρόομαι (to be co-crucified). In light of the question of how to get 
beyond the dominion of the law, Paul presents himself as the ultimate guide for his addressees (over 
against Cephas): “I have been crucified together with Christ.” In that way, you achieve the required 
situation of living in God. The two previous stages in Paul’s rhetoric aim at this final stage, to lead his 
hearers to the theme of co-crucifixion/crucifixion.633 
So, after our exploration of to “live,” we turn our attention – note that this is the movement of 
historicizing text – to “co-crucifixion.” We notice that the address to Peter in Gal 2.15–19 is structured 
and dominated by the thematic matrices of his opponents (“Jew,” “to live like a Gentile/Jew,” “Jewish 
 
632 A different framing is found in Craig Keener, Galatians, 111: “The expression live to God (2:19; Rom 
6:10– 11; cf. Rom 14:8; 2 Cor 5:15) could echo an expression from the Jewish martyr tradition.” From the 
perspective of anticipated participation: How does Paul direct the thoughts of his hearers in this direction? How 
does it constitute the structuring of thought in this specific moment in the delivery? 
633 Here we can pay attention to παραδἰδωμι as well – another term constitutive of the matrix of “dying” and 
“living” (Gal 2.20e). This verb can be heard as an echo of the introductory words in Gal 1.4: “our Lord Jesus 
Christ, who gave [τοῦ δόντος] himself for our sins.” Clearly, Paul recalls the narrative of the crucifixion of 
Christ and the effect on his audience. The participatory and particular verb συσταυρόομαι (being crucified 
together with Christ) frames ἀποθνῄσκω, ζάω, and παραδἰδωμι for the intended addressees – as anticipated by 
Paul. Since not structural to the implied reasoning, we will not elaborate on the role and framing of the particular 
notion of παραδἰδωμι here. 
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customs,” “Gentile sinners,” “rectification,” “law observance,” and “sin/sinner/transgressor”) and 
culminates in the collisional conclusion that “Christ” would be “a servant of sin.” In the notion of “co-
crucifixion” (2.20), however, Paul now shifts the attention to frame “out of faith” more clearly and in 
view of the present situation.  
After this preliminary observation, we ask, “To whom,” “in what state of mind,” and “from whose 
perspective” does the soundbite “co-crucifixion” mean? We assume that the original addressees should 
have been familiar with “Christ,” his central role in their conversion and communal religious life and, 
more specifically, with the narrative of his death on the cross as the ubiquitous Roman form of 
execution (for example, Gal 1.4 and 3.1). Second, and, more so, they must know about the resurrection 
of Christ (for example, Gal 1.1). This turn towards Paul’s gospel is, however, more complicated than 
that. Since the verb implies participation (σύν, together with), more is at stake than the crucifixion of 
Christ himself. The implication of this soundbite is, namely, that the apostle himself has been crucified 
as well with Christ. We fill in, though, that the intended audience subliminally knows that he is not 
literally dead at that moment (remember that he is addressing them at that very moment through the 
emissary). For us, a question comes to mind: How is Paul crucified with Christ? Important to note is 
that he refers to this participatory process (“I am co-crucified with Christ”), with all these implications 
regarding an anticipated proper understanding on the part of his intended audience, without any form 
of introduction. We recall that detextification implies that we attempt to understand how the original 
addressees were intended to understand in the aural event. In conclusion, the anticipatory minimum by 
Paul in συσταυρόομαι as soundbite (with an emphasis for us on the prefix) – which comes to the 
reader of the letter as text very unexpectedly – demands a participatory maximum by the Galatian 
audiences, namely to recall themselves the experience of and provide the thought structure of to die-
with-Christ-on-the-cross-in-order-to-come-to-Life.  
We see this affirmed in Gal 3.1. Here Paul rebukes his audience: “You foolish Galatians! Who has 
bewitched you? It was before your eyes that Jesus Christ was publicly exhibited as crucified!” His 
former converts hear him accuse them of losing sight of what is most important. Paul summarizes his 
former presence and performances among them in the picture of Christ crucified. Implied in this 
exclamation, he anticipates the presence of this knowledge. For us it is important to consider that co-
crucifixion, which is mentioned without any form of introduction, has to be related. So, in the process 
of composition, Paul envisions that this specific single part (“co-crucifixion”) recalls the thematic and 
experiential matrix of his gospel as a whole (totum).634 The question remains now as to what the nature 
and form of this anticipated participation is.  
We will turn to the culmination of this passage as a whole. Our attention is attracted by the explicit 
mentioning of “baptism” on the level of the text in Gal 3.27: “you who have been baptized 
(ἐβαπτίσθητε) into Christ.” Different from the two previous and elaborate sections in Gal 3.1–25, this 
 
634 This rhetorical effect is strengthened by the antithetical structure implied in “not out of law, but out of 
faith.” 
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final and concise passage is dominated by terms of Paul’s gospel: “Sons of God,” “faith in Jesus 
Christ,” “to be baptized into Christ,” “to be clothed with Christ,” “neither Jew nor Greek,” and “to be 
all one in Christ” (3.26–28). More so, in the last verse of this passage, the apostle formulates a 
conclusion in which his gospel provides the ultimate warrant for the themes central to his adversaries 
which govern the previous passages of argumentation (“seed of Abraham” and “heirs according to the 
promise”).  
What role does baptism play in this final passage of Gal 3? The explanatory or causal conjunction of 
γάρ will help us to understand how the apostle intends his addressees to understand in the moment of 
delivery:  
 
For (γάρ) in Christ Jesus you are all children of God through faith. As many of you as were baptized into 
Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ. There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, 
there is no longer male and female; for (γάρ) all of you are one in Christ Jesus. And if you belong to Christ, 
you are Abraham’s offspring, heirs according to the promise.  
 
We recognize a double synonymous structure. First, the status of “being a son of God” (26a) is 
mediated by (διά) “faith in Christ Jesus” (26b). In Gal 3.27, subsequently, this status of being “son of 
God” is based on another and synonymous medium, namely, baptism (“for all of you who were 
baptized into Christ,” 27a). So both media of “faith in Jesus Christ” and “being baptized into Christ” 
result in “being sons of God” and “clothing oneself with Christ.” As an explication of the latter, Paul 
formulates his famous dictum: when you have clothed yourself with Christ – that is, when you are 
baptized into/have faith in Christ, there is “neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for 
you are all one in Christ” (3.28). In contradistinction to the divisive rhetoric of his opponents, 
therefore, the apostle attempts to redefine the newly won status and identity of his addressees as “sons 
of God.” These teachers have introduced the question and shibboleth of the sonship of Abraham. In 
addition to his Umdeutung in the previous section (3.6–14), Paul firmly states in this final passage that 
they are all “sons of God.” In this ultimate sonship in which all distinction and hierarchy is excluded, 
they are united and one – “there is neither Jew nor Greek” (3.28). Here we touch on the ultimate goal 
of the three-stage rhetoric: they are all included, saved, and one because of their prior baptism, which 
they – as I suppose – received by the hands of Paul. 
When we get beyond the level of the text in our way of structuring thought, this theme of oneness can 
become transparent to us as present-day readers: by the recalling of baptism and through that all-
uniting ritual, Paul wants his audiences to revalue the original situation as right and appropriate; what 
they had prior to the divisive presence and performances of these teachers is the ultimate goal to strive 
for. 
As present-day readers, we notice that in Gal 3.27 baptism, on the level of the text, is only mentioned 
very briefly. This anticipatory minimum on the side of Paul asks for a participatory maximum on the 
side of his addressees. The whole reasoning of the apostle hinges on this ritual of “dying” and “living” 
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(rising) with Christ in referring to “co + crucifixion.”635 So the third and final stage of his rhetoric is 
aimed at the recollection, reframing, and reaffirmation of this ritual by his addressees.636  
 
635 From another perspective, we can also find a substantiation of this understanding of “co-crucifixion.” We 
distinguish terms and themes which are typical of these teachers. Similarly, we relate other terms to Paul’s 
gospel. When the latter is thematically consistent in his rhetoric throughout his letters and, more importantly, 
throughout endless (undocumented) other performances in real time, we can turn to Rom 6.1–10 as well. 
Contrary to his letter to the Galatians, we encounter here an elaborate explanation of how he relates “co-
crucifixion” to the senses of his hearers. This part of Romans is on the function of the “law.” Paul has argued 
that “sin” (the impression is that in this letter this term is differently framed) entered the world through “one 
man,” “Adam.” Through “Christ,” however, “grace” and “righteousness” have become abundant. The law was 
added so that sin would increase. And where sin increased grace increased all the more. So now he asks whether 
the hearers are called to sin more so that grace will overflow. At that point, Paul introduces the matrix on 
“dying” and “living”: “What then are we to say? Should we continue in sin in order that grace may abound? By 
no means! How can we who died to sin go on living in it?  Do you not know that all of us who have been 
baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized into his death?  Therefore we have been buried with him by baptism into 
death, so that, just as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we too might walk in 
newness of life. For if we have been united with him in a death like his, we will certainly be united with him in a 
resurrection like his. We know that our old self was crucified with him so that the body of sin might be 
destroyed, and we might no longer be enslaved to sin. For whoever has died is freed from sin. But if we have 
died with Christ, we believe that we will also live with him. We know that Christ, being raised from the dead, 
will never die again; death no longer has dominion over him. The death he died, he died to sin, once for all; but 
the life he lives, he lives to God” (emphasis mine). We see the resemblance of the textualized understanding in 
the main body of the text above – which is anticipated by Paul: the Gentile converts have to get beyond the realm 
of the law. Also in Romans 6, the governing structure is one of transition – to move from one realm or dominion 
to another, to die to live. According to Paul, this transition becomes manifest in the ritual of “baptism,” 
explicated by him in terms of “co-crucifixion.” In this respect, we observe that, in his commentary Galatians, 
Keener calls in the help of Romans 6, however, without thematizing the role of baptism: “Paul’s more detailed 
elaboration of this idea in Romans helps us understand the premises of his argument: Christ died to sin (Rom 
6:10) so that those identified with him died with him (6:3– 8, 11). Believers died to the law through Christ’s 
body (Rom 7:4); the old person (in Adam) thus died (Rom 6:6) and a new person lives in Christ (Gal 2:20)” 
(110/111). In a similar way, Fowler argues similarly with a reference to Romans 6, without addressing the link to 
baptism. See his Galatians, 82. 
636 In several studies, Gal 2.19–20 has been related to baptism. As a typical approach, we can refer to Stephan 
Anthony Cummins, Paul and the Crucified Christ in Antioch: Maccabean Martyrdom and Galatians 2, SNTMS 
114 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 203–4. He already ties 2.16 closely to baptism. Based on 
linguistic and conceptual parallels, he states that a correlation is operative between believing in/to Christ (faith 
parlance) and baptism. Regarding Gal 2.16b, he comments, “In echoing what appears to be baptismal language, 
Paul reminds errant Jewish Christians – in Antioch, Galatia, and elsewhere – that their belief/baptism into Christ 
entails dying and rising with him” (204). In this statement, we recognize the communicative structure of 
anticipation on the side of the composer of participation by the intended addressees. We can also point to 
Heinrich Schlier, Der Brief an die Galater, KEK 7, 6th rev. ed (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1989). 
His view is structured by several partially synonymous key concepts. In an intricate way, he differentiates 
between Gerechtsprechen (to rectify), Gerechtigkeit erweisen – as related to God (to justify) – and Gerecht 
werden aus den Glauben (to be rectified out of faith). In a similar vein, he differentiates between Zum-Glauben-
Kommen (to come to believe) and Glauben as a way of life (faith). According to him, all these different concepts 
come together in the theme of baptism: “Dieses πιστεῦσαι hatte zum Ziel das δικαιωθῆναι ἐκ πίστεως Χριστοῦ 
καὶ οὐκ ἐζ ἔργων νόμου, so dass das Zum-Glauben-Gekommensein das aus Glauben Gerechtfertigt werden 
ermöglicht. Solche Aussage ist nur sinnvoll, wenn das πιστεῦσαι die Taufe in sich begreift” (98). We can 
critically state that the concepts used remain highly abstracted. In no way are these terms and their nuances 
related to the senses – neither in terms of the original addressees nor of us as present-day readers. Now we could 
argue that the original addressees must have been familiar with a concrete baptismal ritual – cf., Gal 3.27. The 
same pertains to us. No differentiation between these groups of participants-in-process-of-coming-to-understand 
is found. Baptism encompasses the initiation rite for new adult converts there-and-then as well as a centuries old 
ritual of infant baptism in traditional churches up until today. In no way does he relate his thoughts on the role of 
baptism to the realm of history in general – think of “how,” “to whom,” or “from whose perspective[s].” In 
conclusion, “baptism” is introduced on and, as a consequence, confined to the level of text. For a comparable 
approach, see Rudolf Schnackenburg, Das Heilsgeschehen bei der Taufe nach dem Apostel Paulus (München: 
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Recalling their baptism becomes a powerful rhetorical tool. Two effects are aimed at. First, the final 
exclamation of verse 21 entails the impossibility of obeying the law any longer: “ I do not nullify the 
grace of God; for if justification comes through the law, Christ died for nothing.” So his addressees 
have to make a radical decision: either they will undergo future circumcision or they will reaffirm their 
past baptism in the light of this reframing of the dying of Christ (co-crucifixion [dying] with Christ). 
Second, when his original addressees are caught by his argumentation and reaffirm their own baptism, 
they become assured, as a result, that they – like Paul – “have died in and through the law.” They can 
no longer follow the call of these other teachers, that is, “to live out of/in the law.”637 Another 
conclusion is that baptism must have been central to Paul’s (former) presence and performances 
among them; his gospel of Christ crucified must have come with this ritual, that is, of “co-
crucifixion.” 
Third, these other teachers wielded power and put inner pressure on the members of these 
communities by introducing a dynamic of exclusion. Paul’s reframing of their past baptism brings 
relief, it makes his converts conclude that they were already included by God. In short, circumcision 
excludes (in line with the performances and presence of these teachers), whereas baptism includes and 
unites (Paul). 
When we turn to the perspective of the present-day reader vis-à-vis the letter as text, the counter 
rhetoric of Paul opens up a new horizon. Autonomous text summons the implied abstracted context. 
When our thought is structured in and constrained to that communicative process, it is impossible to 
identify the role of “baptism” and “circumcision” and the counter framing of “living” in the passage 
under scrutiny.638 In line with the Cautions to the reader in the Introduction, detextification infringes 
on the communicative process inherent in autonomous text. We have to push terms and themes beyond 
the level of text (as it functions to us) to gain this perspective on the intended understanding (as it 
 
Karl Zink Verlag, 1950), 64–65. A blunt denial can be found, however, in James Dunn’s Baptism in the Holy 
Spirit: A Re-examination of the New Testament Teaching of the Gift of the Spirit in Relation to Pentecostalism 
Today, 2nd ed. (London: SCM, 2010), 106–7, 115, 150. No baptism in relation to water is at issue, according to 
him, but a clearly and radically different one with the Spirit. When we turn to the compendium on the ritual of 
baptism in early Christianity, Baptism in the Early Church: History, Theology, and Liturgy in the First Five 
Centuries (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), we see that Everett Ferguson does not mention Gal 2.19–20. 
Regarding this specific letter, he only elaborates on Gal 3.27. From the perspective of the present study, we may 
not be surprised; it strengthens the general assumption of implicit equation, since only in this passage “baptism” 
is explicitly present on the level of the text. 
637 In line with the mental structure as presented by de Boer, we can recognize in his formulation the contours 
of “to live” (now) in distinction from “to Live” (then). The promised Life which is related to the coming age 
would reverberate in the phrase, “I no longer live, but Christ Lives in me” (Gal 2.20bc). The question of how one 
should live in the present evil age (now) would be answered then in the subsequent exclamation: “The life I live 
in the body, I l[L?]ive by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me” (20d–f; based on 
NRSV). In combining the normal and the capital l/L, we can indicate the fusion of the “now” and “then” or the 
age to come and the present evil age in Paul’s rhetoric. This is, however, not the focus of the present 
exemplification. 
638 Regarding this passage, we find in one remark the combination of a literary constraint and a grasp of the 
intended thought structure in Nicolas Thomas Wright, Paul: A Biography (San Francisco: HarperOne, 2018), 
160: “Paul is not speaking of baptism here, he does a chapter later, but his thinking in these verses is exactly in 
line with his view of baptism in Romans 6.” 
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functioned to the Galatians). An argumentum e sensoriis comes to the fore.639 In this way, we can 
come to a deepened grasp of the letter here-and-now – namely, in line with the intended functioning as 





The present Chapter aimed to demonstrate the approach of detextification. In the first example, we 
turned to the logic as heard in Gal 3.10–12. First, the studies by Moisés Mayordomo and Michael 
Bachmann were discussed. In both cases, we concluded that the attempt to grasp the syllogistic 
structure of the reasoning takes place on the level of the text. Bachmann states that, contrary to other 
proposals, his reconstruction does not require implicit premises; he can identify all the parts on the 
level of the text. Mayordomo, who keeps strictly to the rules of formal syllogizing, admits that no clear 
rationale can be found in the laboured reasoning. On both proposals, we commented that these studies 
as texts themselves degrade or supervene the documented wording as text. The sub-questions of 
“how” (text), “to whom” (Bachmann and Mayordomo themselves or the present-day reader), “in what 
state of mind” (highly literate), and “from whose perspective” (the academic writer and reader of the 
article and study) have already been filled in before the whole enterprise started. In this analysis, we 
recognize an important restriction of the subject-object scheme (Chapter 3): at the moment that the 
“subject” functions on the level of text (hypervisuality/“eye to text area”), the whole participatory 
matrix in which this subject in actu (Mayordomo and Bachmann themselves) functions is eclipsed.  
We provided an alternative understanding of the syllogistic structure of this documented reasoning. In 
line with the distinctive media cultures, we differentiated between formal and rhetorical syllogizing. 
By nature, the rhetorical syllogism manifests itself in an enthymematic way: only the necessary parts 
are explicated since the implied reasoning as a whole is constitutive of the collective memory 
involved. In the enthymemes, we recognized the dynamic of (synonymous and antonymous) 
metonymy. Following the procedure of historicizing text, the central terms in the reasoning of Gal 
3.10–12 (“law,” “rectification,” and to “l/Live”) shed new light on Gal 3.21. We textualized the 
following syllogistic structure: The one who is rectified, he will Live (major premise); the one who 
is/lives out of works of law, he will be rectified (minor premise); therefore, the one who is/lives out of 
law, he will Live (conclusion). This reasoning must have governed the performances of these other 
teachers in such a way that they gained influence over the Galatian converts and prepared them for a 
life “out of law” marked by circumcision.   
 
639 Interestingly, the role of baptism in the realm of history there-and-then-to-them prompts the question of 
how these other teachers would have positioned themselves in relation to this ritual.  
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Given Gal 2.16–17 and 3.11b, Paul’s counter logos can be identified as well: the one who is rectified, 
he will Live (major premise); the one who is/lives out of faith, he will be rectified (minor premise); 
therefore the one who is/lives out of faith, he will Live (conclusion). In line with the predominantly 
oral state of mind, we could scrutinize the documented wording for synonymous and antonymous 
parts as well. We identified up to twenty-one threads in approximately eleven enthymemes. We also 
saw that this single and self-evident logos meets the criteria as formulated by John Barclay.  
Based on this example, we can draw several conclusions: First, this detextification does not answer the 
traditional question of “What does it mean?” More so, in the moment that we structure our thoughts in  
line with this question, the original operational matrix in which the letter functioned suddenly and  
totally disappears. Notwithstanding the acknowledgement of the differences between what did it mean  
and what does it mean,640 how this kind of meaning is constituted is fixed from the start. The  
functioning of text and the constitution of meaning in the related mindset usurp the unfamiliar one of  
oral performance and the accompanying state of mind. Second, the detextified presentation of the  
passage is directed by the question guiding the historian: “What is happening there-and-then-to- 
them?” In this way, we get an impression of the oral-aurally determined communicative and rhetorical  
strategies of the apostle: in using the syllogistic rationale of his adversaries, Paul acknowledges his  
hearers in their longing for to “Live”/”Living.” Subsequently, by disqualifying the minor term of these  
teachers (“out of law”) and putting forward his own gospel (“out of faith”), he forces his addressees to  
take a stance: either they dissociate from these teachers and (re)associate with him or vice versa. Not  
so much the question “What does it mean?” is at issue – on the level of text, but “What are you going  
to do?” – beyond that level. Third, in this detextificatory identification of not only this complex of  
syn- and antonyms but also in the underlying metonymical or enthymematic structure, we can  
recognize the treatment of lexis (style) and taxis (structure) as provided by Aristotle in his On  
Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse641 and the emphasis on the artistic structure as found in Cicero  
and Quintilian (see Excursus: Ancient rhetorical sources and oral performance).  Fourth, we get more  
clarity in how detextification has to be applied. From a historical-critical point of view, it is imperative  
first to textualize the envisioned oral performance of Gal 3.10–12 there-and-then-to-them. The  
outcomes of this intellectual activity precede any endeavour in fleshing out any meaning of the text for  
the present-day reader (such as the gospel of Paul in Galatians or the theology of the apostle in this  
letter or in general on the level of text). Fifth, this search for meaning should not only progress from  
this media-specific historical reconstruction, but it could also be transformed by the intellectual  
 
640 See the description of exegesis as provided by Stanley E. Porter and Kent D. Clarke in their essay “What 
Is Exegesis? An Analysis of Various Definitions”, in Handbook to Exegesis of the New Testament, ed. by 
Stanley E. Porter, 3rd ed. (Boston and Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2002), 11, 12: “Exegesis that seeks to 
answer what the text means at present is usually based upon the synchronic condition of the text, that is, what it 
is. On the other hand, exegesis that concerns itself with what the text meant relies more heavily upon the 
diachronic condition of the text, that is, how it came to be what it is.” 
641 Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. with introduction, notes and appendices by 
George A. Kennedy, 2nd ed. (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 3.2 –12 and 3.13–19. 
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movements of textualizing history and historizing history. When different media imply distinctive  
mindsets (Introduction), there has to be more at stake than differences in what it meant and what it  
means or contemporary differences in ascribed meanings to the text. The central question would be:  
How is this particular kind of meaning functioning to the original participants in actu? This vista is  
paramount so that the reader does give priority to the historian.  
In the second example, we detextified our grasp of Gal 2.18–20. In the commentaries that were 
discussed, some illustrations of the media muddle came to the fore. On the sub-question regarding the 
element of “how,” Betz argues first that the letter should be seen as a “court of law”: Paul is the 
accused, these teachers are the accusers, and the Galatians themselves function as the jury or judges. 
Subsequently, he states that the letter is no more than a “lifeless piece of paper,” that is to say stripped 
of all benefits of oral communication or bodily presence. These two concrete perspectives on the realm 
of history there-and-then-to-them are, however, not brought together; they remain contradictory loose 
ends in his text. More so, he finally adds that Paul did not only write for his Galatian converts but all 
the generations of Christians after them. How can we unite all these perspectives? In the commentary 
by Longenecker, we touched on another discrepancy. He starts with a forty-page introduction to the 
letter – with amongst others, questions on date, identity of original addressees, opponents – to exegete 
the passage under scrutiny with regard to “us” (without further specification), “believers” (idem), and 
“Christians” (idem). All of a sudden, there is no difference anymore between the original addressees 
there-and-then and his own readers here-and-now. This transition has to be ascribed to the implicit 
equation of “letter” and “text” in combination with the turn from describing the process of production 
to the product in real time. The next two commentaries discussed both took the other teachers as their 
focal point and intentionally concentrated their thinking on the realm of history-there-and-then. 
Martyn bends his thoughts into the realm of history there-and-then. He structures his understanding of 
the passage according to the transition from the “old” to the “eschatological human being.” De Boer 
argues along the same lines. The latter even suggests that Paul – given his turn from “we” to the “I” 
who has “died in and through the law” – expects these teachers and the Galatians “to say it after him 
and to apply it to themselves.” Although still rather abstract and inchoate, de Boer locates this “saying 
after” and “applying to themselves” in the realm of history there-and-then. Since he denies that Gal 
2.18–20 involves “sacramental” language, we asked how this saying after him would have looked like 
there-and-then.  
In our own detextification of Gal 2.16–20, we honed in on the documented thematic matrix in the 
passage of ἀποθνῄσκω (to die), ζάω (to live), and συσταυρόομαι (to be co-crucified). Since the 
sequence of the letter structures the intended aural event, we set out to scrutinize Gal 2.14–17 for these 
terms. We touched on ζάω. Based on his account of Peter’s changing attitude in Antioch, Paul 
anticipates the frame of reference of his opponents (“to live like a Jew”). Instead of forcing his 
audience to choose between the teachers (“law”) and himself (“faith”), he puts Christ in the centre of 
attention by the disturbing accusation that when you live out of faith (think of Jews having table 
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fellowship with Gentiles) then Christ would be “a servant of sin.” Paul solves this rhetoric of 
confusion with the metaphor of “to build,” “to destroy,” and “to build anew the law” (Gal 2.18–20). 
He explains why Peter first “lived” rightly in Antioch (to destroy the law/have table fellowship) and 
then later acted wrongly (to rebuild it/separate himself). In the blunt rebuke of Peter, Paul disqualifies 
the way in which these other Jewish teachers “live” with the Galatian converts. In this light, we also 
textualized the Umdeutung of notions of his adversaries, such as “sin/sinner” and “lawbreaker.” 
Because of Peter’s changed attitude in Antioch, Paul makes clear that there is no more “we.” In 
opposition to the leader from Jerusalem – who once again started “to live according to the regulations 
of the law” (rebuild) – the apostle confesses that “‘I’ died in and through” that same “law.” After 
having hitherto followed the frame of his opponents concerning to “live,” we touch on the radical turn 
that the apostle intends his hearers to make: when you “die” to the law, you “live” in God. The normal 
sequence of to “die” and to “live” is being reversed. In this turning around, the apostle further explores 
his reframing of “living.” In verse 19, he specifies the sequence of “to die” and “to live” as “co-
crucifixion with Christ.” This term forms the culmination of his rhetoric in Gal 2.14–20. When we 
value “dying” and “living” as preparatory, Paul wants to recall – consider here his prior presence and 
performances – the matrix of his own rhetoric by this single notion. Especially, the participatory 
dimension in the prefix σύν- (together with) led to the argument that Paul expects his audience to 
frame “co-crucifixion with Christ” in a self-evident way: they structure this reasoning by the ritual of 
baptism. We saw this affirmed in the only briefly mentioned verb “to be baptized” at the end of this 
part of the letter (Gal 3.27). The counter rhetoric of Paul – which he commenced in the rebuke of Peter 
in Antioch – comes to a climax: over against the newly experienced and appealing call to 
circumcision, to become “sons of Abraham,” the apostle recalls the ritual of baptism. In his reframing 
of this liminal experience, they are already “sons of God,” that is, the true “sons of Abraham.” 
Precisely because of the experiential nature of baptism we valued this as a powerful example of Paul’s 
counter rhetoric: baptism annuls and trumps circumcision. There is no distinction between Jew and 
Greek. Baptized into Christ, they are united and one as “sons of God” (also with those who are Jew by 
birth).  
Two conclusions can be drawn: First, in detextifying the passage in this way, an argumentum e 
sensoriis comes to the fore that deepens the proposed – rather abstracted and more theological – 
understandings as provided by Martyn and de Boer. Second, this detextified understanding transforms 
meaning there-and-then-to-them as proposed by David Rhoads (Chapter 2, Section H.): the involved 
recalling of baptism penetrates the concrete lifeworld of the Galatians. Thus, Paul is reframing (re-
“mean”-ing?) a liminal experience being stored in their bodies in order to prevent them to answer the 
call to another ritual. It is the ritual that marks (baptism) or will mark (circumcision) their identity, 








In the Introduction, it was stated that in biblical scholarship one reads the Bible in silence and solitude 
asking questions such as, What does it mean? and What does the text say? We phrased this process as 
“eye to text area.” Regarding the corpus Paulinum, this procedure implies an implicit equation of 
“letter” and “text.” At the same time, however, an emerging communis opinio is found in this 
community: the original addressees of Paul’s letters were exposed – in the distinctive context of 
predominant orality – to an emissary or public reader (lector) who is addressing them in real time. We 
encapsulated this procedure in the phrase “body to body.” This rather unfamiliar (at least to us!) 
communicative situation prompted the question: What is happening there-and-then-to-them? Thus, 
two different media functionings and also mindsets regarding the letters – in which two distinct 
subjects in actu are implied (biblical scholar here-and-now and original addressees there-and-then) – 
came to the fore. On this basis, the leading question of the present study could be formulated: How can 
we – as present-day readers in the predominantly literate context of academia – relate here-and-now to 
Paul’s letters mediated by the available versions as “text” in order to understand how the original 
addressees in their predominantly oral state of mind would have grasped these documented words 




A. A new perspective on “text”  
 
The history of research showed, indicative of the emerging communis opinio, that many studies accept 
the notion of oral performance as significant for understanding Paul’s letters (Chapter 2). Several of 
these studies could be categorized as individual intellectual explorations into the field of orality 
studies, and it was observed that it is with the movement of Biblical Performance Criticism, in which a 
practice of live performances of the biblical texts here-and-now by the contemporary scholar is 
advocated, that debate more widely in biblical scholarship starts to be generated. In all the studies 
discussed in the history of research, however, even in David Rhoads’s proposal on performances in 
real time,642 the role and status of “text” as such remain implicit. The present study does not question 
the fact that there was a physical artefact from the start (Introduction; Chapter 3). Instead of exploring 
 
642 David M. Rhoads, “Performance Criticism: An Emerging Discipline (Part I and II),” BTB 36 (2006): 118–
133, 164–184. 
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the orally determined context there-and-then or vocalizing these documents here-and-now, the 
contribution of the present study is to investigate the distinctive framing of these presupposed artefacts 
as “text” and/or as a means to “oral performance.” As indicated in the Introduction, the third and more 
fundamental question as to how the dominant media of autonomous text and the related mindset in 
academia influences our grasp of the functioning of oral performance there-and-then-to-them, has 
governed and structured the present study. From this perspective, we come to the more general 
conclusion that there is an intellectual challenge at issue here: in biblical scholarship, one has to 
explicitly textualize the functioning of the letter as “text” here-and-now-to-us. When we have 
identified how this specific media determines our own understanding, we can attempt to grasp the 
“oral performance”/“public reading” of the letter there-and-then-to-them. Unfortunately, this specific 
intellectual endeavour is virtually absent in Pauline or New Testament studies. Detextification 
provides a program to meet that challenge.  
 
1. Detextification avant la lettre: Louis Martyn and David Rhoads   
In two studies in the history of research, however, these two media were indeed related to each other 
(Chapter 2). In one particular consideration, Rhoads provides the following criterion/question: Would 
the original addressees have been able to grasp and structure the oral delivery of the actually 
documented wording of the letter in line with the represented reasoning in text here-and-now 
(commentaries, articles, monographs, and so forth)?643 Regarding the reconstructed syllogisms by 
Michael Bachmann and Moisés Mayordomo (Chapter 4), the conclusion was that these layouts are too 
difficult to follow in an actual oral delivery; training in the method of abstraction, the aid of fixation-
in-text, and the possibility of rereading is a prerequisite here.  
 
643 Rhoads, “Performance Criticism,” 179. While acknowledging the usefulness of live performances of the 
biblical text for better understanding of the original functioning, there is an important difference between the 
Biblical Performance Criticism as advocated by Rhoads and the approach of detextification. In Chapter 2, 
Section H. David Rhoads: Biblical Performance Criticism, we observed that he uses in his grounding articles the 
term “text” indiscriminately, that is, it floats freely from the realm of history there-and-then-to-them to the one 
here-and-now-to-us and back. Subsequently, we argued that his praxis of present-day performances is also based 
on and dependent on the given “text” of the documents; his performances are like vocalizations of the text 
learned by heart. We also observed that in his argumentation the term “performance” has an extra-historical 
status. As a result, he interchanges his own experiences of vocalizing the biblical text for present-day audiences 
with the originally intended performances of these biblical documents. These observations led us to conclude 
that he is still stuck in the media muddle (Introduction). Since he takes his stance in the actual event of delivery, 
his advocated site for interpretation, Rhoads is not only the performer, but also the audience and interpreter at 
the same time. This is the main difference with detextification. Since we take the perspective of Paul in the 
process of composition, we become neither performer, nor audience, nor interpreter, but historian. We are called 
then to textualize (describe) how the apostle anticipated his intended addressees to participate in the envisioned 
event of delivery; in terms of style and arrangement, we attempt to understand how Paul intended his hearers to 
understand.          
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From a different angle, we observed a crucial structure in the article “Events in Galatia” by Louis 
Martyn.644 He locates the gospel neither in the transmitted document nor on the level of text as such, 
but postulates it as an invasion in the concrete lifeworld of the Galatian converts as anticipated by 
Paul: “the aural event” (Chapter 2). In a specific realm of history or beyond the level of text, Martyn 
envisions a communicative process between the emissary and the audience; in particular, the presence 
and performances of these other teachers is anticipated by the apostle in the process of composition. In 
this way, Martyn introduces a different matrix for grasping the implied “theology” of the letter. His 
reasoning led to the assumption that two “theologies” must have been operative in this rhetorical 
situation, specifically, that of the other teachers, and that of Paul himself. We found several examples 
of how these theologies inform the actual reasoning of the apostle as recorded in the letter. Martyn’s 
approach on the “aural event” intimates the detextification of Paul’s Letter to the Galatians.  
We concluded that both in the work of Rhoads and Martyn the dimensions of media and mindset 
remain implicit. On the level of these texts, “text” itself – in the vagueness of concept and/or physical 
artefact – remains an unquestioned given. The operational result is an implicit and, in our view, 
unjustified equation of “letter” and “text.” This works like a veil over the understanding of the present-
day reader vis-à-vis the biblical document as “text.”  
 
2. Implicit equation of “letter” and “text”: Larry Hurtado and Joanna Dewey  
The clearest instance of this implicit equation of “letter” and “text” was encountered in Larry 
Hurtado’s polemical article on “Oral Fixation and New Testament Studies” (Chapter 2).645 A critical 
evaluation of Hurtado’s reasoning led to the conclusion that he had effectively engaged in a circular 
argument: from the start of his essay, he implies “texts” to be a given in the realm of history there-and-
then. Similarly, he draws his conclusions on the New Testament documents, despite his 
acknowledgement of the communis opinio, in terms of the uncritical use of notions such as “reader,” 
“writer,” “manuscript,” and “text.” Neither the ancient practice of nor the recent attention to oral 
performance seems to lead him to re-evaluate his conclusions. He declares the New Testament to be 
“text,” that is, he textifies these ancient documents. 
We also discussed Joanna Dewey’s article and found there an implicit equation and explicit 
differentiation in one and the same conclusion: “while texts were produced that later became very 
important within Christianity as texts, these texts began as aids to orality, and seemingly had little 
 
644 J. Louis Martyn, “Events in Galatia. Modified Covenantal Nomism versus God’s Invasion of the Cosmos 
in the Singular Gospel: A Response to James D. G. Dunn and Beverly R. Gaventa” in Pauline Theology Vol I: 
Thessalonians, Philippians, Galatians, Philemon, ed. Jouette M. Bassler (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 
160–79. 
645 Larry W. Hurtado, “Oral Fixation and New Testament Studies? ‘Orality,’ ‘Performance,’ and Reading 
Texts in Early Christianity,” NTS Vol. 60/3 (2014): 321–340. 
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importance in themselves.”646 So although text later on and text originally do not function in the same 
way beyond the level of text, they are equated on the level of text and one and the same term is used 
for both. This illustrates the complexity of being reader and historian at the same time. In a more 
general way, we conclude that when the word “text” is used uncritically, the reader fills in the related 
operational dimension to which they are used themselves beyond critical awareness. At that moment, 
the originally intended media functioning and anticipated mindset are overruled and eclipsed. Despite 
good intentions, the media muddle infringes on the processes of coming to understand the realm of 
history there-and-then-to-them. 
 
3. The turn from production to product: Paul Achtemeier and Richard Longenecker 
In Chapter 2, we identified a leap from process to product: given the process of production, the 
participants were explicitly discussed (Paul, emissary, addressees, and teachers); once the scholars 
discussed started to “read” the “text” themselves, they then became the sole and actual participants in 
the communicative process in actu – the result of textification. A sudden role reversal takes place from 
historian to reader.647 Paul Achtemeier, for example, started with a detailed exploration of the oral 
environment of late Western antiquity.648 However, when he comes to the formulation of what he sees 
as a central problem on the original functioning of the New Testament documents, his reasoning seems 
to break down. He observes that the visual format of the manuscripts conveys virtually no information 
about the organization of the content. First, he argues that this problem is absent when an emissary or 
public reader is instructed on the delivery thereof. After this exploration, he restates the problem of 
“the visual format” but from then on, the emissary is no longer constitutive of his reasoning. Suddenly, 
it is we ourselves who are dealing with this apparently problematic “visual format” and “the content it 
[the manuscript] intended to convey.” Without explanation, Achtemeier frames his own experience – 
as reader of the letter as text here-and-now – as a “problem.” The setting of the original functioning is 
lost; he as reader fills in uncritically his own overly familiar praxis. Finally, he solves the problem by 
looking for the oral overlay in the available version of these documents (text).649 Thus we concluded 
that his own processing of the letter as text lays as a veil over the realm of history there-and-then or 
the originally intended functioning of the letter.  
 
646 Joanna D. Dewey, “Textuality in an Oral Culture: A Survey of Pauline Traditions,” Semeia 65 (1994), 51 
(emphasis original). 
647 Regarding this tendency, one could ask – for the sake of debate – whether this deeply ingrained reflex vis-
à-vis the biblical text as “text” searching for (the) “meaning” reveals in biblical scholarship uncritical remnants 
of practicing traditional theology, setting out universally valid prepositions on “God,” “humanity,” “world” etc. 
Despite omnipresent relativism as well in academia, this provocative question remains valid because of the 
unquestioned media and mindset on which this search for meaning is based.  
648 Paul J. Achtemeier, “OMNE VERBUM SONAT: The New Testament and the Oral Environment of Late 
Western Antiquity,” JBL 109/1 (1990): 3–27. 
649 We came to the same conclusion in Chapter 2 regarding Casey W. Davis, Oral Biblical Criticism: The 
Influence of the Principles of Orality on the Literary Structure of Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, JSNTSup 172 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999).   
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In a similar vein, we touched on a rather confusing contradiction in the discussion of the commentary 
by Richard Longenecker in Chapter 4.650 In his introduction, he describes the realm of history there-
and-then-to-them profoundly and systematically (also the originally intended addressees), that is, he is 
acting as a historian. In his text and commentary part, however, his understanding of Gal 2.18–21 is 
structured consistently towards the realm of freischwebendes Denken. Notions such as “Christians” or 
“Christian belief” float around freely, meaning – as a consequence – the same everywhere, every time, 
and to everyone. Contrary to his introduction, Longenecker fails to differentiate between the two 
distinctive realms of history and his roles as historian and (Christian) reader. When the letter is 
processed as autonomous text in real time, abstraction trumps historicization or concretization.  
 
 
B. “Text”: The present portal to representation  
 
Looking for a way out of the media muddle, we explicitly related both media processes to each other 
(Chapter 3). We argued for the need to bring them together on one and the same level, that is, on the 
level of text. In this way, we could become historian of oral performances there-and-then and of our 
overly familiar activity of reading, according with the question What is happening there-and-then and 
also here-and-now? We designated this as the intellectual movement of textualizing history. Within 
this endeavour, two directions were distinguished: textualizing text here-and-now-to-us and 
textualizing oral performance there-and-then-to-them.  
Regarding the first textualization, it was Walter Ong who helped us to approach text from the 
perspective of the spoken and heard word. In essence, spoken and heard words are combinations of 
identifiable and shared sound units. Sound is an evanescent process caused by the one who vocalizes 
and experienced by the one who hears. Spoken words are therefore bound fundamentally to the realm 
of history and to those who bodily and actually participate in this (live) communicative process. As a 
rule, ancient documents (texta) were subservient to such historical events (Introduction, Section D.5.; 
Chapter 2, Excursus: Silent reading in antiquity?). Later on, the product of writing became 
independent of someone who is vocalizing and the time and place in which the performance took 
place. Paul Ricoeur refers to this process as the emancipation of textum into the birth of text 
(Introduction; Chapter 3). In search of the originally intended functioning of ancient documents like 
the corpus Paulinum, we marked this observation as a turning point from ancient oral discourse to 
modern textual discourse. Since the text area compels the eye not to notice anymore that which is 
concretely present outside that frame, we contended that the implied effect is hypervisuality. This 
encompasses one to process specific codes printed or reflected on a flat surface that represent reality. 
We distinguished, therefore, a realm of extra-historical thought or freischwebendes Denken, 
 
650 Richard B. Longenecker, Galatians, WBC 41 (Dallas: Word, 1991). 
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characterized by the constituents of oneness, unchangingness, and, in particular, “being” – or, being 
everywhere, every time, and for everyone the same. In line with the subject-object scheme, the reader 
becomes an outsider defined by his cognitive capacities. The inner-historical realm is in itself the 
opposite, that is, it is diverse, complex, and changing (“becoming”). We exist bodily and uncritically 
in this realm (totum). Once representation starts, one somehow withdraws from naïve participation in 
that presence. From an uncritical participant, we become a critical observer. Text is a motor to do so. 
The prerequisite is, though, that this motor or “text” is physically available. By means of the text as 
inner-historical artefact or thing (that is, beyond the level of text), the reader is enabled to enter or 
activate the level of text (realm of extra-historical thought). For that reason, we concluded that “text” 
is a hybrid combination: it functions at the same time in two opposed realms that cannot come 
together. Hence, this media accomplishes the impossible, that is, the turn or leap from the 
operational/inner-historical realm to the formal/extra-historical level. We argued, therefore, that “text” 
is the given and operational portal (presence) to the realm of freischwebendes Denken (representation). 
 
1. Abstraction and the abstracted context which comes with autonomous text 
So, when sound turns into record, then event, flux, immediacy, and presence turn into thing, fixedness, 
mediacy, and representation. We viewed this intellectual effect of text as abstraction.  
At this point in our argumentation, we explicitly acknowledged that in the present study we ourselves 
also work in real time with text and, as a result, with abstraction. In abstraction-by-means-of-text, we 
cross the line between presence and representation. As an intellectual activity, this way of structuring 
is inevitable and fruitful. The golden rule of Walter Ong is crucial with respect to this. He asserts that 
we can be critical on the level of concretization in our abstractions (Chapter 1). In this respect, we can 
think of the earlier described dynamic in the usage of vocabulary such as “text” and “reading” 
regarding the New Testament. So, if we want to do justice to the rule to get beyond the biblical 
documents while they function as “text” to us, we have to bend our thoughts into the realms of history, 
in which they function, there-and-then and here-and-now, as adequately as possible.    
In the textualization of text here-and-now-to-us, we could concretize this tendency to abstraction vis-à-
vis text. Since, technically speaking, “text” can travel freely throughout times and places, we argued 
that the proper way to come to understand must be independent as well of the concrete context in 
which the actual reader is processing. For that reason, the crucial insight is that the processing of 
autonomous text requires an equally free-floating context. This is a context that furthers abstraction or 
this kind of structuring thought away from the concrete situation in which one actually participates 
when one reads. This freischwebende context as constituent of the implied participatory realm of 
history – the bodily and intellectual activity of reading – is implicit in the given functioning of “text.” 
So, as long as “letter” and “text” are equated, the abstracted context can or will dominate and govern 
the process of coming to understand the letter-as-text. This is essential to the media muddle in biblical 
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scholarship; it becomes difficult for us to do justice here-and-now to this other and distinctive realm of 
history in which the letters of Paul originally had to function.  
 
2. “Interpretation,” “performance,” and “hermeneutics”: Freischwebend or historical?   
In the foundational articles of the movement of Biblical Performance Criticism (Chapter 2), Rhoads 
intricately describes several constitutive elements in composition and oral performance there-and-then. 
Subsequently, he proposes real-time performances of these same documents by the present-day 
biblical scholar so that one may gain a new entrance to them. This new entrance is consistently framed 
by Rhoads as “interpretation.” We do not find any explication of what he means by this. As a result, 
concretization of possible differences between this activity here-and-now-by-us and there-and-then-
by-them is lacking (consider the explicit differentiation of media and mindsets involved). Thus the 
abstracted context of text directs his reasoning and governs his praxis. Since it is neither explained nor 
explicated, we structure this activity of “interpretation” somehow uncritically in line with the familiar 
one in biblical scholarship, namely, the present-day reader processing the Bible as “text” asking, What 
does it mean?   
This tendency to default to the familiar question of what does it mean similarly emerged in our critical 
scrutiny of Rhoads’s approach to “performance.” He jumps from represented performance there-and-
then-to-them in their specific situation to his advocated present vocalizations of the given text here-
and-now in schools, prisons, hospitals, universities, and so forth. Based on these present experiences, 
he reads these documents as autonomous texts here-and-now in order to come to a new understanding 
of them in that double-bound movement. So “performance” – alongside “interpretation” – receives an 
extra-historical status. This represented activity floats freely and uncritically back and forth between 
there-and-then and here-and-now due to the abstracted context of text. In the end, Rhoads’s own 
practice of “performances” here-and-now dominates his understanding of the operational matrix of 
“performance” there-and-then-to-them. As if “performance” is everywhere, every time, and for 
everyone the same. Given Rhoads’s agenda, we asked the following crucial question: Does the biblical 
scholar become Paul (composer), emissary (performer), or audience (interpreter?), or all of them at the 
same time? We noted that these consequences are not systematically elaborated. They all seem to 
come together in one and the same knowing subject in actu, that is, the biblical scholar in an attempt 
to come to a new understanding of these documents still conceived as “texts” (objects).  
The problem involved is that the perspective on the originally intended aural event of Paul is eclipsed. 
Historically speaking, the original addressees whom Paul had in mind would not themselves have been 
exposed to the documented wording in their written form (eye-to-text-area) in any moment in the 
intended communicative process but to an embodiment by the emissary in the moment of delivery. 
Since we emphasize their predominantly oral state of mind and the composition of the letter from the 
perspective of the aural event (body-to-body), we were compelled to conclude that this distinctive 
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process of composition does not only precede the moment of, but, more important, determines the 
nature of the intended oral performance of the letter there-and-then-to-them. The functioning of terms 
like “interpretation,” “text,” and “performance” on the level of Rhoads’s text itself precludes this kind 
of exploration. 
A similar tendency was found in the study by Werner Kelber.651 We observed that when he engages 
with orality and literacy, a Fundgrube of insights is offered. But when it comes to his usage of the 
matrix of “reader,” “hearer,” “writer,” “letter,” and “text,” a monolithic and highly abstracted framing 
seems to structure his thoughts away from the realm of history. The contribution of his book is to 
develop an “oral hermeneutics.” Since he does not explain what he mains by “hermeneutics,” we 
argued that, technically speaking, a similar leap to our presence and practice is involved. Therefore, 
despite his intention to correct “a disproportionately print-oriented hermeneutics” in biblical 
scholarship, his own approach is still based on the biblical documents as “text.”652 In conclusion, 
“hermeneutics” in his argumentation is caught up in the abstracted context which comes with 
autonomous text. So, given the third and more fundamental governing question, we argue that 
unthematized, abstracted, and free-floating concepts on the level of text, such as “text,” “reading,” 
“performance,” “composition,” “interpretation,” and “hermeneutics,” lie as a veil over these attempts 
to understand distinctive communicative processes beyond that level.     
 
 
C. “Text” and “context”  
 
Despite this critique, it is Rhoads’s call to perform the biblical documents here-and-now that enabled 
us to explicate this uncritical turn from the formal level (representation) to the operational realm 
(presence). As long as we do not distinguish between the functioning of “text,” “oral performance,” 
“interpretation,” and so forth on the level of text and beyond that level, presence and representation 
continually become muddled or implicitly equated. We argued that this is due to the scheme of text 
and context (Chapter 3).  
 
1. Relating presence and representation: Textualizing history 
On the level of text, both nouns function as pair or equals, spelled as: t-e-x-t and c-o-n-t-e-x-t. Beyond 
that level, “text” (product/pars/being) and “context” (process/totum/becoming) represent presence in 
totally different ways. In biblical scholarship, one speaks of the “context” when one wants to 
 
651 Werner H. Kelber, The Oral and the Written Gospel: The Hermeneutics of Speaking and Writing in the 
Synoptic Tradition, Mark, Paul, and Q (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983; repr. with a new introduction by the author, 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); for a discussion, see Section A. in Chapter 2. 
652 In a similar vein, we scrutinized the use of “composition” in the argumentation of Bernhard Oestreich, 
Performanzkritik der Paulusbriefe, WUNT 296 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 60–86. 
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understand the “biblical text” involved. So context is subservient to and follows (the givenness and 
processing of) text. Therefore, it was argued that a price is paid when we use “text” and “context” as a 
pair or scheme on the level of text without thematising the intricate relation between representation (as 
that level) and presence (beyond that level). 
In this respect, we can turn to our treatment of the Letter to the Galatians and ask how the original 
addressees were expected to understand the letter: Is this related to the “context” or the “text”? At the 
moment that we turn to the latter in real time, however, the former is called in only if it is necessary in 
our process of understanding the text by reading. The actual functioning of “text” will supervene the 
distinctive media functioning and structuring of thought of the “context” beforehand (oral performance 
and predominantly oral mindset). So, in this procedure or approach, “context” cannot determine “text.”  
We found a notable exception in Joanna Dewey’s article “Textuality in an Oral Culture.” As we saw 
earlier, she explicates the role of “text” in the realm of history there-and-then-to-them: distinguishing 
between a later phase in which “text” (sic) becomes important in itself and the original setting in which 
“text” (sic) is only an aid to orality (textum). Thus she locates “text” in the “context.” In terms of the 
present study, she textualizes text. So we argued that Dewey has provided the incentive to subvert the 
relation between “text” and “context.” In conclusion, the general modus of doing biblical scholarship, 
however, remains dominated by an uncritical and fixed hierarchy between “text” and “context.”  
We saw this illustrated in our first test case. In their search for syllogistic reasonings in Gal 3.10–12, 
Mayordomo and Bachmann work within the confinement of text. Both go back and forth between the 
recorded wording of the letter as text and their own reconstructed representation as layouts in text, that 
is, in the ever-expanding universe of text. We recognize this same mechanism in the earlier mentioned 
studies in Chapter 2. At the moment that one jumps in real time to the letter as product here-and-now 
(exposure to the text-area of the printed version of the biblical document), the structuring of the 
original process in which the letter was intended to function (context) is bypassed. When we want to 
understand how the Galatian converts were expected to structure their thoughts in the aural event, we 
need to penetrate the specific operational dimension of that “context.” Thus, we need to do justice to 
“context” beyond the given functioning to us of this concept in the abstracted context of text.  
 
2. In our presence coming to representation of their presence: Historicizing text 
Therefore – in addition to textualizing history – a second intellectual movement was needed. We 
argued that the veil of text can be taken away – at least, partially – in the actual moment of turning to 
the letter as a physical artefact in real time (available versions here-and-now and/or text area). This 
was designated historicizing text and led to an answer to the first part of the leading question of the 
present study: How to operate in the realm of history here-and-now vis-à-vis these letters as “text” in 
which the present-day reader participates himself beyond critical awareness? This intellectual 
movement implies that the present-day reader relates every term, theme, thematic matrix, reasoning, 
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metaphor, or narrative in a systematic way to these other knowing subjects in actu – in the realm of 
history there-and-then, that is, in the case of the present study, the Galatian converts – who participate 
in a distinct media (oral performance) and in a distinct mindset (predominantly oral). In this way, 
justice was done to the fact that there was a physical artefact from the start, but also to the claim that 
the structuring in the free-standing context of autonomous text can be overcome. These terms and 
reasonings have to resound, so to speak, in that specific inner-historical realm. Instead of “text” as the 
present portal to representation, we proposed an alternative opening to represented presence. On that 
basis, we can attempt to textualize (put into words) how the originally intended participants would or 
could have structured their thoughts in the event of delivery. We concluded that this intellectual 
movement is an antidote to the turn from the represented process there-and-then to the present product 
as product, or to the implicit equation of “letter” and “text” through which the abstracted context can 
take over our structuring of thought.  
 
 
D. Detextification: How, to whom, what mindset, and whose perspective[s]? 
 
In the movements of textualizing history and historicizing text, the leading question of the present 
study turned into a path to pursue. Since text is a motor of abstraction, a reader vis-à-vis the text area 
tends to think away from the concrete realm of history in which they participate in real time. This 
explains the value of John Miles Foley’s critique of the question, What does it mean? Since in this 
question the actual media (text), mindset (predominantly literate), and subject in actu (I/we) are not 
explicated, these aspects seem to be determined in advance. Moreover, these elements constitute that 
concrete situation of reading from which thoughts are structured away. Foley transforms this deeply 
internalized question into “How does it mean?” and this helped him to formulate the Theory of 
Metonymical or Traditional Referentiality (Chapter 1). We preferred to speak of “to function” instead 
of “to mean” and were able to extend this question in our attempt to textualize oral performance there-
and-then-to-them (Chapter 3). In the research of Milman Parry and Albert Lord, the original 
participants in the performances of Homer remain generalized. The Letter to the Galatians is 
composed with a view to Christian-Jewish teachers who had gained influence over (a section of) the 
Galatian communities by their presence and performances. Since Paul attempts to counter the 
influence of these teachers, there is a more specific situation related to the Letter to the Galatians – 
also to the corpus Paulinum in general – than in the case of Homer. According to this reasoning, we 
identified – in line with Foley’s question of “how” – other elements such as “to whom,” “in what state 
of mind,” and “from whose perspective(s).” As a result, the governing question in detextification of 
ancient documents such as Paul’s letters is the following: How does it mean to whom, in what state of 
mind, and from whose perspective[s]?  
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In this way, we could formulate an approach to the second part of the leading question of the present 
study: How can we understand the way in which the original addressees in their predominantly oral 
mindset would have grasped these documented words in the moment of delivery as envisioned by Paul 
while composing? We identified this structure as anticipated participation: in the moment of 
composition, Paul anticipates a specific participation in the oral performance of the letter on the part of 
his original addressees caught up in their specific lifeworld (collective memory) in line with their 
predominantly oral mindset. 
 
1. Anticipated participation and abstraction 
For heuristic purposes, this communicative structure in real time spoken discourse – especially against 
the predominantly oral background of the first-century Mediterranean world – can be contrasted with 
the intellectual movement of abstraction vis-à-vis text. In anticipated participation, the structuring of 
thought is made subservient by the sender to the specific addressees in the realm of history in which 
they are addressed. It is based on the shared history, relation, and dialogue in which both sender and 
receiver somehow participate. More so, this kind of communication aims at how the addressees frame, 
act in, or even change that specific situation. Thus, the communicative process is dominated by and is 
aiming at presence. 
Abstraction is an intellectual movement away from the concrete situation. The aim of this activity is 
related to the knowing subject – for the subject wants to understand (aspects of) reality. In text, 
presence is overruled by representation. Even when the lines of thought offered deal with the concrete 
situation in which readers find themselves, they are being cognitively caught in the process of 
abstraction, somehow bodily severed from, or critical outsiders to this realm of history/other human 
beings as persons of flesh and blood. It is not based on the dialogical structure of subject-subject but 
the relation between subject-object. In this latter scheme, the subject is in the process of getting to 
know. This is a monological or one-way structure. As a result, abstraction creates distance and isolates 
the knowing subject. Instead of immediate action, it enables a mode of observance and distant 
consideration on which basis possible and multiple future plans can be formed. This contrast would 
lead us to conclude that abstraction defines and determines the knowing subject as a spectator of 
reality. Anticipated participation wants to involve the participant in the communicative event as an 
actor in a concrete situation (Kelber). Necessarily, this goal lies beyond the level of text.  
 
2. Explicit parts and implicit whole: Metonymy and collective memory 
With the help of Foley, we textualized the governing dynamic of metonymy (how), on the one hand, as 
well as the decisive role of collective memory of the actual audiences on the other (to whom/in what 
state of mind; Chapter 3). We observed how both are related to each other. In the actual performance 
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of the letters, the apostle provides from his side the explicit parts – terms, themes, fragments of 
reasoning, narrative elements, and metaphors – while he anticipates his hearers to fill in or supply the 
implied whole, which he anticipates as familiar to them. The latter refers to collective memory.  
In this way, we textualized the enthymematic structure in the reasoning of Gal 3.10–12 (Chapter 4). 
Contrary to Bachmann and Mayordomo, we concluded that Paul only explicates those elements 
(partes) of the underlying syllogism (totum) that are necessary to enable his hearers to recall this 
already familiar reasoning. Based on Gal 3.21, we identified three constitutive terms of the somewhat 
laborious reasoning involved: “Law,” “the one who is rectified,” and “to l/Live.” These three terms led 
to the reconstruction of a single, simple, and self-evident syllogism: the one who is rectified/righteous 
before God, he will Live (major premise). The one who is out of law, he will be rectified/righteous 
(minor premise). Therefore, the one who is out of law, he will Live (conclusion). Based on this 
anticipated participation, we could identify the logos of his opponent’s rhetoric. A majority of the 
enthymemes thus identified in the letter, relate to the minor premise. Since they are crucial in this type 
of reasoning, they are consistently and openly denied by the apostle.  
Since redundancy is characteristic of oral-aural communication, we argued that this also works for 
similar and opposed parts, that is, synonymy and antonymy. In the first example of Gal 3.10–12, we 
noticed that “the Blessing of Abraham” (3.8, 9, 14) is synonymous to the promise of “to Live” (3.11) 
and “to receive the Spirit” (3.2, 3, 5, 14). At the same time, they are antonymous to “the curse of the 
law” (3.10). The same pertains to “to be rectified/righteous” (2.16a, 16c, 16d, 17, 21b; 3.6, 8a, 11, 
21d) and “to live like a Jew” (2.14c, 14d, 15). Given this synonym, we also encountered the antonym 
“to be/live like a sinner” and “sin” (2.15, 17), or “to be/live like a Gentile” (2.14c, 15). As a result, we 
noticed that the same syllogistic reasoning is at work in the thematic matrix of “Abraham” and 
“Blessing” (Gal 3.6–9): the one who is son of Abraham, he will be Blessed in Abraham (major 
premise). The one who is faithful as Abraham, he is son of Abraham (minor premise). Therefore, the 
one who is faithful as Abraham, he will be Blessed in Abraham (conclusion). In a similar vein, we 
could textualize the antonymous version on “law” and “curse” (Gal 3.10): the one who is not rectified 
before God, he will be cursed by the law (major premise). The one who is not out of works of law, he 
is not rectified before God (minor premise). Therefore, the one who is not out of works of law, he will 
be cursed by the law (conclusion). We construed a similar syllogism regarding the key terms of 
“sinner” and “to live like a Gentile” (Gal 2.14–15, 17) as well as “to receive the Spirit” (Gal 3.1–5). 
We drew the conclusion that a metonymical network of synonymous and antonymous terms and 
themes was integral to this section of the letter. Therefore, the approach of detextification does not 
cause differences on the level of the meaning of these specific words or sentences, but it enables the 
identification and textualization of the distinctive way in which they were intended to function and to 
structure thought in the envisioned oral delivery. We identified up to twenty-one parts of this one and 
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simple syllogistic reasoning in Gal 2–3. This detextified understanding satisfied all seven criteria 
developed by John Barclay in his article on mirror-reading the Letter to the Galatians.653 
 
3. A reversed example: Reading the letter as autonomous text  
Contrary to the structure provided by metonymy and collective memory, in Chapter 4 we found 
examples of how the presupposed autonomy of text and the abstracted context determine the 
understanding of the present-day reader. In the first example on the reasoning in Gal 3.10–12, 
Bachmann implicitly argues for the superiority of his reconstructions. Contrary to Mayordomo,654 he 
can identify all the elements in his syllogisms on the level of the text of the letter. Since supplying 
implicit premises is apparently inferior, we highlighted the implied literate bias. Since Bachmann 
himself is the reading subject in actu, his syllogistic reconstructions of this passage mean as “text” 
(media), “to him” (knowing subject) in his “predominantly literate state of mind” (mindset). Similarly, 
we saw that in all studies consulted in the first example references to the Jewish holy scriptures 
function necessarily as premise in the letter. Without explanation, this presupposition is maintained 
consistently. In the ever-expanding universe of text, “Scripture” – as the primal and ultimate “text” – 
seems to supersede other texts as text.  
 
4. Paul and other teachers: Rhetoric and counter rhetoric 
The third element, “from whose perspective[s]” (plural), is based on the paper by Louis Martyn. Due 
to his reasoning on the invasion of God in the aural event, he pushes his understanding of the gospel 
beyond the level of text. The structure of his commentary brings our imagination to life. In the light of 
the crucial role of these other teachers, we arrived at the following line of thinking: Paul felt urged to 
compose this letter because he is displeased with developments in his Galatian congregations. The 
presence and performances of these other teachers had changed the course in (parts of) the communal 
life there. In this way, these teachers had gained influence over the Galatian converts.  
When we relate this insight to how text works for us, a crucial insight emerges: the letter as intended 
aural event anticipates but does not explicate this preceding and even partially opposed ethos and 
rhetoric (collective memory). When one approaches the letter uncritically by reading, an explicit 
elaboration of how these conflicting opinions or interests determined the realm of history there-and-
 
653 John M.G. Barclay, “Mirror-Reading a Polemical Letter: Galatians as a Test Case,” JSNT 31 (1987): 73–
93. 
654 In Chapter 4, we also discussed, in several footnotes, the article by Peter Lampe, “Reticentia in der 
Argumentation: Gal 3.10–12 als Stipatio Enthymematum,” in Das Urchristentum in seiner literarischen 
Geschichte: Festschrift für Jürgen Becker zum 65. Geburtstag, BZNW 100, ed. Ulrich Mell and Ulrich B. Müller 
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), 27–39. Michael Bachmann, “Zur Argumentation von Galater 3.10-12,” NTS 
53 (2007), 538, also refers to the article by Lampe as an example of an explanation in need of implicit premises 
(see, in Chapter 4, Section A.2. Textualizing oral performance illic et tunc pro eis).  
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then is not found on the level of the text. In particular, in the commentaries by Martyn and Martin de 
Boer,655 we found several examples in which this dimension is taken into account. We observed, 
however, that these instances are incidental. We argued that these conflicting presences and 
performances – Paul versus these teachers – determine the intended communicative process from start 
to finish. For that reason, we developed the systematic approach of detextification.  
In that respect, turning to the vocabulary used, we argued for the utilization of the notion of “rhetoric” 
over “theology.” The latter tends to extra-historical thought, fixation-in-text, and is governed by 
related expectations of oneness, unchangingness, fixedness, and “being” (God-centred). In general, 
“theology” is related to cognitive capacities and thriving in the ever-expanding universe of text, 
disconnected from our bodies.656 “Rhetoric” implies situation, purpose, change, conflict of interests, 
body, and “becoming” (flux of history). It aims at moving people and making them into actors. 
Therefore, instead of two “theologies” in Galatia (Martyn), we structured our understanding by two 
“rhetorics.” As a result of taking into account the anticipated performances of these other teachers on 
Paul’s part (collective memory), we distinguished a structure of rhetoric and counter rhetoric.  
 
5. Counter rhetoric: Negative rhetoric, rhetoric of confusion, and Umdeutung 
As a next step, the complicated way in which these rhetorics interact in the realm of history there-and-
then was textualized. We distinguished different forms. First in the first example, we noticed the 
explicitly denied minor premises of the logos of these other teachers (Chapter 4). Besides Gal 3.21cd, 
we encountered five other examples of this blunt denial (Gal 2.16a, 16c, 16d, 21b, 3.11a). We 
classified them as rhetoric of denial or negative rhetoric.  
Second, Paul aims to regain the hearts of his addressees, since he wants to discourage circumcision 
and dissociate the Galatian converts from these teachers (“to live out of law”). From this perspective, 
he picks up the themes, terms, and reasonings of his opponents in the course of his own rhetoric. We 
saw this in the verb to “live” in Gal 2. In the delivery of the letter, the first mention of the term is 
related by Paul to living “out of law” (2.16a). In Gal 2.20, however, the apostle relates his actual 
reasoning on “living” to his earlier introduced antithetical formulation of “out of faith” (2.16b). As a 
result, both teachings collide: when you “live out of law,” living in obedience to Christ (Jews having 
 
655 J. Louis Martyn, Galatians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 33A (New York: 
Doubleday, 1997); Martinus C. de Boer, Galatians: A Commentary, NTL (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
2011). 
656 In this respect, we can refer to Jacques Derrida’s Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
with preface by translator; rev. ed. (Baltimore-London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). In line with his 
claim of the “epoch of the Logos” or the “age of the sign” is his analysis of the alleged secondariness or 
exteriorization of “writing” (in the narrow sense): based on Aristotle, it starts with “mental experiences” that are 
symbolized in “spoken words” that are, in their turn, symbolized in “written words” (11). Since the Logos 
originates from God, the latter is in essence separated from or has to be mediated to the body, senses, and the 
realm of history (14/15).  
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table fellowship with Gentiles) will turn you into a “sinner.” In the central term of “living,” the apostle 
creates a short circuit between two ways of thinking. We categorized this as rhetoric of confusion. 
We argued that with this rhetoric he aims at a specific reaction: How do you have to “live” and avoid 
to become a “sinner”? First, he openly disqualifies the referential framing of his adversaries, that is, 
“to live out of law.” Second, he turns to the antonym to “die”: he states that he has “died in and 
through that law” (19a). The goal and claim are the possibility to “live in/for God.” Through “co-
crucifixion” with Christ, a different kind of to “live” is realized. In this train of thought, to “live” is not 
only disconnected from but even becomes opposed to the “law,” and in a surprising way connected to 
Paul’s gospel of the cross. We argued that, first, by reversing the natural sequence of “living” and 
“dying,” and then by introducing the theme of “co-crucifixion,” Paul wants to lead his hearers through 
a restructuring of their thoughts: their past baptism has already made them participants in this “Life in 
God” – just like Paul himself. We classified this counter-rhetorical strategy on the theme of “l/Life” as 
the structure of framing and reframing or rhetoric of Umdeutung.  
In the preceding passage, the apostle applies the same strategy to the notion of “sin”/“sinner” (Gal 
2.17). In the envisioned delivery of the letter, he commences with the framing of his opponents: “sin” 
is living in violation of Jewish regulations. At the end of this passage, he leads his addressees by 
means of an exclamation to decide on the opposite frame (2.18): the one who knows of the crucifixion 
of Christ (2.20; to have died in and through the law) and, nonetheless, still dares to claim that 
disobeying the law is “sin,” he is the only true “transgressor”!  
Regarding his gospel, another level of framing and reframing was identified. In an attempt to counter 
the influence of his opponents, Paul has to deal with typically Jewish issues such as the “law,” “Jews 
and Gentiles,” “sin,” and “Abraham.” In Gal 2.19–21, we observed that he reframes the past baptism 
of his Galatian converts in the light of this thematic matrix. This Umdeutung should make clear that 
baptism disqualifies circumcision and, therefore, the whole rhetoric and authority of these other 
teachers (Chapter 4).   
Based on this dynamic of reframing, we can conclude that another fundamental difference comes to 
the fore in comparison to autonomous text. In composing text, one cannot implicitly change the 
referential meaning of a used term during one’s reasoning. Apart from being extraordinary, this would 
also only be possible under the conditions of explication and justification on that same level. The 
second test case, however, showed that this is the case in the Letter to the Galatians and, in that way, 






E. In the end: There is always manifestation in the realm of history 
 
As a consequence of the approach of detextification, we structure our thoughts as adequately as 
possible into the realm of history involved. Therefore, when the present study is valued as a 
contribution in the philosophy of biblical studies as set out in the Introduction, it is imperative that, in 
the end, some sort of manifestation or embodiment can be discerned. Because of the textualization of 
text here-and-now-to-us, we also asked for the manifestation of our typical “thoughts” or “structuring 
of thought.” We contended that they are mirrored in the text area by hypervisuality (Chapter 3). 
Similarly, we asked this question regarding the originally intended structuring of the single and simple 
syllogistic reasoning on the “law,” “rectification,” and “Life” in Gal 3.10–12 (Chapter 4). We 
suggested that this reasoning would have become manifest in the performances and presence of these 
other teachers. Besides their preaching being governed by the specific logos of law obedience leading 
to the promised Life (performances), they also lived according to those legal regulations themselves 
(presence). The syllogistic reasoning lends authority to their performances and their living according 
to these rules makes their teaching accessible and appealing to the Galatian communities: by receiving 
the mark of circumcision, they (fully) will become partakers in that Life. 
In the second example of Gal 2.18–21, we saw that Martyn and de Boer both argue that Paul is 
juxtaposing the “old” with the “eschatological human being.” Here we encountered an example 
illustrating that the implied structurings of thought – in processing the letter as text by the present-day 
reader and the anticipated participation by Paul in the aural event – can overlap (Introduction). We 
noted, though, that this specific formulation is not taken from the explicitly documented wording. 
Historically speaking, the formulation is anachronistic and abstracted. Therefore, we asked, In what 
sensorial way does Paul anticipate the original addressees in the aural event relating to this transition 
from the “old” to the “eschatological human being”? In our detextification, we pointed to the typical 
way in which Paul uses the sequence of “to die”/“to live” and the matrix of “co-crucifixion.” We 
suggested manifestation in the ritual of “baptism.” The “eschatological human being” becomes visible 
in their memory of those who rise out of the water; baptism reaches into the presence of their bodies. 
So, in this detextification, it becomes clear that the addressees could relate sensorially – in terms of 
“memory” and “experiences” – to that which Martyn and de Boer express in this abstracted and 
anachronistically “theological” way.  
Since in Gal 3.27 “baptism” is found on the level of the text, we noted that all the commentaries 
involved acknowledge and discuss the relevance of “baptism” regarding the Letter to the Galatians. 
None of them asks, however, the question of how this ritual – as constitutive of their identity as 
converts vis-à-vis Paul (collective memory) – functions in the structuring of thought by the original 
addressees in the oral performance of the letter from start to finish. Through “baptism,” we could 
structure our understanding of Gal 2.18–21 beyond the level of text. Thus, we concluded that 
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detextification enables us to deepen our grasp here-and-now of the letter in its originally intended 
media functioning there-and-then. In this way, it was the concern of the present research project to 
validate the hypothesis as presented in the Introduction. That is to say, to demonstrate the difference 
between searching for meaning based on the uncritical functioning of the letters as “text” here-and-
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Biblical scholars are used to processing the Bible as “text,” asking What does it mean? In this way, 
one comes to a certain interpretation of the text. Recently, a communis opinio is emerging that these 
transmitted documents – in the case of the present study, the letters of Paul – were composed 
regarding an oral performance, that is, embodiment by an emissary to the intended addressees. 
Although the present study does not contribute to this specific perspective, it does systematically 
address, however, the media muddle that, as a consequence, the present-day readers find themselves 
in. On a formal level, the reader acknowledges that the letters functioned as oral delivery, though, in 
real time, they function to them as “text.” The complexity of this muddle is deepened by the fact that 
every media prompts its own mindset (Walter Ong). This is the case, especially, when a cultural 
context is dominated by a certain media. In line with the communis opinio, the first-century 
Mediterranean culture, in which the New Testament documents emerged, can be framed as 
predominantly oral. However, the contemporary socio-cultural context of academia, in which the 
biblical scholar is trained to relate to the Bible, is defined by a predominantly literate mindset. 
Therefore, it is paramount to find a way of understanding here-and-now-by-us how Paul intended his 
original addressees to understand in the aural event there-and-then. The proposed approach to do so is 
named detextification. Instead of continuing to “read” the “text” of these documents, one has to act as 
a historian asking What is happening? In the present study, this question is not only asked regarding 
the oral performance there-and-then-to-them but also with respect to the functioning of text here-and-
now-to-us. This first intellectual movement of detextification is called textualizing history. 
Textualizing text here-and-now-to-us leads to the conclusion that this media functions as a portal from 
presence – that is, someone participates uncritically in their concrete lifeworld (as is argued that this is 
the case of the original hearers in the oral delivery) – to representation and abstraction. This 
abstraction is enabled by a similarly abstracted context which comes with this autonomous media. 
Conversely, textualizing oral performance there-and-then-to-them leads to the conclusion that oral-
aural communication is determined by anticipated participation; in view of their concrete lifeworld and 
collective memory, the composer or speaker envisions how the audience will frame certain themes, 
terms, reasonings, metaphors, narratives and so on. The composer does so to touch their hearts and 
gain influence over them. In this setting and mindset, the structuring of thought is metonymical, that is, 
the vocalization of a certain term, enthymeme, metaphor, or narrative fragment (pars) is sufficient to 
anticipate the audience involved to uncritically filling out the themes, reasonings, loyalties, 
propositions, and so forth (totum). On this basis, one can turn to specific passages in the letters 
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themselves, where a second intellectual movement is necessary. In historicizing text, the present-day 
reader can relate to the contemporary and available version of the Letter to the Galatians (printed or 
digitalized versions) without being caught in the process of abstraction: along the lines of synonymous 
and antonymous metonymy, every term, reasoning, thematic matrix or fragment of a narrative has to 
be structured by the biblical scholar into the realm of history there-and-then and related to the 
collective memory of the originally intended addressees. Two demonstrations of detextification are 
provided. In the first example, an alternative understanding is provided of the reasoning in Gal 3.10–
12. Instead of complex reconstructions on the level of text, a single, simple, and historically self-
evident syllogistic reasoning is presented; this syllogistic structure can be identified in more than 
twenty enthymemes in Gal 2–3. The second example entails a deepened grasp of Gal 2.18–20. 
Consistently, the question of manifestation is asked of terms such as “co-crucifixion,” “to die” and “to 
live” (in that sequence). Over against the call to circumcision by other teachers, the counter rhetoric of 






























In dit onderzoek wordt het historisch functioneren van de brieven van Paulus (publiekelijk optreden) – 
in het bijzonder die aan de Galaten – gerelateerd aan de huidige praktijk binnen de Bijbelwetenschap 
(bestuderen van teksten). Het eerste perspectief krijgt steeds meer vorm als een communis opinio over 
de oorspronkelijke orale-aurale achtergrond van deze documenten: er was een bode die de brief ter 
plekke opvoerde. Aan dit perspectief wil dit onderzoek niet zozeer een bijdrage leveren. Het wil 
proberen dit perspectief op de situatie toen en daar te betrekken op de rol van “tekst” als dominant 
medium in de Bijbelwetenschappen hier en nu. Hierbij is het uitgangspunt dat ieder medium om een 
eigen vorm van kennis vraagt. Dit geldt des te meer als een bepaalde cultuur en gemeenschap door een 
bepaald medium is gevormd. In dit opzicht wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen de tijd van het Nieuwe 
Testament, die door het gesproken en gehoorde woord werd gedomineerd, en die van de hedendaagse 
universitaire context, die door tekst wordt gedomineerd. De bijdrage van dit onderzoek ligt in de 
doordenking van de gelaagde en verwarrende situatie waarin de Bijbelwetenschapper zich bevindt: 
enerzijds erkent men dat deze documenten toen en daar voor de oorspronkelijke betrokkenen 
functioneerden als gesproken woord/publiekelijk optreden, maar zelf leest men ze hier en nu alleen en 
in stilte als teksten terwijl men zich afvraagt, Wat betekent dit? Omdat de ene situatie (mondelinge 
voordracht daar en toen voor hen) op een geformaliseerde manier tot uitdrukking komt in de andere (u 
leest hier nu over in een tekst) is er sprake van een media moeras in de Bijbelwetenschap. Doordat wij 
ons verhouden tot de brieven van Paulus als teksten die gelezen worden door ons, worden onze 
gedachten op een andere manier gestructureerd in vergelijking met de oorspronkelijke hoorders. Het 
doel is om hier en nu te begrijpen hoe Paulus er vanuit ging hoe zijn hoorders deze woorden zouden 
begrijpen in de voordracht daar en toen. Deze benadering vraagt om twee intellectuele bewegingen. 
Ten eerste dient het proces beschreven te worden waarin de lezer zich bevindt vis-à-vis de Bijbelse 
documenten als “tekst”. Vervolgens dient dit ook te gebeuren voor de oorspronkelijke hoorders in de 
mondelinge voordracht daar en toen. Deze tweeledige beweging heet het “in tekst brengen” van 
geschiedenis (textualizing history). Hieruit komt naar voren dat “tekst” voor de hedendaagse lezer 
functioneert als de doorgang van de concrete leefwereld (presence), waar hij primair door de zintuigen 
en op een onkritische manier aan deelneemt, naar het bereik van abstract denken (representation). 
Daar tegenover staat het proces waarin een spreker een concrete groep van hoorders wil bereiken. Dit 
gebeurt op basis van het anticiperen van een bepaalde participatie door die hoorders, welke beslissend 
beïnvloed wordt door hun concrete leefwereld en collectief geheugen. Structurele elementen (John 
Miles Foley) vormen de basis van deze geanticipeerde participatie. Ieder woord, thema, metafoor of 
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(fragment van) een verhaal of redenering is dus gerelateerd aan het specifieke collectief geheugen van 
deze hoorders. Met het oog op de Brief aan de Galaten wil Paulus zijn bekeerlingen in het hart raken 
om er zo voor te zorgen dat ze geen gehoor geven aan de oproep om zich te laten besnijden van andere 
leraren, die invloed over hen hebben gekregen. Structurele elementen en het collectief geheugen zijn 
gestructureerd als partes pro toto (metonymie). Aangezien herhaling – denk aan synoniemen en 
antoniemen – de basis van deze vorm van communicatie vormt, bestaat de structuur dus uit synonieme 
en antonieme metonymie. Op deze manier wordt de tweede intellectuele beweging duidelijk, dat is als 
wij als lezers zelf worden blootgesteld aan het fysieke tekstoppervlak van de brieven (de voor ons 
beschikbare geprinte of digitale versies): door de macht der gewoonte zullen wij gaan lezen. Op dat 
moment dient de tendens tot abstractie dus voorkomen te worden. Dit gebeurt door het historiseren 
van tekst (historicizing text): iedere term, thema, metafoor of (fragment van een) redenering – zoals 
het tot ons komt in de tekst – dient in relatie tot het collectief geheugen van de oorspronkelijke 
hoorders gebracht te worden. Zo wordt, door het in tekst brengen van geschiedenis en het historiseren 
van de tekst, ons verstaan van de brieven “ont-tekst” (detextification). Met twee voorbeelden uit de 
brief aan de Galaten wordt een demonstratie gegeven. In tegenstelling tot bestaande complexe 
reconstructies op het niveau van de tekst (Moisés Mayordomo, Michael Bachmann), leidt het eerste 
voorbeeld tot een eenvoudige en historisch plausibele syllogistische redenering (Gal 3.10–12). Deze 
redenering, die de basis van het optreden van de tegenstrevers van Paulus vormt, kan meer dan 20 keer 
aangetoond worden in Gal 2–3. In het tweede voorbeeld zijn we in staat om de door Paulus gebruikte 
termen “sterven” en “leven” (in deze volgorde) en “samen met Christus gekruisigd worden” te 
relateren aan het collectieve geheugen van de oorspronkelijke hoorders (Gal 2.18–20). Tegenover de 
roep van deze andere leraren om zich te laten besnijden, kan deze passage herleid worden tot een 
zinnelijke herinnering aan en krachtige reframing van de doop, die zij eerder hebben ondergaan.  
 
 
